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 The Role of Voluntary Corporate Governance Codes in the 
Interpretation and Application of the Statutory and Common 
Law Duties of the Company Director: A South African 
Perspective 
Helena H Stoop  
 
 
It is critical that regulators ensure appropriate regimes to govern juristic 
persons. Of the many techniques devised to ensure good governance, the 
self-regulatory Code has proven extremely popular across jurisdictions. This 
is also the case in South Africa where a self-regulatory Code demands high 
standards of governance and dictates that the so-called ‘independent non-
executive director’ should be a key custodian of corporate governance.  The 
relationship between the Corporate Governance Code and what can be 
termed ‘black letter law’ is not yet clearly established. In the South African 
context, the courts have been willing to consider the principles that the 
codes espouse when interpreting legal duties conferred upon directors by 
the common law and statute. Such a step has far reaching implications for 
the development of this area of the law. This thesis contributes to the 
discourse by analysing the legality, and consequences of such an approach. 
It does so by focusing on the South African context which is submitted to be 
unique. First, a codified constitutional imperative to develop the South 
African common law gives local courts greater flexibility and, potentially, a 
remit that accommodates a more vigorous interpretation. Furthermore, the 
South African Corporate Governance Code is ambitious in its application and 
aspirational in its contents - applying not only to listed companies but to all 
entities and vigorously promoting a stakeholder inclusive approach to 
company governance. This thesis asks: what are the legal and normative 
boundaries when interpreting this area of corporate law and attempting to 
align the two sources of regulation? In answering this question, the thesis 
will contribute in particular to the state of knowledge of South African 
company law and the application of Corporate Governance Principles in 
relation thereto and make suggestions for legislative reform.   
 
 
 
(Abstract: 291 words)
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION  
 
1 Overview  1 
2 Historical Synopsis         
a. The Limited Liability Company and the  
Board of Director 6 
b. Corporate Governance – The Rise   
of a Movement  12 
3 An overview of the Legal Landscape  
a. South Africa 17 
b. Jurisdictions Chosen for Analysis 23 
4 Overview of Definitions, Concepts, Theories and Debates  
that Inform the Thesis 27 
5 Chapter Overview  30 
6 Methodology   
7 Conclusion  35
  
CHAPTER 2 - THE INDEPENDENT NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: THE ORIGINS 
OF THE OFFICE, CURRENT REGULATION AND PERSISTENT CHALLENGES 
 
1 Introduction  38 
2 Background  42 
3 Definitions and Development  43 
a. General Historic Overview 47 
b. The Non-Executive Director in  
American Law and Practice   48 
c. The Non-Executive Director  
in English and European Law and Practice  51 
d. The Non-Executive Director in South African  
Law and Practice 53 
4 Challenges and Criticism 56
  
5 Conclusion  64 
 
CHAPTER 3 – THE DUTY OF CARE AND SKILL  
 
1 Introduction and Context  67 
2 History and Early Development  70 
3 Later and Recent Developments  
a. The United Kingdom 78 
b. South Africa 82 
4 Debate Surrounding the Director’s Duty of Care and Skill  
a. Practical challenges  87 
b. An Overview of the Academic Debate   90 
5 Conclusion  98 
 
CHAPTER 4 – THE DUTY TO ACT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE COMPANY  
 
1 Introduction  100  
2 A Phrase with many Meanings 103 
 a. Shareholder Value 105 
 b. The Stakeholder Approach 111 
 c. Enlightened Shareholder Value 115 
3 The Duty to Act in the Best Interests of the Company  116 
4 The Current Legal Position  
 a. United Kingdom 120 
 b. South Africa 125 
5 The Potential Impact of the Governance Codes  128 
6 Conclusion  134
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 - COLLISIONS AT THE INTERSECTION:  PROCEDURAL, 
PRACTICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS  
 
1 Introduction  137 
2 From Text to Context  
a. Relevant Developments in the Law of the  
Interpretation of Documents 140 
b. Corporate Law Through the Prism  
of the Bill of Rights  155 
c. The Role of Extrinsic Material in 
 Interpreting Legislation 162 
i. Custom 163 
ii. Similar Provisions in Other Statutes  164 
iii. Surrounding Circumstances 165 
iv. Preceding Discussions or Travaux  
Preparatoires  166
  
3 Relevant Statutory Provisions 173 
4 Interpreting and Developing the Common Law  180 
5 Conclusion  184 
 
CHAPTER 6 - COLLISIONS AT THE INTERSECTION: NORMATIVE DEBATES  
 
1 Introduction 187 
2 Theories of the Firm 192 
3 A Revolution and its Consequence 
a. Chronology 198 
b. Agency Costs Theory 205 
c. Nexus-of-Contracts Theory 210 
4 Recent Developments and Future Possibilities  215 
5 Conclusion 222
  
CHAPTER 7 – ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT  
 
1 Introduction  225 
2 Regulation & Accountability  
a. Accountability as a General Concept 227 
b. Comply or Explain and the Governance Codes  229 
c. Statutory Duties and Remedies  
i. Overview of the applicable remedies 236 
ii. The Derivative Action 241 
3 The Business Judgement Rule 245 
4 Conclusion  254 
 
CHAPTER 8  - REMARKS IN CONCLUSION  256 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  266
 Statement of Copyright:  
 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it 
should be published without the author's prior written consent and 
information derived from it should be acknowledged.
 Acknowledgements   
 
My deepest thanks to my supervisor, Prof Jonathan Mukwiri, who has been 
nothing short of remarkable. The value of his kindness, patience and insight 
cannot be measured and I have no doubt that none of this would have come 
to fruition without it. Thank you also to Mr Chris Riley for encouragement 
throughout. 
My sincere thanks to the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission of the 
United Kingdom who made this wonderful adventure possible. It has been 
the most profoundly incredible experience, both personally and 
professionally, and one that I will treasure for a lifetime.  
There is not enough space to thank my husband who embarked on this 
adventure with me. For standing by my side, for holding my hands high, for 
anchoring my ambitions and giving wings to my dreams I will thank you 
always.   
My incomparable, remarkable parents, thank you.  
Thank you to my family – you were always near despite being so far. And a 
special thank you to my family in the UK for warming our hearts when the 
winters were cold. 
Thank you to my creator, Father God for every opportunity; for as always it 
is by grace alone.  
 
 
Dedication 
 
This work is dedicated to Nicolas and Hanna – as is every other endeavour. 
You make me new.  
 
1 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
In my judgement a potent mixture of recession and scandal is no longer needed to 
keep corporate governance on the public agenda. There is too great a recognition 
of its importance for the wealth-creating process for it to fall out of fashion. The 
process of raising standards of corporate governance should I believe be a 
continuing one. Our proposals should be seen as a step along the road.1 
 
1 Overview 
The limited liability company has been described as a mere ‘figment of the 
imagination’2 and yet it has shaped society immeasurably. It is a ubiquitous 
feature of modern commercial life. Corporate citizens employ us, feed us, 
transport us and entertain us. They spark economic growth, lead scientific 
development, and allow our joint efforts to amaze us. But companies are 
fallible. They are often corrupted by power, greed or inefficiency. They face 
crises and they fail, sometimes leaving devastation in their wake. 3  It is 
against this backdrop that  the lawmakers that regulate corporate entities 
are forced to walk a tightrope - seeking an elusive balance between 
 
1 Adrian Cadbury ‘Restoring trust and confidence in the corporate system’ (1992) 
3(12) ICCLR 403, 403. 
2 Per Walton J, Northern Counties Securities Ltd v Jackson & Steeple Ltd [1974] 1 
WLR 1133. 
3 The examples are too numerous to list. See: William W. Bratton ‘Enron and the 
Dark Side of Shareholder Value’ (2002) 76 Tul.L.Rev. 1275; Stephen Copp, 
‘Corporate governance: change, consistency and evolution: Part 1’ (2003) 14(2) 
ICCL 65; Stephen Haswell and Elaine Evans ‘Enron, fair value accounting, and 
financial crises: a concise history’ (2018) 31(1) AAAJ 25; Michael Haynes 
‘Rationality, morality and Joel Bakan’s The Corporation’ (2007) 3(1) IJBGE 1; Jerry 
W Markam A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals from Enron to 
Reform (Routledge 2006); Rinita Sarker ‘Daiwa and Barings: A Blueprint for Disaster’ 
(1996) 17 Co Law 86; MM Scharff ‘Understanding WorldCom's accounting fraud: 
did groupthink play a role?’  (2005) 11(3) JLOS 109; Raymonde Crête ‘The 
Volkswagen Scandal from the Viewpoint of Corporate Governance’ (2016) 7 EJRR 
25.  
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accountability and efficiency.4 And it is in response to these challenges that 
many jurisdictions now supplement traditional statutory measures with 
voluntary Codes of Governance. 5  These Codes have mostly been self-
regulatory and have applied to listed entities only, but recent debates centre 
around the possible application of the Codes to large private companies,6 
and in South Africa, judicial precedent has hinted at incorporating the 
 
4 As Clarke points out, ‘[c]ycles of crisis and reform in corporate governance are 
now a worldwide phenomenon’ see Thomas Clarke International Corporate 
Governance: A Comparative Approach (2nd edn Routledge 2017) 1. And more 
recently in the examples such as: BBC ‘Carillion collapse to cost taxpayers £ 148 m’ 
(7 June 2018) available online at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-44383224 
accessed on 18/07/2019; BBC ‘Thomas Cook bosses face scrutiny over collapse’ (24 
September 2019) available online at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
49805014 accessed on 25/09/2019. 
5  Almost all developed and developing economies have introduced corporate 
governance codes while many have also enacted new company laws: Bob Tricker 
Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices (3rd edn Oxford 2015) 3. 
Some national examples include: FRC The UK Corporate Governance Code (2016), 
FRC, London available online <www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/ca7e94c4-b9a9-
49e2-a824-ad76a322873c/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-April-2016.pdf>; ASX 
Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014) ASX, available 
online <www.asx.com.au/documents/asx-compliance/cgc-principles-and-
recommendations-3rd-edn.pdf>; China Securities Regulatory Commission (2001) 
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China CSRC, State Economic Trade 
Commission, Beijing available online 
<www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code_en.pdf> There are also several 
international codes of best practice. See for example: OECD The OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance (2015) OECD Paris available online 
<www.oecd.org/corporate/principles-corporate-governance.htm>; The Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2015) Corporate Governance Principles for 
Banks Bank for International Settlements, Basle; available online 
<www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d328.pdf>; ICGN (2014) ICGN Global Governance 
Principles ICGN, London available online <www.ecgi.global/code/icgn-global-
governance-principles>. See also in general: Andreas M Fleckner & Klaus J Hopt 
(eds) Comparative Corporate Governance: A Functional and International Analysis 
(Cambridge UP 2013); Du Plessis JJ and Others Principles of Contemporary 
Corporate Governance (4th edn Cambridge UP 2018).   
6 Department for Business, Energy, & Industrial Strategy ‘Corporate Governance 
Reform: Greenpaper’ 
[2017],43<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/640631/corporate-governance-reform-government-response.pdf> accessed 23 
November 2017. 
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principles and recommendations contained in the South African Governance 
Code when applying so-called ‘black letter law’.7   
These measures pertain to the regulation of an entity that we know can 
neither be kicked nor damned, as it is famously (or infamously) without body 
or soul.8 However, the courts have consistently held that it does have a 
‘directing mind and will’, as these words of Lord Denning illustrate:  
A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain 
and nerve centre which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold 
the tools and act in accordance with directions from the centre. Some of 
the people in the company are mere servants and agents who are nothing 
more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind 
or will. Others are directors and managers who represent the directing 
mind and will of the company, and control what it does. The state of mind 
of these managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by 
the law as such.9 
Directors thus remain the closest thing to a personification of the companies 
they serve, and it is no surprise that a fair amount of company law is aimed 
at regulating those at the helm of the corporate ship. We expect a lot from 
anyone who dares call himself a company director these days – especially as 
far as larger and listed entities are concerned. 10  Boards today face 
demanding and apparently contradictory responsibilities. They must balance 
 
7 See below at note 111. The courts in Australia have taken more direct steps in this 
direction, see for example: S.M. Solaiman ‘The landmark James Hardie case in 
Australia: a wakeup call for non-executive directors’ (2013) 34 Co Law 180; and see 
chapter 7 note 39 and sources cited.  
8 Northern Counties Securities Ltd v Jackson & Steeple Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 1133. 
9 HL Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v TJ Graham and Sons Ltd [1956] 3 All ER 624. This 
is also known as the organic theory of company law or the directing mind theory. It 
has more recently faced criticism cf R.J. Wickins and C.A. Ong ‘Confusion worse 
confounded: the end of the directing mind theory?’ (1997) J.B.L 524. 
10  This is perhaps more true for those serving on boards of companies in the 
financial sector, where additional rules apply and, for example in the United 
Kingdom, the Financial Conduct Authority holds significant influence, especially 
following the introduction of the Senior Managers Regime. See in overview: James 
McCalman & Angus Young ‘Another round of corporate governance reforms in the 
UK: implications for directors in the financial sector’ (2018) 33(8) J.I.B.L.R 286. 
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an entrepreneurial spirit and the need to drive the business forward with 
the prudent control and an eye on risk. They must remain sufficiently 
detached to ensure objectivity and a longer-term view, without sacrificing 
sufficient knowledge of the inner operations of the company to remain 
accountable for its actions. Increasingly, they have to contend with 
conflicting interest groups, and ensure that commercial success is not at the 
cost of employees and other constituents. 11  
To ensure that directors live up to these high expectations, the law relies 
largely on several duties that can be divided into two broad categories, with 
the first comprising a series of obligations anchored in good faith and 
honesty, and the second an overarching duty to act with care and 
competence. 12  The system is not fool proof; in fact the legal duties of 
directors have been labelled ‘…“a confusing and compendious mass of case 
law and the occasional statutory measure”’. 13  In addition, practitioners 
advising clients, and directors themselves, also have to take account of the 
abovementioned voluntary Corporate Governance Codes that dictate best 
practice and optimal approaches to management.  A key feature of most 
Governance Codes the world over, is the insistence on several independent 
non-executive directors to fulfil an overview function and essentially serve 
 
11  Ramani Naidoo Corporate Governance: An Essential Guide for South African 
Companies (2nd edn LexisNexis 2009) 107. 
12 Nolan divides the doctrines into three categories. First, those aimed at defining 
and limiting the scope of the power that may be exercised; second, techniques that 
inform the process of decision making; and finally, control mechanisms that 
address the degree of competence with which the power is exercised. See: R C 
Nolan ‘Controlling fiduciary power’ (2009) 68(2) C.L.J 293, 294. Davies and 
Worthington in turn, classify the various duties in relation to the risks faced by 
shareholders when making an investment. On the one hand the board may be 
active but may not act in the best interests of shareholders – duties of loyalty speak 
to this scenario. On the other hand, the board may be slack or incompetent, and 
duties of care and skill would address such instances. Paul L Davies & Sarah 
Worthington Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell 2016 
10th ed) [478], para 16-15. The authors point out that this twofold classification also 
accords with the two basic common law sources of the rules on directors’ duties. 
13 L Roach ‘The Legal Model of the Company and the Company Law Review’ (2005) 
26 Co Law 98. 
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as a check and balance to managerial discretion.14 This remains the case 
although objective voices at board meetings have to date not proven 
capable of avoiding poor corporate performance and in some instances even 
wide scale corporate collapses.15 
In the face of this proliferation of Code and statute, we are reminded of 
Cicero’s warning that justice is not the inevitable result of more laws.16 The 
question becomes whether the many mechanisms now in place support or 
undermine one another. This research will consider one part of this broad 
question - the legal ramifications of an approach that would see voluntary 
or self-regulatory codes of governance inform the statutory and common 
law duties of the independent non-executive director through caselaw. The 
thesis will focus on the position in South African law, but where relevant 
comparative analysis will refer to best practices in other jurisdictions and 
international norms and trends with relative emphasis on the position in the 
United Kingdom. In particular the thesis will ask whether it is legally tenable 
to draw on the corporate governance code when interpreting statutory 
provisions and the common law – in other words, is it a sound approach form 
a constitutional point of view and do the courts have authority to engage 
with the Code in the manner that they have been doing and, potentially in a 
 
14 Davies and Worthington (n12) 479. And see Chapter 5 below. 
15 Tricker (n5) 15 – 17, where the author chronicles the cycles of crisis of the early 
21st century. The role and responsibilities of the so-called ‘non-executive director’ 
has generated much debate. See for example: Baum H ‘The Rise of the Independent 
Director: A Historical and Comparative Perspective’ Max Planck Private Law 
Research Paper No. 16/20; A J Boyle ‘Company Law and the Non-Executive Director 
– The USA and Britain Compared’ (1978) 27 ICLQ 487; Brudney V ‘The Independent 
Director: Heavenly City or Potemkin Village’ (1982) 95 HarvLRev 597; Ringe W 
‘Independent Directors: After the Crisis’ (2013) 14 EBOR 401 – 424 ; W Ringe 
‘Beyond "Independent" Directors: A Functional Approach to Board Independence’ 
(2006) 119 (5) HarvLRev 1553-1575; Rodrigues U ‘The Fetishization of 
Independence’ (2008) 33 J.Corp.L. 447. See also the discussion of the independent 
non-executive director in Chapter 2 below and sources cited. 
16 The now familiar saying (‘more law, less justice’) is derived from the timeless 
words of Cicero dating 44 BC (De Officiis Book I: 33): Injustice often arises also 
through chicanery, that is, through an over-subtle and even fraudulent construction 
of the law. Translation by Walter Miller. 
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more robust manner. The research further asks whether greater emphasis 
on the Code is normatively desirable. It does this by considering the practical 
ramifications of the potential developments on two specific directors’ duties 
that have traditionally been part of common law and is now statute law. It 
considers this also from a regulatory standpoint, through analysing the 
doctrines that have informed the regulation of company directors and the 
perceived aims thereof such as board accountability. The aim in considering 
these questions is to clarify and deconstruct what has to date been a 
relatively haphazard approach by the South African judiciary and to respond 
to misdirected assumptions about the role and relevance of the goverance 
Code under South African law. The aim is furhter to draw on the conclusions 
of the research question in order to suggest a more structured and certain 
approach to the possible integration of the principles of the Code when 
interpreting and applying Statutory and common law provisions. 
This chapter will contextualise the debate and provide an overview of the 
thesis. Firstly, a broad outline of the history and development of the 
corporation will highlight the features of the corporate structure that give 
rise to the various tensions that require regulation. It will then broadly 
outline the rise of the ‘Corporate Governance’ agenda and offer a condensed 
summary of the most notable mechanisms and instruments developed in 
the wake thereof. This account will consider the developments in general 
but will specifically offer an introduction to the position in South Africa, with 
reference to the position in the United Kingdom. The chapter then offers a 
brief overview of the salient debates and theories that inform the thesis and 
that will be considered in greater depth and applied to the research question 
in subsequent chapters. A synopsis of each chapter will follow before final 
concluding remarks. 
 
2 A Brief Historical Synopsis  
a  The Limited Liability Company & The Board of Directors 
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Nobel Prize winner Nicholas Murray Butler famously described the limited 
liability corporation as ‘the greatest single discovery of modern times … even 
steam and electricity would be reduced to comparative impotence without 
it.’17 This was hyperbole to be sure,18 but more than a hundred years after 
these words were spoken there is still no denying the corporation’s longevity 
and prevalence.19 
Of course the basic realisation that more can be achieved through combined 
effort was not a discovery of modern times.20 The Roman law partnership is 
one example that shows joint ventures were formalised quite early on.21 In 
fact, weak forms of entity shielding could be found as early as the 13th 
century and representation, limited liability and tradable shares gradually 
 
17 Extract from a 1911 speech called "Politics and Economics" to the 143rd Annual 
Banquet of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York in 1911 (pp. 43-55) 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924093105660;view=1up;seq=59 
accessed on 25 October 2017. This certainly might be an exaggerated admiration 
for the private company, but the statement must of course be read in the context 
of the entire speech to be fair to its author. Tricker echoes the sentiment, calling 
the modern limited liability model ‘one of the finest systems ever designed.’ Tricker 
(n5) 6. 
18  As Stern points out: ‘As a legal and political form, the business corporation arose 
out of various, contradictory, and sometimes disparate, attempts to conceptualize 
forms of collective action and governance. Thus, as many scholars have shown, its 
contemporary form is neither inevitable nor necessarily an ideal.’ Phiilip J. Stern 
‘The Corporation in History’ in Grietje Baars and Andre Spicer (eds) The Corporation: 
A Critical, Multi-Disciplinary Handbook (Cambridge UP 2017) 21. 
19  See inter alia: Grietje Baars and Andre Spicer ‘Introduction: Why the 
Corporation?’ in Grietje Baars and Andre Spicer (eds) The Corporation: A Critical, 
Multi-Disciplinary Handbook (Cambridge UP 2017) 1 – 5. 
20 For a comprehensive overview of the history of the company and company law 
see: Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Oscar Gelderblom, Joost Jonker & Enrico C. Perotti 
‘The Emergence of the Corporate Form’ (2017) 33(2) J Law Econ Organ 193 for an 
interesting perspective on the impact of long term capital investment and Asian 
trade on the development of the corporate form. See also: Susan Watson ‘How the 
Company Became an Entity: A New Understanding of Corporate Law’ (2015) 1 J.B.L 
120 where the author considers the development of the modern corporation to 
shed light on perspectives of agency theory. And see in general: Brian R Cheffins 
Corporate Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed (Oxford UP 2008); 
WS Holdsworth ‘English Corporation Law in the 16th and 17th Centuries’ (1922) 31(4) 
YaleLJ 382; Rob McQueen A Social History of Company Law: Great Britain and the 
Australian Colonies 1854 – 1920 (Ashgate 2009); L E Talbot Critical Company Law 
(Routledge Cavendish 2008), Stern (n18) 21 – 46. 
21 Dari-Mattiacci and others (n20) 201; Hopt (n5) 1164. 
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followed suit.22 Medieval jurists in the 14th century began to develop ‘an 
even more well-articulated theory of the corporation as a transcendent body 
whose existence amounted to more than simply the sum of its members.’ 23 
Although medieval guilds and certain political institutions in the late Middle 
Ages in Western Europe already used a body of representatives, these 
boards had little other than collective governance in common with their 
modern counterparts. 24  
Developments in the 16th and 17th century made it impossible for existing 
corporate forms and strategies to provide the capital and longevity that 
more modern commercial endeavours required.25 These challenges could 
not be resolved without legal intervention, and the modern limited liability 
company became a necessity,26  such that by the late 1860’s ‘joint stock 
companies had permeated the Victorian consciousness’. 27 
The British trading companies (most famously the East India Company) had 
started life as charted companies but were later endowed with features 
similar to those of the seventeenth century joint-stock company.28 As these 
companies started to trade for their own accounts ‘boards, elected by 
members, began to manage the affairs of companies and to take business 
decisions in their best interests, acting as members’ representatives’ and 
‘marked the birth of the corporate board as a management organ in the 
modern sense’.29 At the time the members of the board tended to be heavily 
 
22 Dari-Mattiacci and others (n20) 203; Stern (n18) 22. 
23 Stern (n18) 22. 
24 Baum (n15) 7. And see Tricker (n5) 5. 
25 Dari-Mattiacci and others (n20) 195; Tricker (n5) 5.  
26 Dari-Mattiacci and others (n20) 194. And see in general: WS Holdsworth ‘English 
Corporation Law in the 16th and 17th Centuries’ (1922) 31(4) YaleLJ 382.  
27 James Taylor Creating Capitalism: Joint Stock Enterprise in British Politics and 
Culture 1800 – 1870 (The Boydell Press 2006) 208. For a chronology of the various 
statutes promulgated in different jurisdictions at the time see also: Hopt (n5) 1164. 
28 Members could no longer trade individually and voting rights were dependent 
upon each member’s investment in the company’s permanent joint stock. See: 
Tricker (n5) 5. 
29 Baum (n15) 8. 
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invested in the company and investors elected them on the assumption that 
they would be acting for the company’s benefit in rational self-interest. The 
board as monitoring instrument was unfamiliar and the more modern 
divisions between management and the board had not yet developed.30  
The corporate form remained a privilege granted by the state on an ad hoc 
basis, and the generally enabling legislation of today only became a common 
reality during the course of the 18th century.31 Processes for registration 
introduced by the legislation remained cumbersome and restrictive and it is 
only in 1856 and 1862 with the Joint Stock Companies Act and the 
Companies Act respectively that one started to see a shift toward a 
facilitative and enabling regime.32  
In fact, it is the English parliament’s reluctance to grant charters for private 
incorporation following the South Sea Bubble, that led to an enduring 
distinction between American and English company law traditions. 33 
Companies in the United States evolved from the corporation based on a 
grant from the state, and its laws owe much to rules based on corporate 
personality. 34  This was not the case in England where unincorporated 
associations or companies were actually no more than large scale 
partnerships ‘legally constructed through an innovative combination of trust 
law and contract law ... The directors’ powers over the unincorporated 
company’s assets were a direct function of the provisions set forth in this 
deed of settlement.’35 This distinction is significant when considering the 
 
30 Baum (n15) 8. 
31 Dari-Mattiacci and others (n20) 225.  
32 Susan Watson ‘How the Company Became an Entity’ (n20) 124. The French were 
in fact the fore runners, creating a form of incorporation, the Société en 
commandite par actions which limited the liability of external investors see: Tricker 
(n5) 5. 
33 Clarke (n4) 4. 
34 Clarke (n4) 5. 
35 David Kershaw ‘The Path of Corporate Fiduciary Law’ (2012) 8 NYU JLB 395, 406 
where the author gives an overview of these companies, often referred to as “Deed 
of Settlement Companies”. See also: Gower LCB ‘Some Contrasts Between British 
and American Corporation Law’ (1956) 69 HarvLRev 1371 – 1372. 
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development and trajectory of the duties that govern company directors, 
and in turn when considering their reform and interpretation, as later 
discussions in this thesis will again make apparent.36 
At the end of the day, the entity that developed led to significant industrial 
growth, creating employment and wealth. And although the corporation has 
undergone a metamorphosis over time, the ‘original corporate concept’ 
remains at the heart of contemporary company law.37 
Enduring legal mechanisms were gradually devised to regulate this 
increasingly popular business entity. Most of these rules and regulations 
centre around certain core attributes of the limited liability corporation or 
company and it is striking that the rules at the core of corporate regulation 
are almost identical in most jurisdictions 38  (although practical 
implementation and ancillary rules and regulation result in a corporate law 
landscape that remains diverse). 39  Kraakman pointed out that these 
universal legal principles speak to structures that could not be replicated by 
contractual agreement between the parties, but instead required legislative 
intervention  and legal doctrines.40 
 
36 See also David Sugarman ‘Is company law founded on contract or regulation? The 
Law Commission's paper on company directors’ (1999) 20 Co Law 162-183. See also 
Chapters 6 and 7 where the arguments informing the regulation of corporations are 
discussed. 
37 Tricker (n5) 7. 
38 Renier Kraakman and others The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and 
Functional Approach (3rd edn Oxford 2017) 1. 
39  Clarke (n4) 12, where the author considers the “clear divergence between 
outsider systems found in Anglo-American countries with dispersed equity markets, 
separation of ownership and control and disclosure-based regulation, and the 
insider systems which predominate in Europe, Asia Pacific and other regions of the 
world, with concentrated ownership, bank finance and the representation of 
majority interests on the board of directors.” And see: Douglas M Branson ‘The very 
uncertain prospect of “global” convergence in corporate governance’ (2001) 
Cornell Int'l L.J 321; Thomas Clarke ‘The Continuing Diversity of Corporate 
Governance: Theories of Convergence and Variety (2016) 16 Ephemera Theory and 
Politics in Organization 19.  
40 Kraakman and others The Anatomy of Corporate Law (n38) 7. 
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Students of corporate law will be intimately familiar with most of these 
universal characteristics, such as legal personality and limited liability. 41 
However, it is the delegation of management with a board structure that is 
the characteristic most pertinent to the research that will follow.42 In the 
context of a partnership, all partners usually participate in the day to day 
management of the business, and certain more fundamental transactions 
require unanimous consent. It is clearly not possible to manage a company 
with its constantly changing and often dispersed ownership along these 
same lines. 43  Consequently, management is delegated to a board of 
directors, reverting to the shareholders only in the case of fundamental 
decisions. Formally, the board is separate from the company’s operational 
management, and although it is substantially elected by the shareholders it 
is also distinct from the latter.44 In most cases, the board consists of multiple 
members and this, at least in theory, ‘facilitates mutual monitoring and 
checks idiosyncratic decision-making’.45  
This almost universal acceptance of the board system is perhaps 
‘remarkable’.46 Prof Harald Baum in a comprehensive paper tracking the rise 
of the independent director, points out that the company board as we now 
know it, is a comparatively new development, and one that replaced other 
successful models.47 Its acceptance is arguably even more remarkable given 
 
41 Kraakman identifies the following common characteristics: (1) legal personality, 
(2) limited liability, (3) transferable shares, (4) centralized management under a 
board structure, and (5) shared ownership by contributors of equity capital. See: 
Kraakman and others The Anatomy of Corporate Law (n38) 5.  
42 As Baum points out, regulation in almost every jurisdiction today “demands or 
assumes” that a board manages public companies or at the very least that they are 
managed under the direction of a board. Baum (n15) 7.  
43 Kraakman and others The Anatomy of Corporate Law (n38) 11. 
44 Authors point out that it is this structure of delegated authority that leads to the 
efficiency gains companies are known for. See for example: David Kershaw 
Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (Oxford 2009) 188; Davies and 
Worthington (n12) 462. 
45 Kraakman and others The Anatomy of Corporate Law (n38) 12. 
46 Baum (n15) 8.  
47 Baum (n15) 8. Where the author refers to the example of the pre-Meiji merchant 
houses of Japan.  
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that there have been complaints about the ineffectiveness of boards for 
more or less as long as they have been around. In practice the very concept 
of the corporate board often turns to caricature as ‘companies with 
dispersed ownership typically seem to be run in practice by the executive 
management team or the CEO, and companies with concentrated ownership 
are often actually run by the dominant shareholder, with the board playing 
only a peripheral role in both cases.’48 In light of this the ubiquitous company 
board is perhaps not as intuitive a solution to the challenges posed by the 
corporate form as may at first be assumed. However, despite its perceived 
shortcomings, the company board (in its various forms) 49  is a staple of 
modern commercial life and since the turn of the century international focus 
has shifted to consider how best to ensure so-called ‘good corporate 
governance’.50  
 
b  ‘Corporate Governance’: The rise of a movement  
The general history of corporate governance is a vast concept. In fact, even 
when considering the evolution of the term ‘corporate governance’ it is 
useful to do so with a specific focus in mind. As such, what follows is an 
overview of the most significant advances emphasizing the increased role of 
‘soft law’ mechanisms in the corporate governance arena.51  
 
48 Baum (n15) 7. 
49  For example, the unitary board popular in the United Kingdom or the two-tier 
version preferred in Germany. See: Du Plessis JJ ‘Corporate Governance: Some 
Reflections on the South African Law and the German Two-Tier Board System’ in F 
Patfield F (ed), Perspectives on Company Law: 2 (Kluwer Law International 1997) 
131. 
50 See historical overview below at chapter 2 text to notes 44 – 84.  
51 Cheffins B R ‘The History of Corporate Governance’ (2012) ECGI Law Working 
Paper N°.184/2012, 1 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1975404> accessed on 20 August 
2017The discussion initially considers developments in the United States as it is in 
that country that the term ‘corporate governance’ had its genesis before being 
assimilated worldwide. 
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There are numerous definitions for the term ‘corporate governance’52 but 
perhaps none as famous as that found in the UK Report of the Committee 
on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance: ‘Corporate Governance 
is the system by which companies are directed and controlled’.53 It is ‘about 
the way that power is exercised over corporate entities’54  and must be 
distinguished from management. If management refers to the running of the 
enterprise, then governance ensures that it is not being run off the road.55 
These systems for direction and control are generally perceived as essential 
because of latent agency dilemmas. In the briefest of terms, agency theory 
revolves around the fact that conflict is inevitable when one person manages 
the funds of another – or at least this is the conclusion that Adam Smith 
came to when penning his famous treatise ‘The Wealth of Nations’:  
Being managers of other people’s money than their own, it cannot be 
expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in a private co-partner frequently 
watch over their own … Negligence and profusions, therefore, must 
always prevail more or less in the management of the affairs of a joint 
stock company.56  
Nearly two hundred years later, Berle and Means considered the 
consequences of diffused ownership in what would arguably become the 
most influential work on corporate governance in the twentieth century,57 
‘The Modern Corporation and Private Property’. 58  Although ‘corporate 
governance’ as a technical term or discipline in its own right, is a recent 
 
52 See for example: OECD (2015), G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 
OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264236882-en 
53 Sir Adrian Cadbury Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance (1992, Gee & Co Ltd, London) 15. 
54 Tricker (n5) 4. 
55 Tricker (n5) 4.  
56 Adam Smith An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
(Methuen & Co 1776) 264 – 265. 
57 Clarke (n4) 7. 
58 Adolf A Berle & Gardiner C Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
(1933 The Macmillan Company). 
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development; it is thus clear that the concept has been a reality since the 
first conflict arose between investors and management.59 In other words: 
‘[c]orporate governance is old, only the phrase is new.’60 
In fact, the term remained foreign to American industry until the mid-1970’s, 
when the federal Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.) introduced it 
to the formal agenda. 61  Although corporations had been growing and 
flourishing in the United States following World War II, increased numbers, 
sizes and revenue did not coincide with any real sophistication in the 
management of corporate entities. 62  Widespread corporate bribery and 
managerial misconduct during the late 1970’s led the SEC to eventually 
convince the New York Stock Exchange in 1976 to require listed companies 
to appoint audit committees comprised of non-executive directors and this 
was made part of the listing requirements.63 This coincided with increased 
debate about the duties of boards of directors toward other stakeholders in 
both America and in Europe, and the promotion of two-tiered boards on the 
continent.64  
 ‘Corporate governance’ had become irrevocably part of the conversation, 
and from several corners concerns were being voiced about the poor state 
of governance in large American companies. Primarily, these concerns 
centred around the complete lack of oversight on the part of the board, 
allowing management to make ill-informed and self-serving decisions with 
relative impunity. 65  There were several calls to ‘return the board to its 
historical role as internal auditor of the corporation responsible for 
 
59 Cheffins ‘The History of Corporate Governance’ (n51) 1; Clarke (n4) 1, 7. 
60 Tricker (n5) 4. 
61 It did so, by increasingly considering the accountability of corporate managers as 
part of its regulatory remit. Cheffins ‘The History of Corporate Governance’ (n51) 
2. 
62 Cheffins ‘The History of Corporate Governance’ (n51) 1. 
63  Cheffins ‘The History of Corporate Governance’ (n51) 3; Berle & Means The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933) 9. 
64 Tricker (n5) 9.  
65 Cheffins ‘The History of Corporate Governance’ (n51) 5. 
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constraining management from violations of law and breaches of trust’66 
and the debate was picked up in the United Kingdom. 67  However, the 
election of Ronal Reagan in 1980, and a shift in political sensibilities, 
effectively stopped the enthusiastic reforms of the 1970’s in their tracks.68 
The corporate governance agenda regained lost momentum during the 
1980’s. A wave of hostile takeover bids, and concomitant managerial 
defence strategies caused the pendulum to swing in a shareholder-centric 
direction and a ‘shareholder oriented corporate governance infrastructure … 
emerged’.69 The late 1980’s and early 1990’s remain significant in shifting 
the focus of the governance debate towards shareholders and shareholder 
returns.70 
Corporate Governance Codes arrived in the 1990’s, pioneered by the United 
Kingdom’s Cadbury Report in 1992.71 Others soon followed, including the 
Vienot Report (1995, France), the King Report (1995, South Africa), and the 
Toronto Stock Exchange Recommendations on Canadian Board Practices 
(1995, Canada).72 As a rule, the Codes tended to be concerned with the 
potential for abuse of corporate power. By the end of the 20th century there 
seemed to be a working governance system in place, but it proved to be the 
calm before the storm as an incredible spate of corporate collapses in 
America and around the world wreaked havoc during the early 2000’s.73 In 
 
66 Cheffins ‘The History of Corporate Governance’ (n51) 5. 
67 Tricker (n5) 10. 
68 Law and economics scholars also shunned the governance agenda, contending 
that the debate had failed to take key points into consideration, such as the impact 
of market forces on executive behaviour. Cheffins ‘The History of Corporate 
Governance’ (n51) 8. 
69 Cheffins ‘The History of Corporate Governance’ (n51) 11 - 12. 
70 Cheffins ‘The History of Corporate Governance’ (n51) 15. See also an overview of 
the development of law and economics scholarship discussed in Chapter 6, text to 
note 66 – 67 where the impact of the 1980’s takeover driven corporate culture is 
considered further.  
71 Tricker (n5) 12. 
72 Tricker (n5) 13. 
73 There are many famous examples, but perhaps none more than the collapse of 
Enron in the United States. See n 3 above.  
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America it prompted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to be rushed through in 
2002, while other jurisdictions fervently redrafted or updated existing 
Governance Codes.74  
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
gained prominence at an international level, publishing its Principles of 
Corporate Governance in 1999.75 The principles finally adopted by the OECD 
were informed entirely by recommendations made by the Business Sector 
Advisory Group on Corporate Governance, set up by OECD Ministers in 1996 
and mirror those contained in the United Kingdom’s corporate governance 
code at the time almost exactly.  As Dignam points out, this illustrates the 
‘Anglo-Saxon orientation’ of the principles, the consequences of which are 
manifold.76 A number of initiatives in the EU followed, most notably the 
European Commission’s decision to set up a Group of High-Level Company 
Law Experts to consider the modernisation of company law in Europe.77  
As mentioned, almost all advanced and developing countries have by now 
introduced Corporate Governance Codes of best practice and many have 
enacted new company legislation. 78  The corporate governance advisory 
profession has ‘grown in direct correlation with corporate boards’ ever-
increasing governance responsibilities and is now recognised as a distinct 
City sub-industry alongside traditional sectors such as commercial law and 
 
74 Tricker (n5)) 17. 
75 Dignam A ‘Exporting corporate governance: U.K. regulatory systems in a global 
economy’ (2000) 21(3) Co Law 70, 74.  
76 Dignam A ‘Exporting corporate governance’ (n75) 74. The author considers the 
typically Anglo-Saxon approach of ‘negotiated regulation’ that the OECD 
concomitantly embraces and points to the shortcomings of this regime. His views 
are considered in greater detail in Chapter 7, see text to n 30.  
77  See European Commission website at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-
economy-euro/doing-business-eu/company-law-and-corporate-governance_en. 
For an overview of the development of European Company Law and governance 
see: Hopt (n5) 1174; Copp (n3) 66. 
78 Tricker (n5) 3; Hopt (n5) 1182. Hopt points out that the various reasons are given 
for adopting governance codes in different jurisdictions, among them simply 
imitation of even ‘legal fashion’.  
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investment banking.’ 79  Despite this, there remains ‘considerable 
uncertainty’80 about the definition and exact role of corporate governance, 
with Tricker referring to it as ‘a subject in search of its paradigm’.81  
 
In searching for this paradigm, Wymeersch notes that ‘[C]orporate 
[G]overnance [C]odes function within a given legal environment. The 
interaction with the legal system is a complex matter that differs 
considerably from state to state ... Enforcement techniques and efficiency 
will be directly dependent on the legal nature of the codes’.82 This is one of 
the core concerns of the research undertaken below – the efficacy of the 
interaction between the Corporate Governance Code and the formal legal 
order as facilitated by the courts. As such, the discussion will proceed to 
consider (in overview) the South African legal environment within which its 
governance codes must function.  
 
3 An overview of the Legal Landscape  
 
a  South Africa 
A review of company law taking up almost the entire first decade of the 21st 
century, culminated in a new piece of legislation to govern South African 
corporate entities: the Companies Act 71 of 2008.83 The Act made sweeping 
changes, and broke ranks with English law in several respects, choosing 
instead to borrow concepts from jurisdictions such as Australia, and the 
United States.84  The new legislation embraced a facilitative approach, with 
 
79 Mark T Moore Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the State (Hart 2013) 12. 
80 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n79) 12. 
81 Tricker (n5) 74.  
82 E Wymeersch ‘The Enforcement of Corporate Governance Codes’ (2006) 6 J. 
Corp. Law Stud. 114. 
83 Farouk HI Cassim and others (eds) Contemporary Company Law (2nd edn, Juta, 
2012) 2. 
84  Cassim and others Contemporary Company Law (n83) 2. Despite this, many 
similarities between South African and English company law remain. For a further 
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certain core mandatory provisions being supplemented by ‘opt-in/opt-out’ 
provisions that companies can choose to incorporate when drafting and 
refining the company constitution – referred to as the Memorandum of 
Incorporation.85  To achieve this, the Act distinguishes between so-called 
‘alterable provisions’ 86  and ‘unalterable provisions’, 87  with the latter 
essentially comprising the mandatory rules that companies cannot opt out 
of.88 
Like its English counterpart the legislation does not differentiate between 
executive and non-executive directors, nor does it reference the so-called 
‘independent non-executive’ director.89  
The drafters’ decision to partially codify directors’ duties generated 
extensive debate. 90  The arguments echo those raised when the Law 
Commission and Company Law Review in the United Kingdom proposed a 
 
discussion of the impact of English company law on South African corporate law 
jurisprudence and its continued importance see text to n 116 – n 126. 
85  The approach is not unique to South Africa and is especially reminiscent of 
corporate law in the United States and Delaware in particular. See Kraakman and 
others The Anatomy of Corporate Law (n38) 19 – 20. 
86 Defined in section 1 of the Act as “a provision of this Act in which it is expressly 
contemplated that its effect on a particular company may be negated, restricted, 
limited, qualified, extended or otherwise altered in substance or effect by that 
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation.” 
87 Defined in section 1 of the Act as “a provision of this Act that does not expressly 
contemplate that its effect on any particular company may be negated, restricted, 
limited, qualified, extended or otherwise altered in substance or effect by a 
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation or rules.” 
88 An in-depth discussion of the application of these provisions and their interaction 
with existing company documentation etc falls outside of the scope of this thesis. 
See however: Helena H Stoop ‘Alterable and unalterable provisions of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008: Recent Cases Expose Inherent 
Uncertainties’ JCCLP Volume 1 (2016) 40. 
89 The definition of ‘director’ in section one is broad enough to include these as well 
as so-called ‘shadow directors’. For a discussion of the definition see Kathy 
Idensohn ‘The Regulation of Shadow Directors’ (2010) 22(3) SA Merc LJ 326 – 345. 
See further chapter 2 at n 27. 
90 Natasha Bouwman ‘An appraisal of the modification of the director's duty of care 
and skill’ (2009) SA Merc LJ 509; Irene-Marie Esser ‘Codification of directors' duties’ 
(2004) Juta’s Bus Law 26; McLennan JS ‘Directors' fiduciary duties and the 2008 
Companies Bill’ (2009) TSAR 184.  
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‘high level statutory statement’ of directors’ duties.91  Proponents hoped 
that codification could clarify and consolidate what was traditionally an area 
of law that even legal practitioners navigated with some difficulty – let alone 
lay persons acting as company directors.92 On the other hand, critics argued 
that codification and any rigid bright lines could ‘freeze’ the law, and impede 
further development in response to changing circumstance.93 Davies and 
Worthington explain that these concerns could be refuted on two fronts. 
First, the statutory statement of duties was always intended as a ‘high level’ 
statement, and it gives the courts ‘enough interpretative scope when 
applying the principles to the changing circumstances of commercial life’. 
Furthermore, section 170(4) presupposes that the statutory duties ‘shall be 
interpreted and applied in the same way as the common law duties or 
equitable principles’ and also that ‘regard shall be had to the corresponding 
common law rules and equitable principles in interpreting and applying the 
general principles.’ 94  
The effect of the first statement is clearly that existing case law on the 
common law duties remain relevant when interpreting the new statutory 
duties.95 The impact of the second statement is not as immediately apparent, 
but according to Davies and Worthington its effect would be to allow the 
courts to continue to consider developments in equivalent common law 
 
91 Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interest and Formulating a Statement 
of Duties, Law Com. No. 261 and Scottish Law Com. No. 173, Cm. 4436 (1999); CLR, 
Final Report, Ch.3 and Annex C.  
92 Although as Davies and Worthington point out, ‘the behavioural premises upon 
which this view was based were never extensively investigated.’ Davies and 
Worthington (n12) 463. 
93 Davies and Worthington (n12) 463. 
94 Davies and Worthington (n12) 464. 
95 As Keay points out: ‘The rules and principles that have been replaced by the 
statement of general duties will not apply directly, but it is highly likely that the 
approaches and views of the courts in defining directors’ duties over many years 
will be very influential in the manner in which the courts decide to interpret the 
new statutory provisions. So, in cases where the statute adopts wording and 
terminology that is similar to the pronouncements of common law rules and 
equitable principles, case law is likely to be followed faithfully.’ Andrew Keay 
Directors’ Duties (Jordan 2009) 59. 
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duties that apply to trustees and agents as they have traditionally done 
when constructing directors’ duties.96 
Any confusion regarding the relationship between the common law and 
statutory duties is dealt with by these sections read with section 170(3) 
which states that the general duties contained in the statute have effect in 
place of the common law. However, this does not mean that all difficulties 
are eliminated. Many of the statutory statements comprise of more than a 
mere restatement of the common law. In instances where the statute 
departs from the common law, reference to the latter is naturally no longer 
appropriate. The Act does not indicate at face value where it deviates from 
the common law however, and as any inquiry must start by determining 
where the act confirms the common law and where it departs from it. 97  
In the South African context, it remains unclear whether the status quo 
aligns with this position in the UK following the 2006 Companies Act.98 It is 
namely also possible that it could simulate Australian law, where a director 
owes his company statutory duties, but codification did not displace his 
common law duties which apply in tandem. 99  The favoured approach 
following the promulgation of the 2008 Companies Act has been that the 
common-law duties remain intact and can serve as a basis for a separate 
cause of action, alongside the codified duties.100 The common law applies 
unless expressly excluded or in conflict with a statutory provision. Although 
 
96 Davies and Worthington (n12) 464. 
97 Davies and Worthington (n12) 464. And see: Keay Directors’ Duties (n95) 59. 
98 On the position in the UK see further: Keay Directors’ Duties (n95) 174. Section 
170(3) of the 2006 Act states that not all duties are set out in the 2006 Companies 
Act and the courts would therefore remain free to develop these aspects of the law. 
Davies and Worthington name as an example the duties of directors toward 
company creditors. See: Davies and Worthington (n12) 464. 
99  Keay Directors’ Duties (n95) 174. 
100See for example: Mthimunye-Bakoro v Petroleum Oil And Gas Corporation of 
South Africa (SOC) Limited and Another 2015 (6) SA 338 (WCC) where Davis J 
remarked that: “. . . recourse may [still] be had to the common law which, save for 
the express legislative exclusions remains the structure of company law upon which 
the superstructure of the Act rests.” See also: Henochsberg on the Companies Act 
71 of 2008 (Issue 18 2018) 290(5); Bouwman (n90) 516. 
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the duties are codified, their contents are not defined – this is left to the 
common law and it is in fact in this manner that one is able to achieve the 
flexibility that such a scheme requires, although, as Delport points out, at 
the cost of the very legal certainty that it sought to achieve.101 The approach 
also accords with the presumption, in statutory interpretation, that the 
legislature does not seek to change the existing law unless expressly 
stated.102   
In addition to the 2008 Companies Act, South African regulators have chosen 
to embrace a scheme similar to that in the United Kingdom, in the form of a 
voluntary Code of Governance principles. In fact, as mentioned above,103 by 
the time Enron and company were making headlines, South African 
companies had already grown accustomed to the requirements of the King 
Code of Corporate Governance. The King Committee had been formed in 
1992, under the auspices of the Institute of Directors of Southern Africa and 
their report, and a code of best practice (known as the King Code of 
Corporate Governance) was published in 1994.104  
 
101 Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Issue 18 2018) 287. 
102 See for example: Casserley v Stubbs 1916 TPD 310 at 312 where Wessels J sets 
out the position as follows: ‘It is a well-known canon of construction that we cannot 
infer that a statute intends to alter the common law. The statute must either 
explicitly say that it is the intention of the legislature to alter the common law, or 
the inference from the ordinance must be such that we can come to no other 
conclusion than that the legislature did have such an intention.’ See also: 
Dhanabakium v Subramanian 1943 AD 160; Rand Bank Bpk v Regering van die 
RSA 1974 4 SA 764 (T) 767; Bills of Costs (Pty) Ltd v The 
Registrar, Cape 1979 3 SA 925 (A) 942; Kaplan v Inc Law 
Society Tvl 1981 2 SA 762 (T) 770; Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope v 
C 1986 1 SA 616 (A) 639E; Skyway Management Ltd v Telkom SA 
Bpk 2001 2 SA 779 (T) 784. And see: LM Du Plessis Statute Law and Interpretation 
in 25(1) Lawsa (reissue, 2001) para 340. 
103 See text to note 73 above. 
104 On the history and development of the South African corporate governance 
code in general see: Esser I & Delport P ‘The South African King IV Report on 
Corporate Governance: is the crown shiny enough?’ (2018) 39(11) Co Law 378; JJ 
Du Plessis ‘Corporate Governance: Some Reflections on the South African Law and 
the German Two-Tier Board System’ in F Patfield F (ed), Perspectives on Company 
Law: 2 (Kluwer Law International 1997) 131. 
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Despite the fact that it was ground-breaking at the time, King I dealt mainly 
with financial and regulatory aspects of corporate governance and it was 
soon clear that an updated version would be required. The King committee 
thus developed a second iteration of the Report which also contained a Code 
of Corporate Practices and Conduct. King II confirmed a move away from the 
single bottom line to embrace a so-called ‘triple bottom line’ approach – the 
latter taking account of the company’s social, environmental and economic 
impact.105  
The financial crisis of 2007/2008 (which happened to coincide with the 
promulgation of South Africa’s 2007 Companies Act) prompted yet another 
revision of the Code. King III came into effect on 1 March 2010. It remained 
a ‘non-legislative code on principles and practices’, but although it was 
written in accordance to the comply or explain principle commonly used, it 
specifically introduced a so-called ‘apply or explain’ regime to 
governance.106 King III also refined the triple bottom line concept, choosing 
instead to use the term ‘triple context’ to reflect the interconnectivity of 
these different dimensions; the economy, society, and the natural 
environment. It was this development that prompted the novel approach of 
integrated reporting which was favourably received elsewhere.107 
A further revision was announced in 2014 and a process of research and 
consultation resulted in the publication of the most recent King Report and 
Code, King IV, in 2016. It replaced King III in its entirety, and although it 
covered the same material it had taken account of subsequent international 
developments and had a simpler and arguably more accessibly structure.108 
 
105 Esser I & Delport P (n104) 378. And see: Cassim and others Contemporary 
Company Law (n83) 437, Philip Armstrong, ‘The King Report on Corporate 
Governance’ (1995) 3 Juta’s Business Law 65. 
106 Esser & Delport (n104) 378. 
107 Esser I & Delport P (n104) 378. And see: Cassim and others Contemporary Company 
Law (n83) 437. 
108 Esser I & Delport P (n104) 378. See also:  
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In the case of most jurisdictions with self-regulatory Codes in place, the Code 
applies to listed entities only, and is usually enforceable indirectly as part of 
a set of listing requirements set out by a relevant exchange. This was also 
the case in South Africa, with the first two iterations of the King Code finding 
application mainly in the case of listed entities, government institutions and 
banks,109 and being ‘enforced’ indirectly as part of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange’s Listing Requirements. 110   However, the drafters of the third 
updated version of the code,  King III111 were ambitious enough to declare 
that it ‘applies to all entities regardless of the manner and form of 
incorporation or establishment and whether in the public, private sectors or 
non-profit sectors’ stating that they had ‘drafted the principles so that every 
entity can apply them and, in doing so, achieve good governance’.112 King IV 
is ‘soft law’. The only direct reference to it that can be found in South Africa’s 
Companies Act is that in regulation 54, which determines that a prospectus 
must include a narrative statement setting out how the company has applied 
the principles of the King Report and Code113 and any reasons for a failure to 
apply them.114 
The King committee have continued to grapple with issues surrounding the 
appropriate application and enforcement of the Codes. South African courts 
have also increasingly been making statements in obiter that may imply an 
 
109 The Code also applied to Banks, financial and insurance entities as defined in the 
various legislation regulating the South African financial services sector, public 
sector enterprises and agencies, including any department of State or 
administration in the national, provincial or local sphere of government. All other 
companies were encouraged to comply with the Code to the extent applicable. King 
Committee on Corporate Governance Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa (Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, 2002) 21. 
110 Esser & Delport (n104) 378. 
111 King Committee on Corporate Governance Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa (Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, 2009). 
112 King Committee on Corporate Governance Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa (Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, 2009) 17. 
113 This is in turn defined by regulation 47(a) as ‘the King Report on Governance for 
South Africa and the King Report and Code of Governance Principles (King III), as 
amended or replaced from time to time’. 
114 See also: Esser & Delport (n104) 384. 
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indirect application of the codes in proceedings seeking to hold company 
directors personally liable for breaches of their statutory and common law 
duties.115 Such references to the King Code in the cases decided to date have 
been cursory and the courts do not give any clear indication of the extent of 
the interaction between the statutory and common law provisions and the 
governance code.116 The most recent draft of the Code refers expressly to 
these decisions and developments in emphasizing its importance and 
application outside the traditional sphere of the listed company.117 The code 
also contains so-called ‘sectoral supplements’, that are clearly not aimed at 
listed companies.118 
 
It seems beyond doubt that the drafters of at least the latest two versions of 
the King Code seemed to have in mind the broadest possible application of 
its principles. Although it is too soon to draw any definitive conclusions from 
the case law to date, the South African courts at least to some extent, agree, 
even edging in the direction of formally reading the principles of the code 
into black letter law. These developments in South Africa raise interesting 
questions and depending on how the legislature and the courts choose to 
proceed, may have a far-reaching impact on the landscape of corporate law 
and the legal principles governing the conduct of company directors.  
 
b The Jurisdictions Chosen for Comparative Analysis  
 
115 See for example: Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining 
Company (2006) 5 SA 333 (W), Levenstein v S [2013] 4 All SA 528 (SCA); Kalahari 
Resources (pty) Ltd v Arcelormittal SA and others [2012] 3 All SA 555 (GSJ); Council 
for Medical Schemes and Another v Selfmed Medical Scheme and Another [2011] 
ZASCA 207; South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd and another v Mpofu 
[2009] 4 All SA 169 (GSJ). 
116 See 1.5 below.  
117 King Committee on Corporate Governance Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa (Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, 2016) 17. 
118 King Committee on Corporate Governance Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa (Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, 2016) 74 – 117. 
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Although Roman-Dutch law forms the dominant basis for South Africa’s 
common law, the ‘original’ Roman-Dutch law has been extensively 
influenced by English Law, and ‘what today is known as ‘South African law’ 
can perhaps best be described as a hybrid consisting of Roman-Dutch and 
English law elements adapted to peculiarly South African circumstances and 
needs.’119 It is also the case that many South African statutes, among them 
in areas such as shipping, company law, insurance law, and the laws of 
arbitration, negotiable instruments, and evidence are identical to United 
Kingdom enactments or import English law ‘in various decisive respects’.120 
This presents difficulties as far as the interpretation of these statutes are 
concerned. The courts are allowed readily to revert to Roman-Dutch law as 
‘basic common law’ but English law does not have similar default 
authority.121  
 
 A summary of the approach favoured approach is that South African courts 
treat the decisions of British or other Commonwealth courts as having 
‘considerable persuasive force’ although these decisions are not binding.122 
Furthermore, as Colman J pointed out in Montelindo Compania Naviera SA 
v Bank of Lisbon & SA Ltd123  it is not necessarily or invariably sound to 
assume that a word appearing in the English text of a South African statute 
would bear the same meaning in South Africa as it would in England, as ‘a 
word may acquire a meaning different from the one which it bears in 
 
119 Du Plessis (n102) par 372. 
120 Certain sections are incorporated verbatim while in other cases the content of a 
section is incorporated using different words. Du Plessis (n102) par 372. 
121  Du Plessis (n102) par 372. Although the courts seemed readily to revert to 
English law, see for example: R v Myburgh 1916 CPD 676 680; Beukes v Knights 
Deep Ltd 1917 TPD 683 689; Osaka Mercantile Steamship Co Ltd v SAR&H 1938 AD 
146 174. 
122 Du Plessis (n102) par 372. However, this is subject to the caveat that such a 
reliance on foreign law may not conflict with any existing Roman Dutch common 
law or import foreign principles into South African law. See Roodepoort United 
Main Reef GM Co Ltd (in liquidation) v Du Toit supra 71–72. See also In re Trans-
African Insurance Co Ltd (in liquidation) 1958 3 All SA 265 (W); 1958 4 SA 324 (W) 
328A–C; S v Mokoena 1967 1 All SA 572 (A); 1967 1 SA 440 (A) 445A. 
123 1969 1 All SA 241 (W); 1969 2 SA 127 (W) 131F. 
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England’124 under South African usage. Different contexts also have to be 
born in mind.  Although it has been suggested that one can assume that the 
South African legislature was aware of the judicial interpretations placed 
upon English legislation when taking over those statutes or provisions 
contained in them (in particular where the wording is identical), Du Plessis 
points out that this assumption cannot invariably hold sway. He emphasises 
that ‘much will depend on the nature and history of the enactment in 
question and the bearing which South African common law or statute law 
has on the subject matter of the enactment.’125  There is no doubt that 
English law has had a significant impact on South African company law. The 
concept of the limited liability company spread throughout the 19th century 
British Empire, and the company laws of South Africa and other 
Commonwealth Countries still reflect these origins. 126  In fact, Du Plessis 
made the following telling observation on the nature of South African 
company law in 1997: 127  
 
Factors like the influence of European company law on the United Kingdom, 
a relatively long period of isolation from international influence on South 
African company law and a conservative approach as far as a 
comprehensive overview of South African corporate law is concerned, 
resulted in an ironical situation, namely that South Africa has at the moment 
probably a more traditional British company law system than the Brits 
themselves. 
What is more, it is particularly on the law that governs directors’ duties that 
English law has had a significant impact and the courts have referred liberally 
 
124 1969 1 All SA 241 (W); 1969 2 SA 127 (W) 131F. 
125 Du Plessis (n102) par 372. 
126 Stephen D Girvin ‘The Antecedents of South African Company Law’ (1992) 13(1) 
J.Leg.Hist. 63; Tricker (n5) 7. 
127 Du Plessis ‘South African Law and the German Two-Tier Board System’ (n104) 
135. 
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to English precedent in developing both the duty of care and skill and several 
fiduciary duties in South African Law.128   
 
However, there are other reasons why it is useful to consider English law 
when analysing this particular research question. As mentioned, the United 
Kingdom has also opted for a regulatory regime based partially on a 
voluntary code of best practice. The original Cadbury Code strongly 
influenced the drafters of South Africa’s first corporate governance code, 129 
and the drafters have continued to take note of developments in the United 
Kingdom when updating the Code and Report.130  
Apart from the United Kingdom, the thesis will refer to American literature 
and to a limited extent American case law. These sources are pertinent to 
various issues touched upon by the research. Most importantly, the so-
called ‘Law and Economics’ movement developed predominantly in the 
United States. 131  The theories and philosophies developed by law and 
economics scholars have had a significant impact on perceptions of the role 
of company law and the appropriate regulation of corporate entities. 132 
Paragraph 4 below gives a brief overview of these debates and they are 
engaged more fully in Chapter 6 of the thesis. It is also interesting and at 
times helpful to consider American law as a juxtaposition to South African 
and English law. This is due to the fact that the United States, through the 
 
128 Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen and Another 1980 (4) 
SA 156 (W) 165 where Margo J concluded that the ‘essential principles’ of this 
branch of South African company law are the same as those in English law and as 
such, ‘the English cases provide a valuable guide.” See also: Du Plessis NO v 
Oosthuizen 1999 (2) SA 191 (O) 201. And see chapters 3 and 4 and the cases cited.  
129 See above text to notes 71 – 77. 
130  Brian Cheffins ‘Corporate Governance Reform: Britain as an Exporter’ David 
Hume Institute in Corporate Governance and the Reform of Company Law, Hume 
Papers on Public Policy: Volume 8 No. 1 (Edinburgh University Press, 2000) 7. On 
the widespread appropriation of the Cadbury report and some criticisms of this see 
also: Dignam A ‘Exporting corporate governance’ (n75).  
131 See Chapter 7.  
132 See in overview on the role of the law and economics movement and prominent 
scholars: Hopt (n5) 1184. 
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promulgation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 133  have opted for a 
mandatory regime to regulate corporate governance. Finally, the South 
African legislature in drafting the 2008 Companies Act, opted to import 
several distinctly ‘American’ features, and some of these are germane to the 
issues at hand.134 
Amongst other things, the research will turn to the enforcement of directors’ 
duties and the impact that failed enforcement might have on accountability 
in general. In this context, brief reference will be made to the position in 
Australia where the public enforcement of directors’ duties have apparently 
resulted in a more robust regime.135 However, the debate surrounding the 
public enforcement of directors’ duties is only ancillary to the central 
research questions addressed in this thesis and as such Australian law and 
scholarship will not be dealt with in as much depth as other jurisdictions.  
 
4 Theories and Debates that Inform the Thesis  
Having considered common features of company law across a number of 
jurisdictions, Armour, Hansman and Kraakman identify two general and 
primary functions thereof. The first is to create an appropriate structure and 
to then buttress this structure with rules to regulate internal affairs, and the 
second is to control conflicts of interest between various stakeholders or 
corporate communities.136  It is these conflicts, that economists have termed 
 
133 Tricker (n5) 17. 
134 Most notable examples are found in the following sections of the 2008 Act: 
Section 164 which incorporates a version of the American ‘appraisal remedy’; 
section 76 which ostensibly incorporates a version of the American ‘business 
judgement rule’; and section 165 which incorporates elements of the American 
derivative action in the form of a demand procedure. For further analysis pertaining 
to section76 and section 165 see chapters 5 and 7 respectively.  
135 See Chapter 7, text to note  
136 Kraakman and others The Anatomy of Corporate Law (n38) 28.  
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the ‘agency dilemmas’ or ‘principal-agent’ problems.137   Armour, Hansman 
and Kraakman summarise the phenomenon as follows:138 
…an “agency problem” – in the most general sense of the term – arises 
whenever one party, termed the “principal,” relies upon actions taken by 
another party, termed the “agent,” which will affect the principal’s welfare. 
The problem lies in motivating the agent to act in the principal’s interest 
rather than simply in the agent’s own interest…  
The authors point out that almost any contractual relationship in terms of 
which one party promises performance to another may potentially be 
subject to an agency problem, not least because there is usually some extent 
of asymmetry of information. The principal is often unable to verify whether 
the agent’s performance is what was agreed upon, which in turn might 
incentivise the agent to act opportunistically.139    
This approach - which sees the corporation through the lens of the agency 
dilemma - is related to a school of thought known as the ‘nexus of contracts’ 
theory or contractarianism in short. 140  Contractarian scholars see the 
company as a series of contracts, giving rise to the agency dilemmas outlined 
above. As Kershaw explains, these contracts pertain not only to suppliers of 
labour and other resources, but also to suppliers of equity capital – the 
 
137 See M.C.Jensen and W.H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure’ (1976) JFE 305. A wealth of literature 
explores, analyses and discusses agency theory in a great deal of depth. Further 
sources will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 6, text to notes 84 – 102. See 
for example: Kraakman and others The Anatomy of Corporate Law (n38) 28. And 
see for an overview of the corporate agency problem:  Kershaw Company Law in 
Context (n44) 163 – 177. See also Watson ‘How the Company Became an Entity’ 
(n20) 120. 
138 Kraakman and others The Anatomy of Corporate Law (n38) 29. 
139 Kershaw in this regard distinguishes between direct and indirect transfer of 
value (or agency costs). Self-dealing, senior management remuneration and 
business opportunities are examples of the former, while shirking and 
incompetence and perquisites are examples of the latter. Kershaw Company Law 
in Context (n44) 85. 
140 D Attenborough, 'Empirical insights into corporate contractarian theory' (2017) 
37 (2) Legal studies 191, 206; Kershaw D Company Law in Context: Text and 
Materials (Oxford 2009) 85. 
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shareholders. The terms of the contract are found in company law and the 
company constitution and even in the largest of companies, scholars 
contend, there is some form of bargaining to be found.141 Although this does 
not take the form of traditional contractual negotiations, there is an implicit 
bargaining process in place which operates via the market.  The argument is 
that sophisticated shareholders will evaluate the rules of governance 
offered by a company in its constitution. Management will be pressured into 
offering shareholders ‘constitutional terms that maximize what equity 
investors will pay for the shares. Where companies do not offer such terms 
those sophisticated shareholders will pay less for the shares. According to 
contractarians, therefore, the corporate constitution represents part of 
(together with company law) the corporate contract, and an implicitly 
negotiated corporate contract.’142 
Contractarianism became the dominant ideology by the end of the 20th 
century and is often used to justify an approach to corporate governance 
that emphasises shareholder rights or profit maximisation. The influence 
that this theory has had on corporate law scholars, the courts and regulators 
alike is particularly significant when unpacking the issues related to the 
research question.143  
This is because the issues that it raises speak to the very core of how one 
chooses to view the role of corporate law. Contractarians favour the view 
that companies should be regulated with a ‘private law’ slant and that the 
parties should be left to determine how they want to structure their 
relationships with minimum regulatory interference. Where laws and 
regulations are put in place, these should serve mainly to facilitate the 
formation of this contractual nexus and to eliminate transactions costs 
associated with having to negotiate and bargain to achieve optimal 
 
141 Kershaw Company Law in Context (n44) 85. 
142 Kershaw Company Law in Context (n44) 85. 
143  Simon Deakin ‘The Corporation as Commons: Rethinking Property Rights, 
Governance and Sustainability in the Business Enterprise’ (2012) 37 Queen's L.J. 341 
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contractual outcomes for the parties involved.144 This view would see the 
role of corporate law as reflecting or stating the norms and practices that 
already exist and rules that have developed endogenously over time. A 
different point of view sees corporate law from a ‘public’ perspective and 
acknowledges its role as ‘norm setting’. 145  The debate is nuanced and 
comprehensive, but the thesis will attempt to engage with it to the extent 
necessary to adequately unpack the normative issues underlying the 
research question.  
This is one prism through which to view a multi-faceted debate. Regulation 
does not exist in a vacuum, and as Bebchuk and Roe posit in their theory of 
path dependence, historical facts such as ownership structures certainly 
impact the development of corporate entities (and by extension their 
regulation) at later stages.146 The fact that globalisation has not resulted in 
a more comprehensive convergence of corporate law further illustrates the 
impact of culture, socio-economic circumstances and political ideology in 
the formulation of corporate law and policy and attitudes towards 
regulation.147 It is simply not possible to engage with all of these matters to 
the extent that would do them justice in a single thesis. As such, the analysis 
that will follow in subsequent chapters opts to consider only the most 
dominant theories that have directly informed the corporate governance 
debate and are most strongly related to the research question. 
 
5 Chapter Overview  
 
 
144 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n79) 2. 
145 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n79) 2. 
146  Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in 
Corporate Ownership and Governance’ (1999) 52(172) Stan.L.Rev 127. 
147 Du Plessis JJ and Others Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (4th 
edn Cambridge UP 2018) 19. See also: Douglas M Branson ‘The very uncertain 
prospect of “global” convergence in corporate governance’ (2001) Cornell Int’l L.J 
321; Clarke ‘The Continuing Diversity of Corporate Governance’ (n39) 19. 
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Before turning to the contents and application of the directors’ duties 
central to the research chapter 2 will consider the individuals that these 
rules pertain to. For reasons set out below, the thesis will consider much of 
the debate through the prism of the independent non-executive director. 148  
Chapter 2 will therefore define what is meant by the term ‘independent non-
executive director’ and analyses the role and position of the independent 
non-executive director generally, with emphasis on the regulatory 
framework in South Africa. It also considers the importance of the 
independent non-executive director in the broader context of the 
governance regime and overviews weaknesses of the office identified in 
South Africa and elsewhere especially following the financial crisis. 
Having considered the role of the independent non-executive director the 
analysis will turn to the duties themselves. The research homes in on the 
two duties that, in conjunction, have been described as an expression of ‘the 
law’s view on how directors should discharge their functions on a day-to-day 
basis.’149 Chapters 3 and 4 will consider the duty of care and skill and the 
duty to act in the best interests of the company in some detail. The aim of 
this line of analysis is to consider whether these duties are viable candidates 
for such treatment in the first place. It is only by considering the origins of 
the duties, how they have been developed by the courts to date and where 
the judiciary and academic opinion currently stand on their role and 
application that one can safely make any predictions or recommendations 
regarding their potential future development. It is exactly this task which 
chapter 3 undertakes in relation to the duty of care and skill. Following this, 
chapter 4 will turn to the duty to act in the best interests of the company 
with similar aims.  
The duty of care, skill and diligence is perhaps the most apparent choice in 
considering any role that the governance codes might play in the 
 
148  Demetra Arsalidou ‘The liability of non-executive directors for negligent 
omissions: a new approach under legislation?’ (2002) 23(4) Co Law 107,107.  
149 Davies and Worthington (n12) 501. 
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development and interpretation of this new legal regime. The duty and the 
debates that have surrounded it speak to perceptions regarding the role of 
the company director and the extent to which directors should be regulated. 
These debates touch on underlying questions that permeate the thesis: 
should directors’ actions be judged objectively or subjectively; and should 
the duty fulfil a function that reflects prevailing norms, or should it set higher 
standards instead.150 It is especially as far as the independent non-executive 
director is concerned, that the duty to monitor the activities of peers and 
subordinates is of pivotal importance. As Worthington points out, this facet 
of the duty of care has become ‘one of the most crucial aspects of a 
director’s duty. Failures have the potential to lead to enormous corporate 
losses. Almost all of the modern cases on directors’ duty of care concern this 
particular issue and serve to highlight the magnitude of the problem.’151  
Although the duty of care and skill is the most obvious candidate for ‘Code 
based’ reforms, it is possible that certain fiduciary duties may be implicated 
as well - it is specifically the ubiquitous mandate to act in the best interests 
of the company that comes to mind. In this regard, the company could be 
taken to refer to a collection of any number of stakeholders, and the 
mandate may be narrowly or more broadly construed.152 King IV propagates 
 
150 See for example: E Norman Veasey ‘Should Corporation Law Inform Aspirations 
for Good Corporate Governance Practices or Vice Versa?’ 2001 (149) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 2179. 
151 Sarah Worthington, 'The Duty to Monitor: A Modern View of the Director's Duty 
of Care' in F Patfield F (ed), Perspectives on Company Law: 2 (Kluwer Law 
International 1997) 181, 194. Consider for example clear failing such as those in the 
instance of Volkswagen: Raymond Crête ‘The Volkswagen Scandal from the 
Viewpoint of Corporate Governance’ 2016 (7) EJRR 25. 
152  South African courts have consistently concluded that the interests of the 
company are the interests of the shareholders present and future South African 
Fabrics Ltd v Millman, NO, and Another 1972 (4) SA 592 at 596. See also:  Harcourt 
v Eastman NO 1953 (2) SA 424 (N) at 428 429; Marshall Industrials Ltd v Khan 1959 
(4) SA 694. For an overview of the stakeholder debate see: Keay A The Enlightened 
Shareholder Value Principle and Corporate Governance (Routledge 2013); Deakin S 
‘The Coming Transformation of Shareholder Value’ (2005) 13(1) C.G 11; Deryn 
Fisher ‘The enlightened shareholder - leaving stakeholders in the dark: will section 
172(1) of the Companies Act 2006 make directors consider the impact of their 
decisions on third parties?’ (2009) 20(1) ICCLR 10; R. Edward Freeman, Andrew C. 
34 
 
 
without reserve for an approach that is stakeholder inclusive (arguably to a 
far greater extent than that to which black letter company law has done 
before). The indirect consequence of an interpretation that takes on board 
provisions of the code could in turn impact South African law’s approach to 
this so-called ‘stakeholder debate’.153 
The courts have been tasked with the interpretation of the provisions of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008. The legislation leads us into uncharted territory 
not only because it came into operation as recently as seven years ago, but 
also because it draws inspiration from jurisdictions that South African 
company law did not traditionally align with. Given all this, the interpretation 
of the new statutory provisions is especially important. The latest authority 
from the SA Supreme Court of Appeals favours a ‘business like’ outcome 
when interpreting statutes and commercial documents 154  and the 
Constitutional Court is increasingly placing emphasis on Afro-centric 
interpretations and notions such as Ubuntu.155  In light of this, chapter 5 will 
consider the court’s remit in terms of the common law, the Companies Act 
and the Constitution and will consider whether there is any scope for the 
application of the King IV.  
 
Wicks and Bidhan Parmar ‘Stakeholder Theory and "The Corporate Objective 
Revisited"’ (2004) 15(3) Org Sci 364; Anant K Sundaram & Andrew C Inkpen ‘The 
Corporate Objective Revisited’ (2004) 15(3) Org Sci 350. 
153 In this regard, Esser and Delport observed that ‘[t]here has been a discernible 
movement away from the shareholder supremacy philosophy, but the legal 
principles underlying this philosophy are entrenched throughout company law and 
amendments thereto will, at this stage at least, be radical. The use of soft law such 
as King IV will facilitate this shift in philosophy in a manner that will have the least 
impact on the philosophies underlying company law. Esser & Delport (n104) 384. 
154  Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality  2012 (4) SA 
593 (SCA) para 18 
155 Chumo Himonga, Max Taylor and Anne Pope ‘Reflections on Judicial Views of 
Ubuntu’ (2013) 16 PELJ 171. In this regard King IV notes at 24: This idea of 
interdependency between orgnisations and society is supported by the African 
concept of Ubuntu or Botho, captured by the expressions uMuntu ngumuntu 
ngabantu and Motho ke motho ka batho – I am because you are; you are because 
we are. Ubuntu and Botho imply that there should be a common purpose to all 
human endeavours (including corporate endeavours) which is based on service to 
humanity.  
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As society came to terms with juristic persons, debates immerged that 
centred around the justification for the corporate form. Scholars from 
various disciplines subsequently started to engage with the inner mechanics 
of the ‘firm’ 156  and especially legal scholars considered the role of the 
regulator and the extent to which the latter should oversee private ordering 
within companies.157 Chapter 6 will consider the theories that have informed 
regulators (at least those in the Anglo-Saxon context) and have directly or 
indirectly shaped the corporate law that we know today. The chapter will 
emphasise the contractarian theory and the agency theory (as explained 
above). It will consider whether these paradigms might have led the 
regulatory state (to some extent) to withdraw from establishing ‘effective 
managerial accountability mechanisms at the micro level’.158   
Any debate centred around the law’s response to incompetence, 
carelessness or misdirected behaviour on the part of the company director 
would be incomplete without also considering the reality that action against 
directors personally is rarely taken. For this reason, chapter 7 will turn to the 
 
156 The concept is broader than the company but for purposes of this research the 
terms are used interchangeably.  
157 See for example the following sources engaged with in chapter 6: Attenborough 
(n 136) 191; Mathew T. Bodie ‘The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law: 
Returning to the Theory of the Firm’ (2012) 35 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1033; William W. 
Bratton ‘Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, and the Structure of Corporate 
Fiduciary Law’ (1993) 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1084; Cheffins BR Company Law: 
Theory, Structure and Operation (Clarendon Press 1997); John C. Jr. Coffee ‘The 
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role’ 
(1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1618; Michael Galanis ‘Vicious Spirals in Corporate 
Governance: Mandatory Rules for Systemic (Re)Balancing? (2011) 31(2) Oxford 
J.Leg.St. 327; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman ‘The End of History for 
Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 GEO. L.J. 439; Kraakman and others The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law (n38); Marc T. Moore ‘Whispering Sweet Nothings: The Limitations 
of Informal Conformance in UK Corporate Governance (2009) 9 J. Corp. L. Stud. 95; 
Moore Governance in the Shadow (n79). 
158 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n79) 8. The author argues that ‘[l]aw-making 
functions have been restricted to ‘broad procedural standards and mechanisms , 
which provide a facilitative framework for private ordering within individual 
companies, this has ultimately left corporate participants with a material degree of 
self-regulatory ‘space’ in which to determine directly, and on an individual firm 
basis, which substantive accountability norms will govern their ongoing governance 
relationships with one another.’ 
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issues of accountability and enforcement. The financial crisis and several 
large-scale corporate scandals following it have shown repeatedly that 
shareholders in particular, rarely act against directors. If this is the case, any 
reconfiguration of the duties is rendered moot ‘for there is little point in 
formulating appropriate standards of care if those standards cannot or will 
not be brought to bear on directors or, indeed, if other methods of 
controlling competence are likely to be more effective.’159 The chapter will 
also discuss voluntary or self-regulation as opposed to statutory regulation 
and how the one informs the other.160 These themes relate directly to those 
discussed in chapter 6 and builds on the arguments it introduces.  
Finally, chapter 8 will consolidate the various strands, and given an overview 
of the research in an attempt to draw clear conclusions and evaluate the 
questions at the heart of the research.  
 
6 Methodology and Research Parameters 
 
The research is a doctrinal analysis of the law. The research will not include 
empirical analysis or data collection. The most prevalent sources in the form 
of statutes, corporate governance codes, relevant reports and expert 
opinion in the form mainly of scholarly writings such as monographs and 
 
159 Vanessa Finch ‘Company Directors: Who Cares About Skill and Care?’ (1999) 
55(2) MLR 179, 179. 
160 The literature is extensive will be considered in greater depth in Chapter 7. See 
in general: Vanessa Finch ‘Corporate governance and Cadbury: self-regulation and 
alternatives’ (1994) J.B.L 51; Saleem Sheikh and William M. Rees ‘Corporate 
governance and corporate control: self regulation or statutory codification?’ (1992) 
3 ICCLR 370; Cadbury (n1) 403 – 405; David Kershaw ‘Corporate Law and Self-
Regulation (2015) 5 LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 4, available 
online http://ssrn.com/abstract=3574201; Ben Pettet ‘The combined code: a firm 
place for self-regulation in corporate governance’ (1998) 13 J.I.B.L.R 394; Tricker 
(n5) chapters 5 & 6; Jean Jacques du Plessis and others Principles of Contemporary 
Corporate Governance (3rd edn Cambridge UP 2015) chapter 5; Roman Tomasic and 
Folarin Akinbami ‘Towards a new corporate governance after the global financial 
crisis’ (2011) 22(8)  ICCLR 237.  
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academic articles will be consulted. Although the thesis will consider the 
interactions between South Africa’s corporate governance code and 
legislation, not all of King IV is discussed and analysed and a specific chapter 
is not devoted to the contents of the Code. The reason for this is the fact 
that there is much of King IV that will in no way alter or impact the 
interpretation and application of the Companies Act. Furthermore, the 
research question focusses specifically on the impact that an interaction 
between the Code and the Act might have on how directors’ duties are 
interpreted and applied. As such, the matter was approach by analysing the 
duties that may be impacted in turn, with reference to the Code as and when 
appropriate as opposed to a wholescale discussion of provisions that are not 
directly pertinent.  
7 Conclusion 
It is no exaggeration to say that the threats and challenges that the world 
faces today are unprecedented in their complexity and global impact. 
National governments are often at a loss, facing matters as diverse as 
climate change, wide scale political unrest and war, mass migration and the 
rapid and continued ascent of technology. But it is not only nation states 
that find themselves ill prepared in the face of these risks. The company 
must rise to the challenge in new and surprising ways, and prove its agility if 
it is to continue to flourish. Almost sixty years ago, Berle summarised that 
the corporate form presents: 
A commercial instrument of formidable effectiveness, feared because of 
its power, hated because of the excesses with which that power was 
used, suspect because of the extent of its political manipulations within 
the political State, admired because of its capacity to get things done. 
From the turn of the twentieth century to the present, nevertheless, its 
position as a major method of business organisation has been assured. 
Although it was abused, no substitute form of organisation was found. 
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The problem was to make it a restrained, mature and socially useful 
instrument.161  
Hundreds of thousands of pages of reports, recommendations, statutes and 
governance codes have since seen the light and yet countries worldwide still 
battle with a problem that is decades old. Ensuring that our companies are 
‘restrained, mature and socially useful instruments’ remains a global 
challenge - and South Africa is no exception.  
South Africa is a developing economy. Poor economic growth and socio-
economic inequality hamstring development. Robust corporate entities that 
can weather a multitude of challenges are essential to future growth and 
stability. 162  The benefits of sound corporate governance can hardly be 
understated and this is the case not only for listed entities but for small to 
medium enterprises as well.163 Although the first King Code of Corporate 
Governance was introduced decades ago, a culture of good governance has 
not been entrenched and many corporates are still just ‘ticking boxes’. The 
courts have taken a more robust approach and are hinting at an 
interpretation of directors’ duties that take onboard principles set out in the 
King Code of Governance. The relatively opaque nature of especially the 
duty of care and skill has already been highlighted above. The interaction 
between these duties and the voluntary Corporate Governance Codes is as 
ill defined.  
 
The implications of this are manifold and especially relevant to how the law 
treats the independent non-executive director – a stalwart of corporate 
 
161 AA Berle Foreword in The Corporation in Modern Society (Harvard UP 1959) X. 
162  See Johan J. Henning, ‘Reforming Business Entity Law to Stimulate Economic 
Growth Among 
the Marginalised: The Modern South African Experience’ (2002) 91 KY. L.J. 773; 
Johan J. 
Henning ‘Close Corporation Law Reform in Southern Africa’ (2001) 26 J. CORP. L. 
917. 
163 Henning Reforming Business Entity Law (n158); Henning, Close Corporation Law 
(n158). 
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governance. The thesis considers both the normative or policy consideration 
that are at play as well as the technical and constitutional matters that arise 
from such an approach. The likely conclusion will be that there is some role 
for the Codes in formulating the duties but that several caveats apply. What 
waits at this intersection between hard and soft law: a stumbling block, a 
stepping stone, or both? 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE INDEPENDENT NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: THE ORIGINS OF THE 
OFFICE, CURRENT REGULATION AND PERSISTENT CHALLENGES 
 
If you have five directorships it is total heaven, like having a permanent hot bath. 
No effort of any kind is called for. You go to a meeting once a month in a car 
supplied by the company, you look grave and sage, and on two occasions say, ‘I 
agree,’ say ‘I don't think so’ once, and if all goes well you get £500 a year. 1 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this research is to consider the potential role of King IV in the 
interpretation of common law and statutory directors’ duties in South 
African law. To do so, the duties themselves require scrutiny, as do the 
policies and theories that drive and inform their continued development, the 
legal constraints faced by the courts in their application and the mechanisms 
aimed at ensuring accountability in the boardroom. However, before turning 
to these matters, the analysis will consider the role of the independent non-
executive director - a staple of voluntary corporate governance codes and 
subject to the duties in question.2  
 
Despite little empirical evidence of their value or contribution,3 the premise 
that non-executive directors acting independently from management is 
 
1 Lord Boothby as quoted by: Chamberlain, "Why Its Harder and Harder to Get a 
Good Board", Fortune, Nov. 1962, at p. 109 as cited by A J Boyle ‘Company Law and 
the Non-Executive Director – The USA and Britain Compared’ (1978) 27 Int. Com. 
LQ at 490. 
2 It bears repeating that the duties apply to executive and non-executive directors 
alike and that, technically, the duties are in place to regulate the office of both the 
executive and non-executive director.  
3  W Ringe ‘Beyond "Independent" Directors: A Functional Approach to Board 
Independence’ (2006) 119 (5) HarvLRev 1553 where the author gives an overview 
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essential to the integrity of the company board has driven much of the 
corporate governance agenda for decades, and the view seems to ‘gain 
momentum after each wave of scandals’.4 In fact, as an ostensible response 
to agency dilemmas5 ‘the need for active, independent boards has become 
conventional wisdom’6 and (perhaps hyperbolically) those who challenge or 
oppose the institution of the independent director risk being labelled 
‘heretics’.7 Nothing illustrates this better than the status quo in the United 
States, where governance activists propagate for boards on which 
independent directors make up a ‘substantial majority’. 8  
 
While it is true that outside the US the embrace of the independent non-
executive may have been more lukewarm, one could hardly dispute the fact 
that the independent non-executive plays a central role in corporate 
 
of the evidence at page 31. See also Du Plessis JJ and Others Principles of 
Contemporary Corporate Governance (4th edn Cambridge University Press 2018) 
where the authors discuss the following conflicting studies: Bernie Fraser Board 
Governance of Not for Profit Superannuation Funds (16 February 2017) which 
concluded that independent directors would not necessarily deliver improved 
governance; Peter L Fischer and Marc-Oliver Swan, ‘Does board independence 
improve firm performance? Outcome of a quasi-natural experiment’ (2013) 1 SSRN 
Electronic Journal DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2312325 available online at 
http://static.squarespace.com/static/53830acee4b0b1911ba0b52e/t/53f420a6e4
b027 df2521861d/1408508070374/SSRN-id2312325.pdf [accessed on 09/08/2019] 
which found no link between independent non-executive directors and firm 
performance in the Australian context; cf Kathy Fogel, Liping Ma and Randall Morck 
‘Powerful independent directors’, European Corporate Governance Institute (ICGI) 
available online at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=2377106&rec=1&srcabs=2222783&alg=1&ps=2 [accessed on 19/06/2019] which 
concluded that ‘powerful’ independent directors are in fact better able to hold 
CEO’s accountable as they have improved access to information and greater 
credibility.  
4  Alessandro Zattoni and Francesca Cuomo ‘How Independent, Competent and 
Incentivized Should Non-Executive Directors Be? An Empirical Investigation of Good 
Governance Codes’ (2010) 21 Br. J. Manag 63.  
5 See chapter 6 text to notes 84 - 102 for an overview and criticisms of the agency 
theory.  
6 Ringe ‘Beyond "Independent" Directors’ (n3) 1553; Suzanne Le Mire ‘Independent 
Directors: partnering expertise with independence’ (2016) 16(1) J. Corp. Law Stud.  
1.  
7 Usha Rodrigues ‘The Fetishization of Independence’ (2008) 33 J.Corp.L.  457. 
8 Rodrigues (n7) 457. 
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governance regimes far and wide. 9  Considering this, it may come as a 
surprise that the exact meaning of ‘independence’ in the context of the 
corporate board remains somewhat of a mystery. Expectations regarding 
the role and remit of the independent non-executive also remain far from 
settled, leading to what has been called an ‘identity crisis’10 on the part of 
the independent non-executive.  
 
Trying to come to grips with the current debate around independence 
requires insight into a established political, legal and theoretical discourse 
and it soon becomes clear that ‘regulators, commentators, and courts have 
all used ‘independence’ to mean different things at different times for 
different reasons.’ 11   Critics also warn that regulators and corporate 
reformers should refine definitions of independence to address the conflicts 
they seek to regulate, and more importantly should not lose sight of the fact 
that independent directors are actually only useful in instances where a 
conflict exists in the first place. In other words,  that independence should 
be a means to an end and should not become an end in itself.12  
 
Chapter 1 introduced the various mechanisms seeking to regulate the 
conduct of directors with the eye on improving corporate performance and 
sustainability. As mentioned, apart from more traditional legal duties, the 
emergence of self-regulatory codes of governance have had a significant 
 
9 See for example in the UK: FRC, The UK Corporate Governance Code (April 2016) 
available online at https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/ca7e94c4-b9a9-49e2-
a824-ad76a322873c/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-April-2016.pdf; in Australia: 
ASX CG Principles and Recommendations (2014) 16; and in South Africa: Institute of 
Directors King IV: Part 5.3, Recommended Practice 8. 
10 Ringe ‘Beyond "Independent" Directors’ (n3) 1553. 
11 Ringe ‘Beyond "Independent" Directors’ (n3) 1553. 
12 Rodrigues (n7) 447. See in general also: Ringe ‘Beyond "Independent" Directors’ 
(n3) 1553; Sweeney-Baird, M ‘The role of the non-executive director in modern 
corporate governance’ (2006) 27(3) Co Law 67; Victor Brudney ‘The Independent 
Director: Heavenly City or Potemkin Village’ (1982) 95 HarvLRev 597. See also below 
at text to notes 96 – 127. 
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impact on the corporate landscape. These codes emphasise responsibility 
and accountability at board level, and focus to varying degrees on the role 
of the independent non-executive director in ensuring good governance.13  
This chapter will elaborate on some of these themes. Firstly, the term 
‘independent non-executive director’ will be defined both in general and for 
purposes of this thesis. Some background will show how the office became 
the ubiquitous feature of the company board of directors that we have come 
to know. The chapter will then deal briefly with the challenges faced by 
independent non-executive directors and overview debates surrounding the 
value of the independent non-executive as a custodian for corporate 
governance. Following this the various mechanisms that seek to regulate the 
independent non-executive director will be considered with emphasis on 
the South African context.  
The analysis serves as background to the debates that surround the 
appropriate and effective regulation of directors which will be discussed in 
depth later in this thesis. The core research question that this contextual 
analysis speaks to, is whether more robust interaction between the 
governance codes and black letter law is notionally or conceptually 
desirable. This can only be considered in light of a functional understanding 
of the intricacies of the office in question subject to the regulation being 
proposed. The aim of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the salient 
concepts and offer an overview of the most prominent discourse pertaining 
to them.14 
 
2 Background 
 
 
13 See note 9 above and examples mentioned.  
14 For further analysis see: Harald Baum ‘The Rise of the Independent Director: A 
Historical and Comparative Perspective’ Max Planck Private Law Research Paper 
No. 16/20; Boyle (n1) 487; Brudney (n12) 597. 
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When considering the independent non-executive director’s rise to 
prominence, it is impossible to avoid mention of the history and 
development of American corporate governance as this is where the 
concept had its genesis. Different driving forces led to the phenomenon 
setting root in British and subsequently in continental European corporate 
culture,15   but there is no doubt that many of the fundamentals of the 
independent board as monitor were informed by American principles.16 The 
chronology of the rise of the independent monitoring board in America 
must, however, be considered bearing in mind that America and the United 
Kingdom (and by extension South Africa) have very different contexts as far 
as institutions and regulation are concerned.17 For example, although both 
jurisdictions suffer from relatively passive shareholders, Britain is on the 
whole perceived as placing shareholders in a more powerful position vis-a-
vis the board of directors, when compared to the United States.18 Secondly, 
as briefly explained in chapter 1, corporate governance is regulated via 
mandatory law in the United States whereas in the United Kingdom the 
Companies Act 2006 does little to regulate matters related to the structure 
and internal functioning of company boards. These aspects are instead, dealt 
with in the company constitution19 and by means of contractual agreements 
with individual directors,20 monitored on a comply or explain basis as was 
mentioned in chapter 1. In the tradition of English law, the South African 
legislation tends also to deal in broad strokes with certain minimum 
 
15 Baum (n14) 22. 
16 Cheffins Brian R ‘The Rise of Corporate Governance in the UK: When and Why’ 
(2015) 68 Current Legal Problems 387 at 389. 
17 This caveat applies equally when considering the South African context. It bears 
mention that the United States and the United Kingdom did traditionally have some 
things in common as well. As Boyle notes, both jurisdictions firmly recognise a 
separation between ownership and management, and in both countries companies 
often exist as groups of subsidiaries with the main apex of corporate power in the 
main board of the primary holding company. See: Boyle (n1) 488. 
18 Baum (n14) 22. 
19 Paul L Davies & Sarah Worthington Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law 
(Sweet & Maxwell 2016 10th ed) 387. 
20 Sweeney-Baird (n12) 69. 
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requirements pertaining to the board and its proper functioning, and 
generally leaves the minutiae of its regulation to companies themselves. This 
high-level regulation of the board of directors can likely be attributed to 
South African law’s initial and continuing kinship with English law. 21 
Regulatory restraint also may be due to the belief that corporate law is 
essential private in nature and that it is best left to the ‘parties’ of the 
corporate contract to determine how best to run the entity, and the fact that 
English company law has its roots in partnership law as explained above. 22  
 
3 Definitions and Development 
 
The South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 defines ‘director’ as:  
‘[A] member of the board of a company, as contemplated in section 66,23 or 
an alternate director24 of a company and includes any person occupying the 
position of a director or alternate director, by whatever name 
designated…’25 The definition26 is broad enough to include those acting as 
directors without having been formally appointed (so-called ‘de facto 
directors’)27 but clearly makes no distinction between executive and non-
 
21 See chapter 1 at text to note 122. 
22 See discussion in chapter 6.  
23 Section 66 of the Companies Act deals with the appointment and/or election of 
directors amongst other matters.  
24 An ‘alternate director’ is defined as “a person elected or appointed to serve, as 
the occasion requires, as a member of the board of a company in substitution for a 
particular elected or appointed director of that company.”  See: Companies Act 71 
of 2008, s 1.  
25 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 1.  
26 The definition (in both the South African and the UK Companies Acts) raises many 
matters not directly relevant to the research. Other than a brief mention below 
these issues will not be dealt with in greater depth. For further analysis see: Cassim 
and others Contemporary Company Law (n83) 404 – 411; Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Issue 18 2018); Davies and Worthington (n178) 386. 
27 Cassim and others Contemporary Company Law (n83) 404, 408.  The definition in 
the South African Companies Act seems not to include persons known as ‘shadow 
directors’ although individuals acting as shadow directors may be considered 
“prescribed officers” for purposes of the Act, in which case several provisions 
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executive directors.28 It also makes no reference to director independence; 
indeed, no reference to an ‘independent director’ in the general sense, is 
found anywhere else in the legislation. The definition found in the 
Companies Act 2006 is similar, 29  and seems to support the idea that, 
amongst others, the general statutory duties could be applied to de facto 
directors also.30  
The Companies Act 2006 does require all companies to have a board of 
directors in place, 31  and stipulates the minimum number of directors 
required for various types of companies.32 Apart from this, the legislation is 
not specific or prescriptive, leaving the exact composition of the board to 
each individual company. As Davies and Worthington point out, the 
Companies Act 2006 largely leaves it up to each company to determine the 
role of the board in its constitution.33 The fact that the division of power can 
thus be arranged privately by the members of the company via its 
constitution and employment agreements with individual directors likely 
harks back to the fact that the roots of British company law can be found in 
partnership, with the partners having great freedom to arrange their 
 
(including sections 76 and 77 which deal with directors’ standards of conduct and 
liability will apply to them). See: Kathy Idensohn ‘The meaning of 'prescribed 
officers' under the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ (2012) 129(4) South African Law 
Journal 717 – 735; Kathy Idensohn ‘The Regulation of Shadow Directors’ (2010) 
22(3) SA Merc LJ 326 – 345. The Companies Act 2006 in contrast, defines a shadow 
director as ‘a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the 
directors of the company are accustomed to act’ and deals expressly with the 
application of any provisions in relation to shadow directors. 
28 See also: Cassim and others Contemporary Company Law (n83) 411. 
29 Section 250 of the Companies Act defines ‘director’ as ‘any person occupying the 
position of director, by whatever name called.’ 
30 Davies and Worthington (n481). In fact, it has long seemed uncontentious that 
the general duties did apply to de facto directors under English law, although the 
factual question of whether an individual can be considered a de facto director has 
been less settled. See for example: Re Canadian Land Reclaiming and Colonizing Co 
(1880) 14 Ch. D. 660; Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills v Chohan 
[2013] EWHC 680 (CH); Vivendi SA v Richards [2013] EWHC 3006.  
31 A single tier board seems to be assumed although not expressly required, see s 
154. 
32 S 155.  
33 Davies and Worthington (n178) 481. 
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internal affairs.34 This arrangement goes some way in facilitating the use of 
a single act to govern companies that vary greatly in size and structure, and 
jurisdictions with more prescriptive statutory regimes tend to have separate 
pieces of legislation to regulate smaller entities.35 The authors further note 
that:  
It is also a point of some theoretical (even ideological) importance: the 
directors’ authority is derived from the shareholders through a process of 
delegation via the articles and not from the separate and free-standing 
grant of authority from the State. This helps to underline the shareholder-
centred nature of British company law.36 
South African law has broken with this tradition, and the Companies Act 
2008 now expressly states that the ‘business and affairs of a company must 
be managed by or under the direction of its board, which has the authority 
to exercise all of the powers and perform any of the functions of the 
company, except to the extent that this Act or the company’s Memorandum 
of Incorporate provides otherwise.’37 The board’s authority is therefore now 
derived from statute and not granted by the shareholders as was previously 
the case.38 It is perhaps ironic that the very piece of legislation introducing 
this change simultaneously abolished South Africa’s Close Corporations Act39  
 
34 See chapter 1, text to note 35. 
35 Davies and Worthington (n178) 481.  
36 Davies and Worthington (n178) 481 cf Susan Watson ‘The significance of the 
source of the powers of boards of directors in UK company law’ (2011) 6 JBL 597 
where the author questions this view, and argues that ‘the allocation of powers to 
boards through the constitution is most likely an anomaly brought about by the 
drafters of the original Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 using as a precedent existing 
deeds of settlement. Accordingly, it is suggested that no significance at all should 
be attached to this point of difference in UK company law and no conclusions about 
the legal relationship between boards and shareholders drawn from the allocation 
of powers being in the constitution rather than the statute.’ See also comments 
below at chapter 8. 
37 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 66(1). 
38  Cassim refers to this ‘original’ authority that the statute now grants as a 
‘concession to reality by acknowledging that the raison d’etre for the appointment 
of a board of director is the management of the company’s business’. Cassim and 
others Contemporary Company Law (n83) 403. 
39 69 of 1984. 
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which catered for smaller entities and gave exactly the autonomy to regulate 
internally that Davies and Worthington refer to above. The original authority 
granted to the board by the Companies Act 2008 in this sense seems 
anathema to the flexibility required when a single piece of legislation seeks 
to regulate companies varied in size and complexity. In this regard however, 
it must be said that although the paradigm shift towards statutory board 
authority may in the long term affect the jurisprudential approach to South 
African company law, the practical manifestations of its English law heritage 
have remained largely intact.40 That is, while directly granting authority, the 
statute remains generally permissive and allows the members of the 
company by means of the constitution, to determine privately what exactly 
its board should look like and what its role should be.41   
The consideration of the legislation above makes it clear that, as far as both 
South African and English law is concerned, the independent non-executive 
director is not a creature of statute - on paper that is, there is no difference 
between the executive and non-executive director.42  This then begs the 
question; how and when did the independent non-executive director 
become a central feature of company boards all over the world, and what 
exactly is it?43  
 
a General Historical Overview  
As the overview in Chapter 1 showed, seventeenth century trading 
companies in Britain (such as the East India Company) were structured to 
resemble modern joint-stock companies. Companies were increasingly 
 
40 It is interesting to note the similarities between the wording of section 66(1) of 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008, and the default provision found in article 3 of the 
UK’s model articles: ‘Subject to the articles, the directors are responsible for the 
management of the company’s business, for which purpose they may exercise all 
the powers of the company.’  
41 See also notes in this regard in chapter 8.  
42 Sweeney-Baird (n12) 69. 
43 See note 12 and sources cited.  
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being transformed into entities that allowed for passive investment by the 
general public.44 As one might expect, the boards of American companies 
initially mimicked the British tradition, and as colonies generally tended to 
adopt the institutions of their European colonisers, the board of directors 
was adopted as a corporate governance tool in numerous other jurisdictions 
as well.45  
As chapter 1 explains, directors of the earliest companies tended to be 
heavily invested in the entities that they served. There were hardly any 
doubts that they would tend to act to the benefit of the company as this 
would align with their own interests, and a supervisory or monitoring board 
was superfluous.46  As joint-stock companies flourished in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century, 47  and became an increasingly popular and 
attractive investment vehicle for ordinary citizens, investors became more 
dispersed and in the face of this more pronounced separation between 
ownership and control, it was initially assumed that companies would be 
managed by their boards of directors.48   
This harks back to what (in America) was called the ‘received legal model’ of 
the corporate board, namely that ‘the board, theoretically elected by the 
shareholders, selects the officers ... sets policy and generally manages the 
business.’49  But as Boyle pointed out some 40 years ago ‘it hardly needs to 
 
44 Baum (n14) 9. 
45 Baum (n14) 9, where the author points out that even ‘Japan, which was never 
colonized, regarded the modern joint-stock corporation with its board as a superior 
form of enterprise for establishing and conducting business. Immediately after the 
Meiji Restoration of 1868, the Japanese government began to promote the 
introduction of a company system, and the first Japanese banks had to be organized 
as joint-stock companies by decree in 1876.’ 
46 Baum (n14) 8. The author notes a parallel development of joint-stock companies 
and corporate boards in Continental Europe, with the Dutch East India Company 
being perhaps the most notable example.  
47 Partly spurred by the creation of the separate legal entity and the phenomenon 
of limited liability which could shelter investors. 
48 Baum (n14) 10. 
49 Boyle (n1) 489, where the author cites W Cary, Corporations-Cases & Materials 
(4th ed Foundation Press 1969) 150. 
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be said that in any serious sense this is not possible for the board of any  
large public corporation’. 50  In fact, even the idea that the board in this 
traditional sense was truly equipped to weigh in on long-term policy and 
more general strategy was often completely unrealistic.51   
This reality manifested as early as the nineteenth century, as an organic split 
developed between professional managers acting as executive directors and 
those offered a seat on the board with no managerial functions attached.52 
In the case of a well-run company, these ‘guinea pig’ directors were largely 
perfunctory, 53  and were in fact often appointed from the ranks of the 
nobility or, in the case of the United States, celebrities or retired generals to 
add lustre to the board and to attract investment, not because they had any 
particular skills to speak of.54  
 
b The Non-Executive Director in American Law and Practice   
 
As corporate scandals rocked the United States in the early twentieth 
century, classic agency dilemmas became more pronounced and led to the 
first calls for some form of a monitoring board that could actually oversee 
the actions of management.55 Regardless, boards continued to play a largely 
 
50 Boyle (n1) 489. 
51 Boyle (n1) 489. 
52 Brenda Hannigan ‘Board failures in the financial crisis - tinkering with codes and 
the need for wider corporate governance reforms: Part 1’ (2011) 32(12) Co Law 
363, 364; Baum (n14) 10.  
53 Boyle (n1) 499 where the author quotes a rather scathing critique by Alex Rubner 
from his work The Ensnared Shareholder (Macmillan 1965) 56: ‘When scrutinizing 
the composition of the boards one must perforce conclude that many of the 
members are not to be taken seriously. The appointment of " guinea-pig directors" 
originated in Britain, where nobles, drawing fees in guineas, lent their names to 
corporations; in order to dupe the public, to whom the presence on the board of a 
member of the aristocracy symbolized business acumen and/or respectable 
management.' 
54 Boyle (n1) 499. See also the discussion in chapter 3 below at text to note   
55 Jeffrey N Gordon ‘The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States’ 1950 – 
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices’ (2007) 59 Stan.L.Rev 1465;  
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passive role in the United States, with members usually nominated by the 
CEO, with the latter often also chosen as chairman of the board. This state 
of affairs naturally left the board relatively impotent; essentially acting at 
the behest of the CEO, and the autonomy of management was all but taken 
for granted.56 
 
Change was finally sparked in the 1970’s by the collapse of Penn Central,57 
and fallout from the Watergate scandal58 which propelled the issue into the 
public domain and main stream politics.59 An academic publication also had 
some impact,60 in the form of Melvin Eisenberg’s famous  ‘The Structure of 
the Corporation’ 61  where the author contended that monitoring senior 
management was the board’s primary mandate. The 1970’s thus saw 
‘managerial elites [make] significant concessions’62 and by the time a series 
of hostile takeovers struck the United States in the 1980’s the monitoring 
board had largely become accepted practice. Based on this, Delaware courts 
 
Baum (n14) 11, where the author refers to the famous example by author William 
O. Douglas: ‘Directors Who Do Not Direct’ (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1305.  
56  Baum (n14) 11; Boyle (n1) 487; Noyes E Leech & Robert H Mundheim ‘The 
Outside Director of the Publicly Held Corporation’ (1976) 31(4) Bus Law 1799, 1811; 
Tricker (n5) 8. 
57 It later transpired that the directors of this major railway company knew precious 
little about the company’s affairs and had done very little to educate themselves. 
For an overview of the scandal what was at the time the biggest bankruptcy in 
American history see:  Stephen Salsbury No Way to Run a Railroad (McGraw-Hill 
1982); Robert Sobel The Fallen Colossus (Weybright and Talley 1977). 
58 Various illegal campaign contributions and bribes came to light following the 
scandal. There have been numerous reviews of the events. See for example: 
Michael Schudson ‘Notes on Scandal and the Watergate Legacy’ (2004) 47(9) 
Am.B.Sci 1231; Keith Olson Watergate: the presidential scandal that shook America 
(University Press of Kansas 2003); Michael Schudson Watergate in American 
memory: how we remember, forget, and reconstruct the past (BasicBooks 1992). 
59 Baum (n14) 13; Boyle (n1) 493. 
60 Baum (n14) 13 
61 Melvyn Eisenberg The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis (Little, Brown 
& Co. 1976).  
62 Baum (n14) 13. 
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tended to defer to the decision of the board provided that it functioned 
along these newly accepted lines.63 
 
Summarising these developments in 1978, Boyle observed that the 
increased focus on the duties and real powers of the North American non-
executive, was part of an attempt to introduce a ‘new institutional check 
(into the traditional, corporate structure) in order to prevent corporate 
abuses and plain mismanagement. It has been seen as a type of internal self-
regulation designed to prevent such abuses arising in the first place – as 
opposed to seeking remedies to cure them after the event (with an 
attendant blaze of publicity)’.64 
The spate of corporate scandals during the early 2000s65 was largely blamed 
on failings on the part of external gatekeepers but nevertheless exposed the 
shortcomings of a governance system that by then had fully embraced the 
independent board as monitor.66 In spite of this lawmakers in the United 
States remained committed to the precept and responded by requiring 
increased independence on the part of company boards.67 
In fact, by 2010 boards in the United States ostensibly gave the notion of 
director independence such credence that companies opted voluntarily for 
so-called ‘super-majority’ boards, with only a single director (usually the 
CEO) not being an independent director.68  
 
 
 
63  Baum (n14) 15; Rodrigues (n7) 456. See also chapter 6 and 7 for additional 
observations regarding the judiciary’s deference to the board at Chapter 6 text to 
notes 105 – 108 and Chapter 7 page text to note 80 onwards. 
64 Boyle (n1) 487. 
65 See chapter 1 at note 3 and sources cited.  
66  Baum (n14) 15; Rita Esen ‘Managing and monitoring: the dual role of non-
executive directors on U.K and U.S boards’ (2000) 11(6) ICCLR 202; 203.  And see: 
Gordon (n55) 1465, where the author attributes the prevalence of the independent 
director in the US context to an increased emphasis on shareholder primacy.  
67 Baum (n14) 16; Gordon (n55) 1465.   
68 Baum (n14) 17 emphases added; Rodrigues (n7) 457. 
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c The Non-Executive Director in English and European Law and 
Practice   
 
Across the pond, the United Kingdom embraced the monitoring board at a 
much later stage, and it was at first spurred by industry as opposed to 
government intervention.69 Change was prompted by the publication of the 
Cadbury Report in 1992. 70  As mentioned, the report, prepared by the 
Committee on Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance under the 
chairmanship of Sir Adrian Cadbury, was influential and quickly gained 
international attention. 71  As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, it 
effectively represents the beginning of the corporate governance 
movement.72 The report singled out dominant company CEO’s as a specific 
threat to good corporate governance and in response made various 
suggestions to counter this balance of power such as the inclusion of a 
sufficient number of independent non-executive directors to the board.73 
The original report was subsequently reviewed a number of times,74 before 
emerging as the UK Corporate Governance Code in 2010, 75  which 
recommended that ‘the board and its committees should have the 
appropriate balance of skills, experience, independence and knowledge of 
 
69  See for example the PRO NED project backed by the Bank of England, the 
Confederation of British Industry and the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee 
and The Stock Exchange. EJ Jacobs ‘Non-executive directors’ 1987 JBL 269, 269. 
70 David Walker A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial 
industry entities: Final recommendations (2009) available online at 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives. 
gov.uk/+/www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf. And see: Esen 
‘Managing and Monitoring’ (n66) 203. 
71 Baum (n14) 22. The Cadbury Report is considered one of the main catalysts for 
the development of a Corporate Governance Code in South Africa. See chapter 1 
note 104.  
72 Davies and Worthington (n178) 392. 
73 Davies and Worthington (n178) 391. 
74 For an overview of these developments see: Hannigan (n52) 364; Baum (n14) 22. 
75 See also Chapter 1 note 104 for further comments regarding the history and 
development of both the UK and the SA codes of governance.  
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the company to enable them to discharge their respective duties and 
responsibilities effectively’.76 
 
The Higgs Review, published in January 2003, considered the role of the non-
executive director and offered detailed guidance with the eye on avoiding 
further ‘Enron – like’ disasters.77 The review led to a ‘radical reshaping of the 
board’ with an increased emphasis on a more dynamic role for the 
independent non-executive director. 78   Following this, a new-found 
emphasis on skill and expertise, and modified approach to independence 
were introduced in response to the apparent failings on the part of 
independent non-executive directors identified by the Walker Review which 
was commissioned to investigate the issue following the 2007/2008 financial 
crisis.79 The reforms following the financial crisis show a departure from a 
strict approach to the more absolutist approach to independence adhered 
to by the United States. This largely remains the case even after the major 
losses brought about by the events of 2007/2008, with independent 
directors having apparently ‘achieved an almost cult-like status as a magic 
cure for a variety of corporate governance ills.’80 
 
As outlined in chapter 1, following the lead of the Cadbury Report, most 
European Union Member states now boast similar corporate governance 
codes, operating on a comply or explain basis. It also gradually became a 
European standard that boards of directors should consist of at least some 
 
76 Main Principle B, Corporate Governance Code 2014. The Principle is the same in 
the 2010,2012, 2014, and 2018 editions of the CGC. 
77 Derek Higgs Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors (2003) 
available online at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20080726222758/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file
23012.pdf And see: Paul Burke ‘The Higgs Review’ (2003) 24(6) Co Law 162.  
78 Burke (n77) 162. 
79 David Walker A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial 
industry entities: Final recommendations (2009) available online at 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk 
/+/www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf. 
80 Baum (n14) 3. 
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independent non-executive directors. 81  A non-binding 2005 
Recommendation by the European Commission82 closely follows what was 
then the UK Combined Code and calls for ‘an appropriate balance of 
executive/managing and non-executive/supervisory directors such that no 
individual or small group of individuals can dominate decision making’.83 The 
financial crisis of 2008 sparked stricter regulation and following a 2014 
Directive it is now mandatory for a majority of independent directors and an 
independent chair to populate audit committees of public interest 
companies.84 
 
d The Non-Executive Director in South African Law and Practice 
 
As the overview of the statutory definitions above shows, South Africa’s 
Companies Act does not differentiate between executive and non-executive 
directors, nor does it demand that any members of the board are in any way 
independent. The predecessors of the 2008 Act likewise made no such 
distinctions, although it is clear from case law that there have been 
distinctions between executive and non-executive directors in practice for 
 
81 Baum (n14) 3. 
82 Commission Recommendation (2005/162/EC) of 15 February 2005 on the role of 
non-executive 
or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the 
(supervisory) board, 
OJ L 52/51 available online at https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-
detail/-/publication/1e430f30-7d2f-4036-8ee4-f302913bdbff [accessed on 
03/09/2018]. 
83 Section 3.1; Commission Recommendation (2005/162/EC) of 15 February 2005 
on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and on 
the committees of the (supervisory) board, OJ L 52/51 available online at 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1e430f30-
7d2f-4036-8ee4-f302913bdbff [accessed on 03/09/2018]. 
84 Directive 2014/56/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 
2014 amending Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and 
consolidated accounts, [2014] OJ L158/196 available online at 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1e430f30-
7d2f-4036-8ee4-f302913bdbff [accessed on 03/09/2018]. 
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some time, and debate about whether or not this practical distinction should 
be recognised by the courts.  
In the landmark case of Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v 
Jorgensen and Another85 Morgan J confirmed that the extent of the duty of 
care that a director owes his/her company would depend on the nature of 
the company’s business and the obligations of that director. The court relied 
specifically on the famous English case of In re City Equitable Fire Insurance 
Co. 86  as basis for this and the concomitant conclusion that one must 
therefore distinguish between the executive and non-executive director. 
The latter, according to the court, has duties that are of an intermittent 
nature, to be exercised when attending meetings from time to time – 
although no obligation to attend all meetings exists.87  
As far as the non-executive director is concerned, Morgan J remarked 
further that: ‘Nowhere are his duties and qualifications listed as being equal 
to those of an auditor or accountant. Nor is he required to have special 
business acumen or expertise, or singular ability or intelligence, or even 
experience in the business of the company’.88 However, a director’s actual 
knowledge or skill set will be used as a measure when judging his actions.  It 
is perhaps notable that the case was decided before the corporate 
governance movement gained traction and as such, before the office of the 
independent non-executive director was imbued with the responsibilities 
that now define it. 
In the subsequent decision of Howard v Herrigel,89 Goldstone AJ reverted to 
a more traditional approach, commenting that: ‘it is unhelpful and even 
misleading to classify company directors as “executive” or “non-executive” 
 
85 1980 (4) SA 156 (W). 
86 [1925] Ch 407. 
87 At page 165 par [H]. 
88 At page 166 par [A]. The court relies on In re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and 
Estates Ltd (1911) 1 Ch 425 at 437, to support its conclusion. 
89 [1991] 2 All SA 113 (A).  
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for purposes of ascertaining their duties to the company or when any 
specific or affirmative action is required of them.’90 The court pointed out 
that statute recognised no distinction between executive and non-executive 
directors and reiterated that, at common law, accepting an appointment as 
a director renders one a fiduciary in relation to the company with a 
concomitant obligation to display the utmost good faith regardless of 
whether one is an executive or a non-executive director. Although one must 
necessarily take into account the fact and circumstances of each case when 
applying this general rule to any particular incumbent director, Goldstone JA 
concluded that ‘it is not helpful to say of a particular director that, because 
he was not an “executive director”, his duties were less onerous than they 
would have been if he were an executive director. Whether the inquiry be 
one in relation to negligence, reckless conduct or fraud, the legal rules are 
the same for all directors.’ 91 Whether this approach remains viable in light 
of the evolved role of the non-executive director is entirely debatable.  
It can be said that the distinction between the executive and non-executive 
director became a more formalised industry staple with the introduction of 
the first King Code on Corporate Governance in 1994. Recently, King IV 
reconsidered its approach to the independent non-executive in line with 
international trends. It requires that the ‘governing body should comprise 
the appropriate balance of knowledge, skills, experience, diversity and 
independence for it to discharge its governance role and responsibilities 
objectively and effectively.’92 Like its UK counterpart, it stipulates that the 
 
90 At page 130. 
91 At page 131. These observations of the court must prompt one to ask whether 
this approach is still valid today given the very different roles played by executive 
and non-executive directors, and indeed the key role played by the independent 
non-executive director.  
92 King IV, Principle 7. 
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governing body should comprise a majority of non-executive members, 
most of whom should be independent.93 
 
Of particular concern in the South African context is the fact that directors 
are often ‘over boarded’.94 Various reasons are given for this – such as a lack 
of qualified candidates – and it arguably leaves industry with the complex 
responsibility to overcome the dilemma. The phenomenon is not unique to 
South Africa however, 95 and is also merely one of the concerns that have 
been raised in relation to the role and efficiency of the independent non-
executive director.  
 
4 Challenges and Criticisms 
 
Perhaps the most apparent practical, or technical challenge when 
considering director independence is the opaque nature of the concept 
itself.96 In fact, for a concept as ubiquitous in such a variety of regulatory 
 
93 King IV, Recommended Practice 8. A ‘substance-over-form’ approach is endorsed 
for purposes of determining whether a director is independent. See Recommended 
Practice 28.  
94 Inoxico. 2013. The Inoxico Director Singularity Index: Research Report. Available 
online at:  http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/The_Inox 
ico_Director_Singularity_Index_-_2013_Research_Report/ $FILE/Innoxico.pdf. 
[Accessed 4 April 2019]. See also:  Nadia Mans-Kemp, Suzette Viviers & Sian Collins 
‘Exploring the causes and consequences of director overboardedness in an 
emerging market’ (2018) 15 IJ&G 210, where the authors highlight that there are 
two schools of thought in relation to overboardedness. The ‘experience hypothesis’ 
proposes that multiple directorships results in invaluable experience and access to 
vast social networks and resources. On the other hand, proponent of the ‘business 
hypothesis’ argue that directors will be unable to properly fulfil their functions if 
they serve on too many boards simultaneously.  
95 Rita Esen ‘Chartered director qualification: professionalism on UK Boards’ (2000) 
21(9) Co Law 287; 288. And see: Jeremy C Kress ‘Board to Death: How Busy 
Directors Could Cause the Next Financial 
Crisis’ (2018) 59(3) Boston College L Rev 877. 
96 See in general in this regard: Ringe ‘Beyond "Independent" Directors’ (n3) 1553. 
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instruments, it is surprising that the exact significance and precise meaning 
of ‘independence’ has been given so little theoretical consideration.97 
Independence is of course, no more than a means to an end, constructed to 
achieve a particular purpose. It may be implemented to counter the classic 
agency conflict between managers and a dispersed shareholder body.98 If 
this is the case, independence from management and specifically the 
influential CEO ‘of the stereotypical US Berle-Means corporation’ is probably 
the dominant criterion.  If, on the other hand, independence is aimed at 
protecting minority shareholders from potential abuses being perpetrated 
by controlling block shareholders (as is more common in typical Continental 
European or many Asian companies) independence from the dominant 
shareholder is by far the most important concern. 99  As such, different 
jurisdictions define (or at least attempt to define) independence to reflect 
the realities of their context. There are commonalities, such as the fact that 
the independent director must usually be non-executive (ie. not part of the 
company’s management team).100  
Like definitions related to the term, the role of the independent non-
executive is unclear in many jurisdictions.101  The UK Corporate Governance 
Code 2018 expects non-executive directors to provide ‘constructive 
challenge, strategic guidance, offer specialist advice and hold management 
to account.’102 It also envisages a ‘prime role’ for non-executive directors in 
appointing and removing executive directors.’ In particular, non-executive 
directors should ‘scrutinise and hold to account the performance of 
 
97 Baum (n14) 5.  
98 See further on the ‘agency dilemma’ chapter 6 at text to note 92. 
99  Baum (n14) 4. And see: Harvey Gelb ‘Corporate Governance and the 
Independence Myth’ (2006) 6 Wyo. L. Rev. 129 where the author laments the 
inconsistent approach to personal and professional ties that might radically 
undermine independence.  
100 Baum (n14) 5. 
101 Le Mire (n6) 6. 
102 UK Corporate Governance Code: Principle H.  
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management and individual directors against agreed performance 
objectives.’103  
There are tensions inherent to the role as it is carved out by the code but the 
constraints that potentially prevent the independent non-executive director 
from fulfilling his functions optimally are as old as the office itself.104 Chief 
among these are constraints of time and information. At a time when 
countries like the United Kingdom were only starting to opt into a system 
reliant on the independent non-executive director, it was already apparent 
to many that, given the time allowed for meetings and preparation it was 
‘clearly impossible to expect the board, whatever the law may say to 
“manage a corporation”’.105  
 
In fact it is partly this state of affairs that inspired Eisenberg’s emphasis on 
the monitoring function of the board; the argument that companies had 
become too big and too intricate to be managed by persons committing only 
a few working days a year.106 He concluded that this ‘precludes the board 
from making business policy: In a complex organisation, concerned with 
 
103 UK Corporate Governance Code: Provision 13. See also Le Mire (n6) 7: where the 
author argues in favour of a role defined by four main aspects, namely the non-
executive as a monitor, strategist, resource-gatherer and colleague. Yet even in an 
explanation of what each aspect entails the inherent tensions remain undeniable. 
It is practically difficult to be a monitor and a colleague, for example.  
104 See for example a comprehensive analysis by Brudney (n12) 597. And see: Elke 
Hellinx ‘Steeplechase in the boardroom: the obstacles for non-executive directors 
to fulfil their role in public companies’ (2017) 38(1) Co Law 15; Sarah Kiarie ‘Non-
executive directors in UK listed companies: are they effective? (2007) 18(1) 
ICCLR17; Roberta Karmel, ‘Is the Independent Director Model Broken?’ (2013–14) 
37 Seattle Law Review 775. 
105 Boyle (n1) 491. And see: Ran Duchin, John G Matsusaka & Oguzhan Ozbas ‘When 
are outside directors effective?’ (2010) 96 JFE 195 where the findings support the 
conclusion that the effectiveness of the outside director depends on the cost of 
acquiring information about the firm, with outside directors being most effective 
where information cost is low.  
106 Esen relates the following remark by a US SEC Chairman which captures the 
sentiment: ‘I don’t care how talented you are, you can’t be a good watchdog if 
you’re only on patrol three times a year.’ Esen (n66) 205. 
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complex choices, policy cannot be developed on a part-time basis.’107  A 
further constraint was the fact that management tended to provide 
independent non-executives with inadequate information, added to the fact 
that they tended not to have their own resources and staff, or separate 
access to company auditors and related information. And such control over 
the information presented, was really tantamount to power over the 
decision itself. 108  In other words, the fact that the director is independent, 
paradoxically left him/her to rely on information provided by or at least 
under the direction of management. The paradox is especially evident in the 
case of super-majority boards in the United States.  As independent 
directors have no direct relationship with the company, an entirely 
independent board relies heavily on guidance and information curated by 
the CEO - with the ironic result that ‘independency creates dependency’. 109 
Following the Higgs report, Nolan also argued that independent non-
executive directors should be given the more focussed task of monitoring 
management in general and controlling the executive directors’ conflicts of 
interest in particular, and that they should not continue to have any 
noteworthy management functions in addition.110  
 
A further challenge was the fact that independent directors tended to be 
somehow linked to the company’s chief executive and often had an interest 
in maintaining his goodwill.111  This often remains the case, and as South 
African author Ramani Naidoo pointed out, non-executive directors are still 
 
107  Melvin A Eisenberg ‘Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern 
Corporation’ (1975) 63 California Law Review 379. And see: Brudney (n12) 612; 
Esen (n66) 205. 
108  Boyle (n1) 492. And see: Reggy Hooghiemstra & Jaap van Manen ‘The 
Independence Paradox: (im)possibilities facing non-executive directors in The 
Netherlands’ (2004) 12(3) Corporate Governance: An International Review 314. 
109 Baum (n14) 17 emphases added.  
110 Richard C Nolan ‘The Legal Control of Directors’ Conflicts of Interest in the United 
Kingdom: Non-Executive Directors Following the Higgs Report’ (2005) 6 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 413, 414.  
111 Esen (n66) 205. 
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rarely picked for their ability to challenge management; ‘[o]n the contrary, 
they are more often chosen for their business, personal or political ties, or 
for their ability to add symbolic lustre to a company’s board. Since they are 
selected by management, paid by management and, most importantly, 
informed by management, it is relatively easy for directors to become 
captive to management’s point of view.’112  
 
Following the financial crisis, the Walker report highlighted failings such as a 
lack of basic insight and understanding of the businesses whose affairs the 
independent directors were overseeing – perhaps an even deeper concern 
in the context of banks and other financial services providers with complex 
and volatile schemes and products.113 The time it would take to truly grasp 
these matters may well require such a commitment from the non-executive 
director that his/her independence could be undermined. These are not the 
only conflicts inherent to the position. For example, an effective relationship 
between the executives and the independent non-executives is premised on 
some level of trust which is undermined by the fact that the independent 
non-executive is required to act as ‘whistle-blower’.114  
 
112  Ramani Naidoo Corporate Governance: An Essential Guide for South African 
Companies (Juta 2002) 105. And see: Esen (n66) 205. 
113 David Walker A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial 
industry entities: Final recommendations (2009) available online at 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives. gov. 
uk/+/www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf at page 43. In fact, 
these concerns were raised by others in relation to the banking sector specifically 
some time before the financial crisis hit. See for example: Adrian Buckley and 
Mattheus van der Nat ‘Derivatives and the Non-executive Director’ (2003) 21(3) 
Eur.n Manag. J 389.  
114 Sweeney-Baird (n12) 71. And see for example on the so-called ‘structural bias’ 
that arises when directors in the American context are called upon to determine 
whether derivative suits against colleagues should proceed: Kenneth B Davis Jr 
‘Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committees and the Vagaries of Director 
Independence’ (2005) 90 Iowa Law Review 1305. See also: Hellinx (n104) 17 where 
the author highlights contradictions in the core functions of the independent non-
executive director. However, cf Leech and Mundheim (n56) 1805, where the 
authors pointed out that the monitoring role does not imply that the non-executive 
director should substitute their own judgement for that of management, but also 
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Despite these paradoxes, the independent non-executive’s role is ‘most 
often assumed to be monolithic, fixed and even universal’. There is an 
assumption that an increase in independent directors obviously improves 
corporate governance although the manner of these improvements is rarely 
considered. Accepting all this, on what appears to be blind faith alone, has 
often resulted in the discussion surrounding the independent director being 
reduced to ‘a myopic consideration of the appropriate proportion of 
independent directors that should be on boards’. 115 
  
Those most cynical might even argue that the independent non-executive 
director was never anything more than a shield, allowing company managers 
to escape liability and that it did not change the grass roots reality that 
management was calling the shots. Critics have argued that modern board 
structures, dominated by the monitoring board, is nothing more than a 
smoke screen, or façade of corporate governance which creates a dangerous 
and false sense of security.116 Boards with managerial powers held at least 
the advantage that the centre of corporate power was clear and you could 
know the proverbial enemy.  
Despite such doom and gloom, some remain more positive about the role of 
the independent non-executive, and contend that expertise can be a useful 
partner to independence,117 and that the solution lies in a more practical 
analysis of board dynamics – with the most successful boards being those 
 
crucially, that the monitoring role does not necessarily imply and adversary attitude 
toward management.  
115 Baum (n14) 6. Most studies on the impact of the independent non-executive on 
performance find only ‘small, statistically insignificant correlations’ see: Duchin and 
others (n105) 196. However, cf Pornsit Jiraport at al ‘How do independent directors 
view powerful CEO’s? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment’ (2016) 16 Fin. R. 
L. 268.  
116 LE Mitchell, ‘The Trouble with Boards’, in F. C. Kieff and T. A. Paredes (eds.), 
Perspectives on Corporate Governance (Cambridge UP 2010) 17.  
117 Le Mire (n6) 1. The author makes a clear case that the regulatory focus on 
expertise ‘lacks sophistication and coherence’ and identifies three particular 
strands of expertise that are relevant in the context of the company board.  
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where directors work together in a collegial but rigorous manner. They argue 
that the various roles of the independent non-executive should compliment 
each other and should not be seen as inherently contradictory.118 It is also 
telling that, despite the many criticisms, the drafters of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code have not chosen to jettison the independent non-
executive as a foundational concept but have instead chosen to refine the 
role slightly, with added emphasis on skills and the fact that independence 
should not undermine the fact that the board should be fit for purpose.119 
The UK Code speaks directly to some of the concerns raised above.120 It 
requires that the board should ‘include an appropriate combination of 
executive and non-executive (and in particular, independent non-executive) 
directors, such that no one individual or small group of individuals 
dominates the board’s decision-making. 121  Although there is no limit 
imposed on the number of boards any one director may sit on, the principles 
do insist that non-executive directors should have sufficient time to meet 
their responsibilities.122 
In summation, independence often comes at a cost. Most notably, a certain 
lack of credibility as one must question internal processes from the position 
of outsider. 123  Matters are complicated further by the fact that the 
knowledge of the company, and entrenchment in its processes that may be 
required to challenge these perceptions will often negate the sought after 
independence.  
 
118 John Roberts, Terry McNulty and Philip Stiles, ‘Beyond Agency Conceptions of 
the Work of the Non- 
Executive Director: Creating Accountability in the Boardroom’ (2005) 16 Br. J. 
Manag S5, S6. 
119 Hannigan (n52) 363. 
120 Many of the issues were also dealt with in previous iterations of the Code in 
response to the reviews prompted by the 2007/2008 financial crisis. For an 
overview of these developments see: Hannigan (n52) 364. 
121 UK Corporate Governance Code: Principle G. 
122 UK Corporate Governance Code: Principle G. 
123 Esen (n66) 205; Ian GC Stratton ‘Non-executive directors: are they superfluous? 
(1996) 17(6) Co Law 162.  
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As long ago as 1976 Leech and Mundheim lamented the fact that the CEO 
regarded the board as ‘his board’: members were selected (in fact though 
not in law) because they would not rock the boat, information was carefully 
curated and agendas were set to be as uncontroversial as possible. At the 
time the authors remained hopeful that these practices and attitudes could 
change but warned that it would not be enough to encourage the chief 
executive to ‘want to have a board which does an effective monitoring 
job’.124  Instead, they emphasised that ‘the only effective instrument for 
change is the institutionalization of processes that make it mandatory for the 
chief executive to account to a strong board’.125 The authors at the time 
made the crucial point that ‘[a]s a practical matter, these responsibilities can 
only be fulfilled if accountability rests on institutional procedures rather than 
on the willingness of an outside director individually to take unpleasant 
initiatives at board meetings or otherwise appear to be acting in a personally 
hostile manner.’ 126   
It would again appear that the more things change, the more they stay the 
same. Following the financial crisis and the volumes of research that it 
sparked, it is surprising how these observations remain as relevant as they 
had been some 40 years ago.127  And it is arguably exactly in this regard that 
the corporate governance codes have a more pronounced role to play. Much 
of the codes have in mind exactly the institutionalised mechanisms that 
would ensure that the independent non-executive is able to properly 
function in the complex role that is ascribed to him. The challenge remains 
the fact that in many instances executives and management are loath to 
 
124 Leech and Mundheim (n56) 1826. And see: Boyle (n1) 492 where the author 
echoes these sentiments.  
125 Leech and Mundheim (n56) 1826 (emphasis added). 
126 Leech and Mundheim (n56) 1826. Though they do also contend that the non-
executive should himself insist on the processes being put in place in an 
acknowledgement of the new dimensions of his/her role. 
127 It bears mention that the emphasis was on the role of the non-executive in 
representing the interests of the shareholders as his main constituency and as such 
it does not hold sway in the context of the United Kingdom and modern approaches 
to the director’s role without some qualification.  
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institutionalise a process that would see them face actual and dynamic 
monitoring by a strong board and especially by objective, well-informed and 
skilled non-executive directors. As long as it is possible for the very 
mechanism aimed at ensuring efficient functioning of the role to be scoffed 
of as a box-ticking exercise it remains doubtful whether the independent 
non-executive will truly be able to live up to expectations.   
5 Conclusion 
 
It has been said that ‘there are no ‘mysteries in the work of the board that 
require a particularly 'professional' approach in its outside directors.’ No 
school-or profession-can supply the principal qualities of the effective 
outside director. The best qualities are ‘general business experience, an 
enquiring and mind and strength of character’. ’128 
 
For skills that can’t be taught, those required by the independent non-
executive are highly prized and, perhaps understandably, not something one 
can kick out from behind every bush. This chapter considered the history of 
the office of the independent non-executive director and highlighted the 
high premium that the corporate governance community place on it. 
However, despite the office being such a strong feature of corporate 
governance codes and a mainstay of company boards worldwide, it is not to 
say that the in independent non-executive is in fact able to safeguard good 
governance. There is a dearth of empirical support for staffing boards with 
independent directors which belies the ‘faith and fortune internationally 
placed on board independence as well as the corresponding enthusiasm of 
policymakers to promote and enforce it.’ 129  It would appear that the 
continuity of the status quo is based on little more than blind faith and is not 
anchored in data and rationality.  
 
128 Leech and Mundheim (n56) 1811. 
129 Baum (n14) 33. 
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However, given that a board of directors with at least some form of 
monitoring functions is as old as the joint stock corporation itself, it could as 
likely be that ‘the concept of the monitoring board may, like democracy, only 
be a second best option – but yet better than any alternative.’ 130     
 
The question then becomes, how does one regulate this ‘second best’ option 
to ensure that it is functioning optimally? One possibility is an (arguably) 
more onerous approach to the interpretation of directors’ duties, taking 
cognisance of the emphasis that is placed on the monitoring role that these 
directors play. In applying and interpreting not only the duties but also the 
business judgement rule and other ‘safe harbour’ provisions,131 should the 
courts in some way bear in mind the requirements of the very codes that 
have given the independent non-executive director the almost cult-like 
status that he now enjoys?  
It may be that this added emphasis will give independent non-executives 
pause before accepting appointment and may force them to engage in a 
meaningful way with both the governance reports and the company’s, 
managers and executives that they monitor.  Might it also serve to empower 
the non-executive? By ensuring that the governance systems proposed by 
the voluntary codes, that would entrench the position of a strong and 
dynamic board are truly embraced, could such an approach perhaps ensure 
that the voice of the independent non-executive gains greater legitimacy in 
the boardroom? There are also further concerns. As will be considered and 
expounded upon in subsequent chapters, a balance must be struck when 
monitoring company directors. Amongst other things, the efficiencies 
created by delegation could well be undermined by an inappropriate 
number of checks and balances being put in place. Add to this, general 
perceptions regarding company law and the role of the regulator when 
 
130 Baum (n14) 33. 
131 See discussion in Chapter 7 below at note 80 onwards.  
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formulating it, and it becomes clear that it will be no simple task to keep a 
tighter leash on the watchdog.  
The following chapters will consider in greater detail, two pertinent 
directors’ duties – identified in chapter 1, before turning to the 
constitutional and normative constraints that pertain to their interpretation. 
Where applicable, further reference will be made to the independent non-
executive director, and the matter will be considered in conclusion, in 
chapter 8. 
69 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
THE DUTY OF CARE AND SKILL 
 
[T]here is a clear public perception that rogue individuals have managed to get 
away with the unimaginable, and managed this simply because of the lack of 
appropriate supervision by their corporate directors and senior managers. The 
non-lawyer’s immediate response is that directors ought to be made liable to the 
company for such failures. The lawyer is less optimistic: the standard of care 
required of company directors is widely regarded as so low as to be derisory.1 
 
1 Introduction and Context 
 
As mentioned briefly in chapter 1, the duty of care and skill is one of the 
mechanisms of constraint imposed upon company directors to ensure that 
they manage the affairs of the company with an appropriate degree of 
attention. The broad question that the research considers is whether it is 
constitutionally tenable and/or normatively desirable for the courts to 
consult voluntary codes of governance when interpreting and applying this 
duty – potentially even to the extent of ‘reading in’ the former’s contents.2 
The duty of care and skill offers fruitful grounds for consideration. 
Traditionally, it has been confined to a dusty corner and rarely used. 3 
 
1 Sarah Worthington, 'The Duty to Monitor: A Modern View of the Director's Duty 
of Care' in F Patfield F (ed), Perspectives on Company Law: 2 (Kluwer Law 
International 1997) 181. 
2  The term is used informally here to denote an interpretation which would 
consider the principles contained in the Code to comprehensively inform the duty 
(both in common law and the codified version thereof). 
3  Worthington, 'The Duty to Monitor’ (n1) 181 where the author notes that 
‘[h]istorically, all has hung on directors’ fiduciary duties’.  See in the context of 
South Africa also: Natasha Bouwman ‘An appraisal of the modification of the 
director’s duty of care and skill’ (2009) SA Merc LJ 509, 526. Currently it is only in 
the case of Niagara (in liquidation) v Langerman & Others 1913 WLD 188 that 
directors have been held liable for a breach of the duty of care and skill. This is also 
the case in many other European jurisdictions, see: Carsten Gerner-Beuerle and 
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Despite this it provides an interesting ‘case study’ for the potential impact 
of the corporate governance code. On the one hand, it allows one to 
consider whether the importation of governance norms might serve to 
invigorate and redefine the duty itself. On the other hand, it allows one to 
speculate on the exact practical impact that such an approach to 
interpretation might have.  
To this end the following analysis will investigate the roots and development 
of the duty of care and skill and identify how this duty has been moulded 
over time. If one aims to consider the role that voluntary governance codes 
might play in developing the duty in future (and indeed any potential impact 
that it might have had on its development to date) it is important to 
understand the underlying philosophy that has driven the judiciary to 
develop the duty in the manner that it has done.  
The analysis of this chapter will focus on the substance and application of 
the duty of care as such. It will become clear that its exact scope and 
contents remain uncertain and somewhat fluid, in both the South African 
and English legal contexts.4 It is also apparent that the courts have adapted 
their interpretation of the duty to better accord with prevailing societal 
attitudes and expectations. This is significant as far as the central question 
of this thesis is concerned as it would, at least at first glance, appear as 
 
Edmund-Philipp Schuster ‘The evolving structure of directors' duties in Europe’ 
(2014) 15(2) EBOR 191, 199. 
4 This area of the law has generated significant debate and commentary. Leading 
texts and comments include: Paul L Davies & Sarah Worthington Gower’s Principles 
of Modern Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell 2016 10th ed) 478; Keay A Directors’ 
Duties (Jordan 2009) chapter 8 at 173; Simon Mortimore (ed) Company Directors – 
Duties, Liabilities, and Remedies (Oxford 2017 3rd Ed) 328; Brenda Hannigan, 
Company Law (4th edn, Oxford 2016) 236; Joan Loughrey (ed) Directors’ Duties and 
Shareholder Litigation in the Wake of the Financial Crisis (Edward Elgar 2013); A 
Walters ‘Directors’ Duties: the impact of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 
1986’ (2000) 21(4) Co Law 110; C A Riley ‘The Company Director’s Duty of Care and 
Skill: The Case for an Onerous but Subjective Standard’ (1999) 26(5) MLR 697; 
Vanessa Finch ‘Company Directors: Who Cares About Skill and Care?’ (1999) 55(2) 
MLR 179; Susan Watson & Andrew Willekes ‘Economic loss and directors' 
negligence’ (2001) JBL 217. 
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though the duty of care and skill remains ripe for further development.5 If 
this is accepted, the question this research seeks to answer is whether the 
more detailed and (potentially) more onerous standards propagated by the 
governance codes are perhaps the next step, particularly as far as 
independent non-executive directors are concerned. At its core, the 
question relates to the standard of care and how this is to be determined.  
An approach that favours an outright objective standard, for example, is 
arguably more suited towards an interpretation that takes into account the 
principles espoused by the self-regulatory codes.6 Pinning down a particular 
standard also raises the ubiquitous question of whether the duty should be 
merely a so-called ‘norm reflecting’ duty or whether it should, to the 
contrary, be a so-called ‘norm setting’ duty? 7   In this regard, Loughrey 
suggests that a more objective standard indicates that the duty is norm-
setting, but points out that the courts may nevertheless remain reluctant to 
find directors liable for conduct that fails to conform to existing market 
norms. The author observes that a standard of care set at a level that is 
higher ‘than that adopted by the market at the relevant time may be viewed 
as too onerous, and as creating the risk that people may be deterred from 
taking up directorial positions or from engaging in risky behaviour that drives 
entrepreneurial behaviour and the economy’.8  
What Loughrey captures are the critical balancing acts to which 
developments such as the so-called ‘business judgement rule’9 also speak: 
how to regulate and curb the power of company directors and establish 
 
5 Most commentators who have considered the duty of care and skill (or the duty 
of care, skill, and diligence as it is now) have concluded unanimously that it requires 
some reform. See discussion below at text to note 107 – note 135 and sources cited. 
6 See however below the approach suggested by Riley and comments at text to note 
112. 
7 Loughrey (ed) (n4) 39. And see: Bryan Clark ‘The director’s duty of skill and care: 
subjective, objective or both?’ (1999) 27 Scots Law Times 239. 
8 Loughrey (ed) (n4) 39.  
9 See further the discussion on the ‘business judgement rule’ in chapter 7 at 203. 
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accountability on the one hand, without stifling robust and forward-thinking 
management on the other.  
Given the impact of English law on especially this part of South African 
company law, the development of the duty of care and skill will be discussed 
with reference to both South African and English precedent. Recent 
developments in both jurisdictions have resulted in some divergence, which 
the second part of this chapter will highlight and consider. 10  Finally, an 
overview of the debates and criticisms surrounding the duty of care and skill 
is provided, and some reference made to the potential practical impact of 
the provisions of King IV.  
 
2 History and Early Development 
 
The earliest decisions concerned with breaches of the duty of care and skill 
in English law, show an ‘undemanding’ standard.11 In fact, these judgements 
will appear quite startling to the modern legal scholar.12 There are several 
examples that illustrate how famously low the courts set the bar.13 So, a 
director escaped liability based on the fact that he was ‘a country gentleman 
and not a skilled accountant’.14 Ignorance proved an effective defence also 
to the Marquis of Bute (who inherited the directorship from his father at the 
tender age of six months),15 and the directors of a rubber company who 
 
10  Most notably, the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 and the 
Companies Act 2006 in the United Kingdom and the Companies Act 71 of 2008 in 
South Africa. 
11 Keay Directors’ Duties (n4) 182. And see: Blanaid Clarke ‘Duty of care, skill and 
diligence – from warm baths to hot water’ (2016) 56 Irish Jurist 139,152; Clark (n7) 
239. 
12 Walters (n4) 111. See also Loughrey (ed) (n4) 12. 
13 Historically, a plaintiff would have to prove ‘gross’ negligence to hold a director 
liable. See for example: Giblin v Mc Mullen (1868) 2 LR 2 PC 317; Overend & Gurney 
Co v Gibb (1872) LR 5 HL 480; Lagunas Nitrate Co v Lagunas Syndicate [1899] 2 Ch 
392. See also: Mortimore (ed) (n4) 328. 
14 Re Denham & Co. (1883) 25 Ch.D. 752. 
15 Re Cardiff Savings Bank [1892] 2 Ch. 101. 
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could undertake to manage the corporation ‘in complete ignorance of 
everything connected with rubber, without incurring responsibility for the 
mistakes which may result from such ignorance.’16  
These decisions, however, would not have confounded the man on the 
street as they merely reflected the cultural conceptions of the time.17  In 
reference to Brazilian Rubber Plantations Lord Hoffman noted that no-one 
would have expected the directors to have troubled themselves with the 
viability of a rubber business as such technical matters were not their 
concern. ‘They were fund-raisers, lending their names, titles and 
respectability in inviting the public to subscribe for shares. And sophisticated 
Edwardian investors would have had no illusion about how much or how 
little this meant.’18 This view reiterates that the courts considered directors 
essentially as amateurs involved only intermittently.19 What is more, at a 
time when the company was conceptually still closely associated with its 
shareholders (even as far as the judiciary was concerned),20 the courts took 
the position in many cases that the shareholders had only themselves to 
blame if they chose to appoint incompetent or inept directors.21  
Keay pointed out that the courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries treated issues of care, skill and diligence by asking whether the 
director was acting in good faith when he made a relevant decision or took 
a particular action. 22  Thus, matters were considered from a good faith 
perspective as opposed to one that took into account competence or 
 
16 Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd [1911] 1 Ch. 425. 
17 Walters (n4)112. 
18 Lord Hoffmann's lecture on Lord Hoffmann ‘The Company Director Today' given 
26 November 1996 at the Fourth Annual Leonard Sainer Lecture (1997) 18(7) Co 
Law 195. 
19 See for example Re Denham & Co (1883) 25 ChD 752 . See also: Keay Directors’ 
Duties (n4) 179. 
20 Keay Directors’ Duties (n4) 179. 
21 See for example: Turquand v Marshall (1869) 4 Ch App 376; Overend & Gurney & 
Co v Gurney (1872) LR 5 HL 480. 
22 Keay Directors’ Duties (n4) 179. 
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diligence. In instances where liability was incurred, the facts constituted a 
very clear breach.23 Directors were treated as ‘trustees’ or ‘quasi-trustees’ 
and therefore the duties formulated by the courts ‘were not based on any 
benchmark of professionalism nor did they heed the many differences in law 
and practice that distinguish directors and trustees.’24 
The cases mentioned above, and others, culminated in the seminal decision 
of In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. 25  In his judgement, Romer J 
formulated three propositions that would dominate this branch of company 
law for almost the remainder of the century:  
(1) A director need not exhibit greater skill than can be expected of a 
person of his or her knowledge and experience. (2) A director is not 
bound to give continuous attention to the affairs of his company. His 
duties are of an intermittent nature to be performed at periodical board 
meetings, and at meetings of any committee of the board upon which 
he happens to be placed. He is not, however bound to attend all such 
meetings, though he ought to attend whenever, in the circumstances, he 
is reasonably able to do so. (3) In respect of all duties that, having regard 
to the exigencies of business, and the articles of association, may 
properly be left to some other official, a director is, in the absence of 
grounds for suspicion, justified in trusting that official to perform such 
duties honestly.26 
Romer J thus endorsed the approach of Lord Hatherley L.C. in Overend & 
Gurney & Co v Gurney,27  namely that the care that directors must take 
should be measured against the care that an ordinary person could be 
 
23 See for example Gould v Mt Oxide Mines Ltd (in liq) (1916) 22 CLR 490. See also: 
Keay Directors’ Duties (n4) 179. 
24 Finch (n4) 200. 
25 1925 Ch 407 at 427. 
26 1925 Ch 407 at 428-429. 
27 (1872) LR 5 HL 480.Indeed it was also in this judgement (Overend & Gurney & Co 
v Gurney) that Lord Hatherley L.C and Lord Chelmsford concluded that directors 
would be liable only in instances of gross negligence (crassa negligentia) at 487, 
488, 489. 
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expected to take when managing his or her own affairs.28 It would appear 
then as though ‘[t]he director is obliged only to do as much as could be 
expected from someone as incompetent and foolish as he happens to be 
....’29 Or, as Ferran explained in turn ‘[t]he problem with a duty formulated 
as in the Re City Equitable decision … is simple and obvious: incompetence 
is its own defence.’30  
In spite of this apparent degree of subjectivity, it is probably not correct to 
consider the court’s approach in City Equitable void of all objectivity.31 In this 
regard it has been argued that the test was basically objective, considering 
that the courts have to ask whether or not the directors ‘exceeded the 
powers entrusted to them, or whether if they did not so exceed their powers 
they were cognisant of circumstances of such a character, so plain, so 
manifest, and so simple of appreciation, that no men with any ordinary 
degree of prudence, acting on their own behalf, would have entered into 
such a transaction as they entered into?’32 The comparison is thus with a 
‘man with any ordinary degree of prudence’, and, at least to that extent, 
objective.33  
Regardless of one’s take on the case, there is no denying that City Equitable 
made its influence felt not only in England, but also in other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions. It was heavily relied upon by Morgan J when deciding the first 
landmark case in South African law - Fisheries Development Corporation of 
SA Ltd v Jorgensen and Another.34  
 
28 In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. 1925 Ch 407 at 427 – 428. 
29 Mackenzie, 'A Company Director's Obligations of Care and Skill' [1982] JBL 461. 
30 Ferran Company Law and Corporate Finance (Oxford UP 1999) 213. 
31 A Hicks ‘Directors’ Liabilities for Management Errors’ (1994) 110 LQR 390; Keay 
Directors’ Duties (n4) 181. 
32 (1872) L.R. 5 H.L. 480 at 487. 
33 See also: Keay Directors’ Duties (n4) 181. 
34 1980 (4) SA 156 (W). For a general overview of the development of the duty in 
South African law see also: Mildred Bekink ‘An historical overview of the director’s 
duty of care and skill: from the nineteenth century to the Companies Bill of 2007’ 
(2008) SA Merc LJ 95; Bouwman (n3) 509.  
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Morgan J confirmed the established and accepted rule that a company 
director has a duty of utmost good faith towards the company.  Drawing 
from several English decisions 35  Morgan J set out general guidelines or 
principles which (not unlike City Equitable) served to define South African 
courts’ interpretation of the duty of care and skill for years to come.  As 
mentioned in chapter 2 above, the court distinguishes between the 
executive and non-executive director in its analysis.36  
As a general principle, and in reliance on both City Equitable and Brazillian 
Rubber Plantations the court confirmed that a director will not be held liable 
for mere errors in judgement. The court also concluded that it would be 
sound for a director to rely on reports prepared by others and to delegate 
duties that may properly be left to another official. In the absence of grounds 
for suspicion, the director is then justified in trusting that the official in 
question will perform these delegated duties honestly. It is noteworthy that 
Morgan J stated expressly that the director ‘is entitled to accept and rely on 
the judgment, information and advice of the management, unless there are 
proper reasons for querying such.’37 This last statement resembles the so-
called ‘common law business judgement rule’ although, as the discussion of 
this rule in chapter 7 below will illustrate, this is not necessarily an accurate 
term to use in this context.38 
Naturally, a director may not accept information and advice blindly, but 
instead must give it due consideration and must still exercise his/her own 
judgement. A director may not be a mere dummy, nor may he/she shelter 
behind what the court terms ‘culpable ignorance or failure to understand 
 
35 See Fisheries Development Corporation v Jorgensen (ibid) at page 166 where the 
court relied on (inter alia): Lagunas Nitrate Co v Lagunas Nitrate Syndicate (1899) 2 
Ch 392; In re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd (1911) 1 Ch 425; Dovey v 
Cory 1901 AC 477; In re National Bank of Wales Ltd (1899) 2 Ch 629; Huckerby v 
Elliot (1970) 1 All ER 189. 
36 At page 165 par [H]. And see chapter 2 at text to note 85 - 95 above.  
37 At page 166 par [B] – [C]. 
38 See chapter 7 at text to note 95. 
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the company’s affairs’.39 What exactly would constitute ‘culpable ignorance 
or a failure to understand’ was not considered. Culpability may of course 
refer to some form of intent being required, and given the context of the 
cases and the whole of the judgement the degree of negligence required to 
establish culpability would likely be significant.  
In the subsequent decision of Howard v Herrigel,40 Goldstone AJ rejected 
this approach, reverting to the position that the legal rules that pertain to all 
directors are the same and that it is not appropriate to draw a distinction 
between executive and non-executive directors.41  
This may well be true in the nominal sense, but the practical application will 
of course result in different outcomes. Even Romer J in City Equitable 
emphasised the importance of considering the specific circumstances of 
each case when applying these generic legal rules. 42  In this regard he 
observed as follows: 
In order, therefore, to ascertain the duties that a person appointed to the 
board of an established company undertakes to perform, it is necessary to 
consider not only the nature of the company’s business, but also the 
manner in which the work of the company is in fact distributed between 
the directors and the other officials of the company.43 
In conclusion, the earliest permutations of the duty of care and skill were 
undemanding, and the duty was ill-defined. Keay attributes this mainly to 
the fact that directors were quite clearly being appointed with little to no 
experience, there were very few decided cases (brought about by the 
 
39 At page 166 par [D] – [E].  
40 [1991] 2 All SA 113 (A).  
41 At page 131. These observations of the court must prompt one to ask whether 
this approach is still valid today given the very different roles played by executive 
and non-executive directors, and indeed the key role played by the independent 
non-executive director. Debate surrounding the duty of care has given rise to 
several more nuanced approaches and these are considered further below and 
throughout the thesis. And see above chapter 2 text to note 85 – 95. 
42 See also observations below at text to note 48. 
43 1925 Ch 407 at 427. 
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difficulty of bringing action),44 and the courts were reluctant to judge board 
decisions adversely.45  Whether correct or not, the position seemed to be 
that the tests introduced in City Equitable were wholly subjective which in 
every likelihood further deterred potential actions against directors.46  
Thus, the earliest history of the duty of care and skill shows a legal rule 
constrained by the perceptions and societal norms of the time. It was 
informed by the common practice of directors being appointed for the 
prestige they could bring to the board. Courts were hindered by the 
difficulties inherent in more refined definitions. Separate legal personality 
was a more novel concept, and it is perhaps the case that this also read into 
less developed approaches to the duty of care and skill that tended to centre 
around honesty and loyalty while ignoring competence and diligence. One 
might argue that these early developments hardly remain relevant, as times 
have changed and (as the discussion below will show) so has the judiciary’s 
stance when it comes to the duty of care and skill.  
However, the adage ‘the more things change, the more they stay the same’ 
rings true. The executive director of today is usually a highly qualified and 
experienced (not to mention well compensated) individual.  Many of the 
societal perceptions that served to protect incompetent directors at the turn 
of the 19th century and beyond clearly no longer apply to executive directors 
(there are some who would equate executive directors with other 
 
44 See also chapter 7 at note 4.  
45 Keay Directors’ Duties (n4) 182.  
46 Keay Directors’ Duties (n4) 182. See also above at notes 37 and 38. And see: JJ 
Hanks ‘Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability 
Limitation and Indemnification’ (1988) 43 Business Lawyer 1207, 1232 where the 
author summarises the prevailing perception: ‘Unless they engage in conduct in 
which no reasonable owner would be likely to engage, directors should not expect 
to be monetarily liable. No owner is likely to steal from himself – a meaningless act 
– or intentionally inflict harm on his business – an irrational act. Except for such 
egregious situations, it is difficult to justify imposing monetary liability on a director 
for the result of his decisions.’ 
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professionals such as doctors and lawyers). 47  On the contrary, they are 
appointed because of their skillset, usually remunerated aggressively, and 
there is a very clear expectation that they are to devote their skills and time 
to improve the fortunes of the company they serve. Besides this, their 
relationship with the company tends mostly to be regulated by contract, 
with care and skill as an express or implied term, in turn lessening the 
importance of the statutory or common law duty of care.48 In contrast, this 
is often not the case in the context of the non-executive director. Many non-
executive directors are still appointed for the esteem they bring to the board 
or the value of their connections, and in the South African context, this may 
relate also to pressures that companies face to transform the face of their 
boards.49 Given this, and the extent to which corporate governance codes 
rely on the integrity of the office of the independent non-executive director, 
the application of the duties to these directors are pivotal , and will be the 
focal point of the research.   
 
 
 
 
47 See for example: J Cassidy ‘ Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review: 
Divergence of the Duty of Care in the United States and Australia’ 2000 (28) A.B.L.R 
180, 197 – 205;  P Redmond ‘The Reform of Directors’ Duties’ (1992) 15 University 
of New South Wales Law Journal 86 113; Angus Young ‘Regulating non-executive 
directors in Australia: a socio-legal approach’ (2008) 29(11) Co Law 323. Note 
however that, as Davies and Worthington point out, the imposition of more 
objective standards against which to measure the duty of care and recent statutory 
reforms stop short of requiring a directorship to be regarded as a profession. As the 
authors note further: ‘Given the enormous range of types and sizes of companies, 
it would be odd if all directors were to be regarded as professional.’ Davies and 
Worthington (n294) 480. 
48  Richard Stevens ‘The Legal Nature of the Duty of Care and Skill: Contract or 
Delict?’ 2017(20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at 12. See also: Farouk HI 
Cassim and others (eds) Contemporary Company Law (Juta 2012) 411, 477.   
49 See for example Daniels v Anderson (1995) 16 ACSR 607 664 CA (NSW) at 664: 
‘Furthermore traditionally non-executive directors have been appointed for 
perceived commercial advantage such as attracting customers or adding to the 
prestige and status of the company.’ 
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3 Later and Recent Developments 
 
a. The United Kingdom 
 
The passage of time exposed the shortcomings of the common law, which 
had remained stagnant.50 The first notable departure from the approach 
taken in City Equitable was that of Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Stebbing51 
where company directors were held liable for what the court considered 
negligent behaviour - the significance was of course a move away from the 
position established by Overend & Gurney & Co v Gurney,52 in that gross 
negligence was not required.53 Following this, further developments were 
brought about by Lord Hoffman in the decisions of Norman v Theodore 
Goddard 54  and subsequently D’Jan of London Ltd Copp v D’Jan. 55  These 
decisions show a response to the apparently incongruous position which saw 
directors of insolvent companies being measured against what was 
ostensibly a more onerous and objective standard.56 The court applied s 
214(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (which deals with wrongful trading) 
beyond the traditional confines of that section in order to formulate a 
general standard of care and skill expected of directors.57  
The test denoted a departure from that set out in City Equitable by Romer J, 
in that it introduced an objective standard against which all directors are 
 
50 Keay Directors’ Duties (n4) 182, where the author points out that this was a 
surprising lack of development, especially considering the immergence of the 
neighbour principle in the context of the law of negligence.  
51 [1989] BCLC 498. 
52 (1872) LR 5 HL 480.Indeed it was also in this judgement (Overend & Gurney & Co 
v Gurney) that Lord Hatherley L.C and Lord Chelmsford concluded that directors 
would be liable only in instances of gross negligence (crassa negligentia) at 487, 
488, 489. 
53 See also: Keay Directors’ Duties (n4) 182. 
54 [1991] B.C.L.C 1028 Ch D. 
55 [1994] 1 BCLC 561. 
56 Davies and Worthington (n294) 479; Mortimore (ed) (n4) 328. 
57 See also: Re Landhurst Leasing Plc, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Ball 
[1999] 1 BCLC 286 at 344; Cohen v Selby [2001] 1 BCLC 176 at [21]. And see also: 
Hannigan (n4) para 11-2.  
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measured and drew on a subjective consideration of any one director’s 
abilities where this subjective standard is higher than what is objectively 
desired. In other words, the subjective limb of the test ‘can operate only to 
increase the level of care required of the director.’ 58 Ironically, it has been 
argued that the test favoured by Lord Hoffman does not, in fact, bring about 
as radical a departure from that of Romer J as one might at first believe.59  
Furthermore, there have been concerns about a test that effectively 
introduces a higher benchmark for more skilled directors – which is exactly 
what the revised test does.60 Be that as it may, the newly formulated test 
found favour with various factions 61  and was incorporated into the 
Companies Act 2006 with minimal changes.62 Section 174 of the Companies 
Act 2006 (‘the 2006 Companies Act’) now states that: 
(1) A director of a company must exercise reasonable care, skill and 
diligence. 63  (2) This means the care, skill and diligence that would be 
exercised by a reasonably diligent person with – (a) the general knowledge, 
 
58  Davies and Worthington (n294) 479. The authors come to this conclusion 
because: ‘The section attributes to the director the knowledge, skill and experience 
of both the reasonable person and the particular director in question, so the latter 
is important only when it adds to the attributes of the reasonable person.’  
59 Hicks argued that: ‘Romer J was setting out a dual standard, first the minimum 
and irreducible objective standard of the reasonable care of the ordinary man 
acting on his own behalf; and secondly, the subjective test that relieves him if he 
does not have highly specialised expertise. Romer J’s subjective test is not intended 
to reduce the standard of care below that of the reasonable ordinary businessman.’ 
Hicks (n31) 392. 
60 Finch (n4) 203.  
61 Law Commission - Law Commission, Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of 
Interest and Formulating a Statement of Duties (Law Comm No 261), 1999, Ch 5. 
Company Law Review – Company Law Review, Final Report, vol 1 (2001), p 346 and 
Annex C; and see Developing the Framework (2000), pp 40-3. Government – 
Modernising Company Law (Cm 5553-I, 2002), paras 3.2 – 3.7.  See also: Davies and 
Worthington (n294) 479. 
62 Effectively, this development aligned the duty in tort law with the objective, 
contractual duty. See: Loughrey (ed) (n4) 15. 
63 One of the only significant changes is the express inclusion of the word ‘diligence’ 
but as Hannigan points out, case law had already concluded that a director was 
under an obligation to ‘exert and apply himself’ or face penalties as was the case in 
(for example) Re Park House Properties Ltd [1997] 2 BCLC 530.  See: Hannigan (n4) 
para 11-2, note 9.  
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skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying 
out the functions carried out by the director in relation to the company, and 
(b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has.   
For some time, valuable guidance on interpreting the duty of care came from 
the courts in the form of judgements relating to disqualification proceedings 
brought against directors in terms of s 6 of the Company Director 
Disqualification Act 1986.64 These judgements were important due to the 
reality that direct action by the company against its directors is seldom taken 
other than in instances where the company finds itself in insolvent 
liquidation.65  
However, there are limits to the usefulness of these decisions. As Loughrey 
points out, disqualification and care and skill have always been measured by 
different standards, with the former requiring ‘gross negligence’ but not the 
latter. 66  Furthermore, these decisions have ‘dried up’ as a source since 
disqualifications are now predominantly dealt with through administrative 
undertakings.67  (As will become clear, South African law faces the same 
predicament as far as cases dealing with declarations of delinquency, 
decided in terms of section 162 of the 2008 Companies Act are concerned).68  
Of the English disqualification cases, perhaps the most notable was 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Baker (No 5) (‘Re Barings’)69 
where Parker J clearly heightens expectations when he concludes that 
‘[d]irectors have, both collectively and individually, a continuing duty to 
acquire and maintain a sufficient knowledge and understanding of the 
 
64 Hannigan (n4) para 11-3; Loughrey (ed) (n4) 16. And for a general discussion on 
the impact of the CDDA 1986 see:  Walters (n4) 110; Keay Directors’ Duties (n4) 174. 
65 Hannigan (n4) para 11-4. 
66 Loughrey (ed) (n4) 17. 
67 Hannigan (n4) 11-3. 
68 See chapter 7 at text to note 43 and par. See in overview: R Cassim ‘Delinquent 
Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited 
2016 ZASCA 35’ (2016) 19 PELJ 1.  
69 [1999] a BCLC 433. 
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company’s business to enable them properly to discharge their duties as 
directors.’ 70 
Considering these developments, the position now seems to be that a 
uniform and objective duty of care still applies to both executives and non-
executives alike although there will be variations in terms of what the 
discharge of the duty requires, as the specific functions carried out by any 
particular director will inform what is expected of him or her.71  
A director may delegate to others, but although an objective standard of 
care leaves room for such delegation, directors still have to guide and 
monitor management and so the mere fact that there was appropriate 
delegation does not imply that the director is allowed to abdicate 
responsibility and that he/she will have no further duties in regards to the 
matter.72 It has also become clear that, although a negligence suit could be 
based on instances where the directors acted, and did so with undesirable 
consequences, almost all cases decided in English law (and as it happens 
South African law) relates to failures to act or failures to act appropriately.73  
The duty of care and skill was always the ugly stepsister to the more robustly 
enforced fiduciary duties, breaches of which tended to be seen in a more 
serious light.74 All things considered, Davies and Worthington conclude that 
the codification ‘brought the standard of care, skill and diligence required of 
directors into line with that required generally in other areas of social life by 
the law of negligence.’75  Indeed, together with more recent case law, the 
approach taken by the British Parliament seemed, possibly, to indicate a 
 
70 at 489. 
71 Davies and Worthington (n294) 480. 
72 Davies and Worthington (n294) 481; Loughrey (ed) (n4) 30. 
73 Davies and Worthington (n294) 482, para 16-18. 
74 Keay Directors’ Duties (n4) 173. See also Worthington, 'The Duty to Monitor’ (n1) 
181, where the author points out that losses to the company were historically 
caused by breaches in fiduciary duties, with losses resulting from negligent 
behaviour, a more modern phenomenon.  
75 Davies and Worthington (n294) 483, para 16-19. 
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shift in attitude and to send a message that breaches of the duties of care 
would forthwith be taken more seriously. 76  Whether this indeed 
materialised remains open for debate, as the discussion below will show.  
 
b. South Africa 
 
The 2008 Companies Act followed the example of its UK counterpart and 
now includes a codification of directors’ duties.77 Section 76 applies to all 
‘directors’ as defined in the 2008 Companies Act, but also pulls so-called 
‘prescribed officers’ into its fold along with all members of board 
committees whether or not they are members of the board itself.78 The duty 
of care and skill as such can be found in section 76(3)(c), which requires a 
director to ‘exercise the powers and perform the functions of director … with 
the degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected of a 
person— (i) carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as 
those carried out by that director; and (ii) having the general knowledge, skill 
and experience of that director’ (emphasis added). This is subject to 
 
76 Keay Directors’ Duties (n4) 173. 
77  See chapter 1 for a discussion of the background to the legislation and the 
reasons for and merits of the codification of directors’ duties. See also chapters 5 
and 6 for further comments on the interpretation of the legislation in general and 
these provisions. See also in general: Jean C Kanamugire & Terence V Chimuka ‘The 
Directors’ Duty to Exercise Care and Skill in Contemporary South African Company 
Law and the Business Judgement Rule’ (2014) 5(20) MJSS 70; Richard Stevens ‘The 
Legal Nature of the Duty of Care and Skill: Contract or Delict?’ 2017(20) PELJ 12.  
78 Section 76(1)(a) & (b). ‘Director’ is defined in section 1 as “a member of the board 
of a company, …, or an alternate director of a company and includes any person 
occupying the position of a director or alternate director, by whatever name 
designated.” Regulation 38 in turn defines a ‘prescribed officer’ as follows: “Despite 
not being a director of a particular company, a person is a “prescribed officer” of 
the company for all purposes of the Act if that person – (a) exercises executive 
control over and management  of the whole, or a significant portion, of the business 
and activities of the company; or (b) regularly participates to a material degree in 
the exercise of general executive control over and management of the whole, or a 
significant portion of the business and activities of the company. 
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subsections 76(4) and 76(5) which seem to embody some form of business 
judgement rule – the exact impact of which is not yet settled.79  
Section 76 must also be read with section 77 which deals with the liability of 
directors.80 The latter section states that:  
A director of a company may be held liable—  
(a) in accordance with the principles of the common law relating to 
breach of a fiduciary duty, for any loss, damages or costs sustained by 
the company as a consequence of any breach by the director of a duty 
contemplated in section 75, 76(2) or 76(3)(a) or (b); or  
(b) in accordance with the principles of the common law relating to delict 
for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company as a 
consequence of any breach by the director of—  
(i) a duty contemplated in section 76(3)(c);  
(ii) any provision of this Act not otherwise mentioned in this section; or  
(iii) any provision of the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation.”81 
As is the case with section 178(2) of the 2006 Companies Act, the South 
African duty contained in section 76 can be broken up into three elements. 
The elements will often overlap, but it is useful to think of them as proposed 
by Arnold who suggests (as far as the 2006 Companies Act is concerned) that 
‘care is to be understood as carefulness, though not caution; skill denotes 
ability, while diligence may be understood as requiring the director to apply 
himself conscientiously to the affairs of the company and, in particular, the 
matter at hand.’82 
 
79 See below at chapter 5 for a discussion of the impact and contents of these 
sections.  
80 It is not yet entirely clear how the statutory provisions might impact the legal 
nature of the duty. In this regard see: Stevens (n77) 12. 
81 Section 77(2)(a)-(c). 
82 Mortimore (ed) (n4) 330. 
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The courts have not yet had the opportunity to state conclusively how the 
test in section 76 is to be interpreted and applied. The wording does not 
state expressly that the second leg of the test (the subjective component) 
could serve only to heighten the standard against which the director is 
measured but never lower it. However, given the marked similarities 
between the wording of the 2008 Act and the 2006 Act there is every 
likelihood that the provision would be interpreted to align with the position 
in the UK, and in other words, that the subjective element could never allow 
a director to escape liability where his/her conduct falls below the bar 
objectively set. In comparing the wording of the South African provision with 
Australian law, Du Plessis concluded that South African law will now judge 
liability against the standards of the ‘reasonable person’ and that as such, 
the test is objective but with justifiable subjective components given 
especially the unique emphasis in South Africa on encouraging 
entrepreneurs to become directors of local companies.83  
Finally, despite the significant influence of English law, it must not be 
forgotten that the duty in South African law remains rooted in delict and that 
the South African common law duty of care and skill remains ‘at heart more 
subjective than objective – the individual director is considered, and is 
neither measured against the reasonable person nor against the reasonable 
director, but what the reasonable thing would have been for such a director 
to have done.’84 Despite Du Plessis’ faith in the newly introduced standard, 
Stevens and De Beer argue convincingly that the standard of care may well 
be reduced to gross negligence, depending on how the courts interpret and 
 
83  Jean J du Plessis ‘A comparative analysis of directors’ duty of care, skill and 
diligence in South Africa and Australia’ (2010) AJ 263. 
84 Richard Stevens & Philip de Beer ‘The duty of care and skill, and reckless trading: 
Remedies in flux?’ (2016) SA Merc LJ 250, 253 where the authors also point out that 
the subjective component of the test is likely ‘as much a function of its mixed legal 
heritage as it is a function of the variable nature of directorship itself.  
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apply the newly introduced business judgement rule, contained in section 
76(4) of Act.85 
As is the case in the United Kingdom, there is a dearth of actions based on a 
breach of the duty of care and skill in South African law.86 Some decisions 
offer insights into what is considered “reckless conduct” as the 1973 
Companies Act imposed personal liability where companies were managed 
in a way that amounted to reckless conduct. Proceedings under section 424 
of the 1973 Companies Act (and, since 2011, under section 22 of the 2008 
Companies Act, which contains similar sanctions) were brought far more 
regularly as creditors attempted to recoup losses especially where the 
companies that they contracted with faced liquidation.  
Declarations of delinquency as a remedy against errant directors is new to 
South African law and was introduced by section 162 of the 2008 Act. There 
have, however, been a number of applications based on the provisions of 
section 162, and these offer some insight into the meaning of the terms 
‘gross negligence’ and ‘wilful misconduct’. 87  In this regard,  Kathree-
Setiloane J pointed out that, unlike the concept of a ‘delinquent director’ the 
former two concepts are not new to South African company law, with gross 
negligence having been considered in a number of cases.88 In this regard the 
Supreme Court of Appeal noted that gross negligence requires ‘a complete 
obtuseness of mind’ if the distinction between this type of conduct, and 
conduct considered merely negligent were to have any remaining 
 
85 Stevens & De Beer (n84) 260-261. For a further consideration of this argument 
and discussion of the business judgement rule in general see chapter 7 at text to 
note 80 and onwards.  
86 Bouwman (n293) 526. 
87 Section 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa) provides that a court must make an order declaring a 
person to be a delinquent director if the person acted in a manner that amounted 
to gross negligence, wilful misconduct or breach of trust in relation to the 
performance of the director's functions within, and duties to, the company. 
88 Msimang NO and another v Katuliiba and others [2013] 1 All SA 580 (GSJ) para 
[35]. 
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meaning.89 Gross negligence, has in turn also been described as connoting 
‘a particular attitude or state of mind characterised by an entire failure to 
give consideration to the consequences of one's actions, in other words, an 
attitude of reckless disregard of such consequences.’90 
This makes it immediately apparent that, as is the case in the United 
Kingdom pertaining to matters decided in terms of the Directors 
Disqualifications Act, decisions on delinquency and disqualification will be of 
limited use in interpreting the duty of care and skill. Be that as it may, these 
cases at least point to the type of conduct that would definitely be 
considered beyond the pale and some of the courts’ observations in relation 
to the interpretation of provisions imposing personal liability or resulting in 
orders of delinquency remain relevant.  
Most recently negligence in the South African context was revisited in Cape 
Empowerment Trust Ltd v Druker and others where Yekiso J makes some 
interesting remarks relating to the King Code of Governance: 91  
I am of the view that the reservations expressed by the applicant, both 
on the founding and replying papers as well as in its submissions, are 
justified more particularly when it is glaringly apparent that the King 
Code of Governance principles relating to compliance with applicable 
laws and adherence to rules of accepted practice; a duty to ensure the 
integrity of the companies as vehicles of investment; and the need for 
the directors to act in the best interest of the company appear not to 
 
89 See Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet v Owners of the MV "Stella Tingas" and another 2003 
(2) SA 473 (SCA) at para 7: ". . . It follows, I think, that to qualify as gross negligence 
the conduct in question, although falling short of dolus eventualis, must involve a 
departure from the standard of the reasonable person to such an extent that it may 
properly be categorised as extreme; it must demonstrate, where there is found to 
be conscious risk taking, a complete obtuseness of mind or, where there is no 
conscious risk taking, a total failure to take care. If something less were required, 
the distinction between ordinary and gross negligence would lose its validity." 
90 S v Dhlamini 1988 (2) SA 302 (A) at 308. 
91 [2016] JOL 36987 (WCC). 
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have been observed, and, as a matter of fact, appear to have been totally 
disregarded. 
The learned judge does not explain the exact role that the King Code plays in 
her interpretation of the statutory provisions. In fact, it is not entirely clear 
what the court might be implying with the use of the term ‘duty’ in the first 
place. Should it be understood as referring to legal duties, in which case it is 
not entirely clear what the ‘duty to ensure the integrity of the companies as 
vehicles of investment’ could then be. There is no such duty in the 2008 Act, 
nor was there an independent duty along these lines recognised in South 
African common law. It is perhaps more likely that the learned judge was 
speaking more generally and referring, perhaps, to societal norms and 
expectations. Certainly, Yekiso J seems to consider the principles of the 
governance code as some form of evidence which informs the duty of care 
and skill. Although this is not explicitly stated, it appears to inform the 
objective component of the test, speaking to the behaviour that would 
generally be expected in practice.92 
 
4 Debate Surrounding the Director’s Duty of Care and Skill 
 
a. Practical challenges posed by the duty of care and skill 
 
If ever one were to expect a series of claims against company directors, it 
would have been in the wake of the 2007/2008 financial crisis. And yet, from 
Wall Street to the square mile it seemed to have been, just another day at 
the office.93  Naturally, this might lead to questions surrounding the capacity 
 
92 See chapter 5 below for an analysis of the interpretative approach followed by 
the courts. If, as appears to be the case here, the codes are used as part of the facts 
presented to establish the objective standard required and thus inform the 
common law test for care and skill it is submitted that it will likely pass 
constitutional muster and does indeed fall within the remit of the court.  
93 Loughrey (ed) (n4) 7. 
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of the law to respond. The lack of litigation might speak to obstacles faced 
by shareholders attempting to hold directors accountable, but might also be 
since there were in fact no actionable breaches of duty.94 This then relates 
directly to the substance of the duties in general, and in particular the duty 
of care and skill, and how they are interpreted and applied by the courts.   
The consensus following the 2007/2008 financial crisis, was that any blame 
laid at the door of company directors would have to be based on 
incompetence. There was little if any evidence of directors lacking integrity 
or acting dishonestly. As such, claims following the events of 2007/2008 
would likely be based on breaches of the duty of care and skill and not 
breaches of the fiduciary duties.95 It is clear that boards would be considered 
in breach of their duty to monitor if they either completely abdicate it or if 
they ignore obvious risks and red flags – but only where the response to 
these risks was equally apparent or obvious, as the case law generally shows 
a reluctance to hold directors liable for their failure to respond properly to 
complex situations.96 
Generally speaking, there are several ‘constraint[s] on judicial enthusiasm 
for negligence claims’97 against directors, that relate also to the fact that 
there is (in virtually no jurisdiction) a single objective standard of skill. The 
lack of such an objective standard, and a general reticence on the part of the 
courts when enforcing the duty have been variously explained. The 
traditional view,98 was that the shareholders have only themselves to blame 
 
94 Loughrey (ed) (n4) 8. 
95  In considering the allegations made against bank directors following the 
2007/2008 financial crisis, Loughrey identifies four distinct failures, or sets of 
conducts, that could potentially have given rise to successful claims against the 
directors. These are firstly, a failure to monitor or institute risk management 
systems; second, a failure to keep informed; third, an undue reliance on others or 
inappropriate delegation practices; and finally, negligent decision making. 
Loughrey (ed) (n4) 12, 21, 26, 29, 33. 
96 Loughrey (ed) (n4) 25. 
97 Hannigan (n4) para 11-5.  
98 Hannigan (n4) para 11-5; Blackman’s Commentary on the Companies Act 191 
(Issue 7, 2010); Walters (n4) 112. 
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if they find themselves the victims of an errant director.99  As Lord Hatherley 
LC famously noted, ‘however ridiculous and absurd their conduct might 
seem, it was the misfortune of the company that they chose such unwise 
directors’.100 A shareholder acquires his interest voluntarily, it is argued, and 
as such it is a simple case of volenti non fit injuria and not a matter for the 
courts.101 However, there may also be another reason for the reluctance 
shown by the courts and this is based on the general philosophy that defines 
the approach to company law and regulation, and which is especially 
prevalent in the United Kingdom (and by extension also became part of the 
ethos in South Africa). The deference to board decisions may also be 
reflective of an ingrained perception that company law is inherently a 
‘private’ matter and that interference by means of external regulation 
should be avoided or minimised. This will be considered in greater depth in 
chapter 6 below.102  
A second challenge, is the matter of hindsight and the fact that the courts 
are loathe to substitute their judgement for that of the board, where the 
 
99 Hannigan (n4) para 11-5; Blackman’s Commentary on the Companies Act 191 
(Issue 7, 2010); Walters (n4) 112.  
100 Turquand v Marshall (1869) LR 4 Ch App 376, 386.  
101 Lagunas Nitrate Co v Lagunas Syndicate [1899] 2 Ch 392, 426 where Lindley MR 
notes that ‘[n]o one need join a company unless he likes, and if a person knows that 
if he becomes a member he will find as directors persons who, in his opinion, ought 
not to be directors, he should not join the company. If he does he has no right of 
redress on the ground that improper persons were appointed trustees. Volenti non 
fit injuria applies in such a case to members of the company…’ 
102 See for example Moore who considers the ‘fundamental nature’ of the laws 
relating to the governance in the United Kingdom and points out that in the Anglo-
American context corporate law tends to be considered an aspect of private or 
facilitative law. He contends that ‘judicial deference to internal corporate 
autonomy likewise persists in the English common law environment under the 
doctrinal label of the ‘internal management’ doctrine. This rule, together with the 
comparably longstanding contractual principle that underpins the juridical 
character of the corporate constitution, has operated so as to affirm the 
characteristic ‘privity’ of UK corporate law in the sense of its inherently facilitative 
and non-regulatory nature.’ Moore MT Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the 
State (Hart 2013) 8.  
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latter arrived at a decision honestly.103 Cases decided in the UK still show the 
courts’ reluctance to basing liability on a director’s failure to understand 
his/her business and what was going on in it. Directors are not required to 
possess specialist expertise and general knowledge will suffice.104 The two 
final concerns centre on the very diverse nature of companies and the 
directors at their helms. The shear variety of companies and business 
endeavours, the myriad different roles that a director or executive might 
fulfil in the context of each corporation and the fact that directors will come 
to their office with different backgrounds, training and experience all make 
a uniform standard an impossibility.105 
In summation, what has traditionally been a dearth of litigation might point 
to underlying failings as far as the formulation, application and 
interpretation of the law on directors’ duties is concerned. It may also be 
that, more generally speaking, there is a problem with the ‘very concept of 
shareholders as effective monitors’ (an issue that will be dealt with in 
greater detail in chapter 7 below).106 
 
b. An overview of the academic debate 
 
The duty of care and skill is certainly embattled.  While some have called for 
it to be jettisoned entirely,107 others have contended that the duty has a 
 
103 Howard v Herrigel 1991 (2) SA 660 (A) 676; Levin v Felt & Tweeds Ltd 1951 (2) SA 
401 (A) 414-415; Harlowe's Nominees Pty Ltd v Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Co 
NL (1967) 121 CLR 483 493 (HC of A); Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd 
[1974] AC 821 832; [1974] 1 All ER 1126 1132 (PC).  
104 Loughrey (ed) (n4) 27 – 28. 
105  See for example: AWA Ltd v Daniels (1992) 7 ACSR 759 867 SC(NSW); Daniels v 
Anderson (1995) 16 ACSR 607 664 CA(NSW). 
106 Loughrey (ed) (n4) 8.  
107  See for example: Yoram Danziger & Omri Rachum-Twaig ‘Re-evaluating the 
justifications for the existence of an independent duty of care’ (2014) 35(9) Co Law 
265.  
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continued role to play but that reform is required.108 Riley argued that it is 
possible to formulate the duty in a more concrete manner that does not turn 
on a vague balancing act between risk taking and accountability.109 He points 
out that one must differentiate between the functions that one wishes the 
directors to perform, and the standard at which one wishes for them to 
perform those functions.110 The criticisms focus mainly on the fact that the 
courts have failed to formulate in any meaningful way a clear set of functions 
or expectations against which the company director’s conduct could be 
measured. However, doing so does not per se imply that one must measure 
the director against some universal and objective standard. This, he argues, 
conflates the issues. Once one has homed in on a set of concrete 
expectations as a starting point, one is then able to measure the conduct of 
an errant director against this framework in either a subjective or objective 
manner – depending on which is to be preferred. In other words: 
[T]he law can, and certainly ought to, begin by developing an 
appropriately onerous account of the proper, modern role of directors, 
including the functions (meaning the tasks and activities) associated with 
that role. To be sure, such an account would need to be ‘tailored’ to such 
individualised factors as the nature of the company which a director 
serves, the type of director she is, and so on. However, the important point 
is that the content of this role can be specified independently of the 
standard of liability by which a director’s failure to fulfil its constitutive 
functions should be judged.111 
Riley proceeds to propagate a subjective standard, arguing that if it is used 
in conjunction with properly defined roles and functions, it offers a suitably 
balanced approach as it would hold the director to clear standards while 
 
108  Numerous authors have considered the duty over many years and it is not 
possible to consider all of these viewpoints. The discussion below offers an 
overview of some of these approaches. 
109 Riley (n4) 699. 
110 Riley (n4) 699. 
111 Riley (n4) 699.  
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avoiding a scenario where even his or her best attempts at compliance 
remain sub-par.112 
In turn, Watson and Willekes lament the fact that the courts and scholars 
have seemingly accepted that directors should not be liable for their own 
negligence. They describe this as an anomaly in company law, and credit it 
to a misapplication of the organic theory113 of company law. The authors 
propagate a ‘more rational’ basis, namely the use of assumption of liability. 
In terms of this approach liability does not hinge on an assessment of the 
duty of care but is instead determined by considering whether there has 
been an assumption of legal liability for consequent economic loss by an 
individual in any given case.114   
Finch also argued for a reconfiguring of the duty of care and skill.115 The 
author called for ‘an effective machinery for eliminating directors’ 
incompetence’ and pointed out that effective supervision of company 
directors requires a multi-pronged approach.116 Many have argued that the 
duty of care and skill is inappropriate or superfluous and should fall away 
entirely. Certainly, there are many who believe that higher standards would 
not be effective. As Finch pointed out, even the courts themselves have 
conceded that ‘[judges] are not equipped by training or experience to make 
business judgments because such judgements are intuitively geared to risk 
taking and often reliant on shifting competition and market criteria.117 On 
the other hand it has been argued forcefully, that the duty should indeed be 
more rigorous as a more onerous take on the duty accords with the 
 
112 Riley (n4) 700. 
113  Also called the directing mind theory. See also: R.J. Wickins and C.A. Ong 
‘Confusion worse confounded: the end of the directing mind theory?’ (1997) JBL 
524. 
114 Watson and Willekes (n4) 219.   
115 Finch (n4) 201 where the author remarks that: “The common law operates to 
give directors a remarkable freedom to run companies incompetently. Provided 
that their behaviour falls short of the grossest negligence they are unlikely to be 
held to account.”  
116 Finch (n4) 201. 
117 Finch (n4) 202. 
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responsibilities that are a feature of the office of the modern director, and 
the law should reflect the higher expectations that society and the business 
world now have.118 
Finch thus argued for an objective test to be applied, but for this test to be 
defined in such a way that it does not stifle enterprise or discourage 
directors from improving skill levels. She conceded that a single, objective 
test does not appear feasible – given that directors do not comprise a 
homogeneous category. She argued, however, that ‘it does…seem possible 
to lay down a test that allows judges to consider variations in directorial 
roles, but which does not ask judges to become involved in the merits of 
business decisions’ and proposed a formulation that ‘calls on a director to 
exhibit the skill and care reasonably to be expected of a person who has 
undertaken their kind of role in their kind of company’.119 This, she argued, 
would allow the court to consider the size and nature of the enterprise and 
the skills reasonably associated with the office held by the director in 
question. Directors are then judged on the functions they undertake with 
their qualifications not acting as a potential prejudice.120  
Worthington comprehensively considered the origins of the duty of care and 
comments specifically on a component of the duty which has become vital 
given the size and complexity of the modern company: the duty to 
monitor.121 She pointed out that many of the famous decisions traditionally 
seen to support a narrow construction of the duty have actually been 
misinterpreted or interpreted in a blinkered way and called for the duty to 
be ‘recognised for what it is’ namely ‘a common law duty in tort to take 
reasonable care to avoid causing harm to the company’. 122 As the author 
 
118 Finch (n4) 202. The author also points out that a more onerous standard will 
reflect a more stakeholder inclusive approach to company law which is coming to 
the fore.  
119 Finch (n4) 202 
120 Finch (n4) 203. 
121 Worthington, 'The Duty to Monitor’ (n1) 181. See also in this regard chapter 2. 
122 Worthington, 'The Duty to Monitor’ (n1) 201. 
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pointed out, negligence is a changeable concept as it is inherently 
dependent on ‘general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing'. 123  The 
analysis concludes with the following pointed observations, which speak to 
many of the objections that are traditionally raised when a more onerous 
interpretation of the duty of care is mentioned:  
 
None of this should be seen as putting directors under increased pressure 
in performing their assigned roles. Delegation, reliance on others, 
undertaking tasks without any particular professional expertise, and so on, 
will all remain an acceptable part of the director’s role – but only on the 
condition that, in the circumstances, they can be seen as a reasonable 
response to the task in hand. The law – even in its modern formulation – 
is not something to be feared by responsible directors ... none of this does 
anything more than attach liability where it is warranted, and attach it to 
the most appropriate party. This should be welcomed: it is one of the 
important functions of the law.’124 
 
In making a case for the codification of the duty in South African law, Du 
Plessis pointed out that ‘there is an inherent difficulty in trying to write 
bright lines for actions that are judgments taking into account a wide range 
of facts, circumstances, experiences and expertise.’125 Indeed, as the author 
reminds us, in 200 years the courts have proved unable to do so. However, 
despite recent legislative intervention (in both the UK and South Africa), the 
directors’ duty of care, skill and diligence remains opaque. For example, 
there is no clear indication what a court would consider when determining 
standards of conduct. 126  Any inquiry had always required a ‘detailed 
consideration of all the relevant facts in any particular case’ and this remains 
 
123 Worthington, 'The Duty to Monitor’ (n1) 202 citing at note 137 the seminal case 
of Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580.  
124 Worthington, 'The Duty to Monitor’ (n1) 202. 
125 Jean J Du Plessis ‘Open sea or safe harbour? American, Australian and South 
African business judgement rules compared: Part 2’ (2011) 32(12) Co Law 377 382 
126 Loughrey (ed) (n4) 16. 
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the position.127  Matters such as the composition of the board, size and 
nature of the company and the manner in which functions are distributed 
are have been identified as examples of relevant concerns when assessing a 
standard of care.128 The level of reward a director is entitled to receive might 
also be a factor for consideration, with the presumption being that a higher 
level of reward may reasonably bring about the expectation that greater 
responsibilities may be implied.129  
An analysis of the development of the duty shows that one of the matters 
that has been hindering the courts, has been the difficulties of finding more 
concrete parameters against which to measure conduct – in drawing the 
bright lines that Du Plessis speaks of.130 It is submitted that the approach 
propagated by Riley131 may offer a practical solution and that it is in this 
context that the principles of the governance codes could provide some 
useful scaffolding. Riley suggests that the law ought to start off by 
developing an ‘appropriately onerous account of the proper, modern role 
of directors, including the functions (meaning the tasks and activities) 
associated with that role.’132 In developing this account, the codes give a 
concrete overview of what is expected of the company director and provide 
 
127 Mortimore (ed) (n4) 332. And see: In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. 1925 Ch 
407 at 427; Daniels v Anderson (1995) 16 ACSR 607, 668 cited and adopted by 
Jonathan Parker J in Re Barings plc (No5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433, 488, para B5.  
128 Keay Directors’ Duties (n4) 187. See also for example the remarks made by Lord 
Hoffman in Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd v Maxwell (No 2) [1994] 1 All 
ER 261, 264b, CA, which speak to some of the essential issues and summarise in 
broad terms what might inform the court’s decision: “The law may be evolving in 
response to changes in public attitudes to corporate governance, as shown by the 
enactment of the provisions consolidated in the Company Directors Disqualification 
Act 1986. Even so, the existence of a duty to participate must depend upon how 
the company’s business is organised and the part which the director could 
reasonably have been expected to play.” 
129 Re Barings plc (No5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433, para B6. 
130 Jean J Du Plessis ‘Open sea or safe harbour? American, Australian and South 
African business judgement rules compared: Part 2’ (2011) 32(12) Co Law 377 382. 
131 Riley (n4) 697. See analysis at text to note 112. See also further analysis and 
comments in chapters 5 and 6.  
132 Riley (n4) 699. 
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at least some measures that could be valuable in informing the courts’ 
decisions.  
In the UK, this would remain limited to listed public entities subject to the 
provisions of the code. However, in the South African context the drafters 
of the King Code of Governance have been more ambitious and have 
insisted since the third version of the Code that its provisions apply to all 
registered companies in the republic (regardless their size).133 The most 
recent report contains a number of so-called ‘sectoral supplements’ and it 
is possible that these might be a very useful aid in all cases regardless the 
size of the company or the sector within which it operates. It perhaps 
represents a first step in developing the very ‘account’ that Riley speaks of 
- one which the author concedes would need to be ‘tailored to … 
individualised factors’.134 The approach could prove beneficial to directors 
in that it would define expectations. A more refined version of the duty may 
also give the courts the confidence to apply it more robustly in offering 
more concrete yardsticks or parameters.   
An alternative role is that the codes may speak to the matter of ‘diligence’, 
the third component of the duties. In this regard the enquiry might simply 
be: Did the directors truly apply their minds to the code or were they 
engaged in a box ticking exercise. The latter approach would potentially 
then speak to a lack of diligence, to the extent that the provisions of the 
code are aimed at entrenching processes aimed at managing risk and 
ensuring accountability. This approach might have additional benefits. If 
one were to consider proper engagement with the codes of governance as 
a component of the duty of care and skill, it may then serve not only to add 
depth to the duty of care but also to give additional legitimacy to the 
governance codes. This stops short of turning the codes into black letter 
 
133 See chapter 1 note 108. 
134 Riley (n4) 699. 
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law and retains many of the advantages traditionally associated with a 
voluntary approach to regulation.135  
If one considers alternative proposals for the modification of the duty, it is 
also possible to see how the contents of the codes might play a sensible 
part. The approach advocated by Finch would see a focus on the kind of 
role the director plays in the kind of company he is working for. It echoes 
components of what Riley propagates in that it focusses on functions and 
expectations – both more readily susceptible to being objectively 
determined and somehow defined. King IV offers very clear ‘signposts’ from 
an industry perspective regarding these functions and expectations. It 
could at least give the courts a base line, or basic presumption that a board 
that diligently implemented the contents of the code as it applies to the 
sector concerned had acted in accordance with these objectively 
determined functions, duties and expectations.  
If on the other hand one were to argue, as Worthington does, that liability 
should be based on a duty of care in tort law it is again conceivable that the 
content so the governance code could speak to whether ‘reasonable care’ 
was taken. Although a possible caveat here is again that the argument 
would not hold if one considers the codes as an indicator of ‘best practice’ 
as this might allude to a higher standard than what would be required to 
constitute ‘reasonable care’. That being said, given the complexities of 
managing a listed company today, it is perhaps not a far-fetched argument 
that dynamic compliance with the provisions of the governance code 
should be a point of departure and not some higher aspiration.  
 
 
 
 
135 This argument will be considered in greater detail in chapters 7 and 8 below.  
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5 Conclusion 
 
The preceding analysis has shown that, in the earliest stages of its 
development, the directors’ duty of care, skill and diligence would hardly 
have cast fear in the heart of the lax or incompetent director. The emphasis 
was on honesty, loyalty and good faith with little being said about 
competence - other than that one could not possibly take it for granted that 
your appointed directors would be at all capable of doing their job.  
Perceptions have gradually changed and what was initially a dominantly 
subjective inquiry has become increasingly objective in nature. These 
developments speak to the fact that societies (and as the 2007/2008 
financial crisis made clear) even national economies rely more and more on 
the fact that the directors that monitor especially bigger companies are 
competent and diligent when they undertake their tasks.  
A number of authors and some judgements by the courts also seem to take 
for granted that at least some reference will be made to the corporate 
governance codes. 136  Yet the cases (and indeed most academics and 
 
136 See for example: John Lowry ‘The Irreducible Core of the Duty of Care, Skill and 
Diligence of Company Directors: “Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission v Healey”’ (2012) 75(2) MLR 249, 260: ‘While the UK Corporate 
Governance Code lacks the force of legislation, it is likely to be the first port of call 
for judges when called upon to consider the standard of care of directors in relation 
to their role in overseeing corporate financial reporting.’; Mortimore (ed) (n4) 77: 
‘Listed companies are expected to comply with the Combined Code containing 
principles of good governance and a Code of best practice...This deals with the role 
of the non-executive directors and indicates what level of commitment is to be 
expected of them and is likely to be relevant to any issues as to the role and duties 
of non-executive directors’; Davies & Worthington (n4) 482: ‘Although neither the 
Turnbull Report nor the UK Corporate Governance Code are legislative instruments 
binding the courts, it is likely that, in appropriate cases, the courts’ view of what an 
objective standard of care requires will be influenced by the provisions. Indeed, 
that process is already evident in the area of disqualification of directors on grounds 
of unfitness’; Delport P & Vorster Q, Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
(Service Issue 18 LexisNexis 2018) 298(20): ‘The various codes that may apply, such as the 
King IV Code on Corporate Governance, are not law but, it is submitted, do set levels of, at 
least, the duty of care, skill and diligence’ and ‘Non-compliance with the requirements of 
a code, the King IV Code, could under certain circumstances therefore result in liability 
for breach of that duty’ 
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commentators) that reference the governance codes in the context of the 
interpretation of the duty of care and skill (and other directors’ duties) are 
vague in defining the exact role that the codes may play in this context and 
the legal standing that they should be afforded. This chapter has made some 
suggestions on how the provisions of King IV in particular, but voluntary 
governance codes more generally, might impact an analysis of the duties. 
This does not yet address concerns such as the legality of the approach nor 
does it consider whether such an approach would be normatively sound or 
sustainable. Before turning to these issues, chapter 4 will consider the 
fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company and how reference 
to King IV might impact its interpretation and application.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE DUTY TO ACT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE COMPANY 
 
All systems of governance must seek an appropriate balance between the 
interests of self and society. That applies to corporate governance just as it 
does to governance in other areas of society.1 
 
1 Introduction  
 
As the preceding historical analysis shows, the law has been relatively 
settled in its approach to the ordinary director as a mandatory who, given 
his position vis-à-vis the company, was obliged to act in the interests of the 
latter2 and to exercise good faith in doing so.3 This summation is less helpful 
considering that even the courts have conceded on various occasions that 
‘the interests of the company’ remains as unprecise a phrase as any, is at 
times misunderstood, and may have slightly different meanings depending 
on the context’.4 When we then ask a board of directors to act ‘in the best 
 
1  Bob Tricker Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices (3rd edn, 
Oxford, 2015) 71. 
2 See Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421 Ch D In the context of the United Kingdom 
this formulation has changed, and the modern codified version of the duty requires 
the director to promote the success of the company (see below for discussion at 
text to note 95 and onwards). The statutory version of the duty in South African law 
continues to refer to the ‘interests’ of the company (see below for discussion at text 
to note 115 and onwards). 
3 In the South African context see: African Claim & Land Co Ltd v W J Langermann 
1905 TS 494 504 Innes CJ: “An ordinary director is a mandatory, entrusted, in 
conjunction with his co-directors, with the management of the company's affairs; 
bound to exercise the utmost good faith in transacting with them; to give the 
company the benefit of his judgment and experience; and to render that amount 
of diligence which an ordinary prudent and careful man would display under the 
circumstances.”   
4 Nourse LJ made the following telling observation: "[t]he expression 'the interests 
of the company’ is one which is often used but rarely defined', '[i]t seems quite 
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interests of the company’, we may be asking them to align their strategies 
with any one of a number of interests - interests that may conflict. From this 
perspective, the central question becomes, whose interests should be on the 
mind of a company director making a strategic decision? Instead of 
considering the question from the perspective of the ‘interests’ of the 
company or its various stakeholders, one could also choose to frame the 
debate as a search for an appropriate ‘corporate objective’.5 In other words, 
it is only once one has determined what the ultimate goal or purpose of the 
company should be, that one is then able to consider whether it has fallen 
short of achieving this goal. If the company fails to achieve its goal, one could 
argue concomitantly that the correct interests have not been represented 
or adequately represented. If the goal of the company is, for example, to 
maximise shareholder value, it will have fallen short of this goal if 
shareholders fail to enjoy concrete returns.6 As such debates about the so-
called corporate objective seek to answer the same questions raised by an 
interpretation and analysis of the phrase ‘the best interests of the company’ 
and in turn relates to the extent to which wider interests should potentially 
be taken into account. For ease of reference this complicated mouth-full will 
subsequently be referred to as ‘the stakeholder debate’7. 
 
likely that it is sometimes misunderstood and . . . possibly . . . has slightly different 
meanings in different contexts' Brady v Brady [1988] 2 All ER 617 HL. 
5  See for example: Anant K Sundaram and Andrew C Inkpen ‘The Corporate 
Objective Revisited’ (2004) 15(3) Organ Sci 350; Shuangge Wen ‘Revisiting the 
corporate objective through the economic lens – the UK perspective’ (2013) 24(8) 
ICCLR302.  
6 The most famous example of this is perhaps the American decision of Dodge v 
Ford 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).  
7 The debate has generated an extensive body of research, by no means limited to 
the sources that will be discussed and referenced in this chapter. See for example: 
Andrew Keay The Enlightened Shareholder Value Principle and Corporate 
Governance (Routledge 2013); Simon Deakin ‘The Coming Transformation of 
Shareholder Value’ (2005) 13(1) Corporate Governance: An International Review 
11; Deryn Fisher ‘The enlightened shareholder - leaving stakeholders in the dark: 
will section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006 make directors consider the impact 
of their decisions on third parties?’ (2009) 20(1) ICCLR10; R. Edward Freeman, 
Andrew C. Wicks and Bidhan Parmar ‘Stakeholder Theory and "The Corporate 
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The analysis in this chapter will show how societal and legal norms have 
been moving slowly in a more stakeholder-centric direction. In spite of this, 
the existing legal position still focusses on the interests of the company’s 
shareholders and maximising wealth and shareholder return remains the 
dominant corporate objective.8 For purposes of this thesis, these issues are 
key as many corporate governance codes tend to be more aspirational 
where stakeholder interests are concerned.  
King IV advocates strongly for a more pluralists approach to the interests of 
the company, as did its predecessor King III. 9  Should this approach be 
adopted by the courts, it may well push the South African legal position 
robustly in a pluralist direction. Given the position in various developed 
jurisdictions, it may be that this leap - though perhaps ultimately laudable - 
will be premature and unsustainable in practice.10  
This chapter will offer an overview of the stakeholder debate to the extent 
required to illustrate its impact on the duty of the company director to act 
in the best interests of the company (or more lately in the case of the UK to 
promote the success of the company). 11 This duty and its application and 
interpretation is significant to the thesis as, together with the duty of care 
and skill, it serves to illustrate in a practical sense how an interpretation of 
directors’ duties incorporating principles from governance codes may 
impact existing law. To do so, the chapter will also consider the context and 
 
Objective Revisited"’ (2004) 15(3) Organization Science 364; Sundaram and Inkpen 
(n5) 350.  
8 Keay (n7) 16. Keay notes that this might amongst other things be attributable to 
so-called ‘path-dependence theory’ which contends essentially that persistent 
differences in corporate rules and structures from one economy to the next are the 
result of the structures that were initially in place. See: Lucian Arye Bebchuk and 
Mark J. Roe ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and 
Governance’ (1999) 52(172) Stan.L.Rev 127.  
9 See further discussion below. 
10 These more normative questions will be considered again in chapters 6 and 7 of 
the thesis.  
11 The debate has generated a vast amount of literature and to do it justice would 
require one to devote an entire thesis to it. An overview of these sources is 
provided in the references below.  
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development of the duty to act in the interests of the company and what 
form it takes in current law. Finally, the contents of especially King IV will be 
considered to predict any impact it may have on the existing legal position 
and highlight potential pitfalls that its application may have.  
 
2 A Phrase with many Meanings – The ‘Corporate Objective’ and the 
Stakeholder Debate 
Views on what should be the primary focus or responsibility for company 
directors when directing the companies that they serve have leaned in one 
direction or the other, depending on how the corporation as an entity was 
perceived at the time. Although there are variants on the general themes, 
three dominant schools of thought have emerged. The first, known as the 
‘shareholder value’ theory12 provides that the directors are to manage the 
company to ensure the fullest maximisation of shareholder wealth. In a 
nutshell, it implies that the managers have exclusively economic goals and 
‘may do anything to enhance shareholder wealth provided that it is lawful.’13 
At the other end of the spectrum, is the so called ‘stakeholder theory’, which 
contends at its core that there are others, besides shareholders, who are 
worthy of protection as they too are affected by the actions of the company. 
The thinking is that the loyalty that the fair treatment of stakeholders 
inspires will result in improved returns for shareholders down the line as it 
would benefit the company while also creating greater social wealth.14  
 
 
12  The theory is also know as ‘shareholder primacy’ or ‘shareholder wealth 
maximisation’. See: Keay (n7) 16 and see further discussion below and sources 
cited.  
13 Keay (n7) 17. And see Wen (n5) 305.  
14  Keay (n7) 43. And see: Tricker (n1) 75, where the author explains that: 
“Stakeholder thinking is concerned with values and beliefs about the appropriate 
relationships between the individual, the enterprise, and the state. It involves a 
discourse on the balance of responsibility, accountability, and power throughout 
society.” See also:  
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The third option, which was embraced by the Company Law Review Steering 
Group and subsequently the legislature in the United Kingdom, is referred 
to as the ‘enlightened shareholder value principle’. 15  In terms of this 
approach, the directors must continue to manage the company with 
shareholder value as the ultimate goal. However, enlightened shareholder 
value determines that directors must, where appropriate, also ‘have regard 
to the need to build long-term and trusting relationships with employees, 
suppliers, customers and others in order to secure the success of the 
enterprise over time.’16  
 
Shareholder primacy, or profit maximisation has been the favoured 
approach in the field of finance, where its logic is such that texts merely 
assert it as fact without debating any alternatives.17   Divergent opinions 
have come from management and strategy scholars who have argued on the 
one hand that governance should be stakeholder oriented or on the other 
that corporations should balance multiple goals,18 while legal scholars have 
questioned the popular acceptance of shareholder primacy as a norm in 
 
15 Company Law Review Steering Group Modern Company Law for a Competitive 
Economy: Strategic Framework (1999 DTI) par 5.1.22. And see Keay (n7) 43; Clarke 
(n11) 50. 
16 Company Law Review Steering Group Modern Company Law for a Competitive 
Economy: Strategic Framework (1999 DTI) par 5.1.22. 
17 Sundaram and Inkpen (n5) 350, where the authors point out that, in the context 
of the financial field, “[d]eviation from this objective is cast as an agency problem 
resulting from the separation of ownership and control, and failure to meet this 
goal is assumed to be corrected by corporate boards, shareholder voice, 
shareholder exit, and the market for corporate control.”  
18  Sundaram and Inkpen (n5) 350. The authors cite as examples of the former 
Freeman, R. E., J. McVea. 2001. A stakeholder approach to strategic management. 
M. Hitt, E. Freeman, J. Harrison, eds. Handbook of Strategic Management. Blackwell 
Publishing, Oxford, U.K., 189–207. As examples of the latter they point to Drucker, 
P. 2001. The next society: A survey of the near future. The Economist (November 3) 
1–20 and Quinn, J. B. 1980. Strategies for Change: Logical Incrementalism. Richard 
D. Irwin Inc., Homewood, IL. And cf Freeman and others (n7) 364 for a critique of 
Sundaram & Inkpen’s views as expressed in ‘The Corporate Objective Revisited’ 
above.  
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company law for some time. 19  The following paragraphs will offer an 
overview of how these theories have developed and will briefly consider the 
contents, strengths and weaknesses of each approach.  
 
a. Shareholder Value  
 
Initially, while incorporation was still dependent upon government charter, 
the corporation (as a creation of the state) was considered ‘a useful 
instrument for the state to carry out its public policy goals and as an entity 
whose powers must be kept in check.’ 20 As the ability of the regulator to 
dictate corporate objectives waned, the pendulum swung away from the 
protection of stakeholders towards a managerial approach emphasizing 
shareholder wealth.21  
The idea that the interests of the company are defined as the interests of its 
members mirrored the argument that the preferred objective function for 
the nominal corporation should be to optimise shareholder value.22 In the 
United States this was articulated most clearly by the Michigan State 
supreme court in the famous decision of Dodge vs Ford Motor Company23 
decided in 1919. The court concluded unequivocally that ‘[t]he business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of 
 
19 See: Deakin (n7) 11; Jonathan Mukwiri ‘Myth of Shareholder Primacy in English 
Law’ (2013) European Business Law Review 217; Jim Apollo Mathiopoulos ‘The 
purpose of for profit corporations in light of modern perceptions and wider 
corporate responsibilities (Part 1)’ (2017) 38(9) Co Law 278.  
20 This explains the emphasis on and importance of the ultra vires doctrine which 
was gradually undermined as general incorporation resulted in a great number of 
new companies pursuing private agendas. Sundaram and Inkpen (n5) 351. And on 
the history of the company in general see chapter 1. 
21 Sundaram and Inkpen (n5) 351. See also: William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan 
‘Maximizing shareholder value: a new ideology for corporate governance’ (2000) 
29(1) Economy and Society 13.  
22 Hutton v West Cork Railway Co (1883) L.R. 23 Ch. D. 654 Ch D. is often cited as 
authority for this proposition but cf Mukwiri (n19) 217. 
23 Dodge vs Ford Motor Company 204 Mich. 459. 
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stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.’24 
From an English context, Bowen LJ famously observed that ‘the law does not 
say that there are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and 
ale except such as are required for the benefit of the company.’ 25  The 
statement could be construed to imply that any cakes and ale to be handed 
out must somehow benefit the company’s financial bottom line; gratuitous 
charity with no discernible returns would not be acceptable.26 
Debates about companies’ responsibilities in the context of public regulation 
of the economy came to the fore especially in the wake of the 1929 
depression. Berle famously argued that the solution lies in handing back 
control to shareholders, 27  while counter arguments pointed out that 
dispersed ownership undermines the efficiency of the shareholder’s 
monitoring function. The solution that emerged was a combination of 
managerial and public control over companies. Privatisation and the 
deregulation of areas of the economy during the 1970’s led especially 
finance scholars to argue that the managers of large corporations should be 
controlled by the market in the first place – realising that ‘dispersed share 
ownership … freed management from direct supervision by investors.’ 28  
However, the 1998 UK Hampel Committee report reiterated the status quo 
by concluding that ‘directors are responsible for relations with stakeholders, 
but are accountable to the shareholders’. 29    
 
24 Dodge vs Ford Motor Company 204 Mich. 459 at 507. 
25 Hutton v West Cork Railway (1883) 23 Ch. D. at 673.  The case was decided in the 
context of the ultra vires principle, but the ‘benefit of the company’ that the court 
refers to, alludes very clearly to commercial success or viability.  
26 In a similar vein see Re W&M Roith Ltd [1967] 1 W.L.R. 432 and cf Lindgren v L&P 
Estates Ltd [1968] 1 All ER 917 where directors were found to have adequately 
considered the commercial merits of their decision despite it potentially taking 
many years for any benefit to materialise.  
27 Berle, A. (1932) For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, HarvLRev, 
45, 1365. The argument was most notably put forth in his debate with Dodd. See 
also: Dodd, E. M. (1932) For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees? HarvLRev, 
45, 1145. 
28 Deakin (n7) 13. 
29 Tricker (n1) 77. 
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As this overview illustrates, there has been a tussle between proponents of 
stakeholder theory and the concept of shareholder primacy for some time. 
If debacles such as those related to Enron and Worldcom at the turn of the 
century called shareholder primacy into question,30 the financial crisis only 
compounded existing doubt. One might indeed conclude that ‘[a]lthough 
shareholder primacy is not dead by any stretch, it has suffered a series of 
blows that render it open to serious question.’ 31  Some authors have 
questioned the legitimacy of the theory as a staple of English law,32 while 
others have scrutinised the purported advantages of the approach.33 
Deakin argued more than a decade ago that  the origins of shareholder 
primacy lie outside the core of company law and that instead it was founded 
by the norms and practices that marked the 1970s/1980s hostile takeover 
movement in the United Kingdom and America. 34  If one then sees 
shareholder primacy as an essentially cultural point of reference as opposed 
to a legal one, it is clearly  not as ‘institutionalised’ as one might think.35  In 
support for this argument, the author notes that company law itself actually 
does little to support the notion of shareholder primacy. It is justified neither 
by ownership theory36  nor by the manner in which directors’ duties are 
 
30 See for example: William W Bratton ‘Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder 
Value’ (2002) 76 Tul.L.Rev 1275. 
31 Matthew T Bodie ‘The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law: Returning to 
the Theory of the Firm’ (2012) 35 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1039.  
32 For example see: Deakin (n7) 11; Mukwiri (n19) 217. 
33 Keay (n7) 20 – 41 where the author provides a comprehensive overview of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the theory.  
34 Deakin (n7) 16. Deakin illustrates how many of the responses to the takeover 
movement were internalised and subsequently became entrenched to ensure that 
senior management identified strongly with the goal of maximising share price. 
35 Deakin (n7) 16. 
36 Deakin (n7) 12. The idea could not be rooted in the fact that the shareholders 
‘own the company’ because of course it is not clear in what sense they could ‘own’ 
what is essentially a fictive legal entity that owes its existence to the act of 
incorporation. Furthermore, owning a share does not entitle a shareholder to any 
particular segment of the company’s assets (at least not as long as the entity is 
operating as a going concern). See also: Blanaid Clarke ‘Corporate responsibility in 
light of the separation of ownership and control’ (1997) 19 Dublin University Law 
Journal 50. 
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legally constructed as any fiduciary duties are owed the company, and not 
its shareholders directly.37 Company law also does not guarantee any level 
of returns that shareholders could insist on, nor does it offer a time scale in 
line with which shareholder expectations are to be realised. 38  Deakin 
concluded that ‘[t]he current focus on shareholder value is … the 
consequence not of the basic company law model, but of those institutional 
changes which have occurred in capital markets and securities law ... in 
particular since the early 1980s’.39 
 
Mukwiri also questioned the validity of the assumption that shareholder 
primacy was the norm in English law preceding the 2006 Companies Act, by 
reconsidering the caselaw long thought to have underpinned the theory. In 
doing so, he concluded that ‘the confusion was based on the historical 
application of partnership principles to company law, and that a contextual 
reading of case law reveals that shareholder primacy is at odds with the 
tenet of corporate legal personality.’40 The author points out that, as English 
company law had its roots in partnership law, principles from the latter 
permeated company law for the early years of its development until legal 
personality became a firmly entrenched concept. Of course, the pivotal 
difference where partnerships are concerned, lies in the fact that the 
 
37 Deakin (n7) 12 where the author explains that this is more than a mere rhetorical 
device: ‘In practice, the company’s interests will often be synonymous with those 
of its members, that is, the shareholders. However, shareholders are not entitled 
to engage directly in the management of the enterprise; this is the responsibility of 
the board.’ 
38 Deakin (n7) 12. One of the strongest counter arguments advanced by agency 
theory, is the fact that although shareholders may not ‘own’ the company in the 
legal or technical sense, ‘ownership of shares confers upon them the right, 
exclusively of all the stakeholder groups, to hold directors and managers 
accountable.’ However, this does not hold sway as agency theory does not justify 
shareholders’ right to hold managers accountable by means of an ownership claim, 
but instead bases it on the notion that it is in the best interests of society that they 
should do so. Deakin (n7) 12. 
39 Deakin (n7) 14. 
40 Mukwiri (n19) 218. 
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partners are direct owners of the assets of the partnership and this also 
formed the basis for their entitlements and rights to control the entity. Once 
separate legal personality was fully entrenched in legal precedent one might 
have expected shareholder primacy to have been abandoned as contrary to 
the tenets of company law, but this was not the case. The ‘ownership myth 
and the legal remnants which sustain it’ have resulted in a ‘hangover from 
earlier times’ in terms of which shareholder primacy was erroneously 
assumed to form the basis of corporate governance in English company law. 
41 In light of this, Mukwiri proposed that case law following the decision in 
Salomon42 should be interpreted in light of separate legal personality unless 
they ‘unequivocally promote shareholder primacy’ 43  and cautions that 
section 172 should not be interpreted through the prism of this theory. 
In contrast, Blackman pointed out that the principle of shareholder primacy 
does not mean to suggest that the company and its members are one and 
the same – this would be anathema to company law. It is based instead on 
the attribution of the interests of the shareholders to the company, a 
principle of company law which contends that  ‘in law, the company's 
interests are the interests of its shareholders qua shareholders, ie their 
interests in the prosperity of the company as a business concern.’44 In other 
words,   '[t]he interests of a company, an artificial person, cannot be 
distinguished from the interests of the persons who are interested in it'.45 
 
41 Mukwiri (n19) 220 citing P Ireland, Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder 
Ownership 62 MLR 32, 48 (1999) and S Worthington, Shares and Shareholders: 
Property, Power and Entitlement (Part 1) 22 Co Law 258, 259 (2001). 
42 [1897] AC 22. 
43 Mukwiri (n19) 220. 
44 Revision Service 12 (2012) Ch 8 – 70. 
45  Brady v Brady [1988] BCLC 20 40 (CA). Blackman also points out that ‘the 
argument that the identification of the shareholders' interests to the company is 
mistaken is usually coupled with the claim that the law ought not to recognise only 
the interests of the shareholders as the interests of the company, ie that the law 
ought also to recognise the interests of other persons. This, of course, is not an 
argument that the attribution of the members' interests to the company is a 
jurisprudential mistake, or that the company as such has interests of its own, but 
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The author also notes that the argument is usually made in support of a 
more inclusive approach to stakeholder interests which is more accurately a 
policy argument and not one based on the idea that ‘the attribution of the 
members’ interests to the company is a jurisprudential mistake, or that the 
company as such has interests of its own’46 although it is difficult to see how 
this is not exactly what the authors above have implied.  
There are several other doctrinal and conceptual criticism that have been 
raised against the notion of shareholder value. A discussion of all these 
points falls outside the scope of this research and will not serve to further 
inform the research question. Keay offers a comprehensive overview. 
Amongst other things he points out that shareholder value rests in large part 
on mistaken perceptions that the directors act as agents of the shareholders, 
that shareholders are the ones who actually bear the residual risk, that the 
maximisation of shareholder wealth would serve to increase efficiency and 
concomitantly enhanced social wealth, and importantly, that shareholder 
value offers a greater degree of certainty than does stakeholder theory.47 
 
an argument of policy about the persons whose interests ought to be attributed to 
the company.’ Blackman’s Commentary (Revision Service 12 2012) Ch 8 – 70. 
46 Revision Service 12 (2012) Ch 8 – 70. 
47  Keay (n7) 20 – 25. And see: Lynn Stout ‘Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for 
Shareholder Primacy’ (2002) 75 Southern California Law Review 1189; Daniel T.Y. 
Cheung ‘A discussion on whether there is justification in incorporating a 
stakeholder theory into UK corporate governance for private companies in 
unregulated transactions’ (2018) 39(10) Co Law 315, 317; Cheryl C. Asher, Joseph 
Mahoney and James Mahoney ‘Towards a Property Rights Foundation for a 
Stakeholder Theory of the Firm’ (2005) 9 Journal of Management and Governance 
5, 29–32; C Bagley & K Page ‘The Devil Made Me Do It: Replacing Corporate 
Directors’ Veil of Secrecy with the Mantle of Stewardship’ (1999) 36 San Diego Law 
Review 897; Min Yan ‘The Corporate Objective Revisited: Part 1’ (2017) 38(1) 
Business Law Review available online at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2947962 [accessed on 12/04/2018]; P Ireland ‘Copmany Law and the 
Myth of Shareholder Ownership’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 32.  But cf Lorraine 
Talbot ‘Trying to save the world with company law? Some problems’ (2016) 36(3) 
Legal Studies 513, 513 where the author cautions that ‘critical scholars have 
cohered around a core claim about company law which is erroneous. Furthermore, 
they have largely assumed that the current economy can sustain a social agenda as 
well as creating profit. This ... hugely underestimates entrenched problems in the 
economy’.  
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Finally, in defence of shareholder primacy, Wen points out that to the extent 
that the theory is perceived as immoral and short-sighted, this is due to a 
misunderstanding of its application in English law and that it is in fact 
neither. 48 This, the author argues, is due to the fact that the interests of the 
shareholders have always been interpreted as encompassing the interests 
of the shareholders present and future and ‘[t]he logic lies in that the goal 
of long-term shareholder value can only be successfully pursued by 
developing sustaining relationships with stakeholders.’ 49   
Kay referenced an ironic anecdote in relation to the shareholder value 
proposition:  
Jack Welch of General Electric is widely credited with inaugurating that era 
in a speech at the Pierre Hotel in New York soon after he took over as that 
company’s CEO. Welch did not in fact use the phrase ‘shareholder value’, 
but it became more and more widely heard in the two decades that 
followed. Only in 2009, some years into retirement, would Welch describe 
shareholder value as ‘the dumbest idea in the world’. 50 
It may be criticised; it may perhaps even be ‘the dumbest idea in the world’ 
but its influence has been, and remains pervasive. 
 
b. The Stakeholder Approach 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, is the so-called stakeholder approach.51 
Germany and Japan are considered to have fully embraced this strategy 
 
48 Wen (n5) 314.  
49 Wen (n5) 314.  
50  John Kay ‘Theories of the Firm’ (2018) 25(1) International Journal of the 
Economics of Business 13 citing in turn Welch, Jack. 1982. “Growing Fast in a Slow 
Growth Economy.” http://www.123helpme.com/jackwelch-
view.asp?id=160218andWelch,Jack.2009. https://www.ft.com/content/294ff1f2-
0f27-11de-ba10-0000779fd2ac 
51 Keay (n7) 16. See also: RE Freeman & R Phillips ‘Stakeholder Theory: A Libertarian 
Defence’ (2002) 12 BEQ 331; R Karmel ‘Implications of the Stakeholder Model’ 
(1993) 61 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1156; K Greenfield ‘Saving the World With Corporate 
Law’ (2008) 57 Emory LJ 947; A Keay ‘Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has It 
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which rests essentially on two pillars. First, the idea that more than just the 
shareholders contribute to the company and its success and are 
concomitantly affected by its actions; and second a complete lack of 
commitment to other stakeholders will lead to a lack of loyalty on the part 
of other constituents when the company direly requires it.52 Also referred to 
as pluralism or the pluralist approach, the theory is not new. Although a 1975 
discussion paper by the UK Accounting Standards Steering Committee, 
recommended that all large economic entities should produce 
accountability reports to all stakeholder groups at regular intervals, it was a 
lone voice in the wilderness and ‘the political implications of such a heroic 
idea quickly relegated the report to the archives.’ 53  Besides this, Ralph 
Nader, clashed with the ‘boardroom oriented’ Business Roundtable during 
the 1970s, and together with Mark Green and Joel Seligman, pointed out 
that big companies potentially have enormous power, yet to a large extent 
remain unaccountable to their constituencies. 54  However, the ‘father of 
modern stakeholder theory’ is considered to be R Edward Freeman, who 
proposed the main thrust of the theory in his 1984 book entitled Strategic 
Management: A Stakeholder Approach.55  
A good example of this new way of thinking is the 1999 report prepared by 
the Royal Society of Arts in England, entitled ‘Tomorrow’s Company’.56 The 
committee preparing the report was chaired by Sir Stuart Hampson who 
remarked at the time: ‘We don’t believe that the board is there purely to 
 
Got What It Takes?’ (2010) 9 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus. 249; A Campbell ‘Stakeholders, 
the Case in Favour’ (1997) 30 LRP 446; Cheung (n47) 316; Kevin Gibson ‘The Moral 
Basis for Stakeholder Theory’ (2000) 26(3) JBE 245.  
52 Keay (n7) 43. And see: C Leadbeater, ‘Why it Pays to be Good (Eventually)’ (2000) 
New Statesman 26 available online at 
https://www.newstatesman.com/node/193387 [accessed on 20/08/2019]. 
53 Tricker (n1) 75. 
54 Tricker (n1) 75. 
55  R Edward Freeman Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach 
(Pitman/Ballinger 1984). 
56 Lynn Stout et al ‘The Modern Corporation Statement on Company Law’ (October 
6, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2848833. 
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create shareholder value. I’m sure nobody leaps out of bed in the morning 
and says ‘I want to create shareholder value!’ It’s unrealistic’. 57 
This does not mean to say that a stakeholder approach does not present the 
company board with some rather obvious challenges.58 What immediately 
comes to mind, for example, is how to deal with the inevitable conflicts of 
interests that are bound to arise when the interests of multiple constituents 
are taken into account. 59   Critics also point out that it is impossible to 
maximise all stakeholder interests at the same time, interests within 
stakeholder groups may vary which will add to the complexity, and it is 
undefined who is supposed to establish the interests within each group.60  
Yet this very fact may well be one of the strengths of pluralism, as 
‘stakeholder theorists will often argue that because this theory has concern 
for a wider range of groups, it takes in the complexity of the world, whereas 
shareholder value, with its focus on a single objective is far too glib.’61 To 
counter challenges posed by conflicting interests it is suggested that 
 
57  Tricker (n1) 76. The European response was highlighted in a EC Directorate-
General for Employment and Social Affairs Green Paper Promoting a European 
Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility (2001) available online at: 
Europa.eu>rapid>press-release DOC-01-9 en [accessed on 12/08/2019] and see in 
overview: Saleem Sheikh ‘Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility Within the EU’ 
(2002) ICCLR143; Copp Stephen ‘Corporate governance: change, consistency and 
evolution: Part 1’ (2003) 14(2) ICCLR65. See also: Freeman and others (n7) 365 
where the authors contend that ‘stakeholder theory does a better job of explaining 
and directing managerial behavior (sic) in markets’.  
58 See for an overview of criticisms for example: Min Yan ‘Why not stakeholder 
theory?’ (2013) 34(5) Co Law 148.  
59  Sternberg contended that these conflicts could not be reconciled and that 
directors should be able to focus on a single responsibility, that which they owe to 
their shareholder. Elaine Sternberg, ‘The Stakeholder Concept: A Mistaken 
Doctrine’ (1999) Foundation for Business Responsibilities, Issue Paper No.4 
Available online at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=263144 
[Accessed 6 July 2019]. But cf Shann Turnbull ‘Stakeholder Governance: A 
Cybernetic and property Rights Analysis in Corporate Governance’ (1997) 5(1) CG 
11 – 23. 
60 Tricker (n1) 76. And see Eric Pichet ‘Enlightened Shareholder Theory: Whose 
Interests Should Be Served by the Supporters of Corporate Governance?’ (2011) 8 
Corporate Ownership & Control 353; 358. 
61 Keay (n7) 46; Freeman and others (n7) 365. 
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directors should engage in a balancing exercise which appears to be a viable 
but not infallible suggestion. 62  
Pluralism was rejected by the Company Law Review Steering Group on the 
basis that ‘if there are deficiencies in this area they are best made good by 
changes in other areas of the law and public policy, or in best practice, rather 
than by making changes in company law, which might have unpredictable 
and damaging effects’. 63 Furthermore, the Steering Group was concerned 
that the variable number of interests that had to be taken into account 
would give directors a discretion that would be impossible to police and 
might ‘dangerously distract management into a political balancing style at 
the expense of economic growth and international competitiveness’.64 In 
particular, the Steering Group opposed pluralism for reasons that are 
pertinent to the arguments considered by this research, namely because: 
In particular ... this would impose a distributive economic role on directors 
in allocating the benefits and burdens of management of the company’s 
resources; that this role would be uncontrolled if left to director’s in the form 
of a power or discretion; and that a similarly broad role would be imposed 
on the judges if the new arrangement took the form of an enforceable 
obligation conferring rights on all the interested parties to argue for their 
interests in court.65 
 
62 Keay (n7) 46. Keay highlights other criticisms levelled against the theory; such as 
the fact that it lacks normative foundations, that the concepts which underpin it 
are unclear, that enforcement is problematic and that it does not result in fairer 
outcomes at pages 49 – 52. For a comprehensive critique of the business case for 
stakeholder rights see also: Michael L Barnett (ed) Limits to Stakeholder Influence: 
Why the Business Case Won’t Save the World (Edward Elgar 2018) and for additional 
retorts to the criticism pointed out above see:  Freeman and others (n7) 364. 
63  Department of Trade and Industry Modern Company Law for a Competitive 
Economy: The Strategic Framework (1999) par 5.1.27. 
64  Department of Trade and Industry Modern Company Law for a Competitive 
Economy: The Strategic Framework (1999) par 5.1.27. 
65 Company Law Review Steering Group Modern Company Law for a Competitive 
Economy: Developing the Framework (DTI 2000) at para 5.1.28. 
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As mentioned above, these are likely the dominant concerns that would 
arise if King IV were to inform the duty to act in the best interests of the 
company more robustly.66 It is perhaps especially prevalent given the past 
injustices and the resulting socio-economic inequalities that still plague 
South African society.67 As chapter 5 in particular will argue, it highlights one 
of the most pertinent concerns when requiring the courts to interpret 
directors duties taking cognisance of King IV and thus indirectly also of 
multiple stakeholders. It may well require the courts to make high level 
policy judgements without the information or access to the ‘bigger picture’ 
that is required to do so.68 In the context of the United Kingdom Talbot has 
questioned whether the economy would prove able to absorb this more 
robust approach.69 Similar concerns are certainly warranted in the South 
African context where especial caution is warranted when developing this 
area of the law.  
 
c. Enlightened Shareholder Value 
 
Having rejected pure stakeholder theory, the legislature in the UK opted 
instead to endorse a so-called ‘enlightened shareholder value’ approach.70 
It was first proposed by one of the greatest proponents of shareholder value, 
Michael Jensen, at the turn of the century.71 Jensen’s theory was an attempt 
 
66 See further discussion below at text to note 142 and onwards. 
67 This issue will be debated further below in chapter 8. 
68 See chapter 5 text to note 180. 
69 Lorraine Talbot ‘Trying to save the world with company law? Some problems’ 
(2016) 36(3) LS 513. 
70 For a comprehensive analysis of this approach see: Keay (n7). See also: Fisher (n7) 
10; Joan Loughrey; Andrew Keay; Luca Cerioni, ‘Legal Practitioners, Enlightened 
Shareholder Value and the Shaping of Corporate Governance’ (2008) 8 J. Corp. Law 
Stud.  79; Elaine Lynch ‘Section 172: a ground-breaking reform of director's duties, 
or the emperor's new clothes?’ (2012) 33(7) Co Law 196; Andrew Johnston ‘After 
the OFR: can UK shareholder value still be enlightened? (2006) 7(4) EBOR 817. 
71  Michael Jensen ‘Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate 
Objective Function’ (2001) 7(3) EFM 297.  
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to show the ‘proper relation between value maximisation and stakeholder 
theory, termed ‘enlightened value maximisation’. 72  Jensen criticised 
stakeholder theory’s lack of focus and contended that it undermined value 
creation. At the same time, he acknowledged that firms would not be able 
to maximise value if they ignore stakeholder interests. The theory does not 
mark a firm departure from the shareholder primacy model, but it does insist 
that in creating long term value directors must ‘make the requisite tradeoffs 
among ... stakeholders’. 73  An apparently broader approach formed the 
Enlightened Shareholder Value approach which was finally embraced by the 
Steering Group and eventually informed the formulation of the duty 
contained in section 172 of the 2006 UK Companies Act.74 The approach, as 
adopted into English and ostensibly South African law is considered further 
below as part of the current legal status. Though the approach is not without 
fault, it is the latest attempt to strike an illusive balance in an arena where 
so many interests conflict.75  
 
3 The Duty to Act in the Best Interests of the Company – The Position 
Prior to Codification 
 
As with the duty to act with care, skill and diligence, South African law 
governing directors’ fiduciary duties was strongly informed by English law.76 
South African common law has always required the director to act ‘bona fide 
in the interests of the company as a whole.’ 77 The court may intervene 
 
72 Jensen ‘Value Maximisation’ (n71) 299. 
73 Jensen ‘Value Maximisation’ (n71) 297. 
74 Keay (n7) 63. And see: Johnston (n70) 827. 
75 Janice Dean ‘The future of U.K. company law’ (2001) 22(4) Co Law 104, 104.  
76 See chapter 1 text to note 116 – note 123.  
77 The principle was described as ‘indisputable’ by Ogilvie Thompson CJ in South 
African Fabrics Ltd v Millman, NO, and Another 1972 (4) SA 592 at 596. See also:  
Harcourt v Eastman, N.O., 1953 (2) SA 424 (N) at pp. 428 429; Marshall Industrials 
Ltd. v Khan, 1959 (4) SA at p. 694.  
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based on the fact that the director was appointed to act on behalf of the 
company, and if he then acts in either his own interests or those of some 
other third party or parties he is acting improperly, or for an improper 
purpose.78 These duties become alive whenever the directors exercise their 
powers or discretion relating to the management of the affairs of the 
company.  
Common law did not limit liability to instances where there was some or 
other action but extended under certain circumstances to omissions;79 for 
example not attending a meeting despite a responsibility to inform the rest 
of the board of certain facts or failing to vote where a director should have 
voted in order to act in the company’s best interests.80 It would appear that 
even the act of resignation may, under certain circumstances, be considered 
to have been in bad faith and can constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. This 
was the case in Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold 
Mining Co Ltd 81 where all the directors of a public company chose to resign 
en masse. The court in this case found that there were no reasonable 
grounds for the mass resignation and that the directors had not acted in 
good faith by doing so. Having accepted the duties and obligations that go 
with their appointment as directors, it was irresponsible for them to 
abandon the company, and they could not ‘be allowed to merely walk away 
because it was convenient to do so.’82 
 
78 South African Fabrics Ltd v Millman, NO, and Another 1972 (4) SA 592 at 596;  
79  See eg Harris v North Devon Railway Co (1855) 20 Beav 52 ER 651 652; Re 
National Provincial Marine Insurance Co (Gilbert's Case) (1876) 5 Ch App 559 566. 
80 Permanent Building Society v McGee (1993) 11 ACSR 260 289-290 SC (WA); on 
appeal, Permanent Building Society v Wheeler (1994) 14 ACSR 109 160 SC(WA); 
Fitzsimmons v R (1997) 23 ACSR 355 358 SC(WA); Duke Group Ltd v Pilmer (1999) 
31 ACSR 213 340-341 SC(WA). And see Darvall v North Sydney Brick & Tile Co Ltd 
(1989) 15 ACLR 230 250 CA(NSW). 
81 2006 (5) SA 333 (W). 
82 Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd 2006 (5) 
SA 333 (W) at 351. In this instance, the company had been cited for violating its 
environmental obligations under section 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa and the court stressed that allowing such a resignation would make it 
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As far as the common law is concerned, the duty to act in good faith and the 
duty to act in the best interests of the company were technically considered 
two separate duties, although the courts have not applied the distinction 
consistently.83 Blackman, however, describes the duties as a single test with 
two components, explaining that it is ‘subjective as to means (what is to be 
done in order to promote the company’s interests), but objective as to ends 
(the interests to be promoted, ie ‘the interests of the company’).’84 
The ‘subjective’ 85  component of the test, emphasises yet again that 
directors have some autonomy to act in what they honestly perceive to be 
the best interests of the company. The courts have reiterated that it is the 
honest opinion of the directors that is at stake, and not the opinion that the 
courts may be inclined to reach after the fact. 86 Centlivres CJ went as far as 
to conclude that ‘in the absence of any allegation that the directors acted 
mala fide this amounts to asking [the] Court to usurp the functions of the 
directors and to consider what is the best for the company from the business 
point of view. This is not the function of a Court of law.’87 In support, the 
judge cites English law, referring to amongst others, the remarks of Lord 
Loreburn L.C who concluded that ‘[i]t is no part of the business of a Court of 
justice to determine the wisdom of a course adopted by a company in the 
management of its own affairs’.88 Or, as Lord Greene MR simply put it in Re 
 
difficult for courts to enforce an order at factum praestandum against a company 
by means of a punitive order.  
83 Silva v CH Chemicals (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 620 (SCA) para 18.  
84 Blackman ch8 -62 
85 per Nourse LJ in Brady v Brady [1988] BCLC 20 41 (CA). 
86 Ngurli Ltd v McCann (1953) 90 CLR 425 438 (HC of A); Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd v 
Kinsela (1983) 8 ACLR 384 403 SC (NSW).  
87 Levin v Felt & Tweeds Ltd 1951 (2) SA 402 (AD) at 415. 
88 Poole v National Bank of China Ltd., 1907 AC 229 at 236. Centlivres CJ referred 
also to the case of Caldwell & Co. Ltd v Caldwell, 53 Sc LR 251 at 253, where Lord 
Shaw in the House of Lords approved of the following remarks made by Lord 
Skerrington: 'I cannot find any trace in the statute of a suggestion that the Court 
ought to review the opinion of the company and its directors in regard to a question 
which primarily at least is domestic and commercial.' 
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Smith & Fawcett Ltd 89  the directors should act ‘bona fide in what they 
consider – not what a court may consider – is in the interests of the 
company’.90 
To the extent that the director is required to act ‘in the interests of the 
company’ on the other hand, the inquiry is framed more objectively. Despite 
his belief that he was acting in the company’s best interests, liability would 
follow at common law if he was not actually doing so and had 
misunderstood or misconstrued the company’s ‘best interests’.91  
In the case of the duty to act in the best interests of the company, the South 
African courts, like their English counterparts, interpreted the ‘best interests 
of the company’ with a pronounced focus on the shareholders and 
shareholder interests. The approach accorded with the prevailing sentiment 
at the time – namely that the company is a creature with profit as its primary 
goal (profit maximisation).92 If, in other words, one considers the director’s 
duty to act in the best interests of the company, the popular view was 
consistently that the best interests of the company are the interests of the 
shareholders93 (in their capacity as such) as a body.94  
 
 
89 [1942] Ch. 304. 
90 [1942] Ch. 304 at 306 CA. 
91 Blackman Ch 8 page 70. 
92 See discussion above in paragraph a. 
93  This includes both present and future members, see: Gaiman v National 
Association for Mental Health [1971] Ch. At 330. 
94 Yeats JL and others, Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 (Juta 2017) Revision 
Service 12 (2012) ch8 – 69 where the authors point out that this must necessarily 
be so as one could not argue that the fictitious entity had any interests that were 
particularly its own; see also in this regard Davies PL & Worthington S Gower’s 
Principles of Modern Company Law (10th edn Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 502, and cf 
the following statement by Hussain J seemingly implying that the corporate entity 
has its own interests, apart from the interests of its members: ‘The 'interests' in this 
context, are only those of the company itself as a corporate entity and those of its 
members as a body’ Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining 
Co Ltd 2006 (5) SA 333 (W) at 350. 
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4 The Existing Legal Position 
a. Current Position in the UK  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1 above, the Companies Act of 2006 codified all 
directors’ duties, including the common law duty to act in the best interests 
of the company. Section 172 now states that a director should act ‘in the 
way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success 
of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole’.95 In doing so, the 
2006 Act specifically requires said director to ‘have regard’ to six matters 
listed in the section, namely: 96 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,  
(b) the interests of the company’s employees,  
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with 
suppliers, customers and others,  
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and 
the environment,  
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high 
standards of business conduct, and  
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company.  
This revision of the common law test, referred to as ‘enlightened 
shareholder value’ by the Company Law Review Steering Group (CLRSG),97 
 
95 S 172(1). 
96 S 172(1)(a) – (f). The list is not exhaustive.  
97  Company Law Review, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Developing the Framework (DTI, London, 2000), par. 2.22. And for an overview of 
the considerations considered at the time see: Sarah Kiarie ‘At crossroads: 
shareholder value, stakeholder value and enlightened 
shareholder value: Which road should the United Kingdom take?’ (2006) 17(11) 
ICCLR329; Loughrey and others ‘Legal Practitioners’ (n70) 79. 
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represents a compromise between two extreme approaches. It is described 
by the committee in the following terms:  
An obligation on directors to achieve the success of the company for the 
benefit of the shareholders by taking proper account of all the relevant 
considerations for that purpose ... [which would include] ... a proper 
balanced view of the short and long term, the need to sustain effective 
ongoing relationships with employees, customers, suppliers and others; and 
the need to maintain the company’s reputation and to consider the impact 
of its operations on the community and the environment. 98 
As mentioned, the committee thus chose to reject a pluralist approach that 
would see the rights of multiple stakeholders on an equal footing with the 
rights of shareholders – which would have to include the avenues for 
alternative stakeholders to somehow enforce directors’ duties. The wording 
of the new section clearly leans more towards its common law predecessor 
in that it expressly requires directors to promote the success of the company 
‘for the benefit of its members’.99 However, the statutory duty does evolve 
and refine shareholder primacy, by adding the abovementioned obligation 
to ‘have regard to’ the interests of other stakeholders. This begs the 
question whether directors are now merely to take account of the interests 
of (although, as Worthington and Davies point out this obligation is clearly 
subservient to the one that precedes it, which still requires ‘shareholders or 
members … to be the primary object of the directors’ efforts.’) 100 In other 
words, the directors are merely to take into account the interests of 
constituents to the extent that this promotes benefits to shareholders. They 
 
98  Company Law Review Steering Committee Modern Company Law for a 
Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework (DTI, London, 2000), par 2.19. 
99 Davies and Worthington (n520) 502. 
100 Davies and Worthington (n520) 502. Keay concurs with this interpretation based 
on both the background to the provision as well as the way in which it is drafted, 
see for example: Andrew Keay ‘Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006: An 
Interpretation and Assessment’ (2007) 28(4) Co Law 106 at 108. See also: John 
Lowry ‘The Duty of Loyalty of Company Directors: Bridging the Accountability Gap 
through Efficient Disclosure’ (2009) 68(3) CLJ 607, 618. 
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are not to concern themselves with such interests as ends in themselves. 
Their ‘ultimate concern …  is that their action promotes the success of the 
company for the benefit of the members as a whole.’101 
Davies and Worthington describe the modern version of the duty codified in 
the 2006 Companies Act as ‘the most basic of the duties of good faith or 
fidelity owed by directors’ and ‘the core duty to which directors are subject, 
in the sense that it applies to every exercise of judgement which the 
directors undertake, whether they are testing the margins of their powers 
under the constitution or not and whether or not there is an operative 
conflict of interest.’ 102  They emphasise that ‘[t]ogether with the non-
fiduciary duty to exercise care, skill and diligence, the duty to promote the 
success of the company expresses the law’s view on how directors should 
discharge their functions on a day-to-day basis.’ 103   The impact and 
interpretation of the section has since been considered by a number of 
commentators, most notably Prof Andrew Keay,104 who pointed out that the 
discretion afforded to the directors is unfettered, with no objective criteria 
to assess what the directors have done.105 
 
101 Keay ‘Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006’ (n100) 108. 
102 Davies and Worthington (n520) 501. 
103 Davies and Worthington (n520) 501. 
104  See for example: Andrew Keay ‘Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006’ 
(n100) 106.  
105 Keay ‘Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006’ (n100) 107. For example, the 
author notes that the section omits ‘any reference to the fact that the directors are 
to consider the factors that a person of care and skill would consider relevant.’ The 
section has been criticised by others. See for example: Nicholas Grier ‘Enlightened 
shareholder value: did directors deliver?’ (2014) 2 Juridical Review 95; David K 
Millon ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility, and the Redefinition 
of Corporate Purpose Without Law’ (2010) Wash. & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 
2010-11. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1625750; Lynch (n70) 196; 
David Milman ‘Stakeholders in modern UK company law’ (2017) 397 C.L.N 1, 4; 
Richard Williams, ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value in UK Company Law’ (2012) 35 
U.N.S.W.L.J. 360, 362 where the author argues that enlightened shareholder value 
as embodied in section 172 does not represent any substantive change in the 
approach of UK company law to stakeholders and is not a useful model for other 
jurisdictions to emulate.  
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If one considers the matters that directors are required to take cognisance 
of in terms of the section, one can see how a board might be justified in 
considering provisions found in the UK Corporate Governance Code. This is 
due to the statutory mandate to ‘have regard to the desirability of the 
company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business 
conduct’. 106  However, even if one were to argue that reference to the 
voluntary codes that may apply to the company fall outside of the scope of 
this subsection, it is nonetheless clearly not an exhaustive list and it is hard 
to see how the provisions of these codes would not be a legitimate 
consideration when making decisions affecting the company. That being 
said, this remains a far cry from a legal mandate to consider provisions of 
the Governance Code.107 If directors fail to do so, the section could perhaps 
be interpreted to require such reference, and if a failure to do so results in 
losses affecting the shareholders this may even hold some sway.  However, 
the question then becomes whether the provisions of the code would 
significantly impact an assessment of the directors conduct and it is here 
where the position in the UK diverges from that in South Africa.108  
There have been notable developments in the United Kingdom, in the form 
of a Corporate Governance Reform Green Paper in November 2016, setting 
out ‘a new approach to strengthen big business through better corporate 
governance.’109 The Green Paper set out three main areas for reform. First, 
 
106 See above at text to note 96. 
107  Fisher (n7) 15 where the author notes that possibility that ‘Parliament has 
created a right without a remedy, which the law abhors.’  And see: Lynch (n70) 200. 
108 This is perhaps an ironic consequence as the South African Act gives less express 
credence to stakeholder interests than does its English counterpart and yet a 
reading of the Act which would draw from King IV would have a far more pluralist 
consequence.  
109 BEIS: Corporate Governance Reform Green Paper (November 2016) available 
online at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att
achment_data/file/584013/corporate-governance-reform-green-paper.pdf 
accessed on 01/06/2018. 
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shareholder influence on executive pay; second, measures to increase the 
connection between boards of directors and other groups with an interest 
in corporate performance; and finally, ‘whether some of the features of 
corporate governance that have worked well for listed companies should be 
extended to the largest privately-held companies’. 110   Most recently a 
Corporate Governance Code for large private entities111 has seen the light 
and secondary legislation now requires all companies of significant size to 
disclose their corporate governance arrangements.112 
The Financial Reporting Council have also undertaken consultations with the 
eye on a proposed revision to the UK Corporate Governance Code and have 
been urged by ICSA to consider its alignment with the 2006 Companies 
Act.113  The revisions have also been criticised for their focus on a single 
stakeholder group (the workforce) and for the fact that the Code is not an 
appropriate tool for reporting compliance with section 172 of the 
Companies Act.114 
 
110 BEIS: Corporate Governance Reform Green Paper (November 2016) at page 4. 
Available online at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att
achment_data/file/584013/corporate-governance-reform-green-paper.pdf 
accessed on 01/06/2018. For an overview of recent developments in the UK see: 
James McCalman & Angus Young ‘Another round of corporate governance reforms 
in the UK: implications for directors in the financial sector’ (2018) 33(8) J.I.B.L.R. 
286. 
111 The Wates Corporate Governance Principles for Large Private Companies was 
issued by the FRC and took effect on 1 January 2019. Available online at:  
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/31dfb844-6d4b-4093-9bfe-
19cee2c29cda/Wates-Corporate-Governance-Principles-for-LPC-Dec-2018.pdf 
[accessed on ] 
112 The Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018. 
113 Co Law ‘Corporate Governance Code needs to be more closely aligned with the 
Companies Act, says ICSA’ (2018) 39(7) 220. For example, misalignment between 
section 172 and Principle A was highlighted in that the latter envisages a wider 
remit than the former.  
114  Irene-Marie Esser & Iain MacNeil ‘Proposed Revisions to the UK Corporate 
Governance Code: a step forward in recognising a company’s responsibilities 
towards wider stakeholders?’ (2018) 39(8) Co Law 254, 255. The authors point to 
the incoherent overlap between the requirements of the Code and the Provision 4 
of the statutory strategic report requirements with both aimed at reporting on 
compliance with section 172. They also point out that inclusion in the Code seems 
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b. Current Position in South Africa  
 
As discussed, section 67 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 constitutes a 
partial codification of the common law relating to directors’ duties and does 
not entirely supersede existing common law. This is not least because the 
duties set out in the Act are described in very broad terms, and the common 
law will likely still impact their interpretation.115 In terms of section 76(3)(c), 
a ‘director of a company, when acting in that capacity, must exercise the 
powers and perform the functions of director … in the best interests of the 
company…’ 
Thus, the section states merely that the directors must act in the best 
interests of the company, and ‘the company’ is not defined to now include 
a broader range of stakeholders. The ‘interests’ of the company are also not 
defined elsewhere in the Act, to give any greater degree of certainty. What 
is more, no express mention is made of stakeholder interests in the stated 
purposes of the Act, apart from the interests of stakeholders in the instance 
of financial distress and business rescue. 116   There are some indications 
elsewhere in the legislation that the Act embodies a more progressive, and 
enlightened approach to stakeholder interests, but mostly this conclusion 
can be inferred from the aims of the legislation and context rather than any 
express provisions.  
Perhaps the most notable step that the legislature took, is the creation of a 
mandatory social and ethics committee for certain companies.117 In terms of 
 
odd in the face of secondary legislation which will require all companies to report 
on compliance with section 172. 
115 See chapter 1 par # and chapter 5 par # on the merits and impact of codification 
in this context and for a general analysis of the codification in the South African 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 and its likely impact and interpretation.  
116 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 7. 
117 For a more comprehensive discussion of the role and impact of the social and 
ethics committee see: Monray M Botha ‘Evaluating the Social and Ethics 
Committee: Is Labour the Missing Link?’ (2016) 79(4) THRHR Reg 580; S De Lange 
‘The Social and Ethics Committee in Terms of the 2008 Companies Act: Some 
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section 72(4) of the legislation, the Minister may prescribe via regulation 
that a category of companies ‘must each have a social and ethics committee, 
if it is desirable in the public interest’.118 This must be done having regard to 
annual turnover, the size of the company’s workforce, or the “nature and 
extent of the activities of such companies”. 119  The social and ethics 
committee has a broad mandate. Amongst other things, it has the following 
functions: 120  
(a)  To monitor the company’s activities, having regard to any 
relevant legislation, other legal requirements or prevailing 
codes of best practice, with regard to matters relating to  
 
Observations regarding the Exemptions and the Role of the Companies Tribunal’ 
(2015) 27(3) SA Merc LJ 507; Irene-Marie Esser and Piet Delport P ‘The protection 
of stakeholders: The South African social and ethics committee and the United 
Kingdom’s enlightened shareholder value approach: Part 1’ (2017) 50(1) De Jure 97; 
Irene-Marie Esser and Piet Delport P ‘The protection of stakeholders: The South 
African social and ethics committee and the United Kingdom’s enlightened 
shareholder value approach: Part 2’ (2017) 50(2) De Jure 221; H J Kloppers ‘Driving 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) through the Companies Act: An Overview of 
the Role of the Social and Ethics Committee’ (2013) 16(1) PELJ  165; Helena H Stoop 
‘Towards Greener Companies – Sustainability and the Social and Ethics Committee’ 
(2013) 24(3) Stell LR 562.  
118 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 72(4)(a). The rest of the section details the fact that 
it is possible for companies falling within this category to apply for an exemption to 
the Companies Tribunal. See in this regard: S De Lange ‘The Social and Ethics 
Committee in Terms of the 2008 Companies Act: Some Observations regarding the 
Exemptions and the Role of the Companies Tribunal’ (2015) 27(3) SA Merc LJ 507. 
119 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 72(4)(a)(i) - (iii). The Regulations to the Act put in 
place a system to measure the nature and extent of the activities in companies in 
general. The so-called ‘public interest score’ (see Regulation 26) is used also in 
instances where it must be determined which accounting standard and financial 
reporting standards will apply to particular companies (see Section 29(4) and 30(2) 
and (7) read with regulations 26 - 29). Broadly speaking, the public interest score 
tallies the number of shareholders, the number of employees, annual turnover and 
annual third-party liability to arrive at a total ‘score’ representative of the 
company’s impact to determine the extent to which regulation is required (see 
Regulation 26). At the moment, the Regulations require all public listed companies 
to put in place a social and ethics committee as well as any company with a ‘public 
interest score’ that has in any two of the preceding five years had a ‘public interest 
score’ exceeding 500 points. This is not an insignificant public interest score and it 
is likely that only sizeable private companies would be affected.  
120 Companies Act 71 of 2008 section 72(4) – (10) read with regulation 43. 
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(i) social and economic development, including the company’s 
standing in terms of the goals and purposes of -  
(aa)  the 10 principles set out in the United Nations Global Compact 
Principles;  
(bb)  the OECD recommendations regarding corruptions;  
(ii) good corporate citizenship, including the company’s –  
(aa)  promotion of equality, prevention of unfair discrimination, and 
reduction of corruption; 
(bb)  contribution to development of the communities in which its 
activities are predominantly conducted… 
(iii) the environment, health and public safety, including the 
impact of the company’s activities and of its products or 
services 
(iv) consumer relationships… 
(v) labour and employment… 
(b) to draw matters within its mandate to the attention of the 
Board as occasion requires; and  
(c) to report, through one of its members, to the shareholders at 
the end of the company’s annual general meeting on the 
matters within its mandate.  
This would poise the committee to consider how the company affects a 
broad number of constituencies and stakeholders and to liaise with and 
advise the board on these matters. The legislation also mandates that the 
committee reports back to the shareholders which creates some measure of 
accountability. Although this is clearly an attempt to encourage companies 
to focus beyond the immediate interests of shareholders and the financial 
bottom line, it is hardly an official embrace of stakeholder theory. The 
matters listed are similar to those that boards of directors in the United 
Kingdom are required to take account of in terms of section 172 of the 2006 
130 
 
 
Companies Act, although they are not included in the context of directors’ 
duties but are instead introduced by means of an advisory committee.  
 
5 The Governance codes 
 
Since the first version of the King Code it has been possible to see a more 
inclusive approach to stakeholder interests. King III was particularly bold in 
its support for a stakeholder inclusive approach. This is explained in the 
introduction to King III, which sets out the philosophy of the Report as 
revolving around ‘leadership, sustainability and corporate citizenship.’ 121 
The introduction highlights that modern governance and leadership are 
‘characterised by the ethical values of responsibility, accountability, fairness 
and transparency and based on moral duties that find expression in the 
concept of Ubuntu.’122  In particular strategies and operations should be 
directed in such a way as to achieve sustainable economic, social and 
environmental performance. Sustainability is further identified as the 
‘primary moral and economic imperative of the 21st century’ and ‘one of the 
most important sources of both opportunities and risks’ that businesses 
face.123  
A particularly interesting outlook, in the South African context, is the 
report’s approach to so-called ‘corporate citizenship’. The introduction to 
King III explained that ‘sustainability considerations are rooted in the South 
African Constitution which is the basic social contract that South Africans 
have entered into. The Constitution imposes responsibilities upon 
individuals and juristic persons for the realisation of the most fundamental 
rights.’124 In other words, as everyone has the Constitutional right to, for 
 
121 King III, Introduction and Background par 8.  
122 King III, Introduction and Background par 8.  
123 King III, Introduction and Background par 8. 
124 King III, Introduction and Background par 8. 
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example, a safe and clean environment, 125  King III contended that a 
company that pollutes or uses environmentally unsustainable practices is 
anathema to the principles found in the Constitution. In so doing, it pulls the 
Constitution squarely into the realm of corporate governance and perhaps 
even company law. This is of course not revolutionary, as the Constitution is 
the highest law of the land and in a sense superimposes itself on all 
legislation as will be considered further in some detail in chapter 5.   
Following this, King IV was released on 1 November 2016 and was effective 
for financial years commencing 1 April 2017.126 This most recent version of 
the South African Code, introduced sweeping changes but did not depart 
from the core principles or philosophies that shaped the contents of its 
predecessor. Part 5.1 of the Code is devoted to ‘leadership, ethics and 
corporate citizenship’. Of particular importance for purposes of this analysis, 
is Principle 3 of part 5.1, which states that ‘[t]he governing body should 
ensure that the organisation is and is seen to be a responsible corporate 
citizen.’127 The recommendations that support this principle, emphasise that 
it is the responsibility of the governing body to ‘ensure that the 
organisation’s responsible corporate citizenship efforts include compliance 
with the Constitution of South Africa (including the Bill of Rights), the law, 
leading standards, and adherence to its own codes of conduct and 
policies.’ 128  Oversight and monitoring of the effects of the company’s 
activities and outputs on its status as responsible corporate citizen is 
recommended on a continuous basis.129 Oversight and management in this 
 
125  Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The 
principles contained in the Code reiterate the philosophy set out in the introduction 
and makes clear reference to these departure points. Given that King III has been 
succeeded by King IV, the rest of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the 
salient points of the latter report and specific examples of principles from the King 
III Code will not be analysed in greater depth.  
126  For an overview of developments see: 
https://www.iodsa.co.za/page/OurTimeline 
127 King IV, Part 5.1: Principle 3. 
128 Part 5.1, Principle 3: Recommended Practice 12. 
129 Part 5.1, Principle 3: Recommended Practice 14. 
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context should take particular account of certain areas, namely the 
workplace,130 the economy,131 society,132 and the environment.133  
Part 5.5 of the Code then continues to deal more extensively with 
stakeholder relationships. Principle 16 underwrites the recommended 
practices contained in Part 5.5 and states that:  
In the execution of its governance role and responsibilities, the governing 
body should adopt a stakeholder-inclusive approach that balances the 
needs, interests and expectations of material stakeholders in the best 
interests of the organisation over time. 
To give effect to this, it is recommended that the governing body exercise 
‘ongoing oversight of stakeholder relationship management’ and should 
oversee that this gives rise to methodologies by means of which 
stakeholders and stakeholder groupings can be identified – in particular so-
called ‘material stakeholders’ based on the extent to which they either effect 
or are affected by the company’s activities, outputs and outcomes.134 It is 
also recommended that stakeholder risks should be managed as an ‘integral 
part of organisation-wide risk management’ and that formal mechanisms 
should be put in place to engage and communicate with stakeholders. Such 
mechanisms should include the use of dispute resolution mechanisms.135 
Part 5.5 also recommends certain disclosures relating to stakeholder 
 
130 This includes “employment equity; fair remuneration; and the safety, health, 
dignity and development of employees”. Part 5.1, Principle 3: Recommended 
Practice 14.  
131 This includes “economic transformation; prevention, detection and response to 
fraud and corruption; and responsibilities in transparent tax policy.” Part 5.1, 
Principle 3: Recommended Practice 14. 
132  This includes “public health and safety; consumer protection; community 
development; and protection of human rights” Part 5.1, Principle 3: Recommended 
Practice 14. 
133 This includes “responsibilities in respect of pollution and waste disposal; and 
protection of biodiversity.” Part 5.1, Principle 3: Recommended Practice 14. 
134 Part 5.5, Recommended Practice 4.  
135 Part 5.5. Recommended Practice 4.  
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relationships, 136  and makes additional recommendations relating to 
shareholder relationships, 137  and relationships within groups of 
companies.138  
Finally, King IV also makes a number or recommendations in relation to the 
mandatory Social and Ethics Committee (the SEC) introduced by the 2008 
Act. In terms of King IV, the SEC is responsible for oversight of and reporting 
on responsible corporate citizenship, sustainable development, stakeholder 
relationships, and organisational ethics. 139  It also recommends higher 
standards as far as the composition of the SEC is concerned, suggesting that 
a majority of the committee should be non-executive directors. 140 
Companies not required by law to put in place an SEC, are encouraged to 
allocate oversight of these matters to a dedicated committee or delegate it 
to an existing committee.141  
The first matter to prominently reference the code, was Minister of Water 
Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Company, 142  in which the 
board of a listed public company resigned en masse to avoid liability for 
reckless trading. The company faced multiple court orders in relation to its 
environmental responsibilities and the directors had been under the 
impression that it would not be able to meet these requirements and remain 
financially viable (although the court did not agree that this was an accurate 
interpretation of the court orders in question).143 The case is noteworthy not 
just for the fact that it makes clear references to the findings of the King 
Committee on Corporate Governance, but also for the fact that it pertinently 
 
136 Part 5.5, Recommended Practice 5. 
137 Part 5.5, Recommended Practice 6 – 10. 
138 Part 5.5, Recommended Practice 11 – 19. 
139 Part 5.3, Recommended practice 68. 
140 Part 5.3, Recommended practice 70. 
141 Part 5.3, Recommended practice 68. 
142 Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Company 2006 
5 SA 333 (W). 
143 Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Company 2006 
5 SA 333 (W) at par [14] – [15]. 
134 
 
 
referenced how the demands made by the governance code echoes 
constitutional imperatives and how this shapes the onus placed on company 
directors.  
As far as the duty to act bona fide in the best interests of the company is 
concerned, Husain J remained unconvinced that the errant directors had 
acted ‘in good faith upon reasonable grounds for their decision to resign’.144 
As mentioned above, the court concluded that the resignation succeeded 
only in incapacitating the directors from discharging their duties towards the 
company, and the court found it unacceptable that they could be allowed to 
walk away merely because it became convenient to do so. Having accepted 
appointment as directors of a listed company, they had also accepted the 
responsibilities that accompany the position. It is at this point that the judge 
makes the following pivotal observation:145  
Practicing sound corporate governance is essential for the wellbeing of a 
company and is in the best interests of the growth of this country’s 
economy, especially in attracting new investments. To this end the 
corporate community within South Africa has widely and almost uniformly 
accepted the findings and recommendations of the King Committee on 
Corporate Governance (see King Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa March 2002). Regarding the board of directors the King Report 
states the following: "The Board is the focal point of the corporate 
governance system. It is ultimately accountable and responsible for the 
performance and affairs of the company. Delegating authority to board 
committees or management does not in any way mitigate or dissipate the 
discharge by the board and its directors of their duties and responsibility" 
The conduct of the second to fifth respondents flies in the face of 
everything recommended in the code of corporate practices and conduct 
recommended by the King Committee.  
 
144 Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Company 2006 
5 SA 333 (W) at par [16.2] 
145 Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Company 2006 
5 SA 333 (W) at par [16.2] 
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The court was of the view that the directors had acted irresponsibly in 
abandoning the listed company of which they were the directors, and that 
they were themselves guilty of contempt of court, having caused the 
company to disobey the order despite having knowledge thereof. 146 
Notably, the court again referenced the King Committee, this time in the 
context of the company’s social responsibility. It is worth repeating the 
entire passage:  
 
The King Committee, correctly in my view, stressed that one of the 
characteristics of good corporate governance is social responsibility. The 
Committee stated as follows: ’A well-managed company will be aware of, 
and respond to, social issues, placing a high priority on ethical standards. A 
good corporate citizen is increasingly seen as one that is non-discriminatory, 
non-exploitative, and responsible with regard to environmental and human 
rights issues. A company is likely to experience indirect economic benefits 
such as improved productivity and corporate reputation by taking those 
factors into consideration. 
 
The object of the directives is to prevent pollution of valuable water 
resources. To permit mining companies and their directors to flout 
environmental obligations is contrary to the Constitution, the Mineral 
Petroleum Development Act and to the National Environmental 
 
146  The court observed at par [16.8] that ‘[b]y his act or omission such a director 
aids and abets the company to be in breach of the order of court against the 
company. If it were not so a court would have difficulty in ensuring that an order 
ad factum praestandum against a company is enforced by a punitive order.’ The 
judgement cites as authority for this conclusion. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corporation & others v Playboy Films (Pty) Ltd & another 1978 (3) SA 202 (W) at 
203CD; Melitka Trading Ltd & others v Commissioner, SARS 2005 (3) SA 1 (SCA) at 
paragraph [51] page 19. 
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Management Act. Unless courts are prepared to assist the State by providing 
suitable mechanisms for the enforcement of statutory obligations an 
impression will be created that mining companies are free to exploit the 
mineral resources of the country for profit over the lifetime of the mine, 
thereafter they may simply walk away from their environmental obligations. 
This simply cannot be permitted in a constitutional democracy which 
recognises the right of all of its citizens to be protected from the effects of 
pollution and degradation. For this reason too the second to fifth 
respondents cannot be permitted to merely walk away from the company 
conveniently turning their backs on their duties and obligations as directors. 
I am persuaded that the second to fifth respondents, notwithstanding their 
sudden resignation, must be held responsible for the first respondent's 
failure to comply with an order of court. 147 
 
6 Conclusion  
 
Since the earliest decisions considering where the focus of the board should 
be, opinion has shifted and there has been some evolution in both judicial 
attitude and the legislative agenda. The so-called ‘stakeholder debate’ has 
generated extensive literature. Perhaps one of the most contentious 
questions in company law has been, and continues to be, the extent to which 
company directors should take into account stakeholders other than the 
company’s shareholders and if so, which stakeholders in particular. Given 
the potential impact that a company’s activities may have, it is perhaps this 
second part of the inquiry that is the most vexing of all. It is less contentious 
to accept that there may be some duty owed to the company’s creditors 
(especially in instances where the company faces financial difficulties). It is 
 
147 Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Company 2006 
5 SA 333 (W) at par [16.9]. Emphasis added. 
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(arguably) a harder case to make, that the directors should take into account 
other potential stakeholders such as the environment or the communities 
within which it operates.148  
It is apparent even at face value that the principles and recommendations of 
King IV make far more onerous demands than the relevant statutory 
provisions or common law where the directors’ responsibilities to act in the 
company’s best interests are concerned. Its (arguably) progressive ethos has 
certainly not yet been fully embraced by black letter law despite the fact that 
the legislature had the clear opportunity to do so when drafting the 2008 
legislation. Indeed, several of the recommendations contained in King III 
were included in the 2008 Act. Yet in spite of a general commitment to good 
governance in the stated purposes contained in section 7 of the 2008 
legislation, the legislature chose not to further define the phrase ‘best 
interests of the company’, nor did it include the provision similar to section 
172 of the UK Companies Act of 2006. This is pertinent as the 2006 Act was 
already in operation at the time of drafting the 2008 Act, and when 
subsequent amendments were made to it. It is also clear from the 2008 
legislation that statutes of various jurisdictions, including the United 
Kingdom, were doubtlessly consulted and in some instances incorporated 
into the South African legislation. The failure to take a more outspoken 
stance seems then to have been intentional, with the legislature stopping 
short of imposing a more onerous standard directors where stakeholder 
interests are concerned.  
When interpreting the legislation, one must weigh two competing 
principles. Firstly, a clear mandate both when interpreting common law and 
when interpreting statute, that the principles underlying the Constitution 
should inform all interpretation. On the other, the fact that the purpose of 
 
148 Although as Du Plessis points out this is becoming increasingly less contentious 
as the impact on human activities on the environment becomes more difficult to 
ignore. Du Plessis JJ and Others Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 
(4th edn Cambridge UP 2018) 7 – 8. 
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the legislative provisions in question was apparently not to mandate a 
pluralist approach to interpretation by the directors of a company.  
This chapter provided a broad overview of the viewpoints that informed 
these debates. It also considered how the existing formal legal regime seems 
to approach the matter and how this may differ from the approach found in 
voluntary mechanisms – specifically codes of governance such as King IV and 
the UK Corporate Governance Code. It seems clear that an interpretation of 
the director’s duty to act in the best interests of the company would require 
far more from members of company boards, than the current interpretation 
of the statutory and common law expectations would. 
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CHAPTER 5 
COLLISIONS AT THE INTERSECTION – PROCEDURAL, PRACTICAL AND  
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS 
 
And the law may be resembled to a nut, which has a shell and a kernel 
within; the letter of the law represents the shell, and the sense of it the 
kernel, and as you will be no better for the nut if you make use only of 
the shell, so you will receive no benefit by the law, if you rely only upon 
the letter, and as the fruit and profit of the nut lies in the kernel, and not 
in the shell, so the fruit and profit of the law consists in the sense more 
than in the letter.1 
 
1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapters provided an overview of the regulatory environment 
within which South African companies function, with some references to the 
position in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. The aim has been to show 
that, when interpreting company legislation and the common law, there 
may be room for an approach that considers or even incorporates the 
principles espoused in voluntary corporate governance codes (specifically 
South Africa’s King IV).  As previously argued however, such an approach 
could face challenges when considered from a constitutional perspective. 
South African courts are not unique in the sense that their mandate is to 
state the law, not make it.  Iudicis est ius dicere, non facere2 is perhaps one 
 
1 Eyston v. Studd, 2 Pl. Com. 459, 465 n, 75 Eng. Reprints 688 (C. B. 1574) as quoted 
by Frederick J. De Sloovere ‘Contextual Interpretation of Statutes’ (1936) 5(2) 
Fordham L.Rev. 219 at 219. 
2 Du Plessis LM Statute Law and Interpretation in 25(1) Lawsa (reissue, 2001) par 
367. The author cites numerous examples from the cases recognising the maxim, 
see for example: Seluka v Suskin & Salkow 1912 TPD 258 270; Harris v Law Society 
of the Cape of Good Hope 1917 CPD 449 451; Union Government (Minister of 
Mines) v Thompson 1919 AD 404 425; Estate Reid v Goodwin 1920 AD 367 
373; Santy’s Wine & Brandy Co (Natal) Ltd v The District Commandant SA 
Police 1945 NPD 115 117; R v Tebetha 1959 2 All SA 456 (A); 1959 2 SA 337 (A) 
346G; S v Khanyapa 1979 3 All SA 597 (A); 1979 1 SA 824 (A) 835; S v Blaauw 1980 
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of the first concepts a law student is taught. Many consider it integral to the 
trias politica doctrine,3 some or other iteration of which is evident in most 
modern constitutions.4 This is also true in the South African Context where 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 outlines the distinct 
functions of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, 5  and the 
Constitutional Court has emphasised that the courts should not overstep 
these bounds:   
[T]he law cannot countenance a situation where, on a case-by-case basis, 
equity and fairness considerations are invoked to circumvent and subvert 
the plain meaning of a statutory provision which is rationally connected to 
the legitimate purpose it seeks to achieve... To do so would be to 
undermine one of the essential fundamentals of the rule of law, namely the 
principle of legality.6 
 
To say that it is the responsibility of the courts merely to state the law once 
written, seems a simple thing but of course this is far from the case. The 
 
3 All SA 462 (C); 1980 1 SA 536 (C) 537H; S v Ncokazi 1980 3 All SA 83 
(Tk); 1980 3 SA 789 (Tk) 797E–F. 
3 Also the ‘doctrine of separation of powers’. A comprehensive discussion of the 
doctrine falls outside of the remit of this thesis but see for example: Charles H 
Wilson ‘The Separation of Powers under Democracy and Fascism’ (1937) 52(4) PSQ 
481; Jon D Michaels ‘An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers’ (2015) 115(3) 
Colum.L.Rev. 515; Bellamy R ‘The Political Form of the Constitution: the Separation 
of Powers, Rights and Representative Democracy’ (1996) JPS 436. 
4 Wilson (n3) 481 but cf criticisms of the doctrine highlighted by the author.  And 
see: Holger Ross Lauritsen ‘Democracy and the Separation of Powers: A Rancierean 
Approach’ (2010) 11(1) Distinktion 5, where the author posits an alternative to the 
hitherto conflicting approaches to trias politica as being either “the opposite of 
democracy (in Marxism) or the essence of democracy (in liberalism)”.  
5 For an overview of the functioning of the separation of powers doctrine in South 
African constitutional law see: Stuart Woolman & Michael Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edn Juta, 2014) Revision Service 6 Chapter 
12. See also discussion of the relevant provisions etc below. See also Carmichele v 
Minister of Safety and Security (CCT 48/00) [2001] ZACC 22; 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) 
 at [36] ‘the major engine for law reform is the legislature and not the judiciary’; 
Bertie van Zyl (Pty) Ltd and Another v Minister for Safety and Security and Others 
(CCT 77/08) [2009] ZACC 11; 2010 (2) SA 181 (CC) at [106] ‘Drafting should be left 
to the Legislature’. 
6 Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard 2014 (4) SA474 (CC) at [52]. 
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jurisprudence that informs this area of the law (the interpretation of 
statutes), and centuries long history of conflicting case law gives some idea 
of the challenges that confronts a judge when interpreting legal documents 
generally, and legislation in particular.7 
Bennion concluded that the ‘essence of statutory interpretation lies in 
resolving the dichotomy between the ‘pure’ doctrine that the law is to be 
found in the Act and nowhere else, and the ‘realistic’ doctrine that legislation 
is an imperfect technique requiring, for the social good, an importation of 
surrounding information.’8 Given that the governance reports in question 
quite clearly constitute ‘surrounding information’ it is to this dichotomy that 
the discussion must now turn.  
As set out in Chapter 1, the common law duties in question have now been 
partially codified. However, as the codification is not absolute, the common 
law will still play an important role even to the extent of constituting a 
separate cause of action. 9  As a result, there are two distinct issues of 
interpretation to consider, namely the interpretation of the statutory duties 
on the one hand, and on the other the interpretation of the common law 
duties. As such, the chapter will first discuss the interpretation of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 and following this will turn its attention to the 
interpretation of the common law duties to the extent not yet considered in 
chapters 3 and 4 above.10  
 
7 Most recently South Africa’s Supreme Court of Appeal noted that such is the 
complexity of the debate that even an attempt to conclusively resolve it will in 
every likelihood prove futile. See The City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v 
Blair Atholl Homeowners Association (106/2018) [2018] ZASCA 176 at par [60] 
where Navsa ADP observed that: ‘It is unrealistic to expect of this court or, indeed, 
of any court, pronouncements that will end theoretical debates that have raged 
over many decades and settle for all time, terminology that will obviate confusion’.  
8 FAR Bennion Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (3rd ed Butterworths 2002) 520. 
9 See chapter 1 at text to note 83 and onwards. 
10 It is impossible to engage with the many theories, debates and philosophies that 
inform this area of the lawn in a single chapter. It is also outside of the scope of this 
research to provide a full historic overview. Reference to the history and context of 
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South African courts currently favour a context driven, purposive approach 
to interpretation. 11  The chapter will provide an overview of the South 
African position by outlining relevant statutory provisions and considering 
the theories of interpretation that would apply. A brief summary of the 
development of the law will be discussed but only to the extent that it 
highlights the tensions that arise when interpreting legislative texts. 
Following this, the impact of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 on the interpretation of the Act will be considered. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the interpretation and development of the 
common law.  
 
2 From Text to Context  
 
a. Relevant Developments in the Law of the Interpretation of 
Documents 
 
As is the case with most legal subjects, the law governing statutory 
interpretation encompasses numerous theories 12  and has generated 
extensive debate. 13  The most common or conventional theories include 
 
the law relating to the interpretation of statutes more generally will be considered 
only in overview to the extent appropriate for purposes of this research. 
11  See for example Standard Bank Investment Corporation v The Competition 
Commission and Others [2000] 2 All SA 245 (A), 2000 (2) SA 797 (SCA) at par [21]; 
Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality) 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA).    
12 Apart from those discussed below there are, for example, also the objectivism 
and the judicial or free theories. See Du Plessis (n2) 317 – 318. 
13  See in general: Lourens Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (Durban: 
Butterworths 2002); GE Devenish Interpretation of Statutes (Juta 1992); Rupert 
Cross, John Bell and Sir George Engle Statutory Interpretation (Butterworths 1995); 
Bennion (n8); Lord Justice Sales ‘Modern Statutory Interpretation’ (2017) 38(2) 
Stat.L.R 125. 
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literalism,14 intentionalism,15 and purposivism.16 The Companies Act 71 of 
2008 clearly favours a purposive method of interpretation,17 and what could 
perhaps be called a contextual approach taking account of purpose was 
most recently endorsed by the Supreme Court of Appeal 18  and the 
 
14  Du Plessis explains that “[a]ccording to literalism in its crude, unqualified form, 
the meaning of a statutory provision can (and must) be retrieved from the ipsissima 
verba in which it is couched, regardless of manifestly unjust or even absurd 
consequences. Legislative authority is unquestioningly deferred to and no one dare 
tamper with the very words that the legislature used to express its will.” Du Plessis 
(n2) 314. Although such an unqualified from of literalism is “on the wane” (see also 
Devenish (n13) 26). Du Plessis points out that adapted and amplified versions of the 
theory remain ‘alive and kicking’ and that other approaches to statutory 
interpretation ‘are regarded as deviations from literalism instead of theoretical 
positions in their own right.’ Du Plessis (n2) 314. 
15 The theory contends that the paramount rule of statutory interpretation is that 
the real intention of the legislature, once discerned, must be given effect to. See 
for example: Steyn, LC Uitleg van Wette (5 ed Juta 1981) at 2; Devenish, 
GE Interpretation of Statutes (Juta 1992) at 33.  Wallis JA on behalf of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in the judgement of Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni 
Municipality (920/2010) [2012] ZASCA 13 (15 March 2012) 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) 
recently criticised and rejected this approach in favour of a purposive method to 
interpretation. The court considered the prevailing criticisms and debates, referring 
inter alia to the work of ... and case law from the United Kingdom and Australia. An 
overview of this analysis falls outside of the scope of this chapter. See however 
Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality at par [20] – [23] and 
the sources there cited.  
16 Purposive analysis is a widely accepted modern approach, and can be described 
along the following lines: “To achieve a sound interpretation of a legislative text, 
interpreters must identify and take into account the purpose of the legislation, this 
includes the purpose of the provision to be interpreted as well as larger units – 
parts, divisions, and the Act as a whole. Once identified, the purpose is relied on to 
help establish the meaning of the text. It is used as a standard against which 
proposed interpretations are tested: an interpretation that promotes the purpose 
is preferred over one that does not, while interpretations that would tend to defeat 
the purpose are avoided.” Ruth Sullivan Statutory Interpretation (2ed Irwin Law Inc 
2007) 194.  
17 See section 5 & section 7. 
18The decision has been cited and followed by both the Supreme Court of Appeal 
and the Constitutional Court; most recently in Municipal Employees Pension Fund v 
Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund (Superannuation) and Others 2018 (2) BCLR 157 
(CC) ((2018) 39 ILJ 311; [2017] ZACC 43) par [28]; Trinity Asset Management (Pty) 
Ltd v Grindstone Investments 132 (Pty) Ltd 2018 (1) SA 94 (CC) (2017 (12) BCLR 
1562; [2017] ZACC 32) par [52]and National Police Commissioner and Another v 
Ngobeni 327/2017 [2018] ZASCA 14; 2018 (4) SA 99 (SCA) at par [ ] amongst others. 
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remainder of this overview will focus only on the current law and those 
developments that directly informed it.19  
In South African law, the primary rule in the construction of statutory 
provisions had long been to ascertain the intention of the Legislature.20  So 
well-known was this so-called ‘golden rule’ of interpretation, that it was 
considered trite.21 Ascertaining the intention of the Legislature was achieved 
‘in the first instance, by giving the words of the provision under 
consideration the ordinary grammatical meaning which their context 
dictates, unless to do so would lead to an absurdity so glaring that the 
[Legislature] could not have contemplated it.’22 
The courts gradually began to acknowledge that words used in a statute are 
to be interpreted in the light of their context and that the context in this 
sense should not be limited to the rest of the statute but should include its 
scope and purpose and within limits, also its background. These 
developments primarily came about following a seminal minority judgement 
by Schreiner JA in the case of  Jaga v Dönges NO & Another; Bhana v Dönges 
 
19 Other theories of interpretation include objectivism, linguistic turn and value 
based approaches. See JL Yeats (ed) Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 
(Juta 2018) 1-36. 
20 Manyasha v Minister of Law and Order 1999 (2) SA 179 (SCA) at 185, neutral 
citation page 8;  Bastian Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v General Hendrik Schoeman 
Primary School (207/07) [2008] ZASCA 70 (30 May 2008) at par 16. See for example 
the following cases where the phrase ‘the intention of the Legislature’ was used: 
Ebrahim v Minister of the Interior 1977 (1) SA 665 (A) at 677-678; Protective Mining 
& Industrial Equipment Systems (Pty) Ltd (formerly Hampo Systems (Pty) Ltd) v 
Audiolens (Cape) (Pty) Ltd 1987 (2) SA 961 (A) at 991; Summit Industrial Corporation 
v Claimants against the Fund Comprising the Proceeds of the Sale of the MV Jade 
Transporter 1987 (2) SA 583 (A) at 596 – 597, and Manyasha v Minister of Law and 
Order 1992 (2) SA 179 (SCA) at 185 B-C. The use of this ‘slippery phrase’ (as it was 
referred to by Lord Watson in the famous case of Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd 
(1987) AC 22 at 38) was strongly criticised in the influential judgement of Natal Joint 
Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality (920/2010) [2012] ZASCA 13 (15 
March 2012) 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA), considered at greater length below.  
21 Manyasha v Minister of Law and Order 1999 (2) SA 179 (SCA) at 185, neutral 
citation page 8. 
22 Manyasha v Minister of Law and Order 1999 (2) SA 179 (SCA) at 185, neutral 
citation page 8. 
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NO & Another 23  in which he was of the now famous opinion that ‘the 
legitimate field of interpretation should not be restricted as a result of an 
excessive peering at the language to be interpreted without sufficient 
attention to the contextual scene.’24  As early as 2004 the Constitutional 
Court described the ‘emerging trend’ in statutory interpretation as having 
‘regard to the context in which the words occur, even where the words to 
be construed are clear and unambiguous.’25 In other words, context was to 
become more than a mere afterthought to be considered only in the final 
instance when the wording defied an immediately apparent interpretation.  
One must consider these developments against the backdrop of South 
African case law that has long recognised that the aim of statutory 
interpretation as also ‘to give effect to the object or purpose of the 
legislation in question’. 26  Purposivism attaches meaning in light of the 
purpose that a particular provision aims to achieve given the context of the 
 
23 Jaga v Dönges NO & Another; Bhana v Dönges NO & Another 1950 (4) SA 653 (A).  
24 Jaga v Dönges NO & Another; Bhana v Dönges NO & Another 1950 (4) SA 653 (A) 
at 662G-H and 664H. These words of Schreiner JA (from the dissenting judgement) 
have been described as a “seminal exposition of an interpretative modus operandi 
honouring the exigencies of both language and context” and “one of the most 
frequently relied on minority judgments in the history of South African case law.” 
See Du Plessis (n2) par 310.  The relevant dictum has since been quoted with 
approval by the Constitutional Court: Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs & Others (CCT 27/03) [2004] ZACC 15 (12 March 2004) para 
89. And see: Bastian Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v General Hendrik Schoeman 
Primary School (207/07) [2008] ZASCA 70 (30 May 2008) at par 17 where the 
Supreme Court of Appeal cites the judgement with approval.  
25 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs & Others (CCT 
27/03) [2004] ZACC 15 (12 March 2004) para 90. In reaching this conclusion the 
court referred to Thoroughbred Breeders’ Association v Price Waterhouse (416/99) 
[2001] ZASCA 82; [2001] 4 All SA 161 (A) (1 June 2001) at par 12 of the concurring 
judgement where the court concludes that ‘ ‘The days are long past when blinkered 
peering at an isolated provision in a statute was thought to be the only legitimate 
technique in interpreting it if it seemed on the face of it to have a readily discernible 
meaning.’ And see: University of Cape Town v Cape Bar Council (100/86) [1986] 
ZASCA 86) (4 September 1986) page 18; 1986 (4) SA 903 (A) at 941D-E) 
26 Bastian Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v General Hendrik Schoeman Primary School 
(207/07) [2008] ZASCA 70 (30 May 2008) at par 19; Standard Bank Investment 
Corporation v The Competition Commission and Others 44/2000, 50/2000) [2000] 
ZASCA 20 at par [16]. 
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document as a whole.27 The approach was summarised famously by Innes J 
in the judgement of Dadoo Ltd and Others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council: 
28 
Speaking generally, every statute embodies some policy or is designed to 
carry out some object. When the language employed admits of doubt, it 
falls to be interpreted by the court according to recognised rules of 
construction, paying regard, in the first place, to the ordinary meaning of 
the words used, but departing from such meaning under certain 
circumstances, if satisfied that such departure would give effect to the 
policy and object contemplated…But there must, of course, be a limit to 
such departure. A Judge has authority to interpret, but not to legislate, 
and he cannot do violence to the language of the lawgiver by placing upon 
it a meaning of which it is not reasonably capable, in order to give effect 
to what he may think to be the policy or object of the particular measure. 
 
The above, oft cited judgement of Innes CJ in Dadoo was recently referred 
to in L D v Technology Corporate Management (Pty) Ltd and Others; S D v L 
D,29 and Smyth v Investec Bank Ltd30 where the SCA again emphasised ‘that 
it would be wrong for courts to ignore the clear language of a statute under 
the guise of adopting a purposive interpretation as doing so would be 
straying into the domain of the legislature.’31 Although the passage from 
Dadoo’s case therefore illustrates the courts’ willingness to consider the 
object or purpose of legislation, Schutz JA pointed out in the Standard Bank 
 
27 See above at note 20. And see: Du Plessis (n2) 316. This purpose is determined 
(in terms of the classical version of purposivism) by means of the so-called ‘mischief 
rule’ which contends that the purpose of enacted law is to ‘suppress mischief’. The 
rule, taken from Heydon’s case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a 7b, predates literalism and stems 
from an era where purposive interpretation was a practical necessity due to the 
fact that ‘judicial rectification and augmentation of fragmentary statutes was 
inevitable at the time...because Parliament met irregularly.”. 
28 1920 AD 530 at 543. 
29 (40036/16; 35926/16) [2018] ZAGPJHC 69 (23 February 2018) par [65] and [66].  
30 2015 JDR 2278 (GP) par [64]. Subsequently confirmed on appeal: 2018 (1) SA 494 
(SCA) par [45]. 
31 [2018] 1 All SA 1 (SCA), 2018 (1) SA 494 (SCA) par [45]. 
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case that the passage also ‘reflects that it is not the function of a court to do 
violence to the language of a statute and impose its view of what the policy 
or object of a measure should be.’32  
 
The court reiterated that one is confronted by ‘the ultimate logical 
dilemma’ if one were to subvert the words chosen by Parliament in 
favour of the spirit of the law and referred again the judgement in 
Dadoo’s case33 where Innes CJ considered the meaning of authorities 
contending that an action which does not contravene the language of a 
piece of legislation may nonetheless infringe its spirit and as such be 
invalid.34 
 
In considering this, Schultz JA dismissed the appellant’s contention that 
the semantic or literalist approach enjoyed dwindling support in modern 
legal theory. The court pointed out that s 43 of the Constitution vests 
the legislative authority of the national sphere of government in 
parliament and this authority is exercised mainly by enacting 
legislation.35 These pieces of legislation are expressed in words and as 
such, interpretation ‘concerns the meaning of the words used by the 
Legislature and it is therefore useful to approach the task by referring to 
the words used, and to leave extraneous considerations for later’ as 
Harms JA contended in Abrahamse v East London Municipality and 
Another; East London Municipality v Abrahamse.36  
 
32  Standard Bank Investment Corporation v The Competition Commission and 
Others [2000] 2 All SA 245 (A), 2000 (2) SA 797 (SCA) at par [16]. Schultz JA cites the 
very famous dictum from the judgement of Jaga v Dönges NO and Another; Bhana 
v Dönges NO and Another 1950 (4) SA 653 (A) where Shreiner JA warns of the 
dangers of a purposive approach being used to justify a disregard for the actual text 
(at 664). 
33 Dadoo Ltd and Others v D Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at 543. 
34 Dadoo Ltd and Others v D Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at 543.’ 
35  Standard Bank Investment Corporation v The Competition Commission and 
Others [2000] 2 All SA 245 (A), 2000 (2) SA 797 (SCA) at par [21]. 
36 Abrahamse v East London Municipality and Another; East London Municipality v 
Abrahamse 1997 (4) SA 613 (SCA) at 632. 
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Although Schultz JA went on to iterate that this does not imply that 
South African law is not an ‘enthusiastic supporter of ‘purposive 
construction’,37 he endorsed a more reticent approach and appears to 
emphasise that the purpose is only to be considered once the 
application of the ‘literal interpretation principle’ results in ambiguity 
and one seeks to determine which of more than one meaning might 
have been intended by the legislature.38  
 
Although the court in Standard Bank referenced the revolutionary 
judgement of Schreiner JA in Jaga v Dönges NO and Another; Bhana v 
Dönges NO and Another to illustrate the interaction between text and 
context, no mention was made of the fact that Schreiner JA in that matter in 
fact suggested that there could be two approaches to interpretation. Either 
one may split the inquiry into two parts, concentrating firstly on whether the 
language in question appears to have one clear ordinary meaning (in which 
case one would, confine the consideration of context ‘only to cases where 
the language appears to admit of more than one meaning’).39 Alternatively, 
one may from the beginning ‘consider the context and the language to be 
interpreted together.’40  
Nearly a decade later, in a seminal decision the  Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality (hereafter 
 
37  Standard Bank Investment Corporation v The Competition Commission and 
Others [2000] 2 All SA 245 (A), 2000 (2) SA 797 (SCA) at par [21]. 
38  Standard Bank Investment Corporation v The Competition Commission and 
Others [2000] 2 All SA 245 (A), 2000 (2) SA 797 (SCA) at par [21]. Schultz JA endorses 
the approach to purposivism set out by Smalberger JA in the judgement of Public 
Carriers Association and Others v Toll Road Concessionaries (Pty) Ltd and 
Others(323/89) [1989] ZASCA 164 (30 November 1989) page 16, 1990 (1) SA 925 
(A) at 942I-944A.  
39 Jaga v Dönges NO and Another; Bhana v Dönges NO and Another 1950 (4) SA 653 
(A) at 662. 
40 Jaga v Dönges NO and Another; Bhana v Dönges NO and Another 1950 (4) SA 653 
(A) at 663. 
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Endumeni)41  gave South African courts the unambiguous mandate to apply 
the ‘second of the two possible approaches followed by Schreiner JA in Jaga 
v Donges NO and Another’, namely that one should from the outset  consider 
the context and the language together, with neither predominating over the 
other.42 In a judgement written on behalf of the majority Wallis JA in no 
uncertain terms, rejected the ubiquitous golden rule of interpretation43 or 
any form of intentionalism and embraced a shift from text to context in the 
law relating to the interpretation of documents which manifested itself over 
the last century,44 and which was confirmed by the Constitutional Court as 
 
41 (920/2010) [2012] ZASCA 13 (15 March 2012) 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA). The decision 
has been cited and followed by both the Supreme Court of Appeal and the 
Constitutional Court; most recently in Municipal Employees Pension Fund v Natal 
Joint Municipal Pension Fund (Superannuation) and Others 2018 (2) BCLR 157 (CC) 
((2018) 39 ILJ 311; [2017] ZACC 43) par [28]; Trinity Asset Management (Pty) Ltd v 
Grindstone Investments 132 (Pty) Ltd 2018 (1) SA 94 (CC) (2017 (12) BCLR 1562; 
[2017] ZACC 32) par [52]and National Police Commissioner and Another v Ngobeni 
327/2017 [2018] ZASCA 14; 2018 (4) SA 99 (SCA) at par [ ] amongst others. 
42 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality (920/2010) [2012] 
ZASCA 13 (15 March 2012) 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) at par [19]. 
43 Wallis JA considers the notion that interpretation is aimed at establishing the 
‘intention of the Legislature’ and concludes that, despite it being a phrase used by 
generations of lawyers, it is unhelpful. It is namely nearly impossible to discern the 
meaning that Parliament may or may not have attributed to a legislative provision 
in a context of which they may only be dimly aware – if indeed it is a context that 
they contemplated at all. The motivations of lawmakers when passing legislation 
are manifold and in many circumstances, it is entirely artificial to speak of the 
intention of parliament and that ‘to characterise the task of interpretation as a 
search for such an ephemeral and possibly chimerical meaning is unrealistic and 
misleading.’: Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 
(920/2010) [2012] ZASCA 13 (15 March 2012) 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) at par [20] – 
[21]. 
44 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality (920/2010) [2012] 
ZASCA 13 (15 March 2012) 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) at par [18]. Indeed, a good eight 
years before the judgement, Ngcobo J described himself as ‘troubled’ by an 
approach which ‘pays too much attention to the ordinary language of the words’ 
and by doing so ‘ignores the colour given to the language by the context’ see Bato 
Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs & Others (CCT 27/03) 
[2004] ZACC 15 (12 March 2004) at par [92]. The court quotes from the decision of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in Thoroughbred Breeders’ Association v Price 
Waterhouse (416/99) [2001] ZASCA 82; [2001] 4 All SA 161 (A) (1 June 2001) at par 
[12] of the concurring judgment. 
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an ‘emerging trend in statutory construction’ 45  and a Constitutional 
requirement. 
 
The court emphasised again that the ‘sole benefit of expressions such as 
“the intention of the legislature”... is to serve as a warning to courts that 
the task they are engaged upon is discerning the meaning of words used 
by others, not one of imposing their own views of what it would have 
been sensible for those others to say’.46 The proper approach is ‘from 
the outset to read the words used in the context of the document as a 
whole and in the light of all relevant circumstances.’47 In resolving any 
ambiguity that may arise, the court mentioned specifically that the 
apparent purpose of the provision and the context in which it occurs will 
be important guides to correct interpretation, and that ‘[a]n 
interpretation will not be given that leads to impractical, unbusinesslike 
or oppressive consequences or that will stultify the broader operation of 
the legislation or contract under consideration.’48 
The ratio is worth repeating here in full:  
The present state of the law can be expressed as follows. Interpretation is 
the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a document, be it 
legislation, some other statutory instrument, or contract, having regard to 
 
45 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs & Others (CCT 
27/03) [2004] ZACC 15 (12 March 2004) at par [90]. The court in Endumeni referred 
also to the following comment made by Sir Anthony Mason CJ in the judgement of 
Rainy Sky SA and others v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50; [2012] Lloyds Rep 34 (SC) 
at par [21]: “Problems of legal interpretation are not solved satisfactorily by ritual 
incantations which emphasise the clarity of meaning which words have when 
viewed in isolation, divorced from their context. The modern approach to 
interpretation insists that context be considered in the first instance, especially in 
the case of general words, and not merely at some later stage when ambiguity 
might be thought to arise.”  
46 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality (920/2010) [2012] 
ZASCA 13 (15 March 2012) 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) at par [24]. 
47 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality (920/2010) [2012] 
ZASCA 13 (15 March 2012) 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) at par [24]. 
48 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality (920/2010) [2012] 
ZASCA 13 (15 March 2012) 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) at par [24]. 
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the context provided by reading the particular provision or provisions in the 
light of the document as a whole and the circumstances attendant upon its 
coming into existence. Whatever the nature of the document, consideration 
must be given to the language used in the light of the ordinary rules of 
grammar and syntax; the context in which the provision appears; the 
apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material known to those 
responsible for its production. Where more than one meaning is possible 
each possibility must be weighed in the light of all these factors. The process 
is objective not subjective. A sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that 
leads to insensible or unbusinesslike results or undermines the apparent 
purpose of the document. Judges must be alert to, and guard against, the 
temptation to substitute what they regard as reasonable, sensible or 
businesslike for the words actually used. To do so in regard to a statute or 
statutory instrument is to cross the divide between interpretation and 
legislation. In a contractual context it is to make a contract for the parties 
other than the one they in fact made. The ‘inevitable point of departure is 
the language of the provision itself’, read in context and having regard to 
the purpose in the light of all these factors. The process is objective not 
subjective.49  
In spite of a clear preference for an approach which embraces context from 
the outset, the judgement should not be interpreted to suggest that the text 
has become an afterthought: the court in Endumeni emphasised the divide 
between interpretation and legislation and in so doing echoed other 
judgements that have urged the courts not to allow a purposive approach to 
interpretation to undermine the actual words written.50  
 
 
49 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality (920/2010) [2012] 
ZASCA 13 (15 March 2012) 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) at par [18]. 
50 See for example In re former Highlands Residents: Sonny v Department of Land 
Affairs 2000 (2) SA 351 (LCC) at par [12] where the South African Land Claims Court 
remarks: “Important as the purpose of legislation may be, elevating it to the 
prevailing factor of interpretation will not, in my view, always provide the key to 
unlock meaning.” 
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Although it introduced an about-turn in the courts’ approach to statutory 
interpretation in South African law, Endumeni was not entirely clear on 
exactly what its impact should be. The ‘context in which the provision 
appears’ seems a clear reference to the textual context or in other words 
the entirety of the statute. However, the judgement does not indicate what 
is meant by ‘the apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material 
known to those responsible for its production’. Clearly, if broadly construed 
this could allow a great deal of material indeed. That this may be the result, 
appeared from the subsequent judgement of Bothma-Bato Transport 
(Edms) Bpk) v S Bothma & Seun Transport (Edms) Bpk)51 where Wallis JA 
reiterated that:   
Whilst the starting point remains the words of the document, which are 
the only relevant medium through which the parties have expressed their 
contractual intentions, the process of interpretation does not stop at a 
perceived literal meaning of those words, but considers them in the light 
of all relevant and admissible context, including the circumstances in which 
the document came into being. The former distinction between permissible 
background and surrounding circumstances, never very clear, has fallen 
away. Interpretation is no longer a process that occurs in stages but is 
‘essentially one unitary exercise’. Accordingly it is no longer helpful to 
refer to the earlier approach. 
 
The court here mentioned specifically that it is the ‘admissible context’ that 
is to be considered. This could be interpreted as narrowing the scope of 
Endumeni and confirming that what is implied by context is all surrounding 
circumstances subject to admissibility in terms of the existing law. The 
change being introduced by Endumeni then, has to do almost exclusively 
with how context is to be applied and not with what that context comprises 
of. However, the very same sentence then iterates (without qualifying) that 
‘relevant and admissible context’ includes ‘the circumstances in which the 
 
51 Bothma-Bato Transport (Edms) Bpk) v S Bothma & Seun Transport (Edms) Bpk) 
[2013] ZASCA 176 [12].  
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document came into being’ and does away with ‘the former distinction 
between permissible background and surrounding circumstances’. This 
could be construed as an even bolder change, one which disregards the rules 
that have hitherto excluded large swathes of extra-textual material from the 
interpretive process.52 
 
As mentioned, the courts embraced Endumeni in a chorus and it is cited 
almost as a matter of course whenever any statute or contract faces judicial 
scrutiny. However, it is perhaps because of this vagueness that Endumeni is 
often given lip service only and in fact has seemingly been used as authority 
for anything under the sun. The following cogent summary by Perumalsamy 
illustrates this point:53  
In a growing number of judgments that cite Endumeni, it seems that it is 
often only cited for the proposition that it is the correct approach to the 
interpretation of statutes, wills and contracts. But immediately after this, 
our Courts revert to the ordinary meaning as it was intended by the 
legislature or contracting parties, doing the exact opposite of Endumeni. 
In addition to this, even though Endumeni, was decided in 2012, and first 
endorsed by the Constitutional Court in 2013, (See in particular KwaZulu 
Natal Joint Liasion Committee v MEC Department of Education, KwaZulu 
Natal 2013 (4) SA 262 (CC) [128]; National Credit Regulator v Opperman 
2013 (2) SA 1 (CC) [96].) in a number of decisions, the Constitutional 
Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and some divisions of the High Court 
have both endorsed Endumeni and the old approach to statutory 
interpretation simultaneously without recognising the contradiction.54   
 
52 Rightly or wrongly so.  
53 Kessler Perumalsamy ‘The Life and Times of Textualism in South Africa’ (2019) 
PELJ 10 (original footnotes appear in brackets).  
54 The author cites a number of examples that illustrate the point: Trinity Asset 
Management (Pty) Ltd v Grindstone Investments 132 (Pty) Ltd 2018 (1) SA 94 (CC) 
[52]; Reezen Ltd v Excellerate Holdings Ltd [2018] ZAGPJHC 409 [43-44]; Public 
Servants Association v Head of Department of Health, Gauteng and Others 2018 (2) 
SA 365 (CC) [43]; Jordaan and Another v Tshwane City and Another and Four Similar 
Cases 2017 (2) SA 295 (GP) [69]); Tshwane City v Mitchell 2016 (3) SA 231 (SCA); S v 
154 
 
 
It appears from this that Wallis JA’s funeral for the old approach55 was not 
as well attended by the South African judiciary as the learned judge may 
have hoped. Perumalsamy predicted that, the ultimate outcome will likely 
be that subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal will give 
further structure to the decision reached in Endumeni. Indeed, he pointed 
to the first judgement to question the absolute wisdom of Endumeni – a 
dissenting opinion of Majiedt JA and Davis AJA in the case of CSARS v Daikin 
Air Conditioning South Africa.56  
 
The recent decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal in The City of Tshwane 
Metropolitan Municipality v Blair Atholl Homeowners Association57 seems 
finally to have vindicated Perumalsamy’s prediction. Navsa ADP strongly 
criticized the South African courts’ treatment of the principles set out in 
Endumeni. Yet again the judgement confirms that the Supreme Court of 
Appeal ‘has consistently stated that in the interpretation exercise the point 
of departure is the language of the document in question. Without the 
written text there would be no interpretive exercise. In cases of this nature, 
the written text is what is presented as the basis for a justiciable issue.... As 
a matter of policy, courts have chosen to keep the admission of evidence 
within manageable bounds.’58 
 
Navsa ADP laments the fact that the SCA has seen ‘too many cases of 
extensive, inconclusive and inadmissible evidence being led’ and that this 
 
Nteta and Others 2016 (2) SACR 641 (WCC); AfriForum and Another v University of 
the Free State 2018 (2) SA 185 (CC) [43])’. 
55 See Bothma-Bato Transport (Edms) Bpk) v S Bothma & Seun Transport [2013] 
ZASCA 176 at par [12] quoted above where Wallis JA professes that “it is no longer 
helpful to refer to the old approach.” 
56 CSARS v Daikin Air Conditioning South Africa (Pty) Ltd [2018] ZASCA 66.  
57  The City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Blair Atholl Homeowners 
Association 2019 (3) SA 398 (SCA). 
58  The City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Blair Atholl Homeowners 
Association 2019 (3) SA 398 (SCA) [63]. 
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trend seems to be on the increase.59 Decrying the fact that the pendulum 
has swung too far, the court called for a return to the foundational 
principles relating to the extent of evidence led in relation to written texts 
as set out by the SCA in KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd 
& another 60  where the court confirmed that the parol evidence rule 
remained part of South African law, that ‘interpretation is a matter of law 
and not of fact and, accordingly interpretation is a matter for the court and 
not for witnesses ... [and that] the rules about admissibility of evidence in 
this regard do not depend on the nature of the document, whether statute, 
contract or patent.’61  
 
Importantly, the Court in KPMG confirmed that ‘to the extent that evidence 
may be admissible to contextualise the document (since “context is 
everything”) to establish its factual matrix or purpose or for purposes of 
identification, “one must use it as conservatively as possible”(Delmas 
Milling Co Ltd v Du Plessis 1955 (3) SA 447 (A) at 455B-C).’ 62 The court 
unreservedly endorses this approach, as Navsa ADP observes:  
 
In KPMG this court, as we are now, was expressing judicial frustration 
at how hitherto recognised inadmissible evidence, which, in any event, 
is invariably inconclusive, was being led in support of a party’s 
contentions in relation to written text ... Before us it was not suggested 
that the foundational principles set out in KPMG no longer apply or 
should be abandoned. Nor is such a suggestion sustainable. Those 
principles continue to be applicable. Endumeni, ... reaffirmed those 
principles and did not detract from them.63 
 
59  The City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Blair Atholl Homeowners 
Association 2019 (3) SA 398 (SCA) [63]. 
60  [2009] ZASCA 7; 2009 (4) SA 399 (SCA). 
61  [2009] ZASCA 7; 2009 (4) SA 399 (SCA) at [39]. 
62  [2009] ZASCA 7; 2009 (4) SA 399 (SCA) at [39]. Original reference included in 
brackets. 
63  The City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Blair Atholl Homeowners 
Association 2019 (3) SA 398 (SCA) [68] – [69]. 
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These dissenting voices are of course a far cry from a return to the ‘golden 
rule’ or intentionalism, and probably remains uncontentious to say that 
South African law seems indeed to have fully embraced a context driven 
approach to the interpretation of legal documents. What this discussion 
hopes to show however, is that the parameters of this context remain 
vague. It is therefore conceivable that a court might justify turning to a 
report such as King IV as an interpretive aide, especially given that the 
Department of Trade and Industry cites its predecessor on numerous 
occasions in the policy paper that informed the drafting process,64 and the 
Act thought not referencing King III by name, refers clearly to good 
corporate governance as one of its purposes in section 7.65  
 
Yet, the emphatic emphasis of the most recent decision is unambiguous in 
its warning that extra-textual evidence should be treated with caution and 
admitted only in the rarest of cases. Any potential floodgates that 
Endumeni might temporarily have opened are apparently fast closing. It 
bears mention that the decision in Blair Atholl had to do with the 
interpretation of a contract and not statute and as such some of the court’s 
remarks may be considered as having been made in obiter. That being said, 
the judgement in KPMG that Navsa ADP relies upon specifically points out 
that it does not make any difference which legal text one is interpreting as 
far as this reticence towards extra-textual material is concerned.  
 
In conclusion, having considered the relevant case law, it appears possible 
but unlikely that a court will allow evidence related to the governance 
 
64 South African Company Law for the 21st Century – Guidelines for Corporate Law 
Reform Government Gazette 26493 of 23 June 2004 available online at 
https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/26493gen1183a.p
df.  
64South African Company Law for the 21st Century – Guidelines for Corporate Law 
Reform at 11.  
65See below at note 150. 
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codes to inform the provision of the statute. For the moment the analysis 
must now turn to a further reality of statutory interpretation in the South 
African context that may give indirect impetus to an appeal to King IV when 
interpreting the Companies Act – a Constitution that permeates all law.  
 
b. Corporate Law Through the Prism of the Bill of Rights  
 
An end to Apartheid heralded a new era in South Africa and the adoption of 
a codified constitution. The supremacy of the constitution is enshrined in 
chapter one as a founding provision which states: ‘This Constitution is the 
supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, 
and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.’66 
For purposes of this discussion, one of the most important  provisions, is 
Section 39 of the Constitution, which deals with the interpretation of the Bill 
of Rights.67 It gives the courts a specific mandate ‘when interpreting any 
legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law’, 
namely that every court, tribunal or forum must ‘promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights.’ 68 Of course, this imperative applies not only 
to corporate law, and as Langa DP concluded, ‘[t]his means that all statutes 
must be interpreted through the prism of the Bill of Rights. All law-making 
authority must be exercised in accordance with the Constitution...The 
 
66Section 2, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
67 It must be made clear at the outset that it is impossible to do justice to the 
debates, discourse and numerous cases that inform the impact of the constitution 
on statutory interpretation in the South African context, nor is this required for the 
analysis at hand. The overview provided here highlights the most salient points that 
pertain directly to the research question. Numerous comprehensive publications 
deal with the matter in detail. See for example:  
68 Section 39(2). Subsection 39(3) toes on to state that “[t]he Bill of Rights does not 
deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred 
by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent 
with the Bill”.  
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Constitution requires that judicial officers read legislation, where possible, 
in ways which give effect to its fundamental values’. 69  
The Bill of Rights is contained in Chapter 2 of the Constitution, where it is 
described as ‘a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa.’ The Bill of Rights 
‘enshrines the rights of all people’ and ‘affirms the democratic values of 
human dignity, equality and freedom’.70  Its universal application is again 
reiterated in section 8 which confirms that ‘[t]he Bill of Rights applies to all 
law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of 
state’.71 Its provisions will bind a natural or juristic person ‘if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and 
the nature of any duty imposed by the right’.72 Finally, when applying a 
 
69 Hyundai case: Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v 
Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) at 558 par 
[21]. The approach is summarised as follows by the Land Claims Court In re Former 
Highlands Residents: Sonny v Department of Land Affairs 2000 (2) SA 351 (LCC) at 
par [10] in relation to the interpretation of the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 
1994: “‘The Court must exercise its powers to order restitution within the confines 
of the Restitution Act, duly interpreted by using all relevant norms of interpretation 
(the presumptions and other intra-textual and extra-textual aids). Where the 
language of a statute leaves a gap to be filled, the Court must fill the gap. In doing 
so, it must reconstruct the thinking contained in the statute, consider the practical 
implications and come up with a solution which conforms with the purpose of the 
statute and with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, while also 
serving the requirements of justice and equity.” 
70 Section 7(1), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Section 7 further 
iterates that the state must “respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the 
Bill of Rights (s 7(2)), and sets out when the rights contained therein may 
legitimately be limited (s 7(3)).  
71 Section 8(1), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
72 Section 8(2), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Ss 8(4) further 
states that: “A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the 
extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic person.” 
The courts have since interpreted this provision to confer rights of privacy, property 
and expression on juristic persons. See for example regarding the right to freedom 
of expression enjoyed by the press:  Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC), 2002 
(8) BCLR 771 (CC); Sayed v Editor, Cape Times 2004 (1) SA 58, 62–63 (C). Although 
naturally juristic persons could not benefit from all rights, see for example 
Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences & Others v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd & Others: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd & Others 
v Smit NO & Others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC), 2000 (10) BCLR 1079 (CC)('Hyundai') 
regarding the right to human dignity. And see in general: Woolman and Bishop (eds) 
(n5) ch31 – p39. 
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provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person a court ‘must 
apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation 
does not give effect to that right.’73 
Chapter 8 of the Constitution is devoted to the courts and the administration 
of justice. Section 165 vests judicial authority of the republic in the courts,74 
and confirms their independence, ‘subject only to the Constitution and the 
law, which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or 
prejudice’.75 Section 173 confers on the Constitutional Court, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal and the High Court of South Africa the ‘inherent power to 
protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, 
taking into account the interests of justice’. 76  Finally, as part of a new 
generation of statutes promulgated since 1996, the Companies Act itself 
references the impact of the Constitution on several occasions, with the 
Legislature expressly requiring that corporate law should be interpreted in a 
‘constitutional setting’.77  
 
As Du Plessis contends, constitutional interpretation surely calls for a new 
approach - one that has matured beyond the conventional canons of 
construction.78 He refers to this approach, whereby the principles for the 
interpretation of  statutes are to be derived from the Constitution, as a 
‘teleological enunciation of a procedure of statutory-cum-constitutional 
interpretation..., namely the reading of statutes in conformity with the 
 
73 Section 8(3)(a), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Conversely, 
the court may also develop rules of the common law to limit such a right, provided 
that the limitation is in line with section 36 of the Constitution. S 8(3)(b). See 
discussion below at text to note 165 and onwards regarding the impact of this 
provision in relation to the interpretation of the common law. 
74 Section 165(1), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
75 Section 165(2), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
76 Section 173, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Emphasis added. 
77 Nedbank Ltd v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd; Essa and Another v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd 
2012 (5) SA 497 (WCC) (21857/2011, 2106/2012) [2012] ZAWCHC 139 par [21]. 
78 Du Plessis (n2) par 327. 
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constitution.’79 The supreme Constitution does not deprive statutes of their 
worth, but ‘give[s] them new direction.’80 
Reading or interpreting a provision in conformity with the Constitution is 
trellised  by a presumption of constitutionality, in terms of which a provision 
which is at first glance unconstitutional may survive scrutiny if it could be 
read ‘in conformity with the Constitution without distorting it or unduly 
straining its plain meaning’.81  This approach was authoritatively decided by 
Harms DP, speaking for the SCA in Minister of Safety and Security v 
Sekhoto,82 where it was emphasised that ‘[j]udicial officers must prefer an 
interpretation of legislation that falls within constitutional bounds over one 
that does not, provided it can be reasonably ascribed to the section.’ 
Thus, the courts may interpret a word or phrase in a more restrictive sense 
(a reading-down) or in a more extensive sense (a reading-up).83 Along the 
same lines, if there is more than one conflicting interpretation of a statutory 
provision, naturally the one which best promotes the spirit, purport and 
objects of the bill of rights is the preferred approach.84 It is also possible for 
the court to ‘read in’ certain words in order to save a provision from 
invalidity on constitutional grounds. This, however, must entail a ‘reasonably 
possible’, ‘non-distortive’, not ‘unduly strained’ reading in conformity with 
the Constitution.85 Where it can be avoided the courts appear loath to read 
 
79 Du Plessis (n2) par 327. 
80 Du Plessis (n2) par 327. 
81 Du Plessis (n2) par 330. 
82 Minister of Safety and Security v Sekhoto 2011 (5) SA 367 at para 15. 
83  Du Plessis (n2) par 330. Du Plessis here refers to the example of Daniels v 
Campbell 2004 7 BCLR 735 (CC), 2004 5 SA 331 (CC) where the term “spouse” as it 
is used in the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act27 of 1990 was considered. The 
court concluded that, to save a provision that would otherwise be considered 
unconstitutional and struck down, it was necessary to read this term in an extensive 
way, such as to include a Muslim marriage not officially solemnised in terms of the 
Marriage Act 25 of 1961. 
84 Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd 2008 11 BCLR 1123 (CC). 
85 Du Plessis (n2) par 330.  
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words in accordance with what Du Plessis terms a narrow understanding of 
‘interpretation’ which does not allow for any words to be changed.86  
 
These processes of restricting or extending the scope of statutory provisions 
are, however, aimed at rescuing provisions from invalidity on constitutional 
grounds, which is not what this chapter is concerned with. The argument is 
not that the duties contained in the Companies Act will require any such  
rescue mission. But, as Du Plessis contends, ‘[t]he decisive question of 
statutory interpretation no longer is what the legislature intended a statute 
to mean, but which one of the possible meanings of the text is most 
compatible with the Constitution.’ Du Plessis argues that this will only be the 
case where the constitutionality of a statutory provision is challenged, but 
then again, as he puts it ‘the radiating effect of the supreme Constitution, 
like the perpetuity of statute law, is always present in every situation where 
legislation is construed, on account of section 39(2) of the Constitution. 
Irrespective of the interpreter’s surmise of what the legislature intended, 
statute law must be given effect to in a manner promoting the spirit, purport 
and objects of the bill of rights.’87  
 
 
86 This may be either a sound approach which aligns with the separation of powers 
doctrine, or too conservative depending on which argument one favours. 
Moseneke J had the following warning to offer in favour of a remedially rectifying 
a statute as opposed to reading it in conformity with the Constitution: “Another 
important consideration relates to the rule of law. The problem of readily importing 
interpretations piecemeal into legislation is the precedent it sets. Courts below will 
follow the lead and readily interpret rather than declare invalid statutes 
inconsistent with the Constitution. However, constitutional re-interpretation does 
not come to this Court for confirmation. The result may be that high courts develop 
interpretations at varying paces and inconsistently. This makes for an even more 
fragmented jurisprudence and would have deleterious effects on how people 
regulate their affairs. It is highly undesirable to have an institution as important as 
marriage recognised for some people in some provinces and not in others. The rule 
of law requires legal certainty.” See Daniels v Campbell 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC) at par 
[104]. 
87 Du Plessis (n2) par 331. 
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The constitution has also changed our understanding of ‘clear and 
unambiguous language’, with many crucial provisions of its text drafted in 
language that is anything but clear and unambiguous. This is deliberately so 
as values, one could argue, are incapable of being expressed in clear and 
unambiguous terms and what is more, the Constitution is ‘a durable text the 
expansively formulated and thus inevitably ambiguous provisions of which 
are meant to cater for an inestimable array of exigencies for a long time to 
come.’88  
 
Be this as it may, a regard for Constitutional values cannot be taken as carte 
blanche by a court interpreting a statutory provision. Thus, the 
Constitutional Court in South African Police Service v Public Servants 
Association warned that: 
 
Interpreting statutes within the context of the Constitution will not require 
the distortion of language so as to extract meaning beyond that which the 
words can reasonably bear. It does, however, require that the language used 
be interpreted as far as possible, and without undue strain, so as to favour 
compliance with the Constitution. This in turn will often necessitate close 
attention to the . . . and institutional context in which the provision under 
examination functions. In addition it will be important to pay attention to the 
specific factual context that triggers the problem requiring solution. 89  
 
The impact of this type of analysis on juristic persons and company 
directors has focussed mainly on human rights abuses and the potential 
liability for such abuses. In fact, this question has generated extensive 
debate in the South African context given the progressive nature of the 
 
88 Du Plessis (n2) par 331. 
89 2007 (3) SA 521 (CC) ([2007] 5 BLLR 383; [2006] ZACC 18) at par [20] (emphasis 
added). See also Serious Economic Offences & Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors 
(Pty) Ltd & Others: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd & Others v Smit NO & 
Others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC), 2000 (10) BCLR 1079 (CC) at [21] – [24]; University of 
Stellenbosch Law Clinic v Minister of Justice 2016 (6) SA 596 (CC) at [137].  
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Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 90  A link between the Constitutional 
imperative and corporate governance values espoused by King IV is more 
tangential but that is not to say that at least certain components of a good 
governance regime haven’t become constitutional imperatives. What 
comes to mind are in fact issues that were directly mentioned by King III 
and again reiterated in King IV as being required of any company operating 
in a Constitutional dispensation underpinned by the values of the South 
African Constitution - such as corporate social responsibility, appropriate 
risk management, stakeholder management and the environmental impact 
of the company. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
90  See for example M Gwanyanya ‘The South African Companies Act and the 
realisation of corporate human rights and responsibilities’ (2015) 18(1) PELJ 3101. 
As the authors of Blackman contends, ‘one can certainly debate how far this should 
go in relation to the interpretation of directors’ duties. The low-water mark would 
be that a director has a duty to ensure that the company adheres to the 
Constitution as part of its obligations to conduct its business in a lawful manner.’ 
See also:  D Bilchitz ‘Corporate law and the Constitution: Towards binding human 
rights responsibilities for corporations’ (2008) 125(4) SALJ 754; D Bilchitz Human 
Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to 
Respect? (2013); IM Esser ‘Corporate social responsibility: A company law 
perspective’ (2011) 23(3) SA Merc LJ 317; J Katzew ‘Crossing the divide between the 
business of the corporation and the imperatives of human rights—the impact 
of section 7of the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ (2011) 128(4) SALJ 686; L Muswaka 
‘The corporate responsibility for human rights: A conceptual framework’ (2014) 
5(3) MJSS219; SR Ratner ‘Corporations and human rights: A theory for legal 
responsibility’ (2001) 111 Yale LJ 443; CJ Roederer CJ ‘Post-matrix legal reasoning: 
Horizontality and the rule of values in the South African law’ (2003) 19(1) SAJHR 57; 
JG Ruggie ‘Business and human rights: The evolving international agenda’ (2007) 
101 AJIL819; L Smit ‘Human rights litigation against companies in South African 
courts: A response to Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti 2011 (3) SA 237 (CC)’ (2011) 
27(2) SAJHR 354; B Stephens ‘Corporate liability: Enforcing human rights through 
domestic litigation’ (2000–2001) Hastings Int’l & Comp L Rev 401; MD Chirwa ‘The 
long march to binding obligations of transnational corporations in international 
human rights law’ (2006) 22(1) SAJHR 76. 
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c. The Role of Extrinsic or Extra-Textual Material in Interpreting 
Legislation  
 
 
The South African Law Reform Commission, in its review of the 
Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 dealt extensively with the role of extrinsic 
material when interpreting statutes.91 The Committee refers to Bennion’s92 
description of what might constitute ‘enacting history’, namely materials 
‘assumed to be within the contemplation of Parliament when it passed the 
Act’.93 Such enacting history would, according to Bennion, comprise reports 
and other material on which legislation is based, reports of parliamentary 
debates, explanatory memoranda and ‘other contemporaneous material 
upon which Parliament may be presumed to have acted.’94  
These materials are described as the scaffolding used in the construction of 
the statute, and in an ideal world such scaffolding would no longer serve any 
purpose once the ‘building’ is erected – the central idea of legislation being 
‘to provide the citizen or adviser with a structure which in itself constitutes 
a basis upon which the person bound can safely stand.’95 However this idea 
has proven itself to be idealistic, and is defeated by the shortcomings of 
language and the competence of the legislators, not to mention the fact that 
these drafters seek to regulate a future that remains at least to some extent 
beyond their contemplation. 96   
The extent to which sources outside of the statute should be referenced in 
its interpretation has not been without controversy. Historical interpretation 
in the South African context tends to be focussed on the origin or genesis of 
 
91  The South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 112, ‘Statutory 
Revision: Review of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 (Project 25)’, September 2006 
(ISBN:0-621-36904-7) at page 98 - 144 available online at  
http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/dp112_interpretation.pdf.  
92 The Commission at p 98 references Bennion (n8) 520. 
93 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 112 at p98. 
94 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 112 at p98. 
95 Bennion (n8) 520. 
96 Bennion (n8) 520. 
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the text and the deliberations preceding it, ‘custom, references to the 
predecessors and successors of a provision to be construed and surrounding 
circumstances more or less coinciding with the adoption of the provision 
have all been held to be allowable historical indicia of the meanings that may 
be attributed to a provision.’97 On the other hand, apart from in the context 
of constitutional analysis, the courts have been less accepting of so called 
travaux preparatoires and for reasons discussed below genetic 
interpretation98 should best be ‘employed with circumspection’.99 
For purposes of this discussion a number of these sources or references are 
particularly significant. The role of custom as an aid to interpretation will be 
considered as it may be in this sense that the contents of the King Report 
may become a legitimate guide to interpretation. The extent to which the 
surrounding circumstances that existed at the time that the statute was 
passed may be consulted will likewise be considered, as will the genesis of 
the text and so called travaux preparatoires. The latter will be considered 
because the debates and arguments related to the inclusion of these 
materials shed light on the justification of their use and may usefully be 
transposed to illuminate the discussion on hand.  
 
i. Custom  
 
In instances where a statute could reasonably be interpreted in more than 
one way, South African courts have been willing to invoke custom to ‘tip the 
balance’.100 In other words, only where a provision is obscure or unclear, has 
 
97 Du Plessis (n2) par 369. 
98 Or an interpretation focussed on the genesis or origins of the text. See Du Plessis 
(n2) par 369. 
99 Du Plessis (n2) par 374. 
100 Mason AJA in the judgement of R v Lloyd 1920 AD 474 at 486. And see Du Plessis 
(n2) par 369. 
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the invocation of custom ever been considered appropriate.101 In order to 
invoke a custom, it need not have evolved prior to the commencement of a 
statutory provision.102 Du Plessis explains that customs may evolve on either 
a horizontal or a vertical level. In instances where customs evolve ‘because 
subjects live up to them’, they are considered horizontal whereas vertical 
customs are those that cone into being ‘as a result of the conduct of 
authorised functionaries of the state’.103  He correctly points out that the 
cases that deal with the interpretative value of custom seem to refer only to 
those customs that evolved on a vertical level.104 This would tend to exclude 
the possibility of the King Code to be consulted by virtue of its being 
‘commercial custom’. 
ii. Similar Provisions in Other Statutes  
 
It is not uncommon for the courts to refer to similar or identical provisions 
found in predecessors to the statute in question, provided that the two 
pieces of legislation are closely associated or in pari materia. 105  When 
 
101 See Du Plessis (n2) par 370 where the author cites the following authorities: R v 
Detody 1926 AD 198 202–203; Dinkel v Union Government 1929 AD 150 
165; Minister of Justice v Breytenbach 1942 AD 175 190; Ernst v Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue 1954 1 All SA 340 (A); 1954 1 SA 318 (A) 324A–B; Ellert v 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1957 1 All SA 468 (A); 1957 1 SA 483 (A) 
490; Consolidated Diamond Mines of SWA v Administrator SWA 1958 4 SA 572 (A) 
658H–659C; Secretary for Customs & Excise v Millman 1975 3 All SA 536 
(A); 1975 3 SA 544 (A) 551F–G; Stellenbosch Wine Trust Ltd v Oude Meester Group 
Ltd 1977 2 All SA 366 (C); 1977 2 SA 221 (C) 245H; Tseleng v 
Chairman, Unemployment Insurance Board 1995 2 BCLR 138 (T) 149J–
150B; 1995 3 SA 162 (T) 
102 Vorster v Muller & the Minister of Mines supra 129–130; Randfontein Estates 
Gold Mining Co Witwatersrand Ltd v Minister of Finance supra 84; R v Pretoria 
Timber Co (Pty) Ltd 1950 1 All SA 1 (A); 1950 3 SA 163 (A) 165 175B–176H; Webb & 
Ross v Gey van Pittius supra 481D–F. 
103 Du Plessis (n2) par 370.  
104 Du Plessis (n2) par 370.  
105 Nkabinde v Nkabinde & Nkabinde 1944 WLD 112 122; Johannesburg City Council 
v Makaya 1945 AD 252 259; Hleka v Johannesburg City Council 1949 2 All SA 71 
(A); 1949 1 SA 842 (A) 850; R v von Zell (2) 1953 4 SA 552 (A) 558F–G; Estate 
Brownstein v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1957 3 All SA 267 
(A); 1957 3 SA 512 (A) 523B–G. 
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incorporating provisions from one statute into another mutatis mutandis 
the courts have tended to adapt the language of the provisions being 
adopted only to the extent required by necessity. They have, in other words, 
made such changes as were necessary for the provision in question to 
function and have not changed it to the extent that it is ‘fitting’ in relation 
to the new provision.106 The interpretation of the phrase mutatis mutandis 
has thus been held to mean ‘with the necessary changes in points of 
detail.’107  This more conservative approach is justified on the basis that 
fitness in a less strict sense of the word would open a wide field for 
speculation and there may well be room for significant variances in opinion 
when it comes to determining whether changes were or were not fitting. 
This in turn could seriously undermine legal certainty.108 
 
iii. Surrounding Circumstances  
 
Hitherto, relevant surrounding circumstances at the time when the statute 
was passed may be taken into consideration when interpreting the text, 
provided that these circumstances are such that the court can take judicial 
 
106 Du Plessis (n2) par 370, where the author cites Touriel v Minister of Internal 
Affairs Southern Rhodesia 1946 AD 535 544; R v Adams 1959 3 All SA 563 
(A); 1959 3 SA 753 (A) 759H; Publications Control Board v William Heinemann 
Ltd 1965 4 All SA 239 (A); 1965 4 SA 137 (A) 145F–G; S v King 1966 2 All SA 19 
(A); 1966 1 SA 500 (A) 506B–C; SA Master Dental Technicians Association v Dental 
Association of SA 1970 3 All SA 543 (A); 1970 3 SA 733 (A) 745E–G. In Waymark v 
Meeg Bank Ltd 2003 1 All SA 518 (Tk); 2003 4 SA 114 (Tk) 530 the court spoke of 
“necessary alterations to fit the changed circumstances” that had to be made.  
107 Touriel v Minister of Internal Affairs, Southern Rhodesia 1946 AD 535 at 545, 
Feetham AJA  
108 Touriel v Minister of Internal Affairs, Southern Rhodesia 1946 AD 535 at 545, 
Feetham AJA  
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notice of them109 and that they existed at the time the statute was passed.110 
Traditionally it was only possible to take cognisance of such circumstances 
where the provision in question was unclear or ambiguous, but as 
mentioned above, surrounding circumstances may now be considered 
regardless the clarity of the language of a provision.111 
 
iv. Preceding Discussions or Travaux Preparatoires 
 
In the South African context, so-called ‘preceding discussions’ included 
debates about a Bill in parliament, debates and reports of committees 
forming part of the legislative process, and reports of commissions of inquiry 
 
109 Du Plessis (n2) par 373. And see: R v Detody 1926 AD 198 at 208 where Innes CJ 
refers to “circumstances which are matter of common historical 
knowledge”; SAR&H v Smith’s Coasters (Prop) Ltd 1931 AD 113 127; Harris v 
Minister of the Interior 1952 2 All SA 400 (A); 1952 2 SA 428 (A) 457A–B. For a more 
indirect application of this canon, see also Malan v Die Oranje-Vrystaatse 
Ongedierte Bestrydings & Wildbewaringsvereniging 1976 1 SA 830 (O) 836A–
F; Komani v Bantu Affairs Administration Board, Peninsula Area 1980 2 All SA 500 
(A); 1980 4 SA 448 (A) 463F–H; Bamford v Minister of Community Development & 
State Auxiliary Services 1981 3 SA 1054 (C) 1057F–H; Minister of Land Affairs v 
Slamdien 1999 4 BCLR 413 (LCC) pars 14 17–26. See also re ‘judicial notice’: 
Consolidated Diamond Mines of SWA Ltd v Administrator, SWA 1958 4 SA 572 (A) 
657F–H; Diepsloot Residents’ & Landowners’ Association v Administrator, Tvl 1994 
2 All SA 299 (A); 1994 3 SA 336 (A) 347D–E; Christian Lawyers Association of SA v 
Minister of Health 1998 11 BCLR 1434 (T) 1438H–1440H. 
110 Du Plessis points out that, although subsequent developments could not be 
taken into account as ‘surrounding circumstances’ they may well be admissible as 
custom. See: Du Plessis (n2) par 373 where the author references the judgement of 
Cape Provincial Administration v Honiball 1942 AD 1 16; Peri-Urban Areas Health 
Board v Breet 1958 2 All SA 224 (T); 1958 3 SA 783 (T) 788A–B. 
111 Du Plessis (n2) par 373, and see: University of Cape Town v Cape Bar Council 1986 
2 All SA 619 (A); 1986 4 SA 903 (A) 914D.  
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that gave rise to the legislation.112 As a rule, the courts did not allow the use 
of such legislative debates when interpreting legislation.113 
In considering the interpretation of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 1996, Chaskalson J on behalf of the majority of the Constitutional 
Court justices in S v Makwanyane 114  considered the argument that the 
debate surrounding the death penalty before commencement of 
constitutional negotiations formed part of the context within which the 
constitution should properly be interpreted. Chaskalson J referred again to 
the influential judgement of Schreiner J in Jaga v Dönges, N.O. and 
Another115  in confirming that it is permissible in interpreting statutes to 
have regard to the purpose and background of the legislation in question.116 
Specifically, Schreiner JA emphasised that ‘context’ was ‘not limited to the 
language of the rest of the statute regarded as throwing light of a dictionary 
kind on the part to be interpreted. Often of more importance is the matter 
of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose, and, within limits, its 
background.’117 
 
Chaskalson J also pointed out that, although debates in parliament, and 
statements made by ministers responsible for legislation as well as 
 
112 The South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 112, ‘Statutory 
Revision: Review of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 (Project 25)’, September 2006 
(ISBN:0-621-36904-7) at page 102 available online at  
http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/dp112_interpretation.pdf where the 
authors cite the following cases in example: Bok v Allen 1884 SAR 137; Mathiba v 
Moschke 1920 AD 354; R v Ristow 1926 EDL 168. 
113 See for example Ngcobo v Van Rensburg 1999 (2) SA 525 (LCC) para 27 where 
Dodson J concludes as follows: “The weight of authority is very much against 
allowing such documents to be called in aid in the interpretation of a statute. This 
authority has received considerable academic criticism. There are also a few 
authorities which seem to suggest a softening of attitudes by South African Courts 
to certain of the documents which precede the passing of an Act.  
114 S v Makwanyane and Another (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3 at par [12]. 
115 Jaga v Dönges NO and Another; Bhana v Dönges NO and Another 1950 (4) SA 
653 (A) at 662. 
116 S v Makwanyane and Another (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3 at par [13]. 
117 Jaga v Dönges NO and Another; Bhana v Dönges NO and Another 1950 (4) SA 
653 (A) at 662. 
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explanatory memoranda providing reasons for new bills have not been 
admitted as background material, the courts have taken notice of reports of 
judicial commissions of inquiry but only for the purpose of determining the 
mischief that the statutory enactment under consideration was aimed at 
curing.118 He then referred to the decision of the House of Lords in Pepper 
(Inspector of Taxes) v Hart and Related Appeals, 119  taking note of the 
relaxation of the exclusionary rule in the United Kingdom and other 
jurisdictions such as New Zealand and Australia. 
 Makwanyane’s case however, had to do with the interpretation of the 
Constitution which, as the court points out, is no ordinary statute. It is the 
supreme law of the land and the above  remarks in favour of making greater 
allowance for surrounding debate may therefore not be authority for the 
further relaxation of the exclusionary rule in South African law.120  
In the famous 1993 decision of Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart and 
Related Appeals 121  referenced by the court in Makwanyane’s case, the 
House of Lords considered the so-called ‘exclusionary rule’, in terms of 
which any reference to the record of Parliamentary debates for the purpose 
of assisting the interpretation of a statute is excluded.122 The arguments of 
counsel referred to in the judgement and the various judgements by the 
 
118 S v Makwanyane and Another (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3 at par [14] where the 
Chaskalson P cites the following judgements in example: Attorney-General, Eastern 
Cape v Blom and Others 1988 (4) SA 645 (A) at 668H-669F; Westinghouse Brake & 
Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1986(2) SA 555(A) at 562C-563A   
119 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart and Related Appeals [1993] All ER 42 (HL).  
120 S v Makwanyane and Another (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3 at par [14] & [15]. 
121 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart and Related Appeals [1993] All ER 42 (HL). The 
case generated much discussion, see for example: Johan Steyn ‘Pepper v Hart; a Re-
Examination’ (2001) 21(1) Oxford J.Leg.St.  59; Stephan Vogenauer ‘A Retreat from 
Pepper v Hart? A Reply to Lord Steyn’ (2005) 25(4)  
Oxford J.Leg.St.  629; Phillip Sales ‘Pepper v Hart: A Footnote to Professor 
Vogenauer's Reply to Lord Steyn’ (2006) 26(3) Oxford J.Leg.St.  585; Michael P. 
Healy ‘Legislative Intent and Statutory Interpretation in England and the United 
States: An Assessment of the Impact of Pepper V. Hart’ (1999) 35 Stan.J.Int’l L. 231; 
Richard Clayton ‘Life after Pepper v. Hart’ (1996) 1 JR 77.  
122 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart and Related Appeals [1993] All ER 42 (HL) at 
page 630. 
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Lords offer a comprehensive history of the development of the rule and its 
application. 123  First mentioned in the case of Millar v.Taylor, 124  the 
exclusionary rule is a judge-made rule of practice and until its emergence in 
the middle of the 18th century, the courts had willingly referenced all 
available means for the interpretation of statutes as Heydon’s Case 125 
illustrates.126  The rule was later extended further to also prohibit courts 
form having recourse to reports made by commissioners on which 
legislation was based.127  Although  it was eventually relaxed, reports of 
commissioners and white papers could be considered ‘for the purpose solely 
of ascertaining the mischief which the statute is intended to cure but not for 
the purpose of discovering the meaning of the words used by parliament to 
effect such cure.’128 
 
Lord Reid, a proponent of the exclusionary rule, defended it on practical 
grounds – namely that a search for illusory clarity from parliamentary 
debates in any potential matter that turns on the interpretation of a statute 
would add time and expense to the litigious process. 129  Lord Reid also 
questioned the true value of such debates to the interpretative process, 
contending that it is in fact a misnomer to say that the courts are looking for 
the intention of Parliament. He explained that the difficulties were more 
than mere practicalities. Issues that arise during parliamentary debate are 
 
123 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart and Related Appeals [1993] All ER 42 (HL) at 
page 630. 
124 (1769) 4 Burr. 2303, 2332. 
125 (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a. 
126 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart and Related Appeals [1993] All ER 42 (HL) at 
page 630. 
127 Salkeld v. Johnson (1848) 2 Exch. 256, 273 and see Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v 
Hart and Related Appeals [1993] All ER 42 (HL) at page 630. 
128 Lorde Browne-Wilkinson, Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart and Related Appeals 
[1993] All ER 42 (HL) at page 630 where the following cases are cited in reference: 
Eastman Photographic Materials Co. Ltd. v. Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs 
and Trademarks [1898] A.C 571; Assam Railways and Trading Co. Ltd. v. 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1935] A.C445, 457-458. 
129 Beswick v. Beswick [1968] A.C. 58, 74 
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rarely the same as the issues that the courts later decide and relying on the 
views of the promoters of a Bill as indication of parliamentary intent is 
dubious.130  
  
In spite of this, Lord Browne-Wilkinson and a majority of the Lords concluded 
that the reasons to make what the former termed a ‘limited modification to 
the existing rule’ outweigh any concerns. 131  The court decided that 
‘reference to Parliamentary material should be permitted as an aid to the 
construction of legislation which is ambiguous or obscure or the literal 
meaning of which leads to an absurdity. Even in such cases references in 
court to Parliamentary material should only be permitted where such 
material clearly discloses the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention 
lying behind the ambiguous or obscure words’.132  
 
Significantly, the House of Lords concluded that it is specifically in light of the 
purposive approach to construction now adopted by the courts, and aimed 
at giving effect to the true intentions of the legislature that ‘the fine 
distinctions between looking for the mischief and looking for the intention 
in using words to provide the remedy are technical and inappropriate. Clear 
and unambiguous statements made by Ministers in Parliament are as much 
the background to the enactment of legislation as white papers and 
 
130  Black-Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg 
A.G. [1975] A.C. 591 at pp. 613-615 
131 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart and Related Appeals [1993] All ER 42 (HL); 
[1993] A.C. 593 Page 633. These reasons were considered and summarised by Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson as firstly, the fact that the rule left Parliament to legislate and 
the courts to construe the meaning of the words enacted; second, the practical 
concerns related to the expense of researching Parliamentary material, third, the 
‘need for the citizen to have access to a known defined text which regulates his 
legal rights’; and finally the improbability that a source such as Hansard will at the 
end of the day offer helpful guidance.  
132 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart and Related Appeals [1993] All ER 42 (HL); 
[1993] A.C. 593 Page 634. 
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Parliamentary reports.’133 The Lords also dismiss any contentions that the 
use of Parliamentary material in construing legislation would confuse the 
respective roles of Parliament as law-maker and the courts as the interpreter 
of these laws. 134  
 
The decision generated much discourse.135 Lord Steyn criticised it for failing 
to consider important constitutional questions and he also considered the 
argument that the decision was the true embodiment of a purposive 
approach to statutory interpretation:136  
 
There are, however, those who believe that the relaxation of the 
exclusionary rule was the ultimate vindication of purposive 
construction. And purposive construction is like mother’s milk and 
apple pie: who can argue against it? The reasoning in Pepper v Hart 
sought to build on the fact that official reports and white papers are 
admissible for the purpose of identifying the mischief to be corrected. 
Such reports are always admissible for what logical value they have. 
But the constitutional objections do not apply to such reports. They are 
part of the contextual scene against which parliament legislates. In any 
event, to present the Pepper v Hart issue as depending on whether one 
adopts a literal or purposive approach to construction is wide off the 
mark. By the time Pepper v Hart was decided, nobody supported literal 
methods of construction. The suggested antithesis misses the point of 
the fundamental and constitutional nature of the objections. The 
 
133 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart and Related Appeals [1993] All ER 42 (HL); 
[1993] A.C. 593 Page 634. 
134 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart and Related Appeals [1993] All ER 42 (HL); 
[1993] A.C. 593 Page 640. 
135 A comprehensive discussion of the debates and criticisms following the decision 
falls outside of the scope of this thesis and commentary will only be discussed to 
the extent that it remains relevant. See for example sources cited at note 121 
above.  
136  “The Intractable Problem of The Interpretation of Legal Texts” John Lehane 
Memorial Lecture 2002 on 25 September 2002 at the University of Sydney available 
at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/SydLRev/2003/1.html (accessed on 7 
September 2006) see also Steyn (n121) 59. 
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objections are not simply that a minister’s view of a clause is irrelevant 
but that it is in principle wrong to treat it as a trump card or even 
relevant in the interpretative 
process.  
 
 
Following the far-reaching developments in the recent South African 
context, the exact role of genetic material in interpreting statutes remains 
unclear. As was argued above, it may well be that the decision in Endumeni 
has the implication that such materials have now become admissible. The 
argument could be made that this development would be in step with the 
changes introduced to English law by the judgement in Pepper v Hart. 
However, as the debates surrounding this latter judgement illustrate, 
genetic interpretation should likely be employed with caution.137 This seems 
to be the approach that the Supreme Court of Appeals in South Africa is likely 
to follow in future, given the more restrictive interpretation of Endumeni’s 
principles most recently endorsed by the court in Blair Athol Homeowners 
Association.138 
 
Also, even though it may be more acceptable to consult reports of 
parliamentary commissions of investigation recommending a particular 
legislative course,139  this is subject to a number of conditions.140 First, the 
 
137 Du Plessis (n2) par 374, where the author remarks: ‘In the absence of “objective” 
evidence regarding this history genetic interpretation can be of limited value only. 
Each of those who participated in authoring the text is likely to have an unusably 
subjective perception of what the text is capable of saying. Debate and conflict of 
opinion often characterise the deliberations preceding the adoption and passing of 
a (statutory or constitutional) text. Opinions among the members of the body 
authoring the text will thus inevitably diverge (even in respect of formulations to 
which they agreed unanimously).’ 
138  The City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Blair Atholl Homeowners 
Association 2019 (3) SA 398 (SCA). 
139 Du Plessis (n2) par 374. And see: Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v 
Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1986 2 SA 555 (A) 562J–563A. See also S v 
Mpetha 1985 2 All SA 402 (A); 1985 3 SA 702 (A) 712H–713D; Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd 
v John 1987 8 ILJ 27 (W) 34G–I. 
140 Attorney-General, Eastern Cape v Blom (83/88) [1988] ZASCA 83; [1988] 2 All SA 
592 (A) (30 August 1988). 
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language of the provision may not be clear and unambiguous, and there 
must be a clear link between the findings and recommendation of the 
commission and the legislation that was passed at the end of the day. The 
court would then be able to consider such findings for purposes only of 
ascertaining the mischief that the provision in question aims to address.141  
 
The analysis above shows that the courts have traditionally treated extrinsic 
material with a fair degree of circumspection. Whereas the practices that 
have developed under the auspices of the King Codes and Reports over the 
past few decades may be considered ‘custom’ and the Codes themselves 
could be considered ‘surrounding circumstances’ such that a court could 
take judicial notice of, many of the warnings and concerns pertaining in 
particular to travaux preparatiores may well transfer to any debate 
surrounding the importations of more detailed sections of the Code. It may 
well be that the impact of Endumeni is such that much of the reach of that 
judgement as it pertains to these issues has not been decided by the courts. 
Having considered the legal backdrop against which the Companies Act will 
be interpreted, the chapter will now turn to the relevant provisions of the 
Act itself and consider their impact.  
 
 
3 Relevant Statutory Provisions 
 
 
The duties that directors have to act with care, skill and diligence and in the 
best interests of the company were discussed in greater depth in chapters 3 
and 4 preceding this analysis. However, because the exact wording of the 
Act is again of concern, extracts from the Act will be included again for ease 
of reference.  
 
 
141 Attorney-General, Eastern Cape v Blom (83/88) [1988] ZASCA 83; [1988] 2 All SA 
592 (A) (30 August 1988); 1988 (4) SA 645 (A) at 668 - 669. 
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Section 76(3)(c) requires a director of a company when acting in that 
capacity, to exercise the powers and perform the functions of director ‘in 
the best interests of the company’142 and ‘with the degree of care, skill and 
diligence that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same 
functions in relation to the company as those carried out by that director; 
and having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that director’.143 
 
Section 76(4) may also be relevant as will be explained in chapter 7 below. 
As previously mentioned144 that section imports a version of the ‘business 
judgement rule’ into the legislation and determines that a director will have 
satisfied his obligations in terms of Section 76(3)(b) and (c) if ‘the director 
has taken reasonably diligent steps to become informed about the matter’ 
and ‘the director made a decision, or supported the decision of a committee 
or the board, with regard to that matter, and the director had a rational basis 
for believing, and did believe, that the decision was in the best interests of 
the company.’ 
 
Section 77 then determines that a director will be liable ‘in accordance with 
the principles of the common law relating to breach of a fiduciary duty, for 
any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company as a consequence of 
any breach by the director of a duty contemplated in section .....76(3) (b); or 
in accordance with the principles of the common law relating to delict for 
any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company as a consequence of 
any breach by the director of a duty contemplated in section 76(3)(c)...’145 
 
When considering these sections, it is clear that the Act makes no mention 
of the King Code or Report in either section 76 or section 77. Any court 
referring to its provisions would therefore be ‘reading in’ words that are not 
 
142 Section 76(3)(b).  
143 Section 76(3)(c)(i) – (ii).  
144 See chapter 7 at text to note 80 and onwards. 
145 Section 77(2)(a) – (b). 
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expressly found in the act. In particular, the duty of care, skill and diligence 
would have to be interpreted to include a phrase such as ‘with due reference 
to the norms and principles set out in the King Code and Report’. The duty 
to act in the best interests of the company would for example then include 
words such as ‘with those interests encompassing multiple stakeholders as 
envisaged in the King Code and Report’ or perhaps something more generic 
such as ‘reference to the norms and principles of accepted best practices in 
corporate governance’. 
 
Justification for this is perhaps to be found in the purposes of the Act, that 
quite clearly indicate that the legislation is aimed at ‘encouraging 
transparency and high standards of corporate governance as appropriate, 
given the significant role of enterprises within the social and economic life of 
the nation’. 146  Further justification may be found in the form of the 
constitutional imperative. In its policy paper, the South African Department 
of Trade and Industry147 state plainly that the framework of company law 
should reflect the ‘recognition that a company is a social as well as an 
economic institution, and accordingly that a company’s pursuit of economic 
objectives should be constrained by social and environmental 
imperatives’148 and this was reiterated in the purposes to an extent as the 
legislation seeks to ‘reaffirm the concept of the company as a means of 
achieving economic and social benefits’.149  
 
 
146 Section 7. 
147South African Company Law for the 21st Century – Guidelines for Corporate Law 
Reform Government Gazette 26493 of 23 June 2004 available online at 
https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/26493gen1183a.p
df. 
148 South African Company Law for the 21st Century – Guidelines for Corporate Law 
Reform at 27. 
149 Section 7. 
178 
 
 
The Companies Act sets out the scope of its application in section 5 which 
determines that the Act must be interpreted and applied in a manner that 
gives effect to the following purposes set out in section 7:150   
 (a) promote compliance with the Bill of Rights as provided for in the 
Constitution, in the application of company law;  
(b) promote the development of the South African economy by—  
(i) encouraging entrepreneurship and enterprise efficiency;  
(ii) creating flexibility and simplicity in the formation and 
maintenance of companies; and  
(iii)encouraging transparency and high standards of corporate 
governance as appropriate, given the significant role of 
enterprises within the social and economic life of the nation;  
(c) promote innovation and investment in the South African markets;  
(d) reaffirm the concept of the company as a means of achieving 
economic and social benefits;  
(e) continue to provide for the creation and use of companies, in a 
manner that enhances the economic welfare of South Africa as a 
partner within the global economy. 
(f) promote the development of companies within all sectors of the 
economy, and encourage active participation in economic 
organisation, management and productivity;  
(g) create optimum conditions for the aggregation of capital for 
productive purposes, and for the investment of that capital in 
enterprises and the spreading of economic risk;  
(h) provide for the formation, operation and accountability of non-
profit companies in a manner designed to promote, support and 
enhance the capacity of such companies to perform their 
functions;  
(i) balance the rights and obligations of shareholders and directors 
within companies;  
(j) encourage the efficient and responsible management of companies;  
 
150 S 5(1), Companies Act 71 of 2008.  
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(k) provide for the efficient rescue and recovery of financially 
distressed companies, in a manner that balances the rights and 
interests of all relevant stakeholders; and  
(l) provide a predictable and effective environment for the efficient 
regulation of companies.151 
 
As discussed above, South African courts have emphasized the fact that the 
Act is to be interpreted ‘through the prism of the Constitution.’152 Section 7 
clearly requires this153 and the purposes  listed in that section should also be 
read against the backdrop of preparatory documents which preceded the 
legislation. A policy paper published by the South African Department of 
Trade and Industry entitled ‘South African Company Law for the 21st Century 
– Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform’ 154  (hereafter ‘the policy paper’) 
stated that the new act strived to achieve ‘a clear, facilitating, predictable 
and consistently enforced law’. 155  The Policy Paper further sets out 
numerous principles which informed the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Companies Bill, 2007 and subsequently the Act itself. It is noteworthy that 
the policy paper also stated that the framework of company law should 
reflect the ‘recognition that a company is a social as well as an economic 
institution, and accordingly that a company’s pursuit of economic objectives 
should be constrained by social and environmental imperatives’.156  
 
 
151 S 7(a) – (l), Companies Act 71 of 2008, emphasis added.  
152 Booysen v Jonkheer Boerewynmakery (Pty) Ltd and Another [2017] 1 All SA 862 
(WCC) para 41. 
153 See s7(a). See also: Minister of Environmental Affairs v Recycling and Economic 
Development Initiative of South Africa NPC, Minister of Environmental Affairs v 
Kusaga Taka Consulting (Pty) Ltd 2018 (3) SA 604 (WCC).  
154 Government Gazette 26493 of 23 June 2004 available online at 
https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/26493gen1183a.p
df. 
155 South African Company Law for the 21st Century – Guidelines for Corporate Law 
Reform at 11. And see: Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Issue 18 
2018) 50.   
156 South African Company Law for the 21st Century – Guidelines for Corporate Law 
Reform at 27. 
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It goes without saying that the objects of an act will not always align neatly 
and that some may even clearly conflict. So, to name one example, it is 
entirely possible that an act which may ‘encourage[e] entrepreneurship and 
enterprise efficiency’ could undermine ‘transparency and high standards of 
corporate governance’. The wording of the objects in section 7 thus present 
two potential challenges, the first being that conflicting objects may require 
the court to rank or strike a balance between competing goals (and judges 
will often not possess of adequate information to make these far reaching 
policy decisions – nor it could be argued, should they be required to do so). 
Secondly, the stated purposes are relatively generic and devoid of detail or 
explanation. They will often shed no real light on how a provision should 
ideally be interpreted.  
 
In answer to these concerns, the authors of Blackman suggest that section 7 
‘has been provided in order to assist judicial interpreters to understand what 
the general purpose of the legislature was when adopting the act’ and that 
the purposes will ‘contextualise and colour the interpretation of particular 
provisions rather than override them’.157 The manner in which the courts 
have engaged with the purposes since the promulgation of the Act would 
appear to bear this out.158  
 
Section 158 which bears the heading ‘Remedies to promote the purpose of 
the Act’ emphasises a purposive approach159 to the interpretation of the Act. 
 
157 JL Yeats (ed) Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 (Juta 2018) 1-52. 
158 Several judgements illustrate how the courts have engaged with the purposes 
of the Companies Act set out in Section 7: See for example: Sibakhulu Construction 
(Pty) Ltd v Wedgewood Village Golf Country Estate (Pty) Ltd 2013 (1) SA 191 (WCC) 
para 23 – 27 where the court considered the purposes of the Act and then looked 
practically at the implications if multiple courts could have jurisdiction over matters 
affecting the status of a company. And see Newlands Surgical Clinic (Pty) Ltd v 
Peninsula Eye Clinic (Pty) Ltd 2015 (4) SA p45 86/2014 [2015] ZASCA 25 where the 
court took account of contextual material such as the legislative history but 
reiterated that the court should not stray into the territory of inventing or reading 
in too liberally at par [26] – [27]. 
159 See below at note 165 and onwards.  
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In terms of that section, ‘a court must develop the common law as necessary 
to improve the realisation and enjoyment of rights established by [the] 
Act’,160  and a court 161  ‘must promote the spirit, purpose and objects of 
[the]Act’.162 In instances where it is possible that any provision of the Act (or 
other document in terms of the Act) can be ‘reasonably construed’ to have 
more than one meaning, the preferred meaning must be that which ‘best 
promotes the spirit and purpose of [the] Act, and will best improve the 
realisation and enjoyment of rights.’163  
 
Finally, it bears mention that the express purposive provisions of the Act 
appear not to be conclusive. In this regard, the South African Law Reform 
Commission concluded that:  
 
Express purpose provisions provide a more detailed description of the 
legislative purpose than, for example, the long title or preamble, but it 
can never be decisive in isolation. To take such a view would merely be 
to create a new and sophisticated version of literal interpretation. The 
interpreter not only has to read the legislative text as a whole, but must 
also consult all available and relevant internal and external information 
or aids (dealt with in detail below) during interpretation. Although the 
 
160 S 158(a). 
161 The subsection also applies to “the Commission, the Panel, [and] the Companies 
Tribunal” all bodies established by the Act for purposes of regulation, 
administration and dispute resolution.  
162 S 158(b)(i). 
163 S 158(b)(ii). See for an example of such an interpretation Swart v Beagles Run 
Investments 25 (Pty) Ltd 2011 (5) SA 422 (GNP) [2011] ZAGPPHC 103; 26597/2011 
(30 May 2011) an application to initiate business rescue proceedings where the 
court concluded in para [41] that “where an application for business rescue … 
entails the weighing-up of the interests of the creditors and the company the 
interests of the creditors should carry the day.” Along similar lines, admittedly all 
decided in the context of business rescue proceedings, see: Welman v Marcelle 
Props 193 CC and Another [2012] JOL 28714 (GSJ); (33958/2011) [2012] ZAGPJHC 
32 (24 February 2012) paras [16], [25] and [28]; Employees of Solar Spectrum 
Trading 83 (Pty) Ltd v Afgri Operations Ltd 6418/2011 8 May 2012 (GNP); 
6418/2011, 18624/2011, 66226/2011, 66226/2011, 66226A/11) [2012] ZAGPPHC 
359 (16 May 2012) para [12]; and Mouritzen v Greystone Enterprises (Pty) Ltd 2012 
(5) SA 74 (KZD);  [2012] ZAKZDHC 103; [2012] ZAKZDHC 34 (8 June 2012) para [18].  
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interpreter cannot rely on the purpose provision to ascertain the 
purpose of legislation, it could be used as an additional tool to find the 
object and purpose of the enactment. However, the inclusion of a 
purpose provision will also be important in a more substantive sense: It 
will force judges, judicial officers and all interpreters of legislation to 
accept a purposive and value-coherent methodology of interpretation 
that is fully in line with the demands of the new constitutional order 
(more specifically s 39(2) of the Constitution).164 
 
 
 
 
4 Interpreting and Developing the Common Law  
 
 
 
It has always been the responsibility of the courts to develop and apply the 
common law to reflect the norms and address the needs of a changing 
society. 165   The mandate to develop the common law, which is now 
contained in Section 173 of the Constitution, merely reiterates this standing 
role of the courts, 166  although since the coming into force of the 1996 
Constitution the function must now be exercised in a manner that promotes 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.167 The courts have, on 
numerous occasions, considered the impact that this constitutional 
imperative might have on the interpretation of the common law. In the 
seminal case of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 168  the 
 
164 Discussion Paper 112: Review of the Interpretation Act 33 OF 1957 (SA Law 
Reform Commission 2006) available online at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/dp112_interpretation.pdf Page 40 par 
2.50. 
165 Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (CC) 27-8-1998 (case CCT 4/98 
unreported) at [22]. 
166 Blower v Noorden 1909 TS 890 at 905; Pearl Assurance v Union Government 1934 
AD 560 at 563. And see in general also: Malcolm Wallis ‘The Common Law’s Cool 
Ideas for Dealing with Ms Hubbard’ (2015) (4) SALJ 940, 942. 
167 Section 39(2) of the Constitution, 1996. See also: Amod v Multilateral Motor 
Vehicle Accidents Fund (CC) 27-8-1998 (case CCT 4/98 unreported) at [22]. 
168  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (CCT 48/00) [2001] ZACC 22; 2001 
(4) SA 938 (CC). 
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Constitutional Court was asked to developed ‘wrongfulness’ in the context 
of the South African law of delict(tort) to allow for vicarious liability for the 
Minister. The court set out the general approach to the application of section 
39(2), noting that there are two stages to the inquiry that the court must 
undertake:   
 
The first stage is to consider whether the existing common law, having 
regard to the section 39(2) objectives, requires development in 
accordance with these objectives. This inquiry requires a 
reconsideration of the common law in the light of section 39(2). If this 
inquiry leads to a positive answer, the second stage concerns itself with 
how such development is to take place in order to meet the section 
39(2) objectives.169 
 
There was some debate in academic circles about the exact role of the 
constitution and the extent to which it could or should prompt the courts to 
undertake a wholescale ‘constitutional revamp’ of existing common law. 170 
Wallis J addressed the issues in an article commenting on the cases of 
Hubbard v Cool Ideas 1186 CC171 and Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard.172 He 
reminds us that ‘the law was not invented in South Africa in 1994’173 and 
that there was a substantive common law in place which was based on 
equitable principles and which even today, would adequately serve to 
 
169 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (CCT 48/00) [2001] ZACC 22; 2001 
(4) SA 938 (CC) at [40]. 
170 The debate was in particular between Prof Anton Fagan and Judge Dennis Davis 
in a series of articles on the subject. The finer nuances of the debate are technical 
and will not serve to further illuminate the questions posed by this research. See: 
Anton Fagan ‘The secondary role of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights’ (2010) 127 SALJ 611; Dennis Davis ‘How many positivist legal philosophers 
can be made to dance on the head of a pin? A reply to Professor Fagan’ (2012) 129 
SALJ 59; Anton Fagan ‘A straw man, three red herrings and a closet rule-worshipper 
—A rejoinder to Davis JP’ (2012) 129 SALJ 788 and Dennis Davis ‘The importance of 
reading—A rebutter to the jurisprudence of Anton Fagan’(2013) 130 SALJ 52. 
171 Hubbard v Cool Ideas 1186 CC 2013 (5) SA 112 (SCA). 
172 Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard 2014 (4) SA 474 (CC). 
173 Wallis (n166) 941. 
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protect many of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights. In the case in 
question, he argues that reliance on the Constitution was not appropriate as 
the parties to the case had adequate remedies in common law which they 
had failed to pursue.174 He concludes that ‘we will only achieve a mature 
jurisprudential understanding of the relationship between the constitution, 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights and the common law 
through a structured analytical approach that affords each its proper role in 
our jurisprudence.’175 
 
The responsibility of the courts to develop the common law should generally 
be exercised with restraint:  
Judges can and should adapt the common law to reflect the changing 
social, moral and economic fabric of the country. Judges should not be 
quick to perpetuate rules whose social foundation has long since 
disappeared. Nonetheless there are significant constraints on the power 
of the judiciary to change the law . . .  In a constitutional democracy such 
as ours it is the Legislature and not the courts which has the major 
responsibility for law reform . . . The judiciary should confine itself to 
those incremental changes which are necessary to keep the common 
law in step with the dynamic and evolving fabric of our society.176 
 
The Constitutional Court has cautioned that ‘the major engine for law reform 
should be the Legislature not the Judiciary’177 and Wallis reiterates that ‘the 
development of the common law is an adjunct to this process, not the driver 
of it.’178  It does happen that the law might require adaptation to meet 
changing needs and that it might in certain instances not be feasible to wait 
for legislative intervention for any number of reasons. It is in these instances 
 
174 Wallis (n166) 941. 
175 Wallis (n166) 941. 
176 Iacobucci J in R v Salituro, (1992) 8 CRR (2d) 173, cited with approval by Kentridge 
AJ in Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at [15]. Emphasis added. 
177 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (CCT 48/00) [2001] ZACC 22; 2001 
(4) SA 938 (CC) at [35]. 
178 Wallis (n166) 944. 
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where ‘the courts step into that gap and by a process of adaptation – usually 
slow but occasionally more extreme – make the necessary changes that 
society demands, subject always to the legislature’s ability to alter the result 
by legislation.’ 179 
 
In developing the common law, the court should not do more than what is 
required to resolve the matter before it, as the ‘development of the common 
law occurs best when it proceeds from case to case rather than in leaps and 
bounds, because it is rare for a court to have the degree of knowledge of the 
full implications of its decision that sweeping reform requires’.180 In terms of 
the application of the constitution Wallis warns that a court should engage 
in a development of the common law only if it is clear that it has received all 
the factual material relevant to the particular problem, and that any 
potential developments remain rooted in a concrete dispute in a specific 
matter. He notes that ‘[i]t is rare that proceedings on exception or a stated 
case provide sufficiently comprehensive material to determine complex 
issues such as the impact of the Constitution on common law rules. 181 
 
Though the possibility of developing the common law to encapsulate 
elements of the governance code may sound attractive, Lord Scarman’s 
general warning endures: 182  
It is an attractive, ingenious suggestion — but, in my judgment, 
unsound. For so radical a reform can be made neither by judges nor 
by modification of rules of court. It raises issues of social, economic 
and financial policy not amenable to judicial reform, which will almost 
certainly prove to be controversial and can be resolved by the 
 
179  Wallis (n166) 944. The challenge is now compounded as it has become 
necessary, in this continuing process of development, to also identify those issues 
that will be affected by the need to ‘give effect to the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights’. 
180 Wallis (n166) 967. 
181 Wallis (n166) 967. 
182 In Lim Poh Choo v Camden and Islington Local Health Authority [1980] AC 174. 
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legislature only after full consideration of factors which cannot be 
brought into clear focus, or be weighed and assessed, in the course 
of the forensic process. The judge—however wise, creative, and 
imaginative he may be—is ‘‘cabin’d, cribb’d, confin’d, bound in’’ not, 
as was Macbeth, to his ‘‘saucy doubts and fears’’ but by the evidence 
and arguments of the litigants. It is this limitation, inherent in the 
forensic process, which sets bounds to the scope of judicial law 
reform. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has considered whether a court operating within the South 
African constitutional parameters would be exceeding its remit and 
authority in interpreting the existing statutory and common law provisions 
in the manner proposed above and in the preceding and subsequent 
chapters. Setting aside normative questions such as the extent to which the 
state should oversee corporate actions or the accountability of company 
directors, this chapter considered two questions. First, whether it is 
constitutionally tenable for the courts to interpret the Act with such liberal 
reference to this extra-textual source, and second, whether a court would 
be justified in developing the common law with reference thereto.  
The analysis has shown a well-founded reluctance on the part of the courts 
to interpret statutory provisions in such a manner that the autonomy of the 
legislature is undermined. Given the cases and historical context it seems 
unlikely that the code could be consulted based on it being custom. A more 
liberal interpretation of the decision in Endumeni might open the door to its 
introduction as either existing context or, perhaps more feasible, as part of 
context which speaks to the genesis of the text (although as the discussion 
above has shown the latter has especially been treated with circumspection 
by the courts in the past). In favour of this argument would be the liberal 
references to the code in preparatory reports that informed the drafting of 
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the legislation and clear references in the purposes of the Act itself that it 
aims to ensure good governance. 
However, there are convincing arguments to the contrary. The most recent 
decision of the SCA on the appropriate interpretation and application of the 
judgement in Endumeni indicate that the courts will not interpret its 
references to context liberally and will therefore not allow extrinsic evidence 
to be led in order to convince the court of the proper meaning of legislative 
provisions. 183  The warnings that underlie the exclusionary rule that 
dominated English law extend to the introduction of  extra-textual material 
which was, at the end of the day, drafted by an entity not affiliated with 
government that may have its own agendas and concerns and these may or 
may not align with national strategy and policy.184  
The alternative may be that the courts could develop the common law 
pertaining to directors’ duties to take cognisance of the code. However, as 
the discussion has also shown, such developments will be incremental and 
could not introduce the sweeping policy changes that such an approach 
might amount to.185 In the final instance, it could also be argued that the 
constitutional imperative that both statute and common law should reflect 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill or Rights, would justify a bolder 
interpretation by the courts. However, the analysis above has shown that in 
 
183 On a practical note, the problem becomes how the principles of the code are 
then to be introduced in court in the first place. They are not such that the judge 
could simply take judicial notice, and they may not be introduced via evidence 
(expert or otherwise).  
184 The counter argument may well be that the Institute of Directors is better placed 
than parliament to draft these types of rules in the first place, and in fact where 
such codes of conduct are mandated by legislation they are in any event often 
delegated to committees of unelected experts to prepare.  
185 This is true especially of the duty to act in the best interests of the company, 
where such a step might have significant impact on the state of the stakeholder 
debate in South African Law. In this regard cf Irene-Marie Esser & Piet Delport ‘The 
protection of stakeholders: The South African social and ethics committee and the 
United Kingdom’s enlightened shareholder value approach: Part 1’ (2017) De Jure  
97, 106 who argue the opposite and are of the opinion that it in fact reflects a more 
reticent form of change.  
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both the case of the development of the common law and in the case of the 
interpretation of the statutory duties there are several constraints that 
would apply. 186 The implications of this analysis will be discussed more fully 
in chapter 8 with reference to the rest of this thesis, at which stage some 
final conclusions will be drawn. Before doing so, normative and policy 
considerations that relate to the regulation of directors and the appropriate 
level of accountability have to be considered.   
 
186 Consider for example the following warning: ‘There lies a deeper and more 
troubling problem that arises from the very way in which governance reform has 
been effected over the past few years. Responsibility for reform has been semi-
privatised, with the initiative firmly in the hands of fairly small and unrepresentative 
committees, championing a narrow range of interests, and apparently proceeding 
more on the basis of casual empiricism than well-grounded theories.’ CA Riley, 
‘Company Law: Whither UK Corporate Governance?’ (1997) 1 Amicus Curiae 16. 
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CHAPTER 6 
COLLISIONS AT THE INTERSECTION – NORMATIVE DEBATES  
 
One of the fundamental theoretical debates in economic science, directly 
affecting other disciplines such as law, politics and sociology, concerns the nature 
and role of institutions in the operation of markets. Should formal institutions, 
such as mandatory legal rules, be entrusted to govern economic activity or should 
privately negotiated governance mechanisms prevail? In other words, should the 
state intervene to regulate market transacting or would this impede the proper 
functioning of markets? And to turn to the field of corporate governance, how 
should corporate relationships be governed, through law or contract?1 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis have considered the legal status of 
corporate governance codes and the other regulatory mechanisms in place 
in South Africa, with reference to the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions. 
In particular, the duties owed by the independent non-executive director 
were analysed to consider the practical impact of an inclusive interpretation 
drawing from voluntary codes of governance. Having also discussed the 
potential technical and constitutional concerns that such an approach will 
inevitably raise, the thesis turns now to the extent to which it is normatively 
appropriate for the minutiae of governance to be regulated by black letter 
law.  
 
This is hardly a novel inquiry. As Attenborough pointed out, much ink has 
been spilled over the question of whether ‘conventional legal approaches or 
private governance arrangements are the optimal rule-making strategy to 
 
1  Michael Galanis ‘Vicious Spirals in Corporate Governance: Mandatory Rules for 
Systemic (Re)Balancing? (2011) 31(2) Oxford J.Leg.St.  327. 
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regulate the complexity of corporate activity’. 2  The sheer volume of 
academic work related to these topics could be a thesis of its own and no 
attempt will be made to engage with all the intricacies of the debate or all 
of the literature that has seen the light of day in attempts to explain them.3 
Instead, the aim of this chapter is to offer a synthesis of the most pertinent 
theories and debates that speak to the appropriate and optimal regulation 
of corporations. Even this is an ambitious task and must be preceded by the 
caveat that the analysis will be limited by the boundaries of the research 
question.4  
 
As this chapter will show, it is hardly possible to engage with the nature and 
proper regulation of a company without referencing developments in 
financial theory, and micro-economics. The impact of law and economics 
scholarship is such that it can almost be considered trite. And although the 
movement originated in the United States its theories were accepted widely 
and have influenced corporate law scholarship and corporate governance 
 
2 D Attenborough, 'Empirical insights into corporate contractarian theory' (2017) 37 
(2) Legal studies 191, 191.  
3 See inter alia: Attenborough (n2) 191; Mathew T. Bodie ‘The Post-Revolutionary 
Period in Corporate Law: Returning to the Theory of the Firm’ (2012) 35 Seattle U. 
L. Rev. 1033; William W. Bratton ‘Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, and the 
Structure of Corporate Fiduciary Law’ (1993) 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1084; BR 
Cheffins Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (Clarendon Press 1997); 
John C. Jr. Coffee ‘The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on 
the Judicial Role’ (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1618; Galanis (n1) 327; Henry Hansmann 
& Reinier Kraakman ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 GEO. L.J. 439; 
Kraakman R and others The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and 
Functional Approach (3rd edn Oxford 2017); Marc T. Moore ‘Whispering Sweet 
Nothings: The Limitations of Informal Conformance in UK Corporate Governance 
(2009) 9 J. Corp. L. Stud. 95; Moore MT Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the 
State (Hart 2013). 
4 For purposes of this chapter it must be noted that “corporate governance” will be 
used in both the broader sense (as in referring to any laws and regulations that 
have bearing on the management of internal corporate relations) and in the more 
narrow sense (as in referring to the corporate governance movement and those 
principles most typically found in voluntary governance codes). Some of the issues 
under consideration will apply equally to both while others are more unique to the 
latter. 
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on a global scale. 5  Traditional ‘theories of the firm’ seek to justify the 
existence of the corporation, while several alternative doctrines and 
philosophies seek to explain the power dynamics at play within the 
corporation, and consider its regulation from various perspectives.6   
 
The economic and financial theories specifically, provided researchers with 
a toolkit, through which they were able ‘to operationalize the study of 
corporate law “in action”, generating a wealth of new empirical insights’. 7 It 
also ‘supplied a set of normative principles, derived from economic notions 
of efficiency, for evaluating the wealth and welfare effects of corporate law 
rules and doctrines’.8 Because of the impact these theories have had on the 
corporate law scholarship at issue in this chapter, the research would not do 
the topic justice without first considering the theoretical context of this 
economics driven scholarship. Attenborough gives a pointed summary of the 
impact of contractarian theory which emphasises its relevance for purposes 
of this chapter and thesis: 
Overall, it is fair to suggest that the contractarian theory has 
permeated the theoretical discourse in US corporate legal 
scholarship, and inevitably influenced the academic writings of a 
number of UK and other Commonwealth company law textbooks and 
law review articles. Simultaneously, the theoretical discourse is the 
 
5  Galanis (n1) 327; PM Vasudev ‘Law, Economics, and Beyond: A Case for 
Retheorizing the Business Corporation’ (2010) 55 McGill Law Journal 911. 
6  Bob Tricker Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices (3rd edn, 
Oxford, 2015) 68 - 70. Tricker points out that there have been other perspectives 
also, such as Game theory, and theories such as those developed by Filatotchev and 
Wright which view corporations from a longitudinal perspective (see Igor 
Filatotchev & Mike Wright (eds) The Life Cycle of Corporate Governance (Edward 
Elgar 2005)). There are also perspectives from political economics such as the very 
well-known work of Roe who considered political and social conflict in corporations 
and institutions of corporate governance to show how a country’s political 
economy interacts with legal structures and financial markets (Mark J Roe Political 
Determinants of Corporate Governance (Oxford University Press 2003)). 
7  Simon Deakin ‘The Corporation as Commons: Rethinking Property Rights, 
Governance and Sustainability in the Business Enterprise’ (2012) 37 Queen's L.J. 
341. 
8 Deakin (n7) 341. 
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manifestation of a form of politics and it organises the political space, 
often with the intention of monopolising it. To this end, it has found 
favour in various significant policy-making discussions that go to the 
heart of UK company law and practice. Moreover, the rules of 
company law itself comprise many different elements that appear to 
give credence to a private contractual view of the company.9 
 
A comprehensive analysis of the proper contents of a corporate law 
regulatory model must be conducted against the backdrop of these 
theoretical underpinnings. In considering these matters, this chapter will at 
first outline  prevalent theories of the firm to give context to a more detailed 
analysis of agency cost theory and contractarianism – the latter being the 
most appropriate theories to engage with in unpacking the research 
questions. 10  It will then explain how law and economics and financial 
scholarship impacted corporate law and informed its development. 
Following this, part 4 will turn to the core question of whether it is most 
appropriate for corporate governance to be formally enforced (as per 
Sarbanes-Oxley)11 or whether voluntary codes on an comply or explain basis 
are more appropriate, before finally considering whether any conclusions 
can safely be drawn from this discussion that could shed further light on the 
research question. Concluding remarks will also refer to the reasons why the 
South African context is unique, and the specific idiosyncrasies that come 
into play in regulating South African companies.12 
 
9 Attenborough (n2) 206.  
10 It must be noted that the research question could be debated fruitfully with 
reference to other theories also. However, as these are certainly the most pervasive 
theories, and those that have generated the greatest body of literature they were 
identified as the most useful for purposes of this enquiry.  See also chapter 1 for a 
demarcation of the thesis and research question for further comments in this 
regard.  
11  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 available online at 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/3763/text. 
12 Several tensions come to mind, such as the fact that the country is a developing 
economy and faces a crippling wealth disparity, high unemployment rates and 
battles corruption in especially the public sector. Regulators will be mindful of these 
pressures but also the need to attract foreign direct investment which must be 
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It goes without saying that this is a very ambitious scope for a single chapter 
and as such many of the issues will have to be considered in broader strokes 
and as a review of the existing literature. However, it is submitted that 
despite this, the analysis will have adequate depth to inform the research 
questions central to the thesis.  
 
In summation, prevailing thoughts about the proper role of corporate law 
and regulation speak to two related debates that are most relevant to this 
thesis. First, as mentioned, to what extent should regulatory oversight be 
tolerated,13 and second, what is the role of corporate governance codes 
(and arguably other sources of perceived best practice) in such regulation. 
When all is said and done, the conclusion will almost inevitably be a call for 
balanced regulation (as it so often is). However, considering the macro 
challenges that society and by extension its corporate citizens now face, and 
the numerous complexities of business on a global scale this balance may be 
hard to come by. This is arguably more true in developing economies such 
as that of South Africa where the realities of enormous wealth disparity, and 
the socio-economic concerns that accompany it, inevitably puts regulators 
under additional pressure.14 What is more, as was shown in chapters 1 and 
5, the South African legislature and judiciary undertake their tasks against 
 
balanced against the human rights mandates contained in the constitution. See 
further below but see also regarding the drafting of corporate law in a developing 
economy: Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman ‘A Self-Enforcing Model of 
Corporate Law’ (1996) 109(8) HarvLRev 1911. 
13 This is an abbreviation of a more intricate question which has been approach 
from numerous angles. It could refer to the extent to which regulation should be 
prescriptive as opposed to facilitative, the extent to which mandatory rules should 
be allowed to dominate legislation, the role of so-called ‘opt out’ provisions and the 
extent to which matters related to such regulation should be enforced by the 
judiciary or formal process. Without attempting to simplify the matter and paint all 
these issues with the same brush, the thesis will attempt to distil the relevant and 
overarching principals from the appropriate research in order to relate them to the 
questions at the heart of the research.  
14 See note chapter 7 text to note 41. 
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the backdrop of a dynamic constitutional mandate, adding another layer to 
a panoply of issues.  
 
2 Theories of the Firm: A General Overview  
 
Economists were in no immediate hurry to justify the existence of the firm15 
or engage with its inner dynamics, choosing instead to refer to it as a black 
box taking in inputs and putting out outputs.16 As Williamson would note, 
this is perhaps because ‘it is much easier to say that organization matters 
than it is to show how and why.’ 17  In fact even Jensen and Mecklin 
acknowledged that ‘[i]t is embarrassing to admit that, after several hundred 
years, social scientists have not yet developed a thorough understanding of 
the advantages and disadvantages of publicly held profit seeking 
corporations versus other forms of organizations such as cooperatives, 
nonprofit corporations, universities, proprietorships, joint ventures and 
mutuals.’18 
With his article The Nature of the Firm,19 Coase famously took the first peek 
inside the box and tried to address why the firm prevailed over a system that 
relies merely on markets and contracts. 20  In a nutshell, Coase finds 
 
15 John Kay ‘Theories of the Firm’ (2018) 25(1) Int. J. Econ. Bus. 11; Deakin (n7) 350 
on the distinction between ‘firm’ as used in this sense in economic theory and 
‘corporation’ or ‘company’ as a legal term.  
16 Bodie (n3) 1040. For an analysis of how the concept of a black box is used to 
theorise in this manner, and an overview of economic theorists that used it see 
Alice Belcher ‘Inside the Black Box: Corporate Laws and Theories’ (2003) 12(3) 
Social and Legal Studies 360. 
17  Oliver E Williamson ‘The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From 
Choice to Contract’ (2002) 16(3) JEP 171. 
18  Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 J. Financ. Econ. 30. 
19 Ronald H Coase ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4(16) Economica 386. 
20 Coase was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for "for his discovery 
and clarification of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the 
institutional structure and functioning of the economy" and his important 
contributions on the borderline between economics, law and organization. See: 
The Nobel Prize: Ronald H Coase, available online at: 
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1991/coase/facts/. And 
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justification for the firm in transaction cost economics. Although price 
movements could direct production even in the absence of the firm, the 
latter can avoid the transaction costs created through market organisation.21  
It was especially the ability of the firm to manage workers that reduced these 
costs,22  as ‘[t]he boundaries of the firm were defined by the relative costs of 
two methods of co-ordination: markets and the price mechanism versus 
central direction and management hierarchies.’23  
 
Coase’s model was developed further by Oliver Williamson who expounded 
on the challenges that would favour firm governance as opposed to the use 
of market mechanisms.24  Williamson contended that the savings achieved 
by avoiding the market would only hold until the firm reached a critical size, 
at which stage the governance structure that the company chose could 
overcome the disadvantages of scale. In short, this leads transaction cost 
economics to focus ‘on the cost of enforcement or check-and-balance 
mechanisms, such as internal and external audit controls, information 
disclosure, independent outside directors, the separation of board 
chairmanship from CEO, risk analysis, and audit, nomination and 
 
see: Robert Higgs ‘Ronald Coase, Anomalous Superstar of the Economics 
Profession’ (2014) 19(2) The Independent Review 309; Robert Hahn ‘Ronald Harry 
Coase (1910 – 2013): Nobel-prizewinning economist whose work inspired cap-and-
trade’ (2013) 502 Nature 449. 
21 Vasudev (n5) 915. 
22 Coase (n19) 386. And see: Bodie (n3) 1040; Kay (n15) 11. 
23 Kay (n15) 11. 
24  Oliver E Williamson The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, 
Relational Contracting (1985 Macmillan). Bodie offers a further useful if brief 
summary of his thesis: “When contributions and compensation are harder to value 
individually, the parties will be left with incomplete and ambiguous contracts. And 
these contracts will be insufficient to properly allocate economic power within the 
relationship particularly where one or both of the parties must invest significant 
resources in assets specific to the particular firm, project, or transaction. In order 
to prevent opportunism in the face of these contracts, some system of governance 
is necessary to deal with ex ante developments. Firms can provide this governance. 
By creating legal structures that allocate control between the parties separate and 
apart from their contractual rights, governments can assist parties in developing 
relationships that minimize transaction costs and facilitate economic growth.” See: 
Bodie (n3)1041 – 1042. 
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remuneration committees. The argument is then advanced that such 
enforcement costs should be incurred to the point at which the increase in 
costs equals the reduction of the potential loss from non-compliance.’25  
 
After a hesitant start, scholars were enthusiastically poking around in the 
black box by the 1970’s, expounding on existing theories and developing 
new ones.26 It was Jensen and Meckling (in 1976)27 and Easterbrook and 
Fischel (in 198428) who finally ‘coined’ the firm as a ‘nexus of contracts’.29 
Thus, from an economic perspective the firm stood ‘at the centre of a web 
of legal agreements, with employees, suppliers, customers, and lenders.’30 
And yet, especially if considered from the vantage point of the shareholder, 
it is clear that these legal agreements could never adequately cope with any 
and all eventualities. A great deal of the contracted relationship remains 
implied, and while the courts are of course able to enforce implied terms, 
they identified hierarchy as the force that keeps most of the corporate cogs 
turning.31  
 
 
25 Tricker (n6) 65. 
26 Several sources offer comprehensive accounts of these theories and how they 
have impacted corporate law. See for example: Philippe Aghion and Richard Holden 
‘Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the 
Past 25 Years?’ (2011) 25(2) JEP 181; Alice Belcher ‘The Boundaries of the Firm: The 
Theories of Coase, Knight and Weitzman’ (1997) 17 JLS 22; Belcher ‘Inside the Black 
Box’  (n16) 359; Deakin (n7) 339; Andrew S. Gold ‘Theories of the Firm and Judicial 
Uncertainty’ (2012) 35 Seattle U.L.Rev. 1087; Kay (n15) 11; Eric W. Orts ‘Shirking 
and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm’ (1998) 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 265; 
Vasudev (n5) 911; Williamson ‘The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure’ 
(n17) 171.  
27 Jensen and Meckling (n18) 305. 
28 Easterbrook Frank H & Fischel Daniel R ‘The Corporate Contract’ (1984) 89 Col.L.R 
1416. 
29 Kay (n15) 12 where the author points out that this idea “had been present from 
the very beginnings of the modern corporation in the legal doctrine of corporate 
personality – people dealing with the firm transacted with a corporate entity, not 
the individuals who represented the organisation.” 
30 Kay (n15) 12. 
31 Kay (n15) 12. 
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This ideology prompted the well-known ‘property rights theory’ developed 
mainly by Sanford Grossman, Oliver Hart, and John Moore.32 These authors 
‘identified the “owner” within the nexus of contracts as the person who 
determines the indeterminate elements of inevitably incomplete 
contracts.33 The shareholders, residual claimants to revenues and assets, 
and at least in theory collectively possessed of the power to enforce their 
will, fulfilled this role of arbitrators of whatever was not spelled out 
contractually.’34  This hypothesis in turn led to the development of principal 
agent problem as ‘the central issue of organisational design’.35 Jensen and 
Meckling’s 1976 article,36 which set out how incentive schemes might serve 
to align the interests of the managers (agents) with the objectives of the 
organisation (and indirectly the shareholders), proved incredibly 
influential.37   What finally heralded the era of ‘shareholder value’38  was 
Milton Friedman’s article in the New York Times, cited so often that the title 
would later become a ubiquitous ‘call to arms’: ‘The Social Responsibility of 
Business is to Maximise Profits.’39 
 
32 Oliver Hart & John Moore ‘Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation’ (1988) 56(4) 
Econometrica 755; Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart ‘The Costs and Benefits 
of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration’ (1986) 94(4) JPE 691. 
The theory was developed in a series of articles by the authors and was in fact so 
highly regarded that it resulted in the Nobel Prize (Economic Sciences) for Oliver 
Hart in 2016: The Nobel Prize: Oliver Hart at 
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2016/hart/biographical/; 
and see Richard Holden ‘A Nobel Prize for Property Rights Theory’ (2017) Games 4; 
Aghion and Holden  (n26) 181. 
33 Kay (n15) 12. And see Bodie (n3)1042 where the author explains how the theory 
considered the firm as “a repository of property rights for assets used in joint 
production” and requires that those who contribute “the most valuable and most 
asset-specific” property to the enterprise should own the firm. 
34 Kay (n15) 13. 
35 Kay (n15) 13. 
36 Jensen and Meckling (n18) 305. 
37 As Kay points out, this was no doubt due to the fact that the argument was 
congenial to executive managers themselves. Kay (n15) 13. 
38 See also discussion of ‘shareholder value’ in chapter4. 
39 As cited by Kay (n15) 13: Friedman, Milton. 1970. “The Social Responsibility of 
Business is to Maximise Its Profits.” 
http://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-
responsibility-of-business-is-to.html 
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The narrative thus far, highlights the mainstream theories that gained the 
widest acceptance by the academy, business and practitioners and 
eventually matured to become the agency costs and nexus of contracts 
theories long seen to support a shareholder primacy approach to corporate 
law.  There were alternative approaches besides these, such as the ‘team 
production theory’ proposed by Alchain and Demsetz,40 which explained the 
firm ‘as a way of pooling disparate inputs into a system of cooperative 
creation’.41 Subsequent macro-economic shifts from manufacturing toward 
services prompted the development of a theory based on human capital and 
referred to as the ‘knowledge-based’ theory of the firm.42 The focus here 
moved away from the ownership of physical assets and instead turned to 
‘the need to produce, distribute, and ultimately retain valuable knowledge-
based assets within the firm’.43  Resource dependency theory in its turn, 
took a more strategic view of corporate governance. Although it did not gain 
much ground when first presented, Kay argued recently that it may well be 
the theory best positioned to assess the modern corporation. 44  It views 
directors as ‘boundary-spanning nodes of networks able to connect the 
business to its strategic environment...’ and recognises the fact that the 
social networks that link those involved in the governance process can 
enhance or hinder governance activities.45    
 
 
40  Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz ‘Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization’ (1972) 62(5) AER 777. Firms can synchronise production 
between different groups without having to divide these various relationships up 
to govern them through distinct contracts. Such a ‘team method’ increases 
productivity, but the most obvious pitfall is the fact that any member of the team 
might shirk his or her responsibilities. Bodie (n3)1041 
41 Bodie (n3) 1041. The theory then sees the firm itself serving as a central monitor 
to ensure that each member makes an appropriate contribution and is 
compensated proportionally. 
42 Bodie (n3) 1043. 
43 Bodie (n3) 1043. 
44  Kay (n15) 13. 
45 Tricker (n6) 68. 
199 
 
 
Of the remaining paradigms, three final propositions are worth mentioning 
in brief. The first of these, stewardship theory, can perhaps be described as 
the ‘antithesis’ to agency theory. Proponents focus on the resilience and 
success of the original form and function of the joint stock company. This 
original system, which sees managers being authorised to act as stewards, 
subject to reporting requirements and fiduciary duties that serve as 
safeguards, is considered essentially sound. At its core, stewardship theory 
reflects the ‘classic ideas of corporate governance’ and essentially believes 
that directors are to be trusted. Although some directors will fail, the 
argument goes, this does not undermine the basic construct or imply that 
directors are necessarily self-serving or unable to act with integrity and 
independence. 46  
 
Critics of the stewardship theory emphasise that we have come some way 
since the 19th century model of the company first saw the light of day. 
Structures are now far more complex, and transparency and accountability 
cannot be taken for granted.47 A further criticism is the normative nature of 
the theory. It “emphasizes what should be done, or even exhorts” and is 
therefore not predictive in nature and unable to show causality between any 
behaviour and corporate performance. 48   Perhaps more importantly, 
collapses on the scale of Enron and the 2008 financial crisis left many 
disillusioned and with a sense that the trust that the stewardship model 
extends to directors had been betrayed with dire consequences for 
stakeholders. This led many to call for a redress in the balance of power, and 
for the greater empowerment of shareholders. Indeed, following the 
financial crisis shareholder enfranchisement was one of the primary 
manners in which regulators tended to respond.49 
 
46 Tricker (n6) 65.  
47 Tricker (n6) 66.  
48 Tricker (n6) 66. 
49 See for example: “However, sceptics of shareholder empowerment have argued 
that boards, elected by investors, should still have primacy. Only the directors are 
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The following discussion will illustrate how economic theory was assimilated 
by corporate law theorists and debate its continuing role in shaping the 
discourse that speaks to this area of the law. 
 
3 Finance, Firm, and Takeover Mania: A Revolution and its 
Consequences 
 
a. Chronology  
 
Corporate law in the 1960’s (at least in the United states) was described as 
‘ossified, stagnant’50 and dead ‘as a field of intellectual effort’.51 Not short 
on dramatic flair, Bayless Manning lamented that ‘[w]e have nothing left but 
our great empty corporation statutes – towering skyscrapers or rusted 
girders, internally welded together and containing nothing but wind.’52  
 
A relief then, that the 1970’s and 1980’s brought about a paradigm shift in 
corporate law scholarship. Termed a ‘revolution’ by some,53 its impact was 
 
in a position to take into account relevant factors in business decisions. Giving more 
power to investors...would increase investor costs and reduce returns”. Tricker (n6) 
66. 
50 Romano R ‘After the Revolution in Corporate Law’ (2005) 55 Journal of Legal 
Education 343. And see: William Carney ‘The Legacy of the "Market for Corporate 
Control" and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm’ (1999) 50 Case Western Reserve 
Law Review 221-225. 
51 Bayless Manning ‘The Shareholders' Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker’ 
(1962) 72 Yale L.J. 245 n.37. 
52  Later to become Dean of Stanford Law School. See: Bayless Manning ‘The 
Shareholders' Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker’ (1962) 72 Yale L.J. 245 
n.37. 
53 Bodie (n3) 1033; Orts (n26) 265. And see Romano R ‘After the Revolution in 
Corporate Law’ (2005) 55 Journal of Legal Education 342, where the author offers 
a comprehensive chronical of the changes, remarking that: “Corporate law is a field 
that underwent as thorough a revolution in the 1980s as can be imagined, in 
scholarship and practice, methodology and organization. The term "revolution" is 
invoked all too often in popular culture, but ... it is entirely apt in this case. The 
revolution in corporate law has been so thorough and profound that those working 
in the field today would have considerable difficulty recognizing what it was 
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such that once the dust had settled, authors Hansmann and Kraakman 
announced the ‘end of history for corporate law’,54 arguing that we had now 
more or less reached international agreement on the basic structures and 
principles that underpin the corporation.55   
 
The agent of this revolution was the emerging methodology of law and 
economics which, the story goes, turned corporate law academia from ‘a 
swampy doctrinal backwater’ into a ‘vibrant hub of intellectual activity’ by 
introducing such concepts as agency costs, shareholder primacy, and the 
market for corporate control.56 These ideas are now so entrenched that one 
can hardly discuss the regulation of corporations without at least a nod in 
their direction.57 Law and economics scholars soon took for granted that 
their audience arrived well versed in the basics of this new scholarship – 
even to the point that they tended to avoid discussing more general 
principles and turned directly to finer details and more contentious 
arguments.58  
 
Romano traces the origins of this “new paradigm for corporate law” back to 
the work of Henry Manne,59 who was the first to recognise the merger as 
 
twenty-five to thirty years ago.” (at 342).  And see: Cheffins (n3) v, where the author 
prefers more reticent language but nonetheless confirms that ‘[c]ompany law [had] 
undergone an academic transformation...’ 
54 Hansmann and Kraakman (n3) 439. 
55 Hansmann and Kraakman (n3) 439. 
56  Bodie (n3) 1033. And see Cheffins (n3) v: “[a] rich theoretical literature has 
developed in law reviews and related journals, with the use of economic analysis 
providing much of the impetus for this work.”  
57  Bodie (n3) 1033. Most notable publications on Company Law will have one 
reference or another to at least some, if not all, of these issues.  
58 So prevalent was this practice that by 1997 Cheffins observed that the emerging 
body of learning remained inaccessible to scholars and set out to address this in a 
comprehensive analysis of background principles. See: Cheffins (n3) v. 
59 Henry G Manne ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’ (1965) 73 J. Pol. 
Econ. 110 
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something more than merely a threat to competition.60  Shortly thereafter, 
Ralph Winter came to conclusions along similar lines.61 Both authors were 
largely ignored by the academy at the time, who viewed corporate law as 
essentially a species of consumer protection, and supported the adoption of 
a national corporation law in America to ensure adequate protection for 
investors.62  
 
In a useful chronology of the developments, Romano identifies three strands 
that did eventually lead to a transformation of corporate law.63 The first is 
the emergence of corporate finance as a serious field of study in the latter 
half of the twentieth century.64  The second is a parallel development in 
microeconomics which heralded a new theory of the firm – in particular 
transaction cost economics and the agency costs theory of the firm.65 Finally, 
radical changes in corporate practice and the ‘era of the hostile takeover’ 
which spurred an ‘explosion in innovative deals’.66 The fast paced, takeover 
 
60 Manne was also the first to engage with the concept of market control and to 
identify the potential of the merger and the takeover to enhance efficiency by 
replacing mediocre management. Romano (n53) 343; Manne (n59) 110. 
61  Winter R K ‘State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation’ (977)6 J.Leg. Stud. 251. Winter argued against the prevailing 
perception that American states would legislate in a race to the bottom and offer 
investors as little protection as possible, noting that directors would be dissuaded 
from operating in such states. 
62 Romano (n53) 344. 
63 Romano (n53) 345.  
64 The field of corporate finance was first considered as an influence on corporate 
law by Victor Brudney and Marvin Chirelstein in a ground-breaking case book 
published in 1972 (Victor Brudney and Marvin A Chirelstein Cases and Materials on 
Corporate Finance (Mineola 1972)). See:  Romano (n53) 345. The author sets out a 
chronology of the breakthroughs in finance which in turn enabled the evolution of 
corporate law. Among others, she points to the emergence of event studies, 
developed together with the concept of market efficiency and able to test finance 
theory and the theories proposed by Manne and Winter.  
65 These theories were the result of economists’ attempts to decipher the ‘black 
box of the firm’ as neo-classical economics focussed on the firm as a production 
function, termed it.  Romano (n53) 347. And see further below.  
66 Romano (n53) 347. For a further review of the ‘Takeover Wave’ of the 1980’s, see 
also: Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny ‘The Takeover Wave of the 1980s’ (1990) 
249 Science, New Series 745. 
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driven scene of the 1980’s forced lawyers to work increasingly together with 
the investment banking sector, and although they did not always welcome 
this fact, there was simply no choice but to become ‘increasingly conversant’ 
in finance and economics. The courts and the U.S Securities and Exchange 
Commission followed suit, and also drew from developing financial theories 
in formulating legal rules. 67  The concepts transposed from institutional 
economics were used to generate a ‘functional’68 theory of corporate law 
‘which promised to uncover the economic structure of the legal rules 
governing the firm.’69 Where lawyers and the courts had found themselves 
floundering when talking and thinking about the consequences of the novel 
transactions that they were encountering, ‘the theoretical developments in 
finance and in the theory of the firm literature provided the language and 
analytical tools to address a host of challenging legal issues.’ 70   Deakin 
explains that it was essentially a reductive process that saw an inevitable 
development from contractarian theory to the structure of the firm being 
based on agency conflict, noting that ‘[a]lmost the entirety of the modern 
economics-inspired tradition of corporate law scholarship is derived from 
this methodological move, which is so generally accepted as to be almost 
taken for granted’. 71 
 
And so, corporate law scholarship seemed to greet the new millennium ad 
idem about the fact that the norm of shareholder primacy had prevailed 
(due largely to the efficiency gains it ostensibly generated), and corporate 
 
67 This was an era of creative deals and transactions and colourful terminology such 
as ‘crown jewels’, ‘white knights’, ‘poison pills’ and ‘greenmail’. The trend would 
prevail in spite of numerous attempts by the legislature in the United States to 
curtail it. Romano (n53) 350. And see: Deakin (n7) 340. 
68 First used by Hansmann and Kraakman to describe corporate law as informed by 
economic theory. See:  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, “What is Corporate 
Law?” in Reiner Kraakman et al, eds, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative 
and Functional Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 5. 
69 Deakin (n7) 340. 
70 Romano (n53) 347. And see: Deakin (n7) 341. 
71 Deakin (n7) 344. 
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law and practice would merge along these lines (prompting the 
abovementioned article by Hansmann and Kraakman heralding the end of 
corporate law).72 Deakin argued that this prediction has since proven false 
because of resistance of national systems to the convergence of corporate 
governance rules but also because of the fact that the global financial crisis 
was such a shock to the universal system.73   
 
The financial crisis of 2007/2008 did more than to destabilise the global 
economy. It shook established notions about corporate law and prompted 
scholars to question the accepted theories of the firm that had informed and 
shaped corporate law regulation and jurisprudence. Where there had been 
a wholescale acceptance of the idea that company law should become 
increasingly enabling and is there merely to facilitate an existing ‘nexus of 
contracts’, scholars were now considering theories of the firm from new 
perspectives.74  
Thus, although the shareholder primacy model which had become the 
dominant legal-economic theory at the turn of the century had to be 
reconsidered, this did not imply a general rejection of economic theory or 
the social sciences when analysing and researching legal norms.75   
 
When it comes to the role of economic theory or the social sciences in 
generating and interpreting corporate law, Gold made the observation that 
there is no necessary connection between theories of the firm scholarship 
and judicial theories of the firm. He argued that is no surprise that 
 
72 Deakin (n7) 341 in reference to the famous article by Hansmann and Kraakman 
(n3) 439. 
73 Deakin (n7) 342, where the author points out evidence suggesting that “firms 
characterized by a higher degree of shareholder influence over managerial decision 
making ... were more exposed to risk in the run-up to the crisis and more likely to 
fail during it.” And see Bodie (n3) 1039; Jill E. Fisch ‘Measuring Efficiency in 
Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy’ (2006) 31 J. CORP. L. 638. See also 
regarding shareholder primacy chapter 4 at note 86 and further and sources cited. 
74 Deakin (n7) 342. 
75 Deakin (n7) 343. And see:  Bodie (n3) 1045; Fisch (n73) 638. 
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economists and legal scholars might adopt a particular theory of the firm 
while the courts opt to endorse another: judges are not economists and not 
positioned to keep abreast of the increasingly sophisticated theories of the 
firm that are so rapidly emerging.76  He explained that ‘[l]egal scholars who 
focus on theories of the firm often develop an interpretation of corporate 
law that endorses a particular legal theory of the firm. On these accounts, 
courts are thought to have adopted a commentator's preferred theory 
(consciously or otherwise), with legal doctrine seen as a means of facilitating 
the formation and governance of firms with the desired features.’ 77  He 
argued however, that corporate law can be considered from a different 
viewpoint, and that much of corporate legal doctrine is in fact a reaction to 
uncertainty among the judiciary as to the appropriate theory of the firm as 
opposed to an endorsement of any one particular theory.78 
 
There is merit in the argument. However, this it does not negate the 
pervasive influence of these theories in how regulators and the judiciary 
perceive company law. As Moore pointed out, contractarianism is 
manifested in how the judiciary in both the UK and the US approach cases in 
corporate law.79 He pointed to a long tradition of judicial deference to the 
internal contractual autonomy of corporations in the United States 
(entrenched by the operation of the common law business judgement rule), 
and judicial deference to internal corporate autonomy which ‘persists in the 
English common law environment under the doctrinal label of the ‘internal 
management’ doctrine’.80 Arguably judges may not consciously favour any 
 
76 Gold (n26) 1087. 
77 Gold (n26) 1087. 
78 Gold notes that “[t]here is also evidence in support of this hypothesis. Courts, in 
fact, seem to go out of their way to avoid adopting a particular theory of the firm. 
At the same time, actual case outcomes are subject to multiple interpretations from 
a theory of the firm perspective. Moreover, leading explanatory theories often 
must identify at least some cases as exceptions to the rule, a necessity that 
indicates these theories do not perfectly fit the case law.” Gold (n26) 1087. 
79 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 1. 
80 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 8. 
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one theory over another, but the existing legal paradigm, its jurisprudence 
and preceding case law may have endorsed contractarianism to the extent 
that there is no escaping its influence. 
 
It is also apparent that the legislative approach in both the United States and 
the United Kingdom has been shaped by the ideologies underpinning 
contractarianism. As noted above, ‘the contractarian paradigm is dependent 
on a peculiarly passive-instrumentalist understanding of corporate law as a 
phenomenon that is in the last place determined by, rather than 
determinative of, the private preferences and bargains of individual 
corporate participants (principally shareholders and managers)’. 81   The 
influence of this logic on legislative approach is evident in US corporate 
governance in the ‘opt-out’ traditions of State corporate governance design. 
In the UK it is demonstrated most conspicuously in the significant degree of 
regulatory deference apparently afforded to so-called ‘soft law’ norms that 
are promulgated outside of government and which depend mainly on 
market pressures, rather that the binding force of state sanction, for their 
effectiveness in eliciting managerial behavioural change’. 82 
 
One can make a convincing argument that the regulatory regime in South 
Africa shows similar influences. The 2008 Companies Act expressly favours a 
‘facilitative’ approach and includes numerous ‘opt in/opt out’ type 
provisions throughout.83 Furthermore, as mentioned in previous chapters, 
corporate governance is regulated via soft law norms as is the case in the 
United Kingdom. The South African courts in large part endorsed their 
English and American counterparts’ reluctance to interfere in internal 
 
81 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 7. See also: Attenborough (n2) 206. The 
approach aligns with one based on ‘negotiated regulation’: See: Dignam A 
‘Exporting corporate governance: U.K. regulatory systems in a global economy’ 
(2000) 21(3) Co Law 70 and discussion in chapter 7 at note and further.  
82 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 7. 
83  These are referred to as so-called ‘alterable provisions’ of the Act. See also 
discussion of alterable and unalterable provisions in chapter 1.  
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matters, and it is likely that the business judgement rule incorporated into 
the 2008 legislation will perpetuate this in many cases.  
  
b. Agency Costs Theory 
 
As the discussion above has detailed, certain theories of the firm had 
become very popular in corporate law debates by the turn of the century. 
Foremost was the agency costs theory and the concomitant idea of the 
company as a ‘nexus of contracts’.84 As mentioned in chapter 1, the agency 
theory refers in general to the inevitable conflicts of interests that will arise 
when one party has the task of furthering the interests of another. In any 
such situation, it is argued, the ‘agent’ will be inclined not to further the 
interests of the principal exclusively and the former must be incentivised or 
motivated not to act in a self-serving manner.85 As with transaction cost 
theory, agency theory is rooted in financial economics, is concerned with 
managerial discretion, and is based on the assumption that managers are 
prone to opportunism.86 At its core, the model firm is conceived of as a 
‘cascade of principal-agent problems’. This, according to Kay, ‘was the logical 
culmination of what had earlier been described (though with a degree of 
scepticism which had increased over time) as ‘scientific management’. 
Shareholders-owners, too busy and too numerous to manage the business 
themselves, contract with executives to run the business. 87 
 
84 See below at text to note 103 and further and sources cited. 
85 Early proponents of agency theory, Jensen and Meckling, defined it as follows: 
‘[A]gency theory involves a contract under which one or more persons (the 
shareholders) engage other persons (the directors) to perform some service on 
their behalf which includes delegating some decision-making authority to the 
agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers there is good reason 
to believe the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal’: Jensen 
and Meckling (n18) 308. 
86 Tricker (n6) 65. In fact, this is the case to the extent that Bodie argues that 
contractarianism is no separate theory at all but instead merely an answer to the 
cost dilemmas identified by agency theory.  
87 Kay (n15) 13. He then defines these executive functions to include ‘determination 
of the appropriate scope of the firm, integrating idiosyncratic activities within the 
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It bears mention that agency costs, and the agency dilemma is not a brand-
new concept. Vasudev explains that Jensen and Meckling essentially 
‘adopted Ronald Coase's ideas on microeconomic theory, along with those 
of Adam Smith, and Berle and Means on corporate governance, and wove 
them together into their own theory. In Jensen and Meckling's model, 
Coase's entrepreneur-coordinator, rechristened as an “owner-manager”, 
sells a part of the equity or ownership to outside investors. Jensen and 
Meckling's theory is therefore about business enterprises in the corporate 
form.’88  Smith, of course, was mainly concerned with conflicts between 
shareholders as contributors of capital, and directors as controllers – he 
believed a conflict between the two was expected and unavoidable. Berle 
and Means in turn applied essentially the same principle but framed it in 
political terms to speak more directly to the large industrial companies that 
had come to the fore in the US.89 
 
At first glance it appears that the agency dilemma in the context of the 
modern public company manifests in a rather straightforward manner, with 
the shareholders cast as the principals and the directors as the agents 
managing the entity on their behalf. But the agency relationships at play in 
companies today are usually far more complex. As Tricker points out, where 
one is dealing with minority shareholders, institutional investors and block 
shareholders, executive and non-executive directors, and powerful creditors 
it becomes exceedingly difficult to trace the so-called ‘agency chain’ and 
determine where and how the company and its constituents are exposed to 
agency risks is almost impossible.90 The world has come a long way from the 
 
overall common organisational structure, and contracting in competitive markets 
where there are multiple potential suppliers of homogenous inputs.’ 
88 Vasudev (n5) 916. 
89 Vasudev (n5) 916: ‘Berle and Means framed the issue in more explicitly political 
terms: the concentration of power in the corporate boards and the undermining of 
the property rights of large numbers of retail shareholders who were understood 
as the “owners” of the corporations.’ 
90 Tricker (n6) 60. 
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original idea of the joint-stock company – and it is now possible, for example, 
to acquire voting rights in a company without owning any shares. Directors 
are faced with novel dilemmas, such as whether they represent the interests 
of the traditional long-term shareholder, or conversely whether they 
steward the interests of short-term activist institutions. It is unlikely that 
these interests will align. 91  
 
The strength of agency theory lies in its use of data about governance 
practice and company performance that is easily accessible (such as 
directors’ reports or audited company accounts), and which in turn allows 
for a ‘statistically rigorous insight’ 92 into corporate governance practices. Its 
simplicity and the fact that it relies on available and reliable data and 
accepted statistical analysis means that agency theory has been able to 
make a dynamic contribution to corporate governance theory. 93   
 
In addition, it is probably no surprise that the agency theory has become 
such a popular lens through which to view corporate governance practices 
and behaviours. There is hardly a dearth of anecdotal evidence to support 
the fact that directors have often treated listed companies as their own 
property, and have exploited their positions to great personal gain – often 
taking benefits unrelated to performance or by simply appropriating 
unsanctioned funds to the great detriment of the company and its 
shareholders. 94  
 
 
91 Tricker (n6) 60, where the author points out that the agency problem is certainly 
not limited to relationships within listed companies, and can occur in private 
companies,  private companies, joint ventures, not-for-profit organizations, 
professional institutions, and governmental bodies, not to mention a group 
company context, where ‘[t]he opportunities for the subsidiary company directors 
to take decisions beneficial to the subsidiary, but detrimental to the group, are 
legion...’ 
92 Tricker (n6) 62. 
93 Tricker (n6) 62. 
94 Tricker (n6) 62. 
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Amongst other things, this is to do with asymmetrical access to information 
and the fact that the directors not only have more information than the 
shareholders, but also (within the confines of legal requirements) curate the 
information that the shareholders are given.95 At the core of the joint-stock, 
limited-liability company is the stewardship role of the directors, who are 
trusted by the shareholders to manage their contributions in the face of this 
asymmetry. Agency theory, in essence, takes a more sceptical view of this 
arrangement.96 Kay offers a concise summary of this phenomenon:  
 
Internal organisation requires decentralisation to those who hold the 
diffuse information required for efficient production while incentivising 
them to use that information for the advantage of the firm rather than 
the holder of the information. The incompleteness of contracts requires 
that those with superior access to information are given appropriate 
incentives to internalise the objective of the firm – the maximisation of 
value for its shareholders. A suite of models of these kinds provides a 
rationalist and reductive account of the role and functions of the firm 
which is still pervasive.97 
 
Despite being such a ubiquitous model, the theory faces a number of 
criticisms.98 It is criticised for having a relatively narrow theoretical scope. It 
focusses purely on measurable data such as how the board is structured, 
what remuneration packages look like or how a company has complied with 
a corporate governance index by means of ‘box ticking’. The criticism is 
 
95 Somewhat ironically, this same problem arises as between the executive and 
non-executive directors and has been identified as one of the hurdles preventing 
the latter from performing their functions optimally. See chapter 4 for a general 
discussion in this regard.  
96 Tricker (n6) 62. 
97 Kay J ‘Theories of the Firm’ (2018) 25(1) International Journal of the Economics of 
Business 13. 
98  See for example: Paddy Ireland, ‘Property and contract in contemporary 
corporate theory’ (2003) 
23(3) LS 453; William Bratton, ‘The ‘‘Nexus-of Contracts’’ Corporation: A Critical 
Appraisal’ 
(1989) 74 Cornell L.Rev. 407. 
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mainly that board behaviour is influenced by more than a set of contractual 
relationships but rather is also swayed by ‘interpersonal behaviour, group 
dynamics and other political intrigues and question whether the subtle and 
complex dynamics of board behaviour lend themselves to measurement and 
numerical analysis’. 99  Others have criticised the very simplicity that is 
considered to be the model’s strength, contending that some investors 
behave more like ‘corporate raiders’ than the more traditional long-term 
investors envisaged by the model, while the short termism that dominates 
stock markets may well produce different agency relationships entirely.100 
Yet others have challenged the findings of agency theoretical research and 
have concluded that the number of well-connected executive directors 
forming part of the company’s board is a better predictor of how well the 
company will perform than whether or not the company followed corporate 
governance codes or whether it had effective independent director 
oversight in place.101  
 
Finally, there is also the fact that agency theory is essentially rather cynical. 
As Tricker puts it:  
[I]nherent in agency theory is a philosophical, moral assumption about the 
nature of man. The theory assumes that people are self-interested, not altruistic; 
they cannot be expected to look after the interests of others. In other words, 
directors cannot be trusted. The legal concept of the corporation, and the basis 
of stewardship theory ... takes the opposite view.102  
 
 
 
 
 
99 Tricker (n6) 63. 
100 Tricker (n6) 63. 
101 Tricker (n6) 63.  
102 Tricker (n6) 63. And see: Timothy L Fort and James J Noone ‘Banded Contracts, 
Mediating Institutions, and Corporate Governance: A Naturalist Analysis of 
Contractual Theories of the Firm’ (1999) 62(3) Law and Contemporary Problems 
165. 
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c. Nexus-of-Contracts Theory 
 
Also called ‘contractarianism’, the nexus-of-contracts constitutes ‘an 
economic paradigm that regards the company, and the rules related thereto, 
as no more than an explicit and implicit set of ‘private’ contractual 
arrangements between shareholders, directors, employees, creditors, 
suppliers, etc.’ 103  Attenborough describes it as a ‘deregulatory, 
individualistic depiction of company law and corporate governance’, which 
explains the legal governance structure of the company ‘as the endogenous 
outcome of a collection of autonomous and rational actors freely 
negotiating notional bargains to produce and enforce rules that regulate 
their exchange activities.’104   
 
Or according to Moore, it is a theory which determines that ‘the core and 
motivating purpose of corporate governance laws should be to reflect or 
“mimic” the governance “terms” that shareholders and managers would be 
inclined to agree upon with one another privately, in the hypothetical 
scenario where no antecedent laws exist and therefore all norms stand to 
be determined by private negotiation alone.’105 This is due to the fact that, 
at least in the Anglo-American context, the efficacy of laws and regulations 
in the corporate sphere depends on how well the rules respond to the needs 
of key participants or parties to the corporate contract.106  It speaks to an 
approach that views corporate governance law as being at its core ‘organic’ 
or (‘bottom up’) as opposed to ‘synthetic’ or (top down), 107  and sees 
corporate law as an aspect of private or facilitative law as opposed to public 
law which tends to be more prescriptive. Moore points out that  unlike 
criminal, environmental, tort and securities law, ‘corporate law – including 
 
103 Attenborough (n2) 192.  
104 Attenborough (n2) 192. 
105 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 2. 
106 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 2. 
107 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 4.  
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corporate governance law – is typically not perceived as being designed to 
coerce social-behavioural change, or to bring about direct distributional 
outcomes within society whether in terms of risk, power or wealth.’108 He 
describes the laws and norms in the field of corporate governance as 
‘fundamentally non-socially-determinative’ in nature.109  
 
The distinction is critically important. If one adheres to a school of thought 
that views corporate law as essentially private, one is likely to argue that the 
law should ‘respond to private preferences as opposed to determining them.’ 
If, however, one perceives corporate governance laws as inherently public, 
the normative position you are more likely to take is one that would allow 
for laws to ‘be coercive and socially determinative, aimed at eliciting direct 
change in the behavioural patterns and relative resources of key corporate 
participants in line with general democratic opinion in society, and 
irrespective of whether or not such regulatory outcomes are consistent with 
the affected participants’ (especially shareholders’) private preferences.’110 
 
 Despite the fact that it was so widely accepted, contractarianism has many 
critics. Belcher argues that the theory is based on ‘individual economic 
agents who act and make contracts in a rational way and in their own 
interest’. 111 Relying on work by Snider,112  she contends that the theory 
reflects the ‘sleek, minimalist view of “Chicago-style” economics’ and 
 
108 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 3. 
109 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 3. 
110 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 4. And see: D Millon ‘New Directions in 
Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law’ 
(1993) 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1373. And see Bodie (n3) 1047: ‘because a 
corporation is merely an intersection of voluntary agreements, corporate law 
should facilitate freedom of contract and eschew mandatory rules.’ 
111 Belcher ‘Inside the Black Box’ (n16) 362. 
112 Snider, L. (2000) ‘The Sociology of Corporate Crime: An Obituary’, Theoretical 
Criminology 4: 169–206. 
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reduces the company to no more than a transaction-cost reducing device. 
113  
 
Some argue that it is not a theory of the firm to start with, but that it is 
instead ‘a theory of agency costs within a certain type of firm – namely, the 
corporation’.114 Bodie points out that the theory ‘falls apart’ as a theory to 
justify the firm – if a company is truly no more than a nexus of contracts -  
what then is its purpose in the first place, or by extension the purpose of 
corporate law.115  Proponents of the theory respond to this by arguing that 
the contractual nature of the corporation implies terms that the parties have 
chosen for themselves and these terms, having been freely chosen, are 
presumably efficient.116 Jensen and Meckling strongly emphasized the fact 
that companies are private arrangements:  
 
[T]he corporation is neither the creature of the state nor the object of 
special privileges extended by the state. The corporation did not draw its 
first breath of life from either a minister of state or civil servant. More 
importantly, the corporation requires for its existence only freedom of 
 
113 Belcher ‘Inside the Black Box’ (n16) 362. 
114 Mathew T. Bodie ‘The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law: Returning to 
the Theory of the Firm’ (2012) 35 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1045. The author explains that 
“ Unlike Alchian and Demsetz's firm-which plays a real role in shaping, executing, 
and enforcing contracts with input providers- the "nexus" at the center of Jensen & 
Meckling's firm is a mere legal fiction that is "not an individual" and has no real 
independent existence. Jensen and Meckling's model focuses on agency costs 
created by the upper-level managers who are tasked to do the bidding of principals. 
Their theory defines agency costs as the costs associated with monitoring by the 
principal, bonding expenditures by the agent, and the residual loss. The monitoring 
they describe looks a lot like the "control" that Coase focused on as the key element 
in defining the firm. But Jensen and Meckling turn their attention to the relationship 
between shareholders (principals) and management (agents), rather than the 
relationship of employees to the firm. Their model joins the financial structure of 
the firm with the management structure of corporate governance. As other 
commentators have pointed out, the nexus of contract theory is thus not really a 
theory of the firm at all. Rather, it is a theory of agency costs within a certain type 
of firm-namely, the corporation. 
115 Bodie (n3) 1047. 
116 Bodie (n3) 1047. 
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contract. Corporate vitality in no way is dependent on special dispensation 
from the authorities.117 
 
Hence, contractarianism presents corporate governance as a creature of 
contract and not of regulation. In other words, the purpose of the state as 
‘regulator’ within this paradigm reduced essentially to that of facilitator – its 
regulatory functions merely to ‘supply the most popular governance ‘terms’ 
to corporate participants on an ‘off-the-shelf’ basis, so as to save 
participants (principally shareholders) the extensive transaction costs that 
would otherwise be involved in devising such norms from scratch. Over and 
above this base facilitative level of involvement, however, the state is 
perceived as having no further material role to play in engendering effective 
managerial accountability within public corporations.’118  
 
But, given the very nature of contractarian theory, how can mandatory rules 
ever be justified? And mandatory rules in corporate laws are a fact of life. 
The mere fact that such a large number of these rules are mandatory and 
apply across the board regardless of preference ‘sits uneasily alongside the 
dominant contractarian portrayal of corporate laws as being the flexible, 
instrumental and non-socially-determinative outcomes of private selection 
methods based on rational (shareholder and managerial) choice.’119   
 
As legal scholars, Easterbrook and Fischel were sensitive to the logistical 
challenges presented by a theory that eschews the law. In response to 
criticisms they emphasized the autonomy that corporations are afforded 
 
117 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, “Reflections on the Corporation as a 
Social Invention” (Controlling the Giant Corporation: A Symposium, Center for 
Research in Government Policy and Business, Graduate School of Management, 
University of Rochester, 1982) as cited by Vasudev (n5) 928 at note 54. 
118 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 7 
119 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 5. He identifies the most problematic 
feature of mandatory rules as being their universal application. By their very nature, 
they cannot respond to individual preference or ‘firm-specific’ circumstances that 
may justify exceptions from the rule. 
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when managing their own affairs and stressed the ‘open character’ of 
corporate law.120 Arguing that the enabling statutes found in most American 
states allowed managers and investors to ‘write their own tickets, ....without 
substantive scrutiny from a regulator and without effective restraint on the 
permissible methods of corporate governance’121 they point out that the 
courts apply the business judgement doctrine in a hands-off approach to 
corporate managers, affording the law a relatively inconsequential position. 
Their answer to the inevitable question – why not just abolish corporate law 
and allow people to contract as they please – is utilitarian at heart.122 In 
essence, they see corporate law as a set of ‘off-the-rack’ terms, allowing 
participants in corporate ventures to save the costs of contracting. There are 
numerous terms which one can imagine most companies would want to 
adopt, and corporate legislation and existing case law are in the business of 
supplying these terms free of cost, making it possible for entrepreneurs to 
focus on more pertinent matters.123   
 
But as Vasudev points out, Easterbrook and Fischel describe their answer as 
not entirely satisfactory – in a sense admitting the limitations of the 
contractarian approach. He notes that, although it is true that incorporation 
has evolved from privilege to right, and that the law is minimally intrusive, it 
is undeniable that corporate and securities law do in fact exist.124 
 
Even the staunchest of contractarian scholar will concede that ‘at the most 
basic level of civil society the fundamental structural preconditions of a 
market system are dependent on extra – contractual governmental 
 
120 Vasudev (n5) 928. 
121 Easterbrook and Fischel (n28) 1417. 
122 Vasudev (n5) 929. 
123 Vasudev (n5) 929. 
124 The author points out that ‘[i]ncorporation is made possible only by following 
the procedures prescribed under the corporate statutes that, together with 
securities laws, govern corporations during their existence. Economic theory fails 
to deal with this fact in a satisfactory manner.” Vasudev (n5) 929. 
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design’. 125  Contractarians and neo-liberal theorists will in general also 
concede that it is a legitimate state function to preserve the macro-
economic conditions that support sustained market stability (even if only to 
the extent of producing monetary instruments and setting a national base 
rate of interest).126 And therein lies the rub:  
 
Against this backdrop, it could be surmised that contractarians ...in 
seeking at once to admit the necessity of – but also significantly limit the 
permissible ambit of – regulatory state interventionism in private 
ordering, are proverbially ‘trying to have their cake and eat it’. That is to 
say, acknowledging that the purportedly self-regulatory domain of 
private ordering (both in corporate governance matters and in citizens’ 
socio-economic affairs more generally) is necessarily dependent on an 
irreducible minimum of governmentally-mandated institutional 
infrastructure, opens an awkward regulatory ‘can of worms’ for 
contractarians that could be said to discredit their argument against 
state interventionism in other – less structurally fundamental – 
respects.127 
 
 
4 Recent Developments and Looking to the Future 
 
As mentioned earlier, a number of scholars have been reconsidering the 
contractarian theory and its impact on corporate law scholarship. Some have 
also tackled specifically the question of appropriate state intervention and 
regulatory oversight. A number of theories were developed and although it 
is not possible to offer a comprehensive overview of them all, the following 
section will give an overview of the salient arguments that have emerged 
from the research.  
 
125 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 234. 
126 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 234. 
127 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 235. 
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Attenborough approaches the contractarian theory from an empirical 
vantagepoint and takes aim at the ‘myopic economic vision’ of company law 
that has dominated literature for decades.128 A view of the company as a 
nexus of explicit and implicit contracts logically implies that ‘company law 
rule making is essentially a variety of contract law.’129 On a positive note, the 
theory allows for spontaneous governance to arise ‘in a decentralised, 
emergent fashion even within large communities of participants.’ 130 
However, contractarianism goes beyond the private nature of corporate 
governance arrangements and touches on the many interactions between 
the law and markets. From this standpoint the theory takes on a politico-
economic guise and proponents consider conventional regulatory 
approaches as ‘a largely external and regressive force to be resisted in the 
interests of efficient profit making.’131  
 
Using empirical enquiries, Attenborough comes to conclusions that belie 
two fundamental assumptions that contractarian theory rests upon. First an 
assumption that individual rationality and uninhibited agreement produce 
spontaneous governance, and second neo-classical economic assumptions 
about de-centralised rule making.132 The first assumption, he argues, ignores 
the role of hierarchy within the notional bargaining activities that the 
contractarian theory rests upon. In reality, he argues, there is a ‘casual and 
 
128 To fully reflect the author’s argument, it bears mention that the article does not 
take aim at the entirety of contractarian theory but sounds a ‘note of objection’ to 
two fundamental assumptions made by contractarian theorists. First an 
assumption that individual rationality and uninhibited agreement produce 
spontaneous governance, and second neo-classical economic assumptions about 
de-centralised rule making. See Attenborough (n2) 193. 
129 Attenborough (n2) 224. 
130 Attenborough (n2) 193. 
131 Attenborough (n2) 224. 
132 Attenborough (n2) 193. Attenborough argues finally, that these two dimensions 
– socio-economic pressures resulting from intragroup hierarchies and the influence 
of the state in the development and operation of private markets – create 
conditions that privilege financial capital within the notional company. 
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correlative relationship ... between socio-economic hierarchy and the 
development of private orders.’ A tiered governance structure prompts 
those with power to prefer privately generated rules that will maintain the 
status quo. Weaker participants co-opted into the structure, interact with 
others in spite of the terms of the arrangement being unfavourable towards 
them.133 As far as the second assumption is concerned, he argues cogently 
that ‘private orders do not necessarily emerge without overall design or 
operate at the margins of more traditional legal or regulatory structures.’ 
Instead, he argues, there is frequent interaction between law and markets 
and ‘non-legal systems typically displace in part, yet rest upon, the extant 
legal regime.’134 As such, the formal structures of law and politics generally 
remain a ‘vital pre-requisite for privately generated rule making, and that 
state interventionism normally constructs the conditions necessary for 
private orders in all sorts of cooperative interactions.’ 135  Moore echoes 
these sentiments, and remarks:   
 
Like any effective institutional feature of a supposed ‘free’ and 
‘deregulatory’ market system, the contractual principle in UK corporate 
law – despite outward appearances – does not arise spontaneously out 
of thin air but rather is underpinned by a sophisticated and pre-ordained 
public-regulatory infrastructure....136 
 
Galanis also considered whether ‘privately derived governance mechanisms 
as opposed to mandatory institutions, are sufficient to not only establish but 
also maintain an efficient corporate governance regime.’137 He approaches 
the inquiry by considering the effect of power asymmetry on the dynamics 
of corporate governance and, in accordance with Attenborough’s 
 
133 Galanis comes to a similar conclusion. See: Galanis (n1) 329. 
134 Attenborough (n2) 193. 
135 Attenborough (n2) 194. 
136 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 208. 
137 Galanis (n1) 329. 
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conclusions, he finds that the power dynamics inherent in the bargains 
between the company and its stakeholders have the propensity over time to 
cumulatively increase the power of stronger parties, while creating a ‘vicious 
spiral’ of loss for weaker parties. 138  This is not the ideal corporate 
governance outcome, which according to Galanis, is the product of an 
equilibrium which balances stakeholder interests against the independent 
interests of the corporation, so that the capabilities of the latter are able to 
create organizational rent. In a ‘Coasean world’, this equilibrium can be 
achieved by contract alone. However, the power imbalances highlighted 
above undermine this contractual utopia, with governance tending to 
exacerbate power imbalances and undermine the sought-after co-operative 
equilibrium. Galanis concludes that ‘contract-derived corporate governance 
mechanisms alone are inherently unstable and unable to balance and 
synthesize divergent intra-corporate interests’ and that ‘to overcome these 
inherent inefficiencies of contractual corporate governance, legally 
prescribed power balancing institutions are necessary.’139  His views echo 
Attenborough’s findings regarding hierarchy and the balance of power 
within firms, and a propensity for hierarchy to become entrenched under 
the terms of private ordering.140 
 
Deakin also, proposes a change in perspective. He suggests an inverted focus 
of analysis which asks how the phenomenon of the business firm is viewed 
by the law. Considered from this angle, corporate law becomes more than 
merely a response to the agency dilemma, but instead represents a 
manifestation of solutions to the ‘collective action problems’ that arise in 
the context of business enterprises, and which have over time become part 
 
138 Galanis (n1) 329. 
139  Galanis (n1) 330 where the author warns that this is a daunting task: 
“Stakeholder and company power is drawn from numerous interweaved 
institutional arrangements in the economy, so that piecemeal regulatory changes 
or company law alone would be insufficient to resolve power imbalances....[A] 
systemic approach to corporate governance regulation is needed.” 
140 See above at text to note 138. 
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of the discourse of the legal system.  This view sees company law regimes as 
‘complex emergent phenomena, which have co-evolved alongside the 
emergence of firms and markets in industrial societies. They have both 
shaped and been shaped by the long-run processes of economic and 
technological development associated with industrialization.’141 The aim of 
corporate law scholarship which is economically informed should be to seek 
explanations for the many functions that company law performs in a 
national but also in a global context.142 Based on principles that emerge from 
commons research, he posits a model of corporate law which he 
acknowledges is ‘radically at odds with the shareholder-oriented, market 
focused and globally-driven model of corporate law’ that was pervasive from 
the 1980’s until the destruction of the financial crisis. The model he suggests 
should be based on ‘multi-stakeholder governance in preference to 
shareholder primacy; autonomy for rule-making processes at the level of 
internal enterprise relations in the face of external capital market pressures; 
and respect for local and national democratic choices on how to regulate the 
business firm in the face of pressures to condone or encourage transnational 
regulatory arbitrage and avoidance.’143  
 
As mentioned in chapter 4 above, Deakin argued that the shareholder 
primacy model which has dominated discourse for near 30 years falls short 
as it fails to describe core aspects of the legal model of the business 
enterprise.144 In summation he argues that the firm should be seen as a 
‘collectively managed resource or “commons” which is subject to a number 
of multiple, overlapping and potentially conflicting property-type claims on 
the part of the different constituencies or stakeholders that provide value to 
 
141 Deakin (n7) 344. 
142 Deakin (n7) 344. 
143 Deakin (n7) 379. 
144 In this regard he refers specifically to ‘the underpinning provided by law for 
managerial autonomy, the organizational continuity of the firm and the multi-
stakeholder nature of firm-level governance.’ Deakin (n7) 380. 
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the firm’.145 Drawing on the theory of the commons, he then argues that ‘the 
sustainability of the corporation depends on ensuring proportionality of 
benefits and costs with respect to the inputs made to corporate resources, 
and on the participation of the different stakeholder groups in the 
formulation of the rules governing the management and use of those 
resources. Viewing the corporation as a commons in this sense is the first 
step toward a better understanding of the role that the corporate form can 
play in ensuring wider economic and social sustainability’.146  
 
Moore also considered the impact of contractarian theory on the 
development of corporate law.147 The essential arguments were touched on 
above 148  and relate to contractarian theory’s ‘organic’ or non-
interventionist approach to corporate law, as opposed to a more 
prescriptive approach. 149  Moore proposes a new dynamic – which 
essentially ‘entails accepting a significantly wider ambit of regulatory state 
involvement in the development of governance norms at the macro level, as 
a logically necessary precondition to the effective functioning of Anglo-
American corporate governance as a whole.’150  
 
 
145 Deakin (n7) 381. 
146 Deakin (n7) 381. While acknowledging the strengths of contractarian theory 
others have also argued for a “richer, more comprehensive and inclusive theory of 
corporations.” Vasudev (n5) 958. And at 691 where the author calls for a 
reconsideration of the role of public policy in guiding corporate governance: 
“Corporations are creatures of and are governed by the law, which represents the 
public policy on the subject. In the recent past, statutes have granted corporations 
considerable free space to organize their affairs. If necessary, the free space can be 
reviewed in light of this experience. The question of how far public policy must 
concern itself with guiding corporations and their governance must be examined 
more intensively”  
147 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3). 
148 See inter alia text to note 95 – 57.  
149 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 8. 
150 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 6. 
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He proposed a ‘revised contractarian explanation for regulatory state 
paternalism in corporate governance’.151 To abstract his suggestion to the 
‘barebones’, it holds managerial accountability as the principal rationale for 
mandatory corporate governance laws. The reasoning behind this is based 
on the author’s contention that ‘the principal and definitive purpose of 
corporate governance law should be understood as that of engendering an 
effective and ongoing process of managerial account-giving to 
shareholders’.152 This in turn allows the law to legitimate and sustain the 
reciprocal power imbalances that underlies public companies. He further 
argues that the formal accountability of managers153 becomes increasingly 
important in light of the fact that information asymmetry often renders 
‘micro-level monitoring’ either impossible or cost-ineffective.154 He argues 
that, from the point of view of the investor, it becomes more realistic and 
even cost-effective to determine relative managerial accountability levels if 
the primary focal point moves from the micro to the macro level. If 
managerial account giving is systemic, adherence is likely to ensure that 
firms trade at a significant premium, due to the fact that the system will 
enhance power-legitimacy with concomitant reputational advantages which 
should in turn result in lower micro-costs of capital from the company’s 
standpoint. 155  He considered this resultant ‘macro-accountability’ as a 
public good, and contends that ‘state regulation should supplant – rather 
than supplement – private ordering with respect to the internal governance 
dynamics of the corporate equity relation.’ 156  The approach purportedly 
 
151 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 257. 
152 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 257. 
153 In other words, legal mandates to give reasoned account on an ongoing basis. 
For further discussion on accountability and the role thereof see also chapter 7. 
154 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 265. 
155  Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 268. This somewhat simplifies the 
argument, but a more comprehensive overview is impossible given the limitations 
of the thesis.  
156 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n3) 269 – 271, where the author addresses 
concerns such as the inevitable ‘free-rider’ problems that would arise if, instead of 
opting into managerial accountability mechanisms firms were, for example, given 
the option to opt out instead. 
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solves two dilemma’s faced by classic contractarian theory. The laws, though 
cost ineffective may still be overall wealth-increasing, and any flexibility that 
is seen to be lost is essentially fictitious considering how the governance 
codes are often implemented in practice. 157  
 
5 Conclusion  
 
An intangible abstraction, the limited liability company has perplexed the 
man on the street and scholars alike since its inception. As Salomon’s famous 
dispute illustrates, Joe public could hardly fathom a legal fiction which would 
see the company as a ‘different person altogether’ from the subscribers to 
the memorandum, even more so if ‘the business is precisely the same as it 
was before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hands 
receive the profits.’158 To be fair to Joe public, in his confusion he most 
certainly found himself in the company of some preeminent lawyers and 
politicians at the time. As companies grew in number and influence, the 
ivory towers took note and scholars started to consider the justification for, 
and functioning of an entity which was by then ubiquitous. This chapter 
outlined these scholarly pursuits to show how they have informed and 
shaped the attitudes of those who draft and apply corporate legislation.  
 
In this regard, the pervasive influence of contractarianism and agency cost 
theory is apparent. If one considers the facilitative, opt-in/opt-out regime 
embraced by the South African legislature, it appears that the theory also 
found favour among the drafters of the 2008 Companies Act. 159 
Furthermore, although the Act ostensibly speaks to the interests of 
stakeholders other than shareholders, 160  the cumulative effect of its 
 
157 For a further explanation of this conclusion see chapter 7. 
158  Salomon v Salomon [1897] A.C. 22 Page 51. 
159 See chapter 1 text to note 83 and onwards. 
160 See also the discussion regarding stakeholder theory and the Act, chapter 4. 
225 
 
 
provisions remains a far cry from a comprehensive stakeholder-oriented 
approach. In fact, as chapter 4 argues, at most the legislation can be 
considered to have adopted the UK’s enlightened shareholder value 
propositions and as chapter 7 will contend, stakeholders other than 
shareholders remain relatively disenfranchised. To be clear, the aim of this 
research is not to argue for a stakeholder-oriented approach. However, to 
the extent that shareholder primacy is associated with contractarianism, it 
is noteworthy that nothing in the Act conclusively distances it from this norm.  
 
The drafters of the 2008 Act did their work before the repercussions of the 
financial crisis could be appreciated fully and at a time when 
contractarianism was still the mainstay of corporate discourse. Since then, 
many scholars have urged regulators to reconsider the appropriate role of 
the state as supervisor of corporate affairs. As the analysis above has shown, 
the contractual nexus at the heart of contractarianism does not exist in a 
vacuum. To consider it in such a manner disregards the concrete effect that 
hierarchical structures and power imbalances within the corporation have 
on the formulation of the notional bargains that make up the nexus of 
contracts. It also denies evidence that endogenous rules rarely materialise 
in the absence of at least some regulatory structures that act as scaffolding.  
 
Suggestions along the lines that state mandated rules of corporate 
governance might be an appropriate regulatory solution are usually met 
with cries of horror and visions of unwarranted costs, inefficiencies and red-
tape, not to mention the impossible task of designing a governance regime 
able to cater to the needs of the many divergent firms that it would seek to 
regulate. These complexities are undeniable, but they are not 
insurmountable and nor are they necessarily incompatible with the core 
tenets of contractarian theory (albeit an expanded version thereof).  
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The question that this research seeks to answer, is however a slightly 
different one. The question is not whether it is advisable for the South 
African legislature to supplement or supplant the existing corporate 
governance regime by introducing additional, more comprehensive rules in 
the form of mandatory mechanisms. The question is whether the courts 
should interpret the legislation and common law that exists in such a manner 
that it incorporates soft law principles when applying hard law rules.  Is it 
conceivable that such a judicial intervention could be the best of both worlds? 
Chapter 8 will address these conclusions in greater detail. However, ancillary 
matters relating to accountability and the enforcement of corporate laws 
will also have some bearing on the debate and it is to these matters that 
chapter 7 will turn. 
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Chapter 7 
Accountability and Enforcement 
 
A central part of company law is thus concerned with providing a 
framework of rules which, on the one hand, constrains the potential 
abuse by directors of their powers, whilst on the other hand does not so 
constrain the directors that the efficiency gains from having a strong 
centralised management are dissipated. This is an age-old problem for 
company law and one that is constantly re-visited by successive 
generations of rule-makers, for no one approach can be shown to have 
struck the balance in an appropriate manner.1  
 
1 Introduction  
 
Previous chapters of this thesis offered an overview and analysis of a 
selection of duties that bind company directors. The preceding chapters 
considered predominantly whether the rules in question should take the 
form of black letter law or should be used to inform black letter law, and if 
so, in which way and to what extent. While it is good and well to ponder the 
existence and contents of rules and norms (both legally prescribed and 
otherwise), one can hardly do so without considering their enforcement.2 It 
is especially in the context of ‘soft law’ that the absence of traditional 
 
1 Davies PL & Worthington S Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (10th edn 
Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 462. 
2  In the words of David Sugarman: ‘Access to justice depends upon both the 
existence of legal rights and the ability to enforce them.’ David Sugarman, 
‘Reconceptualising Company Law: Reflections on the Law Commission's 
Consultation Paper on Shareholder Remedies: Part 2’ (1997) 18 Co Law 274, 276. 
And see: Deidre Ahern ‘Directors’ duties: broadening the focus beyond content to 
examine the accountability spectrum’ (2011) 33 D.U.L.J 116.  
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sanctions may undermine the efficacy of the regime. 3  Similar problems 
plague remedies contained in black letter law, particularly in the context of 
public listed companies where (at least in jurisdictions such as South Africa 
and the United Kingdom) the derivative action to enforce directors’ duties, 
is rarely pursued to fruition.4  
The question that this chapter considers, relates specifically to the 
enforcement of the existing directors’ duties in terms of black letter law. If 
these duties are robustly enforced, any role for the governance codes in 
their application would be affected by this fact. On the one hand, if the 
statutory remedies already constitute a dynamic counterweight to the 
exercise of directorial power it begs the question whether there is any need 
for the additional nuance or detail which an importation of the principles 
contained in the codes would imply. If, on the other hand, the duties are 
rarely enforced the potential role of the code could be rendered moot as it 
would be of no avail to tinker with the substantive contents of a duty that is 
essentially a lame duck.5 
In addition, the central question of this research also has to do with 
enforcement, namely the indirect enforcement of the King Code of 
Corporate Governance. Chapter 1 spoke briefly to the application and 
enforcement of both King IV and other corporate governance codes, but the 
 
3 Gill North ‘Are Corporate Governance Code Disclosure and Engagement Principles 
Effective Vehicles for Corporate Accountability? The United Kingdom as a Case 
Study’ (2018) 23 Deakin LR 177, 177. And see: Andrew Keay ‘Assessing 
accountability of boards under the UK Corporate Governance Code’ (2015) 7 JBL 
570, 571; E. Wymeersch ‘The Enforcement of Corporate Governance Codes’ (2006) 
6 J. Corp. L. Stud. 113.  
 
4  John Armour et al ‘Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical 
Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United States’ (2009) 6(4) Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 687, 687 where the authors found private lawsuits against 
directors of public companies alleging breach of duty are nearly non-existent in the 
United Kingdom. And see: Andrew Keay, 'The Public Enforcement of Directors' 
Duties: A Normative Inquiry' (2014) 43 C.L.W.R 89; Brenda Hannigan, Company Law 
(4th edn, Oxford 2016) para 11-4. 
5 There are counter arguments that can be raised against both contentions. These 
will be considered in this chapter.  
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issue warrants further consideration. Starting with a brief description of 
‘accountability’ as a wider concept,6 this chapter will give a more in-depth 
overview of the well-known ‘comply or explain’ approach to corporate 
governance and the most recent iteration of this approach, adopted by the 
drafters of King IV in South Africa – ‘apply or explain’.7 To the extent that 
regulation by means of black letter law as opposed to soft law or market 
regulation has not been considered in chapter six, it will be discussed further 
in this chapter to highlight some remaining matters. Following this, it will 
turn to black letter law and consider the enforcement of the statutory and 
common law duties and any shortfalls in enforcement that might undermine 
their operation. In doing so, it will also consider the possible impact of the 
‘safe harbour’ provisions in the South African legislation that were modelled 
on the well-known business judgement rule, perhaps most strongly 
identified with American law and in particular court driven developments in 
the US state of Delaware.  
 
2 Accountability and Enforcement 
 
a. Accountability as a General Concept and its Relation to 
Enforcement  
 
Accountability as a prevalent feature of society has today almost 
unanimously been accepted as a vital element of any governance regime, 
 
6 The concept and related issues will be discussed to the extent that they inform 
the central research question. For a broad and comprehensive overview of 
accountability in corporate governance see: Andrew Keay Board Accountability in 
Corporate Governance (2015 Routledge).  
7 The distinction is nuanced. It essentially envisages greater engagement with the 
principles as the explanation offered should not stop with why compliance was not 
possible but should set out how the aims of the principle were otherwise 
established. See King IV 37. 
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including those pertaining to companies.8 In spite of this, it is an ‘elusive 
concept’9 and it tends to be used ‘in a rather glib or simplistic sense without 
regard for its proper meaning, especially when the term is deployed by 
corporate lawyers.’10  
 
Central to most discussions however, is the idea that accountability implies 
being answerable and providing account of what has been done. 11  It 
involves taking responsibility for actions and across disciplines the weight of 
literature seems to support the idea that accountability should entail at least 
potential consequences for the person or body being called to account.12  
Given all of this, ‘[a]ccountability can be seen as one person requiring a 
justification by another of what has been done, and the latter being subject 
to reward or punishment (or at least some negative consequences)’. 13  
 
Although reducing accountability to no more than ‘the punishment that can 
be exacted on those held accountable by the ones to whom they are 
accountable’ is perhaps a step too far, there probably must at the very least 
 
8  Keay ‘Assessing accountability’ (n3) 556. For an overview of the roots of the 
concept in general see also: Mark Bovens ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: 
A Conceptual Framework’ (2007) 13(4) European Law Journal 447. And see in 
general: J. Koppell, ‘Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of 
“Multiple Accountabilities Disorder”’ (2005) 65(1) Public Administration Review 94; 
Mark Bovens, Thomas Schillemans and Paul T Hart ‘Does Public Accountability 
Work? An Assessment Tool’ (2008) 86(1) Public Administration 225; Amir N. Licht 
‘Accountability and Corporate Governance’ (2002). 
9 Mark Bovens ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework’ 
(2007) 13(4) European Law Journal 447, 448. And see: Keay ‘Assessing 
accountability’ (n3) 557; where the author calls it an ‘notoriously difficult concept 
to articulate’.  
10  Marc T Moore ‘The (neglected) value of board accountability in corporate 
governance’ (2015) 9(1) Law and Financial Markets Review 10. 
11 Keay ‘Assessing accountability’ (n3) 557. 
12 Keay ‘Assessing accountability’ (n3) 557. 
13  Keay ‘Assessing accountability’ (n3) 557. To the extent that accountability 
includes ‘giving account’ Keay argues that the latter must ‘explain and justify’ the 
actions that were taken by the one giving account. He points out that those 
endowed with power must justify their decisions; that to be accountable implies 
that one must clarify the reasons for your actions and supply normative grounds to 
justify them. 
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be ‘some possibility of consequences’ that might be of a ‘negative flavour’,14 
with several authors actually considering the possibility of sanctions as part 
and parcel of accountability. 15  It is in particular as far as potential 
consequences for transgression are concerned that the Corporate 
Governance Code is ‘highly problematic in contributing to accountability’ 
and it manifests that ‘where there is any choice of self-regulation over state 
regulation, the matter of enforcement is the critical element, and the one 
that produces the most controversy’.16   
 
The controversy is likely stoked further by the inextricable link between 
accountability and legitimacy, as failings of the former inevitably erodes the 
latter. If power is the initial corporate governance problem, accountability is 
then posited as the solution to this problem and legitimacy hallmarks its 
successful implementation to resolve the corporate power problem. 17  
Before turning to the enforcement of the corporate governance code, the 
following section will first consider the statutory remedies that were 
developed to enforce the duties designed to curb and focus directorial 
power. 
 
b. ‘Soft Law’: Comply or Explain, the Governance Codes and the 
Market as Enforcer  
  
As discussed in chapter 1, the UK is one of many jurisdictions that has chosen 
a more discretionary approach to governance by principle, which assumes 
that accountability is best achieved through a voluntary code coupled with 
 
14 Keay ‘Assessing accountability’ (n3) 569. 
15Mark Bovens ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework’ 
(2007) 13(4) European Law Journal 447, 451; R. Mulgan, ‘“Accountability”: An Ever 
Expanding Concept?’ (2000) 78 Public Administration 555; K. Strom, ‘Parliamentary 
Democracy and Delegation’, in K. Strom et al. (eds), 
Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies (Oxford University 
Press, 2003) 62. 
16 Keay ‘Assessing accountability’ (n3) 570. And see: Wymeersch (n3) 118. 
17 Moore MT Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the State (Hart 2013) 7. 
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disclosure on a ‘comply or explain’ basis – and South Africa has followed 
suit.18 This stands in stark contrast to American corporate governance, the 
underpinning of which has become ‘mandatory governance determined by 
regulation and law’ with China following a similar orientation.19  
  
In the UK context, Adrian Cadbury explained that the code relied on market 
regulation to turn its recommendations into real improvements and 
believed that ‘it will benefit the market standing of companies to comply 
with the Code ... and shareholders will have a direct interest in ensuring that 
the companies in which they invest comply’.20 As such, the drafters of the 
first UK governance code argued that a combination of the self-interest of 
boards and shareholder action would be sufficient to ensure compliance. 
This form of endogenous self-regulation has many ostensible advantages. It 
is cheap as the market effectively pays for its own regulation. It also 
addresses information asymmetries in that the market is best positioned to 
identify and address the obstacles generated by its own activities. 
Importantly, it might avoid the divisive impact of rules being imposed from 
on high and in turn ensure a greater degree of buy-in on the part of 
participants, and avoid dangers of ‘crowding out’ company directors’ innate 
moral compass with a mass of legal rules.21 Finally, at least when compared 
to statute, it is supposedly able to respond more quickly to changes in the 
 
18 And see: Bob Tricker Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices (3rd 
edn, Oxford, 2015) 21. And see: Robert C Bird and Stephen Kim Park, 'Organic 
Corporate Governance' (2018) 59 B.C.L.Rev. 21, 35; Adrian Cadbury ‘Restoring trust 
and confidence in the corporate system’ (1992) 3(12) ICCLR 403, 405 
19  Tricker (n18) 21. See also: Peter Burbidge ‘Creating high performance 
boardrooms and workplaces - European corporate governance in the twenty first 
century’ (2003) 28(5) European Law Review 642 for a comparative overview of 
governance systems in Europe, the US and the UK at the turn of the century – the 
crux of which remains applicable. 
20 Cadbury (n18) 405. 
21 David Kershaw ‘Corporate Law and Self-Regulation (2015) 5 LSE Law, Society and 
Economy Working Papers page 3, available online 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=3574201>. 
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regulatory landscape.22 
  
However, some thirty years later it appears the rational self-interest that the 
Cadbury committee relied upon has brought us only so far, and ‘comply or 
explain’ turned out not to be the silver bullet once thought. The approach 
usually leaves enforcement to the shareholders. Yet it is unlikely that the 
shareholders will always be aware (or at least timeously be aware) if the 
company falsely asserts compliance with the provisions of the Corporate 
Governance Code – whether such assertion be intentional or otherwise. This 
all but eliminates any immediate consequences for the directors and in turn 
results in a ‘serious breakdown of accountability.’ 23 Even if the shareholders 
consider the explanations offered by the board as inadequate and choose 
not to accept them, they have little power to act on this.24 In commenting 
on recent changes in the UK corporate governance landscape, Peter Bailey 
captured what has been widespread opinion:25  
 
Corporate governance, certainly at the quasi-legislative level, is like 
marmite: company law folk either love it or hate it. This writer has 
historically been one of the haters. The reason for this is that as an old-
fashioned type I believe that if things aren't enacted into law with 
appropriate sanctions for failure to comply then some corporate 
executives will simply not comply (or not comply fully).  
 
This is partly due to what must surely be a deep misunderstanding of what 
the ‘comply or explain’ model requires from company directors. The idea 
 
22 Kershaw (n21) 3. Though the author points out that ‘self-regulatory bodies also 
typically provide for time-consuming procedures to effect rule changes. This is 
because public expectations of due process and consultation typically inform non-
state as well as state bodies’. 
23 Keay ‘Assessing accountability’ (n3) 570. 
24 MacNeil and X. Li, “‘Comply or Explain’: Market Discipline and Non-Compliance 
with the Combined Code” (2006) 14 Corp Gov 486, 489. 
25 Peter Bailey ‘It looks like corporate governance is starting to toughen up (at last)’ 
(2018) 409 Company Law Newsletter 1,1.  
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that directors are given carte blanche to do whatever it is they choose and 
then simply ‘explain’ their lack of compliance has proven to be tenacious as 
a nit.  
 
Firms still follow the principles in a blind and unthinking manner, with 
‘boilerplate’ explanations to tick the necessary boxes. For many the Code is 
seen as a surrogate piece of quasi-legislation which limits the nuanced 
tailoring to individual firms that was envisaged and instead turn the 
governance code into ‘a source of bureaucratic illegitimacy in itself.’ 26  
Indeed, if the managers and investors perceive the Code as no more than a 
formalistic and procedural exercise, detached from the real world of 
business strategy and firm leadership, the value of the Code as an effective 
mechanism for managerial accountability is called into question. 27  
Further concerns relate to the market – a device focussed on efficiency – as 
an appropriate tool to hold directors accountable. In other words, holding 
directors accountable might not be the most efficient course of action and 
might not be in the interests of the shareholders at a given time or in a 
particular context. Although the market ostensibly enforces by assigning a 
lower share price to a company in instances where its directors fail to comply 
or offer inadequate explanations for not doing so, this does not always 
materialise.28  Non-compliance is rarely penalised in the absence of non-
performance. In other words, investors apparently ‘depend on financial 
 
26 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n17) 275. And see: Marc T Moore ‘Whispering 
Sweet Nothings: The Limitations of Informal Conformance in UK Corporate 
Governance (2009) 9 J. Corp. L. Stud. 95. See also: Alvaro Cuervo ‘Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms: a plea for less code of good governance and more market 
control’ (2002) 10(2) Corporate Governance 84,84 where the author laments 
practices in Civil law jurisdictions with similar effects (despite marked contextual 
differences between ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and ‘continental European’ systems of 
governance.  
27 Moore Governance in the Shadow (n17) 276. 
28 Keay ‘Assessing accountability’ (n3) 570; Ahern (n2) 118. 
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performance as a proxy for non-compliance’.29  
 
Dignam explains how the approach favoured by the United Kingdom 
dynamically informed that embraced by the OECD Advisory Group on 
Corporate Governance, which set out to formulate minimum standards on 
corporate governance to be followed by OECD countries.30 He noted that the 
final OECD principles had almost no impact in the United Kingdom due to 
their overtly Anglo-Saxon orientation but warned that their impact in other 
jurisdictions could be ‘less benign’. 31   Dignam argues that the reaction 
favoured by the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel committees (and later 
adopted by the OECD principles and indirectly subsumed into regulatory 
regimes in many other jurisdictions) is the result of ‘a particularly British 
form of regulation’ which political scientists often refer to as ‘negotiated 
regulation’. 32  It was described by Wilkes as ‘arm’s length regulation’; ‘a 
regulatory style, which is based on accommodation, mutual respect and 
negotiation’ and is rooted in the importance that British public 
administration has always attached to the autonomy of the firm. Yet again 
what it harks back to is respect for property and freedom to contract, and 
the ‘legacy of a non-interventionist, minimalist state’. 33   
 
29 Keay ‘Assessing accountability’ (n3) 570. And see: MacNeil and Li (n21) 492 where 
the authors refer to the system as one of ‘comply or perform’, arguing that 
shareholders will rarely concern themselves with non-compliance or insipid 
explanations while the company is performing well.  
30 Dignam A ‘Exporting corporate governance’ (n842) 74. 
31 Dignam A ‘Exporting corporate governance’ (n842) 76 where the author notes 
that ‘[f]irst, on a very basic level the OECD Principles are not suitable for other 
corporate cultures where for example worker co-determination is at the core of 
their corporate system or cross ownership exists. Despite the presence of 
representatives from Germany and Japan on the Advisory Group, no concessions 
are made to other corporate cultures. In themselves the Principles appear 
somewhat harmless as they are non-binding and for guidance only. That, however, 
is not the end of the matter, the adoption of the Principles by the IMF and the World 
Bank as part of their assessment criteria for lending is less harmless and may begin 
the imposition of a foreign corporate culture on Asian, African, South American and 
continental European states’. 
32 Dignam A ‘Exporting corporate governance’ (n842) 73.  
33 S. Wilks, “The Amoral Corporation and British Utility Regulation” (1997) 2 New 
Political Economy 280. 
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It must be remembered that ‘[t]he Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel 
committees did not spring from the ether fully formed: they are part of this 
long tradition of negotiated regulation with government’.34 As utopian as 
this may sound, Dignam lamented that the approach is akin to the inmates 
not only running the asylum, but that (for some parts of British industry at 
least) the inmates were designing, building and running the asylum.35   
The approach has other perceived shortcomings, such as the fact that the 
self-regulator may abuse his knowledge and devise rules that are biased in 
favour of specific interest groups.36 
In response to these shortcomings, MacNeil and Li have suggested that the 
code should be adopted as a set of default rules in company law, subject to 
an annual application/disapplication resolution at the annual general 
meeting. They argue that this would counter the current position, where the 
‘comply or explain’ approach has distanced shareholders from compliance 
decisions and has concomitantly strengthened the role of the board.37   
A final approach bears mention, as it embodies what may be considered a 
compromise between various approaches. To the extent that enforcement 
is considered a weakness of the ‘Cadbury structure’, Finch suggested the 
possibility of a ‘compliance agency’ to monitor and enforce compliance. She 
noted that the difference between such an approach and a ‘government 
commission model’ would be that in the case of the former an agency would 
be charged merely with the enforcement of rules produced by industry 
 
34 Dignam A ‘Exporting corporate governance’ (n842) 74. 
35 Dignam A ‘Exporting corporate governance’ (n842) 74. As the author explains: 
‘the financial sector, in particular the banks, were used to negotiated regulation 
with the Bank of England. Indeed, the Bank of England and the DTI have nominees 
on the Financial Reporting Council which was responsible for the formation of the 
corporate governance committees. This negotiated form of regulation offered an 
ideal solution to release the pressures that had built up without losing control of 
the agenda.’ 
36 Kershaw (n21) 4; MacNeil and Li (n21) 494. 
37 MacNeil and Li (n21) 492. The authors were of the view that this would not 
diminish the flexibility ordinarily associated with the code. 
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itself.38 This is similar to the system that operates in Australia at the moment, 
which has seen the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 
play a dynamic role in enforcing corporate governance rules.39  
The problems that the comply or explain regime presents are not unique to 
the United Kingdom and certainly plague the South African landscape as well. 
In fact, the drafters of King IV found themselves so frustrated by ‘box ticking’ 
that they chose to revise the ‘comply or explain’ approach to the ‘apply or 
explain’ measure included in King IV.40 Certainly some of the advantages of 
self-regulation will perhaps be even more pivotal in the South African 
context. The fact that the tax payer does not have to foot the bill, but that 
the system is instead financed by the market itself is attractive. A system 
that avoids additional litigation in a country where the courts are under 
pressure and court dates are a long time coming is not something to 
disregard lightly. Conversely, as a developing economy under socio-
economic pressure and facing the urgencies of income disparity and racial 
transformation it can hardly be justified that the systems put in place to 
manage systemic risk and complexity should be reduced to a begrudgingly 
prepared boilerplate that ticks the box. In this regard, the argument has 
been made that in transition economies ‘the desirable mix of interactive 
components of the corporate governance framework tends to be in favour 
of legislation and regulation, rather than  self-regulatory and voluntary 
 
38  Vanessa Finch ‘Corporate governance and Cadbury: self-regulation and 
alternatives’ (1994) JBL 51, 60. And see: Andrew Keay, 'Public Enforcement' (n4) 89. 
39 The question of whether the public enforcement of the governance codes is a 
different thesis altogether. See as an introduction to the position in Australia:  
Helen Anderson, Michelle Welsh, Ian Ramsay & Peter Gahan ‘The evolution of 
shareholder and creditor protection in Australia: an international comparison’ 
(2012) 61(1) ICLQ 171; Demetra Arsalidou ‘The liability of non-executive directors 
for negligent omissions: a new approach under legislation?’ (2002) 23(4) Co Law 
107; Demetra Arsalidou ‘An examination into the recent approach of the courts in 
articulating a standard of care for company chairpersons in Australia’ (2005) 26(5) 
Co Law 155; Joanna Bird ‘Regulating the Regulators: Accountability of Australian 
Regulators’ (2011) 35 MULR 739; John Lowry ‘The Irreducible Core of the Duty of 
Care, Skill and Diligence of Company Directors: "Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission v Healey"’ (2012) 75(2) MLR 249.  
40 See above note 7. 
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arrangement’ - amongst other reasons because of the fact that the market 
mechanisms of control are ‘not yet sufficiently developed to support ... 
compliance with self-regulatory norms.’ 41  
It may well be that it will take more than a tinkering with the contents of the 
duties to ensure accountability and establish a more robust regime, and that 
down the line an approach such as the one seen in Australia should be 
debated. However, as chapter 8 below will argue more comprehensively it 
is certainly a start, and it is one that need not compromise the many benefits 
traditionally associated with voluntary or market-based regulation. Having 
considered the latter, the discussion will now turn to the ‘black letter’ 
remedies in South Africa’s Companies Act, and whether they provide 
effective mechanisms by means of which directors’ duties can be enforced.  
 
c. Enforcement Through the Companies Act  
 
i. An overview of the Applicable Statutory Remedies  
 
Because company directors owe their duties to the company and not to the 
shareholders directly, the immediate predicament becomes how these 
duties can then be enforced, and potential damages recovered should the 
company suffer a loss because of a breach.42 It is in this context that the 
 
41 Nina Cankar ‘Transition Economies and Corporate Governance Codes: Can Self-
Regulation of Corporate Governance Really Work’ (2005) 5 J. Corp. Law Stud.  285. 
Whether this is entirely true in the South African context stands to be debated, but 
be that as it may, one must not lose sight of the subtleties of regulation in the 
context of developing economies. An analysis falls outside of the scope of this 
research, but for an introduction to the issues see for example: Rachael Ntongho 
‘Self-regulation of corporate governance in Africa: following the bandwagon? 
(2009) 20(12) ICCLR427; Joseph E.O. Abugu ‘Directors' duties and the frontiers of 
corporate governance’ (2011) 22(10) ICCLR322; Nicolae Albu & Maria Madalina 
Girbina ‘Compliance with corporate governance codes in emerging economies: 
How do Romanian listed companies “comply-or-explain”?’ (2015) 15(1) Corporate 
Governance 85; Silvia Fazio ‘Corporate governance, accountability and emerging 
economies’ (2008) 29(4) Co Law 105. 
42 This is known as the ‘proper plaintiff rule’ at common law. It entails that where a 
wrong is done to the company only the latter has standing to take proceedings 
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derivative action stands central. A such, a more comprehensive overview of 
its operation and shortcomings will be provided below. Before doing so, 
mention must be made of other potential avenues that have been included 
in South Africa’s 2008 Companies Act and that may establish causes of action 
that indirectly enforce directorial duties or otherwise have the potential to 
call directors to account. 
 
Section 162 of the Act allows a company, a shareholder, a director, company 
secretary, prescribed officer or a registered trade union that represents 
employees (or any other employee representative) to apply to court to have 
a person declared delinquent or under probation.43 The person must have 
been a director of the company in question within the 24 months 
immediately preceding the application. 44  The section determines that a 
court must make an order declaring a person to be a delinquent director 
under the circumstances listed. These include for example 45 that while a 
 
against the wrongdoers. It is also often referred to as the rule of Foss v Harbottle 
as it was in this judgement that it was most famously articulated. See: Foss v 
Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189. For further analysis of the principle see 
also:  Letseng Diamonds Ltd v JCI Ltd; Trinity Asset Management (Pty) Ltd v Investec 
Bank Ltd 2007 (5) SA 564 (W) at 573574); Trinity Asset Management (Pty) Ltd v 
Investec Bank Ltd 2009 (4) SA 89 (SCA); Mbethe v United Manganese of Kalahari 
(Pty) Ltd 2016 (5) SA 414 (GJ) para 60;  and Lewis Group Ltd v Woollam and Others 
(1) [2017] 1 All SA 192 (WCC) para 29 on the role of the principle in South African 
law.  
43 Section 162(2). For a general discussion on delinquency and probation orders see: 
Jean du Plessis and Piet Delport ‘Delinquent directors’ and ‘directors under 
probation’: a unique South African approach regarding disqualification of company 
directors’ (2017) SALJ 274; Cassim R ‘Delinquent Directors under the Companies Act 
71 of 2008: Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited 2016 ZASCA 35’ 2016 (19) PELJ 128. 
See also: Kukama v Lobelo 2012 JDR 0663 (GSJ); Lobelo v Kukama 2013 JDR 1434 
(GSJ); Msimang v Katuliiba [2013] 1 All SA 580 (GSJ); Rabinowitz v Van Graan 2013 
5 SA 315 (GSJ); Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC); Gihwala 
v Grancy Property Limited 2017 2 SA 337 (SCA); Lewis Group Limited 
v Woollam 2017 2 SA 547 (WCC). 
44 Section 162(2)(a). The section also makes provision for the Commission or Panel 
to apply to court to make such declarations (subsection 3) or for any organ of state 
responsible for the administration of any legislation (subsection 4) given certain 
requirements are met.  
45 The list contains several other grounds for delinquency, such as having acted or 
consented to act as director whilst ineligible or disqualified in terms of the Act. It 
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director, the person ‘grossly abused the position of director’,46  or ‘took 
personal advantage of information or an opportunity, contrary to [the 
Act]’.47 Further grounds are that the person, whilst a director, intentionally 
or by gross negligence, inflicted harm upon the company48 or acted in a 
manner that ‘amounted to gross negligence, wilful misconduct or breach of 
trust in relation to the performance of the director’s functions within, and 
duties to the company; or contemplated in [the Act].’49The circumstances in 
terms of these subsections have been collectively categorised as 
‘substantive abuses of office’.50  
 
The authors of Henochsberg emphasise that the remedy should not be 
conflated with either the personal or representative or statutory derivative 
action (despite the fact that it possibly contains elements of these 
remedies).51They note that this will lead to confusion and undermine the 
 
would not serve the discussion further to include the entire list. Those grounds that 
were included are the most relevant for purposes of the issues under consideration 
in this research.  
46 Section 162(5)(c)(i). See: Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd and Others 
[2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA) para 143 where the court emphasises that the section 
does not imply a ‘trivial misdemeanour or an unfortunate fall from grace’ but 
instead denotes gross abuses of the position of director. The latter has been 
described as ‘obvious and egregious conduct’ see: Lewis Group Ltd v Woollam and 
Others (1) [2017] 1 All SA 192 (WCC) para 14. Also Henochsberg on the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008 (Issue 18 2018) 566 where the authors emphasise that ‘Gross abuse 
of the position of director’ relates to the "position as director" and not to the 
performance of a person in that position or to the duties or functions of the 
director, as these are dealt with in subs (5) (c) (iv). 
47  Section 162(5)(c)(ii). The subsection refers specifically to breaches of section 
76(2)(a) of the Act which contains the duty not to use information for personal gain 
or advantage and not to knowingly cause harm to the company or any of its 
subsidiaries.  
48 Section 162(5)(c)(iii). 
49 Section 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa) – (bb). 
50  Grancy Property Limited and Another v Gihwala and Others; In re: Grancy 
Property Limited and Another v Gihwala and Others (1961/10; 12193/11) [2014] 
ZAWCHC 97 (26 June 2014) para 156; confirmed in part on appeal in Gihwala and 
Others v Grancy Property Ltd and Others [2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA) 
51  Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Issue 18 2018) 565. But cf 
Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd and Others [2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA) and 
Lewis Group Ltd v Woollam and Others (1) [2017] 1 All SA 192 (WCC). 
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importance of the remedy which is not aimed at the enforcement of 
personal rights in the company law sense, and instead is also directed at the 
indirect protection of the public.52 
 
Although the remedy has the potential to root out the most egregious of 
offenders, it is too soon to reach any definite conclusion on how 
enthusiastically it will be received by applicants or how vigorously it will be 
applied by the courts. However, considering the wording of the section it is 
highly doubtful whether a disregard for the provisions of the King code could 
be grounds for a delinquency order – the exception perhaps, might be a 
systemic and flagrant disregard for the provisions of the code in the case of 
a listed entity with resultant actions taken by the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange resulting in adverse consequences for the company. Delinquency 
seems to be aimed at the lowest common denominator and therefore, as 
long as the governance code is perceived as aspirational and a standard of 
best practice it will likely not play a significant role in this context.  
 
Commonly known as the ‘oppression remedy’, section 163 gives standing to 
a shareholder or director of a company to apply to court for relief in three 
instances.53 Most relevant for purposes of this discussion is the third of these, 
namely that ‘the powers of a director or prescribed officer of the company, 
or a person related to the company, are being or have been exercised in a 
manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly 
disregards the interests of, the applicant.’ 54  The provision echoes its 
 
52  Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Issue 18 2018) 565. But cf 
Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd and Others [2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA) and 
Lewis Group Ltd v Woollam and Others (1) [2017] 1 All SA 192 (WCC). 
53  Section 163(1)(a) and (b) determine that: “(a) any act or omission of the 
company, or a related person, has had a result that is oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of, the applicant; (b) the 
business of the company, or a related person, is being or has been carried on or 
conducted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly 
disregards the interests of, the applicant...” 
54 Section 163(1)(c). 
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predecessor (section 252 of the South Africa’s 1973 Companies Act) and the 
jurisprudence developed in relation to this previous equivalent remains 
relevant in determining what constitutes unfair or oppressive conduct.55 The 
modern iteration of the duties leans itself to applications beyond the 
narrower confines of its predecessor. If acts by directors fall within the ambit 
of subsection (1)(c), they are now directly actionable by shareholders and, 
‘such an act that is in breach of fiduciary or other duties, whether in common 
law or in terms of the Act, could, like illegal acts, be argued to be prima facie 
unfair.’56 To date no case law has tested the boundaries of this and the 
application of this section in such a context is not clear. Certainly, the section 
gives the courts a wide discretion as far as remedial action is concerned.  
 
Before turning to the derivative action, a final section that bears mention is 
section 218 which carries the heading ‘civil liability’. Subsection two thereof 
determines that ‘[a]ny person who contravenes any provision of this Act is 
liable to any other person for any loss or damage suffered by that person as 
a result of that contravention.’57 Because the duties are now statutory, a 
breach of duty would constitute a contravention of the Act and could be 
grounds for a claim in terms of this section. However, the fact that 
shareholders are barred from pursuing reflective loss even in terms of 
section 218 would imply that it would be rare for members to pursue 
breaches by directors directly by means of this section. More likely, the loss 
would be suffered by the company and even in terms of section 218 the 
shareholders could only pursue it by means of the derivative action. It would 
 
55 Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Issue 18 2018) 574(2) and see 
Grancy Property Limited v Manala [2013] 3 All SA 111 (SCA) para 22; Count Gotthard 
SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) 
para 17.12; Peel v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd [2013] 1 All SA 603 (GSJ) para 
43; Omar v Inhouse Venue Technical Management (Pty) Limited and Others 2015 
(3) SA 146 (WCC) para 4. De Villiers v Kapela Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others 
(42781/2015) [2016] ZAGPJHC 278 (14 October 2016) para 75. 
56 Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Issue 18 2018) 574(4). 
57 In terms of subsection 218(3), the provisions of the section do not affect the right 
to any remedy that a person may otherwise have.  
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then be creditors or employees who could make use of this section under 
limited circumstances. In the case of a creditor it is unlikely to be preferred 
above section 22 although it might be used as a claim in the alternative.58  
 
ii. The Derivative Action 
 
Section 165 of the Act constitutes a codification of what had been a common 
law remedy – the derivative action.59 The section is an interesting hybrid, 
drawing strongly from Australian law but also taking on board certain traits 
of the American derivative action. 60  In short, it gives standing to a 
shareholder,61  a director,62  or a registered trade union which represents 
employees of the company, 63  to serve a demand on the company ‘to 
commence or continue legal proceedings, or take related steps, to protect 
the interests of the company’.64  Once the demand has been served the 
company can respond either by applying to have it set aside on grounds that 
it is frivolous, vexatious or without merit,65 or the company must respond to 
the demand by appointing an independent and impartial person or 
 
58 Section 22 creates a right of recourse in instances where there has been reckless 
trading by the company’s directors.  
59 In terms of subsection 165(1) “[a]ny right at common law of a person other than 
a company to bring or prosecute any legal proceedings on behalf of that company 
is abolished, and the rights in this section are in substitution for any such abolished 
right.”  
60 For an analysis and comparative review of the provision in general see: MF Cassim 
The New Derivative Action under the Companies Act (Juta 2016) 1314; Kathy 
Idensohn ‘The Fate of Foss under the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ (2012) SA Merc LJ 
355; Helena H Stoop 2012 SALJ 527 553. 
61 Section 165(2)(a). The subsection includes in its ambit persons entitled to be 
registered as shareholders, and those who are shareholders of related companies  
62 Section 165(2)(b). The subsection also includes prescribed officers and directors 
and prescribed officers of related companies.  
63 Section 165(2)(c). 
64 Section 165(2). Subsection 165(2)(d) also allows persons who have been granted 
leave of the court to [serve a demand], which may be granted only if the court is 
satisfied that it is necessary or expedient to do so to protect a legal right of that 
other person.” 
65 Section 165(3). The company has 15 days following receipt of the demand to 
make such an application. 
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committee to investigate its allegations and report back to the board.66 
Upon receipt of this report (and with 60 days after being served with the 
demand) the company may either initiate or continue legal proceedings or 
take related steps to protect the interests of the company as contemplated 
in the demand, 67  or it may serve notice on the person who made the 
demand refusing to comply with it.68  
 
Following the ‘demand phase’, the second stage of the process would allow 
the person who made the demand to apply to court to bring or continue 
proceedings ‘in the name and on behalf of the company’69 provided that the 
latter had failed to respond or failed to respond appropriately to the demand 
that was served.70 The application may also be brought in instances where 
the person had been served a notice refusing to comply with the demand 
provided that the court is satisfied that ‘the applicant is acting in good faith; 
the proposed or continuing proceedings involve the trial of a serious 
question of material consequence to the company; and it is in the best 
interests of the company that the applicant be granted leave to commence 
the proposed proceedings or continue the proceedings, as the case may 
be’.71 
The section further provides for an application to be brought without a 
 
66 Section 165(4)(a). The person or committee must report on  “(i) any facts or 
circumstances (aa) that may gave rise to a cause of action contemplated in the 
demand; or (bb) that may relate to any proceedings contemplated in the demand; 
(ii) the probable costs that would be incurred if the company pursued any such 
cause of action or continued any such proceedings; and (iii) whether it appears to 
be in the best interests of the company to pursue any such cause of action or 
continue any such proceedings”. 
67 Section 165(4)(b)(i). 
68 Section 165(4)(b)(ii). 
69 Section 165(5). 
70 Specifically, that “the company “(i) has failed to take any particular step required 
by subsection (4); (ii) appointed an investigator or committee who was not 
independent and impartial; (iii) accepted a report that was inadequate in its 
preparation, or was irrational or unreasonable in its conclusions or 
recommendations; (iv) acted in a manner that was inconsistent with the reasonable 
report of an independent, impartial investigator or committee.” 
71 Section 165(5)(b)(i) – (iii). 
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demand having been served in ‘exceptional circumstances’.72 
 
Subsection 165(7) then creates a rebuttable presumption that granting leave 
is not in the best interests of the company if the company has decided not 
to bring or defend proceedings73 and ‘all of the directors who participated 
in that decision acted in good faith for a proper purpose; did not have a 
personal financial interest in the decision, and were not related to a person 
who had a personal financial interest in the decision; informed themselves 
about the subject matter of the decision to the extent they reasonably 
believed to be appropriate; and reasonably believed that the decision was 
in the best interests of the company.’74 Finally, should the court grant leave 
to a person in terms of the section, it must also make an order determining 
who is responsible for the remuneration and expenses of the appointed 
person (or committee)75  and the court may at any time make any order it 
considers appropriate about the costs of the person who applied or was 
granted leave, the company or any other party to the proceedings.76  
 
The common law derivative action faced criticism and was deemed 
ineffectual, which is what prompted statutory intervention.77 Although the 
codified version is a step in the right direction there are still several points 
of concern and there are no clear signs yet that the new remedy will be more 
effective than its common law predecessor.78  
 
72 Section 165(6)(a) – (c).  
73  Or the company has decided to discontinue, settle or compromise the 
proceedings. 
74 Section 165(7)(a) – (c).  
75 Section 165(9). 
76 Section 165(10). 
77 Cassim F and others Contemporary Company Law (2nd edn Juta 2012) 776.  
78 For a comprehensive discussion of the issues see: MF Cassim The new derivative 
action under the Companies Act: guidelines for judicial discretion (Juta 2016); ‘MF 
Cassim ‘Costs orders, obstacles and barriers to the derivative action under section 
165 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ (2014) 26(1) SA Mercantile Law Journal 1; MF 
Cassim ‘Untangling the requirement of good faith in the derivative action in 
company law’ (2018) 39(2) Obiter 363. And see: M Siems ‘Derivative actions as a 
global phenomenon’ in S Wrbka, S Van Uytsel & M Siems (eds) Collective Actions: 
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Ahern laments the fact that the law’s hands-off approach as far as internal 
company matters are concerned results in a scenario where companies are 
given ‘freedom to choose how they handle directors’ breaches of duty’. 
Through mechanisms such as ratification and release it is possible for a 
simple majority to decide that taking action is inconvenient or not in the 
interests of the company. 79  Numerous constraints, not least access to 
information and the costs of litigation would deter shareholders from 
pursuing directors on behalf of the company in the first place, but it is 
possible that any such actions could be rendered impossible in law as well.  
 
When applying the remedies above and the duties they aim to enforce, the 
courts have traditionally been reluctant to interfere with internal company 
matters and especially avoid second guessing business decisions made by 
the board. The reasoning behind this is familiar territory and was touched 
upon in previous chapters. The most recent codification of directors duties 
in South African law formally incorporates this approach into the 2008 
Companies Act in the form of a safe-harbour provision or ‘business 
judgement rule’. 80  As the contents of this provision might have such a 
 
Enhancing access to justice and reconciling multilayer interests? (Cambridge UP 
2012) 95. 
79 Ahern (n2) 119. 
80 The term ‘business judgement rule’ is used here in a loose sense. As will be 
explained below, the South African version is a far cry from the American rule most 
closely associated with the term. The latter has generated an extensive body of 
research. See for example: K Chittur ‘The Corporate Director’s Standard of Care: 
Past, Present, and Future’ (1985) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 505, Anthony 
Duggan, Jacob S Ziegel, Jassmin Girgis ‘REPAP: A Study in Judicial Review of Business 
Judgements’ (2007) 44 Canadian Business Law Journal 279; Lyman PQ Johnson 
‘Corporate Officers and the Business Judgement Rule’ (2005) 60 Bus Law 439;  A 
Hamermesh and A Gilchrist Sparks ‘Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment 
Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson’ (2005) 60(3) Bus Law 865; Charles Hansen ‘The 
Duty of Care, the Business Judgment Rule, and The American Law Institute 
Corporate Governance Project’ (1993) 48(4) Bus Law 1355; Joseph IV Hinsey, 
‘Business Judgment and the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance 
Project: the Rule the Doctrine and the Reality’ (1984) 52 George Washington Law 
Review 609;  Bayless Manning ‘Business Judgement Rule and the Director's Duty of 
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notable impact on the mindset with which the courts will approach 
directors’ duties in South African law in future, it must be considered.  
 
 
3 Deferring to ‘Business Judgement’: Judicial and Regulatory 
Restraint  
 
Directors have always been allowed to delegate – this fact speaks to the 
simple reality that companies are often big and rather complex organisms 
that rely on large numbers of employees to function.  This was recognised 
as early as 1925 by Romer J in City Equitable, 81   and as Davies and 
Worthington point out, it is based on this principle that directors involved in 
recent cases where objective tests were used as measure, managed to 
escape liability.82  However, the authors rightly emphasise that suggestions 
that a director could abdicate all responsibility after having chosen an 
appropriate delegate and delegated a task to him or her do not accord with 
recent developments in the law.83 
Delegation and the subsequent responsibility to monitor was perhaps the 
most important issue before the court in Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry v Baker (No 5) (‘Re Barings’).84  In considering the duties of the 
directors following delegation, Park J surmised that: 85 
the exercise of the power of delegation does not absolve a director from 
the duty to supervise the discharge of the delegated functions. No rule of 
universal application can be formulated as to the duty referred to … above. 
The extent of the duty, and the question whether it has been discharged, 
 
Attention: Time for Reality’ (1984) 39 Bus Law 1477; Andrew Tunc ‘The judge and 
the businessman’ (1986) 102 Law Quarterly Review 549;  E Norman Veasy ‘New 
Insights into Judicial Deference to Directors’ Business Decisions: Should we Trust 
the Courts?’ (1984) 39 Bus Law 1461.  
81 1925 Ch 407 at 428-429. See also discussion of the case above.  
82 Davies and Worthington (n922) 481.  
83 Davies and Worthington (n922) 481.  
84 [1999] a BCLC 433. 
85 at 489.  
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must depend on the facts of each particular case, including the director's 
role in the management of the company.  
As mentioned, the legislation does not per se differentiate between 
executive and non-executive directors, and when Langley J highlighted the 
salient feature of the duty of care as it pertains to the non-executive in 
Equitable Life Assurance Society v Bowley,86 the learned judge noted that, at 
least in expression, it does not differ from the duty owed by an executive 
director although in application it ‘may and usually will do so’87 but that ‘ it 
in any event suffices to say that the extent to which a non-executive director 
may reasonably rely on the executive directors and other professionals to 
perform their duties is one in which the law can fairly be said to be 
developing and is plainly 'fact sensitive'. As a point of departure, Langley J 
was convinced that a company could look to its non-executive directors at 
the very least for ‘independence of judgement and supervision of the 
executive management.’ 88  
What exactly constitutes ‘independence’ (and indeed what should be 
determining factors in establishing same) and the extent of the 
supervision that is required, remain as unclear as ever. What the dictum 
again confirmed though, was the fact that although a director may 
delegate tasks, doing so can be no defence where the delegate was not 
subsequently monitored appropriately. Adding to the complexity of these 
inquiries is the fact that courts are called upon to adjudicate the boards 
failure to act, or failure to act appropriately, after the fact. This 
predicament is traditionally less pertinent in cases of omissions. It is 
where the board did act, but the action or decision produced a negative 
outcome, that the weighing up of the directors’ ‘business judgement’ take 
centre stage.  
 
86 [2004] 1 BCLC 180 at paras 35 – 41. 
87 At para 35. 
88 At par 41. 
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Indeed, where one is concerned with judging action as opposed to inaction 
matters of hindsight, business judgement and the key purpose of the 
corporate entity as a vehicle for risk taking, take on added significance. As 
mentioned,89 the courts are reluctant to revisit, with the benefit of hindsight, 
commercial decisions made by boards of directors, provided of course, that 
these decisions were taken in good faith and that the directors believed that 
they were in fact in the best interests of the company. The approach has 
been that ‘[t]here is no appeal on merits from management decisions to 
courts of law; nor will courts assume to act as a kind of supervisory board 
over decisions within the powers of management honestly arrived at.’90 In 
other words there is, in general, no liability for so-called errors of 
judgement.91 This approach is certainly not unique to courts in the UK, and 
perhaps the most famous manifestation thereof is the American Business 
Judgement Rule, applied robustly in the state of Delaware.92  
The wording of the 2008 Companies Act now echoes these sentiments. 
Section 76(4) states that:  
In respect of any particular matter arising in the exercise of the powers 
or the performance of the functions of director, a particular director of 
a company—  
 
89 See note 55 above.  
90  Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821, 832.  See also: 
Worthington – ‘The Duty to Monitor: A Modern View of the Directors’ Duty of Care‘ 
in F Patfield (ed) Perspectives on Company Law: 2 (London, Kluwer Law 
International, 1997)at 189, 191-192 where the author observes that  “the courts 
are more reluctant to hold directors to account where the claim is that they acted 
negligently rather than that they failed to act at all because the former requires the 
courts to evaluate the merits of different business policies.” 
91 Joan Loughrey (ed) Directors’ Duties and Shareholder Litigation in the Wake of 
the Financial Crisis (Edward Elgar 2013) 34 
92 It is notable that the UK did not explicitly incorporate such a rule into the 2006 
Companies Act. The South African legislature on the other hand apparently did aim 
to include a statutory business judgement rule (or safe harbour provision) although 
the exact implications of the newly enacted provision remain unclear. See below 
for a more detailed discussion on this section of the 2008 Companies Act and the 
position in the UK with reference to the rule as it developed in the United States.  
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(a) will have satisfied the obligations of subsection (3)(b) and (c) if 
(i) the director has taken reasonably diligent steps to become 
informed about the matter;  
(ii) either—  
(aa) the director had no material personal financial interest 
in the subject matter of the decision, and had no 
reasonable basis to know that any related person had a 
personal financial interest in the matter; or  
(bb) the director complied with the requirements of section 
75 with respect to any interest contemplated in 
subparagraph (aa); and  
(iii) the director made a decision, or supported the decision 
of a committee or the board, with regard to that matter, 
and the director had a rational basis for believing, and did 
believe, that the decision was in the best interests of the 
company.  
Section 76 of the 2008 Companies Act states explicitly that a director may 
rely on the performance of persons specifically referred to in the section, or 
persons ‘to whom the board may reasonably have delegated, formally or 
informally by course of conduct, the authority or duty to perform one or 
more of the board’s functions that are delegable under applicable law’.93 
The board may also rely on any ‘information, opinions, recommendations, 
reports or statements, including financial statements and other financial 
data, prepared or presented by any of these persons.’94  
 
93 76(4)(b)(i)(aa) – (bb). 
94 76(4)(b)(ii). The persons specifically referenced of the statute, are employees of 
the company ‘whom the director reasonably believes to be reliable and competent 
in the functions performed or the information, opinions, reports or statements 
provided’. Also included in section 76(5)(b) are legal counsel, accountants, or other 
professional persons retained by the company, the board or a committee as to 
matters involving skills or expertise that the director reasonably believes are 
matters within the person’s professional or expert competence; or as to which the 
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The provisions offer a framework and give some guidance to directors and 
to the courts yet much remains open for interpretation and turns on the 
reasonable belief or discretion of the director concerned.  The wording 
seems to suggest a subjective enquiry when considering whether the belief 
to rely on a professional or expert’s competence and an objective enquiry 
when considering whether it was reasonable to place confidence in a board 
committee. Whether this was done intentionally is not clear. Certainly, there 
seems to be no apparent reason for the discrepancy. The provisions are 
particularly relevant to the non-executive director, who will often be 
beholden to management or other functionaries to provide him or her with 
information and recommendations to act on and review. The position of the 
non-executive director, and in particular the independent non-executive 
director, is unique in this regard. 
It is not clear what impact the provisions in the 2008 Companies Act will have 
on the South African legal position. As is the case with the delegation of 
tasks, 95  the common law contained what could be called a ‘business 
judgement rule’ even before the enactment of the 2008 Act. There is some 
debate regarding the origins of the rule (which would have been derived 
from English common law),96 but it was certainly accepted that there was at 
least a ‘principle of judicial restraint in deferring to the business judgment of 
directors’.97 As mentioned, the term itself is originally the product of US 
 
person merits confidence. Finally, in terms of section 76(5)(c), a director may validly 
rely on a committee of the board of which the director is not a member, unless the 
director has reason to believe that the actions of the committee do not merit 
confidence. 
95 See discussion above. 
96 See J S McLennan ‘Duties of care and skill of company directors and their liability 
for negligence’ (1996) 8 S.A Merc. LJ 94 94. where the author cites the words of 
Lord Greene M.R from Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch. 304 CA as the apparent 
origin. See on the other hand: P. Redmond ‘The reform of directors’ duties’ (1992) 
15 University of New South Wales Law Journal 86 113.  who argues that the origins 
of the common law business judgement rule are to be found in the judgement of 
Lord Hatherley L.C in Overend & Gurney & Co v Gurney (1872) LR 5 HL 480. 
97 Jean J Du Plessis ‘Open sea or safe harbour? American, Australian and South 
African business judgement rules compared: Part 1’ (2011) 32(11) Co Law 347 348. 
Although some took this to imply a common law business judgement rule, Du 
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jurisprudence, but in whatever form it is recognised in Australia or South 
Africa, Du Plessis warned that ‘it has not been developed to a state of 
sophistication sufficient to make it a common law rule of any significance or 
a rule comparable to the American business judgment rule’.98   
In other words, equating the American business judgement rule with a South 
African or English common-law equivalent would be to compare apples with 
pears: the so-called common law business judgement rule is a poorly 
developed rule, derived from the courts’ reluctance to interfere with 
internal company decisions. ‘The “American business judgement rule” on 
the other hand, is highly developed with many nuances (even applying in a 
special way in specific areas like takeovers, ‘within the vicinity of insolvency’ 
and in other situations) and with a massive body of case law and academic 
literature informing it.’ 99 
In the United States, the rule generally serves to relieve a director of liability 
in instances where they have acted (as opposed to instances where they 
have failed to act). The rule involves a set of procedural steps which, if 
complied with, will establish a presumption against negligence operating in 
favour of the director in questions. 100  It must be pointed out, that the 
complexity inherent in the American business judgment rule is such that 
 
Plessis points out that none of the cases traditionally quoted as authority actually 
used the term. 
98 Jean J Du Plessis ‘Open sea or safe harbour? American, Australian and South 
African business judgement rules compared: Part 1’ (2011) 32(11) Co Law 347, 349. 
At most literature points to some jurisdictions recognising what may be referred to 
as a ‘business judgement doctrine’ but it operates to protect decisions themselves 
and not to create any evidentiary presumptions. See also: S Lombard ‘Importation 
of a Statutory Business Judgment Rule in South African Company Law: Yes or No?” 
(2005) 68 Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeins Hollandse Reg 614; Michelle 
Havenga ‘The Business Judgment Rule’ (2000) South African Mercantile Law 
Journal; D Botha and Richard Jooste ‘A critique of the recommendations of the King 
Report regarding a director’s duty of care and skill’ (1997) 73 South African Law 
Journal 65. 
99 Jean J Du Plessis ‘Open sea or safe harbour? American, Australian and South 
African business judgement rules compared: Part 1’ (2011) 32(11) Co Law 347 349. 
And see note 79 above and sources cited.  
100 Davies and Worthington (n1) 482. 
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there is still not absolute consensus about whether it is in fact a presumption 
acting in favour of the directors (as described above), or whether it is a 
standard of conduct for directors or in the final instance whether it is a 
principle of judicial review.101 The Supreme Court of Delaware has preferred 
the view that the rule ‘posits a powerful presumption in favour of actions 
taken by directors’.102 
It is not clear which approach the South African courts will follow when 
interpreting the version of the rule that made its way into the 2008 Act. It is 
submitted that the marked differences between the South African legal 
tradition in this context and that of the United states, make it inherently 
risky to borrow from American jurisprudence when interpreting the 
provisions of the 2008 Act. This holds true not only for this section of the 
legislation but for others that were ostensibly transplanted from American 
law. Luckily it would appear that the South African courts are alive to these 
risks.103 Given the fact that South African common law on directors’ duties 
has always had English roots, and given the marked similarities between the 
South African statutory provisions and the Australian version of a codified 
business judgement rule, it appears likely that the jurisprudence of these 
two jurisdictions would offer more appropriate guidance. 
The rule was considered by the Law Commissions in the UK, but the 
codification thereof was deemed unnecessary as the Commissions were of 
the opinion that the courts would be well aware that they are better 
equipped to adjudicate conflicts of interest than they are to evaluate 
 
101 Jean J Du Plessis ‘Open sea or safe harbour? American, Australian and South 
African business judgement rules compared: Part 1’ (2011) 32(11) Co Law 347 349. 
102 Cede & Co v Technicolor Inc 634 A. 3d 361 Del, modified 636 A. 2d 956 (Del. 
1994). 
103 See the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals in African Banking 
Corporation of Botswana v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers & others (228/2014) 
[2015] ZASCA 69 (20 May 2015) where the court was called upon to consider the 
relevance of US Chapter 11 proceedings when interpreting the Business Rescue 
provisions that now form part of the South African legislation. For further 
commentary on the dangers of interpreting the transplants in the 2008 Companies 
Act see also: H Stoop and A Hutchison (2017) PELJ. 
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business risks and that it is not ideal to substitute (as Worthington and 
Davies put it) ‘the courts’ hindsight for the directors’ foresight.’ 104   
The Australian legislature initially showed similar reluctance to make the 
rule part of its statutory provisions. However, following developments that 
rendered the standard of care that directors had to comply with wholly 
objective, calls for a ‘safe harbour’ were eventually headed.105 Section 180(2) 
and (3) of the Australian Corporations Act, 2001 states that directors who 
make ‘business judgements’ 106  would be taken to have met the 
requirements of the directors’ statutory duty of care and skill found in 
section 180(1) (or its common law equivalents) in respect of that judgement 
if they:  
(a) make the judgement in good faith and for a proper purpose; and  
(b) do not have a material personal interest in the subject matter of the 
judgement; and  
(c) inform themselves about the subject matter of the judgement to the 
extent they reasonably believe to be appropriate; and  
(d) rationally believe that the judgement is in the best interest of the 
corporation.  
There was some uncertainty about the impact of the provision. Did the 
incumbent director bear the onus to prove that he or she met the criteria 
set out in the subsection, or would the plaintiff bear the burden to do so? 
 
104  Davies and Worthington (n1) 482. Indeed the courts needed no statutory 
reminder of this and, as per Lord Greene M.R, in Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] 
Ch. 304 CA. ‘[t]hey [the directors] must exercise their discretion bonda fide in what 
they consider – not what a court considers – is in the interests of the company.’ 
105 Jean J Du Plessis ‘Open sea or safe harbour? American, Australian and South 
African business judgement rules compared: Part 2’ (2011) 32(12) Co Law 377 377. 
106 “Business judgements” are in turned defined by subsection 180(3) as referring 
to “any decision to take or not take action in respect of a matter relevant to the 
business operations of the corporation.” 
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The matter has not been resolved at appellate level, but in ASIC v Rich107 the 
court concluded that the burden must be carried by the directors and 
officers. 
The similarities between the sections contained in the South African and 
Australian legislative provisions are at once apparent. There are, however, 
some marked differences. Most notably, the South African provision is not 
restricted in its application to the duty of care and skill alone but can also 
apply to the fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company. What 
the two pieces of legislation do share, is a lack of clarity in several regards. It 
is not clear whether the South African legislation places the burden of proof 
on the director or the plaintiff, nor is it clear whether it attempts to create a 
presumption in favour of the director or a defence. Stevens and De Beer 
have argued convincingly that the courts could interpret and apply the 
business judgement rule in such a manner that it could effectively lower the 
standard of care demanded by the duty of care, skill and diligence to that of 
gross negligence only, which might erode any use of the duty of care and 
skill completely.108 
The business judgement rule speaks directly to the accountability debate in 
that it embodies what can be called an instinctive restraint when regulating 
directors. On the one hand, as was discussed at the beginning of this chapter, 
a legitimate regulatory regime has at its heart accountability and as such 
most would readily concede that there should be some consequences for 
directors falling short of their task (unprecise as the definition of this task or 
the standards relating to it may be). On the other hand, various authors have 
pointed out that it is essentially the most efficient solution to delegate 
power to the board of directors and that undue regulation and scrutiny could 
 
107  [2009] NSWSC 1229. The court, per Justice Austin, acknowledged that the 
language of the legislation was ‘profoundly ambiguous’ and that the matter would 
have to be revisited at the appellate level at [7269]-[7270]. 
108 Richard Stevens & Philip de Beer ‘The duty of care and skill, and reckless trading: 
Remedies in flux?’ (2016) SA Merc LJ 250. 
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negate these efficiency gains.109  As Kershaw points out, the agency cost 
problem is actually a result of a corporate form that makes it possible for 
professional managers to manage assets and wealth on behalf of investors 
who possess the necessary funds but may lack managerial skills.   If we were 
to delegate this power, but then monitor directors inappropriately when 
they exercise it, these efficiency gains are lost. 110 
Inappropriate regulation may also cause directors to shy away from risk 
taking, which may not serve to maximise corporate wealth.111 If we then 
believe that the law remains ‘lenient’ towards directors, we must bear in 
mind that this is not necessarily an inappropriate state of affairs. When 
considering the impact that voluntary governance codes could and should 
have on the interpretation of directors’ duties, it bears remembering that  
there would have to be some ‘explanation as to why current commercial 
practice should dictate the content of our legal norms. And current practice 
might itself offer a rather confused prescription for the law. For …there 
might be such a diversity in the role of directors …. that no single supposedly 
more rigorous, duty could capture this diversity.’112 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
Accountability stands central to the question of how companies and the 
directors that govern their affairs should be regulated. A system of 
governance can only be legitimate if it demands from those in control an 
account of their actions and insists that they face any consequences that 
 
109 D Kershaw Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (Oxford 2009) 188; 
Davies and Worthington S (n1) 462.  
110  Kershaw Company Law in Context (n108) 188. Compare also Davies and 
Worthington S (n1) 462.  
111 Keay A Directors’ Duties (Jordan 2009) 176 – 177. 
112 C A Riley ‘The Company Director’s Duty of Care and Skill: The Case for an Onerous 
but Subjective Standard’ (1999) 26(5) MLR 698. 
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may arise in the wake of such a rendering. When considering how to 
interpret and apply directors duties, and whether the governance codes 
should play any role in the process, the question must be considered against 
the backdrop of this fact and must speak to the extent to which 
accountability can and should be affected by the corporate governance 
codes and in particular whether a novel mode of application of the codes 
would enhance or undermine accountability.  
It stands to reason that the progressive and more textured contents of 
corporate governance codes in general, and King IV in particular, could add 
depth to the existing black letter duties and that this in turn might well result 
in more robust enforcement and enhanced accountability. But one is again 
confronted with some of the questions encountered in previous chapters of 
this thesis that relate to the intricate balancing of interests and goals in 
regulation and corporate governance. On the one hand the firm belief that 
the courts and regulators should defer to wisdom of corporate boards and 
the efficiencies of the market ‘do what they do best’. On the other hand, the 
reality that one after another poor performance, corporate collapses and 
scandals undermine the legitimacy of the regulatory regime. This is perhaps 
increasingly relevant in an era where companies are no longer just expected 
to thrive financially – there increasingly seems to be a tacit understanding 
that their power and influence at least to some extent demands also that 
they should pro-actively contribute to socio-economic and environmental 
well-being.
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CHAPTER 8 
REMARKS IN CONCLUSION 
 
Needs, motives, and initiatives not acknowledged in statutes energize the 
corporation. As a response to the forces that shape it, the corporation has 
accumulated responsibilities unrecognized in traditional corporation law ... With 
the implied consent of its customers, members, and interested public, the 
corporation sprang loose long ago from traditional economic and legal models. 
Any attempt to rebottle this corporate genie in its original vessel is a futile 
exercise, exposing the inadequacy of outmoded economic models. We should not 
feel hard pressed to devise controls to restrain a spirit ominously unbottled...The 
exercise of ethical leadership in organizations requires values and skills in intricate 
combinations that cannot be prescribed by black letter law.1 
 
In drafting South Africa’s newest corporate laws, much was made of 
modernising company law and enhancing corporate governance, and 
although the legislature did take some unconventional steps, the legislation 
that emerged was mostly along the same non-interventionist lines. In fact, 
its facilitative stance was a dominant selling point.   
However, when it came to corporate governance, the sentiment has been 
that the regulator should know its place. The mystical force that is ‘the 
market’ and the companies that are its minions should be left to find their 
own equilibrium - lest we blunder in and regulate efficiencies into obsoletion. 
In considering the origins of the approach, one finds that it is rooted largely 
in the contractarian outlook that dominates the discourse in the United 
 
1 Kenneth R. Andrews ‘Corporate Governance Eludes the Legal Mind’ (1983) 37 
University of Miami Law Review 213, 215 in response to the outcry that greeted the 
publication of the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance and 
Structure.  
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States and the non-interventionist, arm’s length approach followed in the 
United Kingdom – the latter of which is also the likely source of the 
‘negotiated regulation’ that seeped into much of the commonwealth’s 
corporate governance philosophy. There is no question that the ‘founding 
fathers’ of the movement were acting in the good faith conviction that the 
system they devised was optimal. But when the committees chaired by 
Cadbury and others did their work, the expectation was certainly not that 
the fruits of their labour would be relegated to annual box ticking exercises 
begrudgingly undertaken by board members.  
This thesis set out to evaluate the status quo and to reconsider the role of 
soft law norms in the interpretation and application of the statutory and 
common law duties that regulate company directors, and specifically non-
executive company directors.  
The research considered two fundamental duties that company directors 
undertake – the duty to act with care, skill and diligence and the duty to act 
in the best interests of the company – the former one stale, and the latter in 
a state of flux. It has considered the practical implications of an approach 
that many authors take for granted and that the South African judiciary 
seems intent on embracing: an interpretation of directors’ duties informed 
by the soft law provisions found in the Corporate Governance Code, (now) 
King IV. An analysis of the case law shows that the jurisprudence remains 
immature. References to the principles contained in the Codes tend to be 
fleeting and obiter or made without any clear indication of how exactly they 
relate to the black-letter law being applied or what that implies as far as their 
legal status is concerned. The courts seem ready to allow the traditional 
duties to take on the nuances contained in the Code but have done so largely 
without considering the legal basis of such an approach, or the full policy 
implications that it might have. The following overview will summarise the 
key findings of the thesis, before ending with some concluding remarks and 
final suggestions.  
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As is the case in many jurisdictions, South African corporate governance 
principles centre around the role of the independent non-executive director. 
The system is premised in no small part on the idea of the independent non-
executive as an internal watchdog or at the very least as an integral part of 
the system of checks and balances put in place to prevent rent seeking 
behaviour and excess on the part of management. Some debate exists 
regarding the proper role of the independent non-executive, and it may well 
be that it is not realistic to expect of them to do more than just fulfil a 
monitoring function. Indeed, given the constraints traditionally associated 
with the position it is not clear how the independent non-executive can be 
expected to also play a more active role in framing strategy. Certainly though, 
one must concede that at the very least the independent non-executive 
should ensure dynamic engagement with the very principles that insist on 
his seat at the boardroom table. And yet, given the lackadaisical attitude of 
many professional managers, and the complex relationship which erodes 
the legitimacy of the independent non-executive to change this fact, one 
must question whether the system lives up to its potential.  
How should regulators respond to this challenge? There are many potential 
answers to the question. One might be public enforcement of Corporate 
Governance Codes, as seen in Australia, and another might be black letter 
law regulation as seen in the United States. A further option is to indirectly 
give credence to the governance principles when interpreting the statutory 
and common law duties – and it is this approach that the thesis has 
considered.  
An analysis of the duty of care and skill made it clear that it is not being used 
to great effect. There are various reasons for this, not least the difficulties 
associated with the derivative action and other enforcement mechanisms. 
However, there is little denying that counsel will remain reluctant to advise 
clients to pursue a cause of action that has traditionally been interpreted 
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and applied so that only the very crudest of breaches would lead to a result. 
The codified version of the duty does little to change this state of affairs, and 
notably the inclusion of the business judgement rule might effectively pull 
its last remaining tooth. 
One of the challenges that has proven very difficult to resolve has been 
finding concrete parameters to inform the duty. It is impossible to impose a 
uniform standard, and difficult to determine whether the standard should 
reflect existing norms or whether it should be more aspirational in what it 
requires. A starting point would be to at least define expectations and set 
out what the role requires. It is argued that it is in this regard that the 
provisions of King IV could play a useful part. The principles offer an objective 
metric of expectations. It avoids asking more opaque questions such as 
‘what would a reasonable director in the position of this director have done’ 
as it gives a concrete job description against which to manage conduct. This 
is not to say that it is impossible to be in breach of the duty of care and skill 
if one complies with King IV, but considering the comprehensive nature of 
the Code’s provisions it is certainly unlikely  - perhaps even to the extent that 
it might justify a presumption in the director’s favour which could inform the 
application of the new statutory business judgement rule also.  
Where the duty to act in the best interests of the company is concerned, a 
reasoned reference to King IV might be able to push South African 
companies to embrace the interests of wider stakeholder groups in a 
responsible manner and underscore the operation and efficacy of the social 
and ethics committee introduced by the Act.  
The approach raises some flags. First, is it legally tenable given the 
constraints within which the courts interpret and apply statute and the 
common law. Second, is it desirable from a normative and/or policy 
standpoint?  
The analysis has shown a well-founded reluctance on the part of the courts 
to interpret statutory provisions in such a manner that the autonomy of the 
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legislature is undermined. A liberal interpretation South Africa’s Supreme 
Court of Appeal in the case of Endumeni might open the door to King IV’s 
introduction as either existing context or, perhaps more feasibly, as part of 
context which speaks to the genesis of the text (although as the discussion 
above has shown the latter has especially been treated with circumspection 
by the courts in the past). In favour of this argument would be the liberal 
references to the Code in preparatory reports that informed the drafting of 
the legislation and clear references in the purposes of the Act itself that it 
aims to ensure good governance.  
However, there are convincing arguments to the contrary. The most recent 
decision of the SCA on the appropriate interpretation and application of the 
judgement in Endumeni indicates that the courts will not interpret the case’s 
references to context liberally and will therefore not allow extrinsic evidence 
to be led in order to convince the court of the proper meaning of legislative 
provisions. The warnings that underlie the exclusionary rule that dominated 
English law extend to the introduction of an extra-textual material drafted, 
at the end of the day,  by an entity not affiliated with government and that 
may have its own agendas and concerns that may or may not align with 
national strategy and policy.  
As far as the duty of care and skill is concerned, the legislation does state 
that statutory liability is ‘in terms of the common law of delict’. The duty of 
care in a delictual context has always depended on reasonableness which 
has always been determined with reference to the legal perceptions of the 
community as assessed by the Court. As such, the courts could allow the 
principles of the code into evidence in that it might speak to an assessment 
of reasonableness. It is submitted that it is essentially on this basis alone that 
King IV might be introduced in proceedings against a company director.  
There are other caveats. The courts develop the common law incrementally 
and with circumspection. One must bear in mind that the legislature in a 
recent wholescale review of corporate law chose not to include any direct 
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reference to the governance code in the act despite ample opportunity to 
do so. The decision to codify directors’ duties was contentious, and when 
the legislature did proceed, they opted for a high-level codification (as the 
legislature in the UK did). Neither the statutory duty of care, skill and 
diligence nor the statutory duty to act in the best interest of the company 
detract from or ads to the existing common law in any meaningful sense. 
Add to this the presumption that the legislature does not intend to alter the 
common law more than is necessary, and the fact that the judiciary should 
not drive sweeping legislative reforms, and it is not entirely clear that more 
direct references to the Codes will not amount to overstepping the bounds 
in the absence of legislative intervention. 
There are potential evidentiary concerns as well. The Code as such cannot 
be incorporated into the statute by reference, nor it is submitted could it be 
taken to inform the common law enquiry into reasonableness or the 
determination of the best interests of the company simply because it asserts 
as much in its own text. Instead, it is submitted, evidence would have to be 
presented to show its prevalence in a particular context or industry is such 
that it warrants a development of the common law as it pertains to directors 
duties to include adherence to the principles of the code in the inquiry into 
care and skill or the determination of whether a director acted in the best 
interests of the company. What would constitute such evidence is 
potentially problematic and it is submitted that some legislative intervention 
is necessary to address this and some of the other issues raised above. The 
challenge is less pronounced in the case of listed public entities where 
compliance with listing rules and requisite disclosure requirements in the 
legislation would be a guide to establishing a generally applicable ‘industry 
standard’. However, as mentioned above, the generic statements often 
prepared for these purposes are a far cry from showing compliance with the 
spirit and not just the letter of the Code. In the context of unlisted public 
companies and larger private companies the matter is far more intricate. 
Given that ‘expert testimony’ is neither allowed nor applicable it is difficult 
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to see how the court can be convinced that the codes are prevalent to the 
extent that they should start informing legal norms. It is submitted that the 
courts’ hands should be tied absent some form of legislative 
acknowledgement of the role of the Code.  
Setting aside the practical difficulties considered in the thesis and outlined 
above, there are obvious policy concerns as well. As mentioned above and 
considered in the research, the prevailing perception has been that the 
regulator should intervene as little as possible in corporate life, an approach 
that reflects a contractarian theory of company law. In line with this, self-
regulation has long been seen as optimal given the many advantages it 
brings such as flexibility, buy-in from industry and the fact that it is a cost-
effective model. However, many have questioned the efficacy of the regime, 
especially following the 2007/2008 financial crisis which again highlighted 
the deficiencies of the system. Many have also argued that the time has 
come to reconsider a wholescale acceptance of contractarian theory. 
Concomitant to a re-evaluation of the shareholder primacy model, it is 
argued that the contractarian model in its original form is no longer able to 
stand up in the face of modern realities. It may be that some greater degree 
of regulatory interference is not the bogeyman that will destroy capitalism 
and lay waste to the efficiencies of the market; just as it may be that 
shareholder primacy is not the best way to ensure thriving entities ready to 
meet the challenges of this decade and beyond.  
However, one must admit that such a ‘reading in’ could undermine certainty 
and call on the courts to make decisions of a normative nature which they 
are not necessarily equipped to do. Some have therefore argued that any 
revisions such as those being suggested will require a systemic and holistic 
approach, and not a piecemeal application by the courts – and that is if it is 
required at all: there are still the original objections that it will add to costs 
and deter qualified candidates from taking up positions as directors.  
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These are valid concerns, as are those raised in chapter 5 in relation to the 
interpretation of the legislation and the common law, the legality of the 
approach and the evidentiary concerns that arise. It is therefore submitted 
that the most desirable outcome would be for the statute to directly 
reference the role of the Code. In the context of public listed entities this 
would be a relatively simple matter, but more nuance would be required for 
unlisted public entities and larger private entities. A viable solution might be 
to use the public interest score already in place to determine whether or not 
financial statements should be audited, what reporting standard should be 
applied and whether or not a company should have a social and ethics 
committee in place. As mentioned briefly in the text, the system awards 
‘points’ based on annual turnover, the number of shareholders and 
employees, and third-party liability. Given this, and the fact that King IV 
contains industry specific supplements it is entirely conceivable that the 
legislation could expressly give the courts permission to take account of its 
provisions in interpreting the duties and offer broad guidelines on how this 
is to be done making use of the public interest score.  
It is submitted that this is the only manner in which the problems identified 
in the thesis could be overcome. The approach also speaks to a number of 
other concerns: it will not relinquish the flexibility of the code, and its 
contents will still be ‘industry driven’. Finally, it is not foreseen that this 
would cause a ‘run on the courts’ or open the proverbial floodgates. What is 
a more likely outcome is that discussions about how to treat the Code in 
boardrooms will likely change as counsel will have grounds to insist on more 
dynamic compliance. It is submitted that the approach does not imply a 
‘higher’ standard, but in fact denotes a reasonable standard which can be 
measured against an objective and industry specific metric.  
The preceding discussion attempted to summarise a vast and multi-faceted 
debate. This is the inevitable consequence of considering a question as 
fundamental as how to regulate the powerhouse that is the modern limited 
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liability company in a manner that will ensure efficiency without 
undermining accountability and create wealth without compromising 
sustainability.  Clearly the landscape is brutal. In the time that it has taken to 
complete this research, the United Kingdom has seen many giants fall. Even 
companies the size of Carillion or beloved like Thomas Cook were not spared. 
Marks & Spencer - one of the nation’s darlings - has tumbled from the FTSE 
100. In South Africa, the collapse of the Steinhoff group of companies has 
been reverberating for some two years and this is to say nothing of the large-
scale corruption being exposed among the ranks of state-owned entities.  
At the moment, statutory remedies are rarely used by shareholders to hold 
managers accountable. Corporate scandals rarely see management face up 
to the failures of the companies and independent non-executive directors 
are hardly ever called to task. The fiduciary duties are applied with a fair 
degree of vim and vigour (especially those that speak to conflict) but the 
duty of care and skill bobs like a lame duck in the legislative pond and the 
duty to act in the best interests of the company takes a myopic and archaic 
approach to what is expected of company directors.  
 
Meanwhile, the voluntary corporate governance code has gained traction 
but still struggles for boardroom legitimacy. Independent non-executive 
directors still lack the credibility to ensure that management sees 
engagement with the code as more than perfunctory box-ticking.  
 
It is possible that the suggested interaction between the Act and King IV 
would reinvigorate both. In other words, it could revive and give direction to 
the stale duty of care and skill and nudge the duty to act in the best interests 
of the company towards a more stakeholder centric middle ground while at 
the same time giving added legitimacy to King IV.  
 
The approach would avoid the difficulties traditionally associated with 
legislating these principles. It would allow for a casuistic and more flexible 
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approach and in each instance the application of the code would be a 
considered question of fact and context. In the South African context, the 
Constitution may give further impetus to such an approach. Given the 
country’s socio-economical context and the challenges this brings about, it 
is perhaps justifiable to reconsider the role of the state as regulator and 
move in the direction of a more ‘synthetic’ approach or top down approach 
to regulating company directors. 
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